Opinion
Civ. A. No. 91-2743.
August 22, 1995.
John C. Combe, Jr., Warren M. Schultz, Jr., M. Richard Schroeder, T. Michael Twomey, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere Denegre, New Orleans, LA, First Commonwealth Corp.
Robert Stephen Rooth, Corinne Ann Morrison, James Calvin Young, Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler Sarpy, New Orleans, LA, John F. Weeks, II, Usry Weeks, Metairie, LA, for Hibernia Nat. Bank in New Orleans.
Robert G. Stassi, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis, Breslin Murray, Metairie, LA, Frank Gerald DeSalvo, Frank G. DeSalvo, New Orleans, LA, for Leonard H. Aucoin.
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before the Court is a "Motion to Amend Amended Judgment and Alternative Motion for Relief from Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum in Support" filed by First Commonwealth Corporation (hereinafter "First Commonwealth"). Having considered the record, the memoranda of the parties and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS First Commonwealth's motion in part and DENIES it in part.
Background
The factual background of this matter is detailed at length in a previous "Order and Reasons" wherein the Court ruled on the parties' post-trial motions. (R.Doc. 268.) The Court will not repeat the facts here, other than to note that the parties tried this breach of contract agreement to a jury over the space of eight days earlier this year, at which time the jury found Hibernia National Bank (hereinafter "Hibernia") had breached the contract through its gross negligence but that this breach did not cause First Commonwealth any damages. (Verdict form, attached to R.Doc. 245.)
In the Court's ruling on the post-trial motions, the Court found that First Commonwealth was entitled to a return of the fees it paid to Hibernia under the contract. (R.Doc. 268, p. 23.) The Court decided that it was proper to amend the judgment entered after the jury verdict to reflect an award of $64,400 in favor of First Commonwealth and against Hibernia for fees paid to Hibernia. Id., p. 24. The Court signed an "Amended Judgment," also awarding interest on the $64,400 from date of judicial demand. (R.Doc. 270.)
First Commonwealth brings the present motion seeking to amend the "Amended Judgment," arguing that the amount of fees paid to Hibernia was $64,440.40, not $64,400.00. First Commonwealth also argues that it is entitled to prejudgment interest from the inception of the contract because Hibernia breached the contract from its beginning.
Hibernia counters that the Court properly awarded prejudgment interest from the date of judicial demand because the issue of whether the contract was breached was hotly contested and because interest should only run from the date that any debt becomes certain.
Law and Application
Because First Commonwealth filed the instant motion within ten days of entry of judgment, the Court construes the instant motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). "Motions for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must establish newly discovered evidence." Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986). The standards underlying Rule 59(e) "favor the denial of motions to alter or amend judgment." Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Company, 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993).
The Court addresses first the issue of when prejudgment interest should begin to run. Second, the Court addresses the issue of the proper amount of damages.
Applying Louisiana law in this diversity case, the Court notes that the most recent pronouncement by the Louisiana Supreme Court as to the present issue is Trans-Global Alloy Limited v. First National Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443 (La. 1991), which also involved a breach of contract case against a bank. After discussing Louisiana jurisprudence on the issue of prejudgment interest in breach of contract actions, the Supreme Court concluded "that interest is due, not from date of judgment, but from the date of judicial demand." Id. at 459.
The Supreme Court then addressed "plaintiff's contention that . . . interest should be awarded from the date of defendant's breach, some two-and-a-half years before the suit was filed." Id. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]his case is a highly complicated one, in which three courts have had difficulty in determining whether there was a breach meriting compensation, and what the consequential damages of that breach should be. The variations in the amounts awarded by the jury . . . the trial court . . . the court of appeal . . . and now this court . . . clearly demonstrate that the damages owed by [First National Bank of Jefferson] to Trans-Global were not ascertainable at the time when the breach occurred.Id.
For these same reasons, the Court finds that First Commonwealth is only entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of judicial demand. Like Trans-Global Alloy, the instant case also was complicated. Not only was there a genuine dispute as to whether a breach occurred in this matter but also, even had there been a breach, as the jury found, there was a legal question whether First Commonwealth was entitled to a refund of the fees. This is true because, as the Court explained in ruling on the post-trial motions, had the jury awarded damages to First Commonwealth, it would not have been entitled to recover the fees paid to Hibernia in addition to damages. See "Order and Reasons," p. 21, citing Morris v. Homco International, Inc., 853 F.2d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 1988).
First Commonwealth contends that, because its claim was for a sum certain and because Hibernia breached the contract from the inception, its damages were clearly ascertainable from the three dates on which the fees were paid. First Commonwealth principally relies on Mini Togs Products, Inc. v. Wallace, 513 So.2d 867 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1987), where the court of appeals stated:
[A] debt or claim for the payment of money or damages under a contract is ascertainable and becomes due on the date an active violation occurred or the obligor was put in default, which can be earlier but never later than judicial demand, and legal interest runs from that date.Mini Togs, 513 So.2d at 875. Despite this seemingly broad statement, however, the Mini Togs court upheld an award of damages only from date of judicial demand in a case involving breach of contract for alleged failure to perform a building contract in a workmanlike manner. Id. at 868, 875.
The Court finds that the broad statement by the Mini Togs court is inapposite to the present situation, for the reasons explained above, i.e., complicated nature of this matter and the question of whether, even if the jury found a breach, whether First Commonwealth was legally entitled to a return of its fees. Further, Mini Togs predated Trans-Global Alloy, the Louisiana Supreme Court's most recent explanation of this legal point.
First Commonwealth has failed to establish any manifest error of law such that prejudgment interest should be awarded earlier than date of judicial demand, Simon, supra, especially considering that the standards applicable to Rule 59(e) favor denial. Southern Constructors Group, supra.
The Court next addresses First Commonwealth's contention that the "Amended Judgment" should be amended to reflect that the fees paid to Hibernia totalled $64,440.40, not $64,400.00. Hibernia does not oppose this aspect of First Commonwealth's motion, and the Court finds that the fees paid to Hibernia amount to $64,440.40, according to copies of the checks paid to Hibernia attached to First Commonwealth's motion. (Exh. A, R.Doc. 270.) This appears to be a manifest error of fact of the type referred to in Simon. Therefore, the Court will amend the "Amended Judgment" to reflect that First Commonwealth is entitled to a refund of its fees in the amount of $64,440.40.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the "Motion to Amend Amended Judgment and Alternative Motion for Relief from Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum in Support" is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.