Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-1209, SECTION "T"
March 30, 2004
Before this Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of August 20, 2003, Denying Pleko Southwest, Inc.'s ("Pleko") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Quigley Homes, Inc. and Quigley Homebuilders, Inc. (collectively "Quigley") third party demand. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having studied the legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
BACKGROUND:
The Ravannacks, as homeowners, sued Quigley, as homebuilder, claiming defective construction, defective installation of the Exterior Insulation and Finish System ("EIFS"), and defective installation of various other aspects of the house, all of which led to water intrusion and water damage. Quigley filed a cross claim for indemnity against Matherne, the EIFS installation subcontractor, and brought a third party demand against Pleko as the manufacturer of the EIFS. Pleko moved to Dismiss the third party demand pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6), which this Court denied on August 20, 2003. Pleko now asks the Court to alter, amend, or reconsider that decision.
The Law on Motions for Reconsideration:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within ten business days after its entry. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59. Under Rule 59, a district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying such a motion.Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works. Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990); First Commonweatlh Corp. v. Hibernia Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.La. 1995), amended 896 F. Supp. 634, affirmed 85 F.3d 622. There are certain grounds upon which a Court may grant a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment. These grounds include the following: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously available becomes available, or (3) it is necessary to correct clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Database America. Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising Pub. Corp. 825 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1993). It is important to note that reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly and should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Lafargue v. Jefferson Parish, No. 98-3185, 2000 WL 174899, *1 (E.D.L.A. Feb. 11, 2000).
Discussion and Analysis:
Pleko advances two arguments as to why this Court should reconsider its original ruling. First, Pleko argues that there are no sets of facts under which Quigley, as a general contractor, could not be construed as being negligent. Secondly, Pleko argues that there was a change in the law due to the Louisiana Supreme Court holding in Dumas v. State of Louisiana 828 So.2d 530 (La. 2002).
On first hearing, this Court made a determination that "Quigley has alleged facts, which if proven true, would establish that as to damage caused by defects in the EIFS product, Quigley is totally free from fault and liable only vicariously or derivatively as a result of the fault or negligence of Pleko." August 20 Order and Reasons, p. 11. Pleko's only contention is that this Court erred in that determination. The Court agrees with Quigley, in that Pleko is doing nothing more than alleging facts and arguments that this Court has already considered. Throughout the entire first half of Pleko's Motion, counsel fails to allege a single valid ground for reconsideration; he simply reargues his initial Motion to Dismiss. In its original ruling, this Court determined that there were possible sets of facts under which Quigley could be construed as non-negligent. Pleko has not alleged any valid reasons for this Court to reconsider that ruling. Finding such, this Court declines to reconsider its previous ruling with regards to Pleko's first argument.
Pleko's second allegation was that there had been a change in Louisiana law due to the holding of the Dumas case. Dumas held that the "language of Articles 2323 and 2324(B), as amended by Act 3, is clear, unambiguous, and does not lead to absurd consequences." Dumas at 537. The change in the law occurred in 1996 and this Court had complete understanding of the law at the time this matter was originally heard. As this Court decided just a month ago, "The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hold that the right to seek indemnification among alleged cotortfeasors disappeared, just the right of contribution." Campo v. John Fayard Fast Freight, Inc. 02-3690, 2003 WL 22229300 (E.D. L.A. Sept. 26, 2003).
CONCLUSION:
Pleko has failed to plead any of the requisite requirements necessary under F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) and has basically used this Motion as an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by this Court. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds Pleko's arguments have failed to properly allege any circumstances which would justify reconsideration. They have failed to show any changes in the factual circumstances or controlling law to support the notion that this Court's Order of August 20, 2003 was erroneous. Furthermore, Pleko's has failed to prove that this Court's prior Order contained a clear error of law warranting reconsideration. Finally, the Plaintiffs failed to show that a failure to reconsider the Order of August 20, 2003 would work an injustice upon the parties.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration be, and the same is hereby DENIED.