Corey T. Lee, appellant, pro se. Charles E. Hodum, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DICKINSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. After Corey Lee failed to appear at his divorce hearing, the chancellor granted his wife's complaint for divorce and divided the marital property. On appeal, Corey argued, among other things, that the chancellor erred by not making the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Ferguson v. Ferguson. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Corey's claim was procedurally barred for failure to raise the issue before the chancellor. But because Corey did raise the issue below, and because the chancellor's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under Ferguson was manifest error, we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2. In the fall of 2007, Corey Lee filed for divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. His wife, Jean Lee, countersued on the same ground. After Corey's attorney withdrew, Corey represented himself and actively pursued his claim.

¶ 3. On the day of trial, Corey arrived late and walked into the courtroom as the chancellor was giving his ruling from the bench. The chancellor dismissed Corey's complaint and granted Jean a divorce. The chancellor divided the marital property and awarded Jean custody and child support.

¶ 4. Corey then hired an attorney and filed a motion to vacate the judgment, claiming dizziness from hypertension caused him to miss the trial. Corey also filed a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. In that motion, Corey challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the awards of custody and child support, and he claimed the chancellor's equitable distribution of marital assets was error. After a hearing, the chancellor denied Corey's motions, and Corey appealed pro se.

¶ 5. The Court of Appeals found that, because Corey never raised the property division issue before the chancellor, he was procedurally barred from arguing it for the first time on appeal. We granted certiorari and now reverse and remand for a new hearing.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. Corey raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he properly raised the equitable-division-of-property issue in the trial court; and (2) whether the chancellor erred in failing to make the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Ferguson.

1. Corey properly brought the equitable-division-of-property issue before the trial court.

¶ 7. A divorce judgment entered when a party fails to appear is “a special kind of default judgment.” And to obtain relief from such judgments, absent parties are required to raise the issues in post-trial motions under Rules 52, 59, or 60 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Corey filed a Rule 59 motion, the Court of Appeals held that the motion did not address the equitable-distribution issue; and, therefore, the issue was procedurally barred.

2. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under Ferguson.

CONCLUSION

¶ 14. By dividing marital property without following this Court's mandate in Ferguson, the chancellor committed reversible error. Corey properly raised this issue, and we therefore reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Chancery Court of DeSoto County and remand with instructions to the chancellor to proceed in accord with this opinion.

¶ 15. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. KING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

1. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss.1994).

2. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 699 So.2d 1198, 1204 (Miss.1997).

3. Mayoza v. Mayoza, 526 So.2d 547, 548 (Miss.1988).

4. Id. at 548–49.

5. Luse v. Luse, 992 So.2d 659 (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

6. Id. at 660.

7. Id.

8. Id. at 663.

9. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928–29 (“[T]his Court directs the chancery courts to evaluate the division of marital assets by the following guidelines and to support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law for purposes of appellate review....”).

FN10. Id. at 928.

FN11. Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So.2d 1348, 1354 (Miss.1997).

FN12. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 699 So.2d 1198, 1204 (Miss.1997); e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So.2d 364, 368 (Miss.2000); Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So.2d 341, 347–48 (Miss.2000).

FN13. Sandlin, 699 So.2d at 1204.

FN14. Luse, 992 So.2d at 663–64.

FN15. Stinson v. Stinson, 738 So.2d 1259, 1264 (Miss.Ct.App.1999).