ORDER

JAMES CARR, District Judge

This is a Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., case by an investor, Glenda Lehman, against investment advisor Deborah Detray and her investment company, Detray Investment Group. Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of defendants' contractual and fiduciary duties of due care and diligence and intentional or reckless investing of the plaintiff's funds. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and principles of pendent and supplemental claims jurisdiction.

Pending is the defendants' motion to compel arbitration pursuant to agreements between the parties. For the following reasons, defendants' motion shall be granted.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Deborah Detray serves as plaintiff's investment advisor. On March 11, 1998, Charles and Glenda Lehman signed a new SunAmerica account with Deborah Detray. They signed a second SunAmerica account on February 10, 2000. Both account agreements contained arbitration clauses. Glenda Lehman individually signed a third "New Account Agreement" on August 15, 2000 with Walnut Street Securities, Inc. ("Walnut Street"). Detray signed the agreement as Walnut Street's registered representative. Again, this agreement contained an arbitration clause stipulating that all disputes involving Lehman, Walnut Street, or Detray shall be resolved by a National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitrator, provided the dispute pertains to the securities agreement. Paragraph 14 of the August 15 agreement reads in part:

It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business or this agreement, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. . . . .

The arbitration clauses in all three agreements are clear and unambiguous and are set off in bold typeface or all caps. There is also notification of the clause on the signature line.

When the agreements were signed, Lehman instructed Detray that the funds to be invested were for retirement purposes, she would need the money in three to four years, she could not tolerate much risk, and she did not want any speculative or volatile investments. In the Fall of 2000, defendants invested plaintiff's funds in a nine year variable annuity with a penalty for early withdrawal, in addition to placing the funds in a high risk portfolio. Within one month, the funds had declined substantially and Lehman brought suit in this court.

Plaintiff maintains that the parties to the agreement were the Lehmans and Walnut Street, not Deborah Detray in her personal capacity. According to plaintiff, Detray's signature was merely the signature of Walnut Street. Defendant contends that Detray signed the agreement in both her capacity as registered representative of Walnut Street, as well as signing in an individual capacity. The decision to grant or deny the pending motion hinges on who is a party to the agreement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Through the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., Congress has declared a national policy favoring arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). The FAA's purpose is "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Accordingly, "the [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of Federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. . . ." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1982).

Notwithstanding this policy, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration [in] any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." ATT Techs. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). Under § 2 of the FAA, an arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.

When considering a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration under the Act, a court has four tasks:

First, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the action are subject to arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings pending arbitration.

"In determining whether the parties have made a valid arbitration agreement, `state law may be applied if that law arose to govern the issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,' although the FAA preempts `state laws applicable to only arbitration provisions.'" Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996)). Thus, "[s]tate law governs `generally applicable contract defenses [to an arbitration clause], such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.'" Id. at 889 (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687).

Like the federal government, Ohio respects the integrity of arbitration agreements that have been entered into freely. O.R.C. § 2711.01. In this case, the question whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable is resolved by basic, generally applicable precepts of Ohio contract law. The federal policy favoring arbitration, however, is taken into consideration even in applying ordinary state law. Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007, 1014 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Great Earth, 228 F.3d at 887).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that she is seeking to recover from her individual advisor, not the investment account company with which the advisor has a relationship. Such a distinction is irrelevant. Relying on Letiza v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit has held that a nonsignatory agent to an arbitration agreement between an investor and the agent's principal can enforce the arbitration clause against the investor. Arnold, 920 F.2d at 1281. Furthermore, "if [plaintiff] can avoid the practical consequences of an agreement to arbitrate by naming . . . signatory parties in their individual capacities only, the effect of the rule requiring arbitration would, in effect, be nullified. . . ." Id.

Other courts have also recognized what is now the majority rule announced in Letiza. See Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[f]ederal courts have found that an arbitration agreement between a customer and a brokerage firm can also be binding on the agent who represented or traded the customer's account"); Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., 823 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1987) (disclosed agents of the broker could enforce an arbitration agreement between the broker and the customer); Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (arbitration clause that called for arbitration of any disputes arising out of the customer's accounts was broad enough to include the agent who actually facilitated the transactions).

Not only did Detray sign the agreement she is attempting to enforce, but she is also the registered representative of the company on whose behalf she signed the agreement. Analyzed through either legal prism, Detray and Lehman are bound by the agreements they signed.

Additionally, attached to the August 15, 2000 agreement is a proviso that states:

This agreement and its provisions shall be continuous, and shall inure to the benefit of [defendant's] present organization, and any successor organizations or assigns, and shall be binding upon the undersigned and/or the estate, executors, administrators and assigns of the undersigned.

(Doc. 20, exh. 3, at 3). This provision clearly manifests the intent of all parties signing the agreement to be bound. It is incongruous to assert that Detray, as a signatory to the agreement and representative of the brokerage companies on whose behalf she signed, did not intend to be bound or is otherwise not bound. Detray may therefore enforce the arbitration provisions of the agreements.

NASD Rule 10301 mandates that all disputes "between a customer . . . and/or associated person . . . in connection with the activities of such associated persons shall be arbitrated under this code as provided by a duly executed and enforceable written agreement. . . ." The existence of the written agreement has been recognized by both parties and this court has determined that both Detray and Lehman are bound by the agreement. Because the parties are bound by written agreement and the Rules of the NASD, the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that her claims for violations of the securities laws cannot be the subject of mandatory arbitration agreement. This assertion is incorrect. Plaintiff's reliance on Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) is misplaced. Wilko was overruled by the subsequent decision of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), in which the Court held a valid pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the 1933 Securities Act enforceable. Id. at 482. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has allowed claims under the 1934 Exchange Act to be arbitrable. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Therefore, the plaintiff's claims against Detray are ripe for arbitration and should thereto be referred.

CONCLUSION

It is, therefore,

ORDERED THAT defendants Detray Investment Group and Deborah Detray's motion to compel arbitration and stay these proceedings be, and hereby is, granted.

So ordered.