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holding that where a claimant fails to "exhaust his administrative remedies — by failing to timely file his appeal before the UIAB — this Court has no jurisdiction to make a determination as to the merits of his case."
Summary of this case from Ramey v. Wal-Mart Stores EastOpinion
C.A. No. 02A-08-003 WLW.
Submitted: March 14, 2003.
Decided: May 16, 2003.
Upon Appeal of the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Affirmed.
Michael L. Lively, pro se.
Stephen J. Ballard, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
ORDER I. Introduction
Upon consideration of the pleadings before this Court and the record below it appears to this Court that Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board's (UIAB) ruling should be affirmed.
II. Background
On July 29, 2001, Michael L. Lively ("Lively") filed a claim for unemployment benefits. A Claims Deputy determined that Lively was disqualified from benefits. On August 23, 2001, the Notice of Determination was mailed to Lively advising him that the last day to appeal the determination was September 3, 2001. On September 26th, Lively filed an appeal from the Claims Deputy's determination. An Appeals Referee held a hearing on the issue of timeliness and found that the appeal on the merits was jurisdictionally barred. In the hearing, Lively admitted that the Notice of Determination was mailed to the correct address.
However, he claims that he did not receive the Notice. In fact, Lively's sole excuse for not filing his appeal on time is that he did not receive the filing; thus, he did not know when the Appeal was due. The Appeals Referee's decision was appealed to the UIAB on October 25, 2001. The UIAB affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee. That decision became final on November 30, 2001. Subsequently, on July 30, 2002, Lively filed an "appeal" with the UIAB addressing the merits of the claim and the timeliness issue. This filing was construed as a request to reargue the issues. Since the UIAB's decision became final on November 30th, the UIAB dismissed the request for lack of jurisdiction. On September 9, 2002, Lively
III. Analysis A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a decision of the UIAB, the scope of the Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and whether that decision is free from legal error. Substantial evidence requires "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance" to support the finding. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court possesses limited review power of the factual findings of an administrative agency. Specifically, "the findings of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board as to facts, if supported by the evidence and in absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to the questions of law." The Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Rather, the Court is restricted to a consideration of the record. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. If the record below contains substantial evidence in support of the Board's findings, then that decision will not be disturbed.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1985); see also MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Capella, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 126, *4-*5 (Del.Super.Ct. 2003).
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308 (Del. 1975); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (Del.Super.Ct. 1979).
Onley v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)
Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994).
Malatesta v. Thiokol Corp., 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 92,*4 (Del.Super.Ct. 1994) (quoting DELAWARE CODE ANN. tit 19 § 3323(a))
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761 (Del.Super.Ct. 1976).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 10142(d) (1997) states: "The Court, when factual determinations are at issue, shall take due account of the experience and specialized competence of the agency and of the purposes of the basic law under which the agency has acted. The Court's review, in the absence of actual fraud, shall be limited to a determination of whether the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record before the agency."
B. Merits of the Appeal
Pursuant to title 19, section 3318(b) of the Delaware Code provides that if an employee fails to file an appeal of a disqualification determination within 10 days that determination becomes final. "The time for filing an appeal is an express statutory condition of jurisdiction that is both mandatory and dispositive." Appellant jurisdiction cannot be "invoked or properly exercised unless an appeal is perfected within the time period fixed by law." The 10 day period for filing an appeal begins running on the date of mailing unless the mailing fails to reach the recipient because of a mistake made by Claim's Deputy. Delaware law presumes that a mailing with the proper address and postage has been received by the intended claimant. Generally the UIAB is unable to accept jurisdiction over appeals that are not timely filed. However, the UIAB may under certain circumstances accept appeals if it finds that "the interest of justice would not be served by inaction." The Supreme Court in Funk v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board provides that the UIAB can take jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal if the lateness was traced back to an UIAB's error, or if appellant proffers an excuse which could arrant the UIAB's sua sponte exercise of jurisdiction. It has long been the position of the UIAB and this Court that absent an UIAB error, the mere assertion that one did not receive the decision is not a sufficient reason for the UIAB to assert jurisdiction of an untimely appeal.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 3318(b) provides: "Unless a claimant . . . files an appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed to the last known address o the claimant and the last employer, the Claim's Deputy's determination shall be final . . ."
Duncan v. Delaware Dep't of Labor, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 242, *4 (Del.Super.Ct. 2002).
Id. (quoting Draper King Cole v. Malave, 743 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1999).
Bowers v UIAB, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 92, *4 (Del.Super.Ct. 1998).
See Malatesta, 194 Del. Super. LEXIS 92 at*5 (holding that failure to file a timely appeal of the Referee's decision acted as a waiver of employee's right ti appeal that decision).
Manlove v. Sears Fashion Center, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 545 (Del.Super.Ct. 1992); see also Fuller v. Tapical Labor Nursing, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 243, *2 (Del.Super.Ct. 2002) (stating that "as a matter of statutory jurisdiction, the UIAB us precluded from accepting a lat appeal").
Funk v. UIAB, 592 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
592 A.2d 222 (Del. 1991).
Id. at 224; Manlove, 1992 Del. Super LEXIS 545 at *6.
Funk, 592 A.2d at 225; Manlove, 1992 Del. Super LEXIS 545 at *6.
Funk, 592 A.2d at 225(allowing for a departure for the 10 day rule for circumstances more severe then the claimant merely not receiving the decision); Bowers v UIAB, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 92 (Del.Super.Ct. 1998); Gabert v. Hy-Point Farms, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 640 (Del.Super.Ct. 1999); Malatesta, 194 Del. Super. LEXIS 92 at *5.
In this case, the Appeal's Referee held a hearing to determine whether it should accept jurisdiction over this claim despite its untimeliness. In that hearing it was determined that the Claims Deputy's Notice of Determination was mailed to the correct address. Lively did not allege that there was any mistakes made in the mailing of the Notice of Determination, nor did he allege any compelling reason that the UIAB should assert jurisdiction over his claim despite his untimely filing. The UIAB upheld the Appeals Deputy's decision that Claimant's late appeal on the merits of the separation was jurisdictionally barred.
One further point of clarification. In his appeal to this Court, Lively argues the merits of his claim. However, because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies — by failing to timely file his appeal before the UIAB — this Court has no jurisdiction to make a determination as to the merits of his case.
Manlove, 1992 Del. Super LEXIS 545 at *7; see also Griffin v. Daimler Chrysler, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 1516 (Del.Super.Ct. 2001) (determining that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over a claim when the Appellant failed to exhaust all administrative remedies).
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, Lively did not present a compelling reason that the UIAB should have asserted jurisdiction over his untimely appeal. As such the UIAB properly found that it did not have jurisdiction over Lively's appeal, thus, the UIAB's decision is affirmed.IT IS SO ORDERED.