Opinion
24A-CR-1737
12-03-2024
Jason Chad Lane, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
APPELLANT PRO SE Jason Chad Lane Michigan City, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hancock Superior Court The Honorable Dan E. Marshall, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 30D02-2106-F6-761
APPELLANT PRO SE Jason Chad Lane Michigan City, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bailey and Foley concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] In 2021, Jason Chad Lane pled guilty to Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and the trial court sentenced him to 180 days executed in the Hancock County Jail, followed by 730 days on probation, with 365 of those days on home detention through community corrections. After he violated the terms of his conditional release, Lane's probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the county jail. In 2024, Lane filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which motion the trial court denied. Lane contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On June 16, 2021, Lane was charged with Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Lane pled guilty as charged and agreed to an aggregate sentence of 910 days, with 180 days executed in the county jail, followed by 730 days on probation, with 365 of those days on home detention through community corrections. On August 19, 2021, the trial court sentenced Lane accordingly.
[¶3] On September 14, 2022, Lane admitted that he had violated the terms of his conditional release. The trial court revoked Lane's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the county jail. On September 28, 2022, Lane filed a motion to reconsider his probation violation, which motion the trial court denied. On January 25, 2024, Lane filed a motion to modify his placement from the county jail to the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), which motion the trial court denied.
[¶4] On June 21, 2024, Lane filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, in which he requested that the trial court modify his placement from the county jail to the DOC. The trial court denied this motion on the same day.
On July 8, 2024, Lane filed a motion for clarification, requesting that the trial court explain its reasons for denying the motion and alleging that the trial court "must incorporate its reasons in the record." Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 26-27. The trial court again denied the motion, on the same day.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Lane contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
[¶6] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion. Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans denied. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision is "against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." Id. A motion to correct erroneous sentence may be filed only to address "a sentence that is 'erroneous on its face.'" Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004)). A claim of sentencing error requiring "consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment" is best addressed "promptly on direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction relief proceedings where applicable," rather than through a motion to correct sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
[¶7] When Lane moved to correct his allegedly erroneous sentence, he sought an order from the trial court that he serve the remainder of his term in the DOC, rather than in the county jail. In his motion, Lane relied on judgments relating to other, unrelated criminal convictions; a letter from the county jail Administrator; and his own booking history for support that the trial court should have placed him in the DOC rather than the county jail. Lane's reliance on materials outside of the trial court's order foreclosed his argument that the sentence was erroneous on its face. See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787 (providing that a claim requiring "consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence").
[¶8] Lane has not alleged, much less proven, that the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the county jail was erroneous. Lane does not allege that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence. He merely argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that he serve his previously-suspended sentence in the county jail rather than the DOC. The authority relied on by Lane, however, does not require that his sentence be served in the DOC, but rather, at most, indicates that the trial court could have placed him in the DOC if it had so chosen. Lane has therefore failed to convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
Lane's reliance on Indiana Code section 35-38-3-3(d) is misplaced: the code states that a trial court "may not commit a person convicted of a Level 6 felony for an offense committed before July 1, 2022, to the [DOC] unless" certain conditions are met. However, even when such conditions are met, the trial court is not required to commit the person to the DOC under this section; it is simply permitted.
[¶9] We affirm.
Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.