Opinion
C.A. No. 08A-02-012 PLA.
Submitted: August 18, 2008.
Decided: September 9, 2008.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD.
AFFIRMED.
This 9th day of September, 2008, upon consideration of the appeal of Deborah L. George ("George") from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board") ordering repayment of benefits wrongfully received, it appears to the Court that:
1. George filed an unemployment insurance claim on June 3, 2007. On the basis of that claim, George received $73 per week for the weeks ending June 9, 2007 through October 13, 2007. At the time her claim was filed, George signed the required Form UC-410 acknowledging her obligation to repay all unemployment benefits disbursed during a disqualification period if a claims deputy, appeals referee, the Board, or a court later determined her to be subject to disqualification.
Docket 4, at 9 (Decision of Appeals Referee (January 22, 2008)).
See id. at 15.
2. George was contacted by Caldwell Staffing on September 7, 2007, regarding a position with the Boy Scouts of America ("the Boy Scouts"). George denies that she was ever formally offered a position, but nevertheless expressed to Caldwell Staffing that she would refuse employment with the Boy Scouts. George apparently told Caldwell Staffing personnel that the Boy Scouts "supported the war," and that the Boy Scouts' pro-war stance would conflict with her religious beliefs. Caldwell Staffing conducted an Internet search that revealed no indications the Boy Scouts had taken a position on war efforts.
See id. at 7; Docket 7, at 1-2.
Docket 4, at 1 (Determination of Claims Deputy (November 6, 2007)).
After the time to appeal her disqualification for benefits had passed, George would indicate that the Boy Scouts' program materials espoused values unrelated to the war that conflicted with her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. See id. at 4.
3. Subsequently, Caldwell Staffing informed the Department of Labor ("DOL") that George had refused assignments. On November 6, 2007, a DOL Claims Deputy issued a determination that George was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, effective for the week ending September 8, 2007, for refusing to accept an offer of suitable work. The Notice of Determination indicated that George's disqualification would be used to establish an overpayment and further provided that the determination would become final unless appealed by November 16, 2007. George did not appeal.
See 19 Del. C. § 3314(3) (disqualifying an individual for benefits "[i]f the individual has refused to accept an offer of work for which the individual is reasonably fitted").
Docket 4, at 1 (Determination of Claims Deputy (November 6, 2007)).
4. On December 21, 2007, a DOL Claims Deputy issued a determination that George had received $438 in overpaid benefits, or $73 for the six weeks from September 8, 2007 to October 13, 2007. George timely appealed this determination, but having failed to challenge her disqualification in the first place, her efforts to argue that there was no overpayment were unavailing. At a hearing before an Appeals Referee on January 22, 2008, George testified as to her religious objections to the Boy Scouts, her claims that she had never received a job offer, and her history of medical and emotional problems, which she said prevented her from appealing her disqualification. This testimony was presented over repeated cautions from the Appeals Referee that the substantive merits of George's disqualification were not at issue, because the disqualification had already become final. The Appeals Referee found that there had been a benefits overpayment. George timely appealed the Appeals Referee's decision, and the Board affirmed.
Id. at 2 (Determination of Claims Deputy (December 21, 2007)).
Id. at 6-12, 14 (Tr. of Hr'g Before Appeals Referee (January 22, 2008)).
Id. at 10, 11-12, 13.
Id. at 10 (Decision of Appeals Referee (January 22, 2008)). The Appeals Referee found an overpayment in the amount of $2,680, which was apparently a typographical mistake. The decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board modified the overpayment amount to $438 to correct this error. Id. at 39-40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
Id. at 40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
5. The Appeals Referee stated in his findings of fact that George "suffered medically and was emotionally incapable of responding to decisions mailed" in reference to George's failure to appeal her disqualification. While the Board's decision noted George's objections to her disqualification and her contention that she was unable to timely appeal the original ineligibility decision. The Board affirmed the overpayment, finding "no evidence of error on the part of the [DOL] which might have delayed claimant's appeal of the initial determination, at which time she could have made her factual arguments."
See Docket 4, at 9 (Decision of Appeals Referee (January 22, 2008)).
Id. at 40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
6. George filed a pro se appeal of the Board's decision to this Court on April 24, 2008. In her brief, George continues to argue the substantive merits of her disqualification, reiterating her claims that she could not have declined a position with the Boy Scouts because she never received a formal offer and that she did not appeal her disqualification as a result of medical and emotional problems. George's brief does not raise any challenges to the overpayment distinct from her arguments regarding the unappealed disqualification, nor are any separate arguments specific to the overpayment determination found in the record below. The Board did not submit a brief in this matter.
Docket 7, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
The overpayment amount was modified by the Board on its own initiative to remedy a typographical error, as discussed supra note 11.
See Docket 8.
7. This Court's appellate review of decisions of the Board is limited. The Court's function is to determine whether the Board's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. The substantial evidence standard is satisfied if the Board's ruling is supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The Court does not weigh evidence, decide questions of credibility, or engage in fact-finding in reviewing a Board decision. Where the Board has made a discretionary decision, the scope of the Court's inquiry includes examining the Board's action for abuse of discretion. A discretionary decision will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion in which the Board "exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."
Stoltz Mgmt. Co. v. Consumer Affairs Bd., 616 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. 1992); see also Lively v. Dover Wipes Co., 2003 WL 21213415, at *1 (Del.Super. May 16, 2003).
Anchor Motor Freight v. Ciabottoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1998) (citation omitted).
Hall v. Rollins Leasing, 1996 WL 659476, at *2 (Del.Super. Oct. 4, 1996) (citing Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965)); see also Duncan v. Del. Dep't of Labor, 2002 WL 31160324, at *2 (Del.Super. Sept. 2, 2002).
See, e.g., Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991); Meacham v. Del. Dep't of Labor, 2002 WL 442168, at * 1 (Del.Super. Mar. 21, 2002).
Funk, 591 A.2d at 225.
Nardi v. Lewis, 2000 WL 303147, at *2 (Del.Super. Jan. 26, 2000) (citation omitted).
8. Under 19 Del. C. § 3318(b), a Claims Deputy's determination that an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits becomes final if no appeal is filed within ten days. This ten-day period is "an express statutory condition of jurisdiction that is both mandatory and dispositive." Where a failure to timely appeal is due to "unintentional or accidental actions" by the claimant, and was not caused by administrative error, the disqualification becomes final after the running of the ten days and 19 Del. C. § 3318(b) operates as a jurisdictional bar to further appeal.
19 Del. C. § 3318(b) ("Unless a claimant . . . files an appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed . . . the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.").
Lively v. Dover Wipes Co., 2003 WL 21213415, at *1 (Del.Super. May 16, 2003) (quoting Duncan, 2002 WL 31160324, at *2).
Meacham v. Del. Dep't of Labor, 2002 WL 442168, at * 2 (Del.Super. Mar. 21, 2002); Hartman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2004 WL 772067, at *2 (Del.Super. Apr. 5, 2004).
9. In this case, the Board's decision to affirm the overpayment determination was supported by substantial evidence. As the Board correctly noted, George never contested that she received the benefits at issue and never appealed the determination that she was disqualified from receiving them based upon a refusal to accept suitable work. George was notified of the ten-day appeals period at the time she was determined to be disqualified and did not initiate an appeal. Although the Appeals Referee permitted George to offer testimony regarding the disqualification and her failure to appeal that decision in order to clarify the history of her claim, this information is irrelevant to George's appeal from the overpayment determination. The Board therefore properly held that George did not exhaust her administrative remedies in challenging her disqualification by appealing to an Appeals Referee, and was barred from doing so by the running of the appeals period.
Docket 4, at 39-40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
See id. at 1 (Determination of Claims Deputy (November 6, 2007)).
See Docket 4, at 40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
10. To the extent that George's Opening Brief continues to press arguments regarding the merits of her disqualification and her failure to appeal that decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider those arguments because of George's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. An appeal from an overpayment determination cannot be made into a vehicle to challenge the merits of a finalized disqualification decision when the claimant has failed to perfect an appeal from that disqualification.
See Draper King Cole v. Malave, 743 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1999) ("The appellate jurisdiction of a court cannot be invoked or properly exercised unless an appeal is perfected within the time period fixed by law."); Lively, 2003 WL 21213415, at *2; Duncan, 2002 WL 31160324, at *2.
11. Where a disqualification has become final, the only issues for this Court upon review of the Board's overpayment determination are whether substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the overpayment was sought from the correct individual and that the amount of overpayment was accurately assessed. George does not dispute her receipt of the benefits or the computation of the overpayment amount, and the record clearly supports that George was responsible for the overpayment, that she received notification of it, and that the amount of overpayment was accurately assessed in the Board's decision.
Duncan, 2002 WL 31160324, at *2.
See Docket 4, at 12; id. at 15 (Tr. of Hr'g Before Appeals Referee (January 22, 2008)); id. at 39-40 (Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (February 21, 2008)).
12. The Board's refusal to assume jurisdiction sua sponte to consider the merits of the disqualification determination was not an abuse of discretion. The Board lacks authority to hear an appeal brought by a party after the ten-day appeals period under 19 Del. C. § 3318(b). Where no valid timely appeal has been filed, however, the Board possesses discretion under § 3320 to review the record sua sponte if the failure to timely appeal was caused by administrative error or if "the interests of justice would not be served by inaction." Cases in which the Board assumes jurisdiction sua sponte to consider an untimely appeal are "few and far between" and involve "severe" circumstances.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Dillon, 327 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1974).
See 19 Del. C. § 3320(a) ("The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [UIAB] may on its own motion, affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of the evidence previously submitted to the appeal tribunal or it may permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeal before it."); Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).
Funk, 591 A.2d at 225.
13. Here, the Board's refusal to consider the merits of George's disqualification sua sponte was within its discretion. George's failure to timely appeal was not caused by administrative error. It is highly unlikely that George's alleged physical and emotional conditions, for which she did not provide corroboration at the hearing before the Appeals Referee, would have constituted good cause for failing to timely appeal her disqualification, particularly when she was able to timely appeal the overpayment determination. The circumstances were not extraordinary or "severe" such that the Board was required to act in the interests of justice. The Board therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to assume jurisdiction sua sponte to consider George's substantive arguments regarding her disqualification.
See Zicarelli v. Boscov's Dep't Store LLC, 2008 WL 3486207, at *2 (Del.Super. June 5, 2008) (noting Board holding that alleged illness did not constitute good cause for failure to timely appeal determination of Claims Deputy); Meacham v. Del. Dep't of Labor, 2002 WL 442168, at * 2 (Del.Super. Mar. 21, 2002) (holding that Board did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise jurisdiction sua sponte over untimely appeal where claimant's proffered reasons for untimeliness included "mental anguish").
See Funk, 591 A.2d at 225.
14. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is hereby
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.