MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

Opinion By Justice FRANCIS.

This is an appeal of the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Cesar Romero, Dr. Anthony Claxton, and Dr. David Korman. On original submission, we concluded we were bound by this Court's holding in Hall v. Provost, 232 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) and that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims of Joseph Lieberman and John Lieberman, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Larry Lieberman (collectively "Lieberman") because they could not have been brought against a governmental unit or entity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

While the doctors' petition for review was pending, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue in Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011), holding that, "for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought `under' the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions." Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 370-71; Romero v. Lieberman, 332 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). In light of its holding in Franka, the supreme court granted the doctors' petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reversed this Court's judgment and remanded the case to us for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Romero, 332 S.W.3d at 404. On remand, we affirm the trial court's order.

Larry Lieberman died shortly after being transferred from the El Paso Psychiatric Center to Terrell State Hospital. Lieberman sued the doctors, alleging they had negligently failed to make proper tests and examinations, administer proper medications, call in consultants, recognize and treat the obvious signs of a serious illness, and timely transfer Larry to a facility capable of treating his condition. Lieberman alleged Larry relied on the doctors to provide him with proper and timely medical care and treatment and that the doctors' negligence was a proximate cause of Larry's death and of Lieberman's damages.

The doctors filed an answer and a motion to dismiss under section 101.106(f) of the civil practices and remedies code. In the motion, the doctors claimed their dismissal from the suit was "mandatory" because they were acting "in the general course and scope of their employment with [Texas Department of State Health Services] at Terrell State Hospital" and Lieberman's lawsuit "is a case which could have been brought against the governmental unit, TDSHS." The trial court agreed with the doctors and dismissed Lieberman's case.

On appeal, Lieberman claimed the trial court erred in dismissing this case because this lawsuit could not be brought "against the governmental unit" as provided in section 101.106(f) of the civil practices and remedies code and therefore, Lieberman was not required to file a motion to dismiss the doctors and name TDSHS as the defendant.

Section 101.106(f) of the civil practice and remedies section provides:

If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee's official capacity only. On the employee's motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f) (West 2005). Although this Court previously interpreted the phrase "could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit" in section 101.106(f) to mean the government-employee defendants had to prove their employer's governmental immunity was waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act in order to be entitled to dismissal, the supreme court recently held that "any tort claim against the government is brought `under' the Act for purposes of section 101.106, even if the Act does not waive immunity" and specifically applied that rule to section 101.106(f). See Huynh v. Washington, 2011 WL 1107220, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 28, 2011, no pet h.) (citing Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381-84). This construction of section 101.106(f) forecloses suit against a governmental employee in his individual capacity if he was acting within the scope of his employment. Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381; Huynh, 2001 WL 1107220, at *2.

Applying the supreme court's holding in Franka, the trial court's order granting the doctors' motion to dismiss was correct. We overrule Lieberman's issues.

We affirm the trial court's order.