GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

The question presented in this habeas corpus case is whether in a Louisiana prosecution for a first offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (DWI), the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, entitles the accused to a jury trial notwithstanding that the five hundred dollars fine and six months' imprisonment maximum penalty prescribed for the infraction does not exceed that appropriate for "petty" offenses under Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). Disagreeing with the panel's contrary determination, Landry v. Hoepfner, 818 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1987), this Court en banc now holds that the United States Constitution does not require the states to provide the right of trial by jury for such an offense. We accordingly affirm the district court's dismissal of appellant's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 attacking his Louisiana DWI conviction.

I.

Petitioner-appellant Philip Landry (Landry), who waived his right to counsel and represented himself, was charged with, and following a January 1984 bench trial was convicted by the First Parish Court of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana of, first offense DWI, contrary to LSA-R.S. § 14:98. Pursuant to section 14:98 B, which authorizes a maximum sentence of a five hundred dollars fine and six months' imprisonment for this offence, Landry was sentenced to a fine of three hundred dollars and a term of six months in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. The confinement sentence was suspended for two years, during which period Landry was placed under probation requiring him to perform four days of community service work, attend four days of driver improvement courses, and undergo evaluation at the Jefferson Parish Substance Abuse Clinic.

Under Louisiana law, there is no entitlement to trial by jury in respect to misdemeanors for which the maximum sentence does not exceed a five hundred dollars fine and imprisonment for not more than six months. LSA-C. Cr. P. art. 779. A first offense violation of section 14:98 — DWI — is a misdemeanor. Accordingly, since the penalty provided for first offense DWI in section 14:98 B does not exceed a five hundred dollars fine and six months' imprisonment, it is recognized in Louisiana law that there is no entitlement to trial by jury for such offense. See e.g., State v. Thigpen, 275 So.2d 760 (La. 1973); State v. Hayden, 437 So.2d 294 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983); State v. Henderson, 491 So.2d 647 (La. 1986).

Following his conviction and sentence, Landry retained counsel and sought appellate review of his conviction, asserting that he was denied his right to trial by jury because he was not informed of it by the trial court and that the provisions of the Louisiana statutes and Constitution purportedly denying the right to a jury trial were invalid as contrary to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Landry, 463 So.2d 761 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1985). It held that "defendant was not entitled to a jury trial" under Louisiana law, id. at 764, and that Landry's complaints as to the invalidity under the United States Constitution of the Louisiana statutory and constitutional provisions in this respect were waived by his failure to raise them at trial. Id. at 763. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Landry's application for writ of certiorari and/or review without opinion. State v. Landry, 464 So.2d 1373 (La. 1985).

Landry thereafter brought the instant habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his DWI conviction. The district court ruled that because the maximum penalty for this first offense DWI was six months' confinement and a five hundred dollars fine, the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, did not entitle Landry to a jury trial. Accordingly, it dismissed Landry's petition. A panel of this Court reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment entitled Landry to a jury trial because of the serious nature of the offense of DWI and the adverse collateral consequences of conviction thereof. Landry v. Hoepfner, supra. We agree with the district court and disagree with the panel, and we therefore affirm the dismissal of Landry's habeas petition.

II.

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution provides, in its third clause, that "[t]he trial of all crimes ... shall be by jury," and the Sixth Amendment requires "[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury ...." It was recognized, however, that these provisions, though they applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies, did not extend the right of trial by jury to "petty offenses." Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1306-07, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937). Long after those decisions, the Supreme Court, rejecting contrary dicta in several earlier opinions, for the first time held that the Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the states were hence likewise obliged to afford the right of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). Nevertheless, in Duncan, the Court acknowledged "that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States." Id. 88 S.Ct. at 1453 (footnote omitted). While recognizing that for this purpose it would inevitably become "necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious infractions," id. at 1453, the Duncan Court was not required to "settle in this case the exact location of the line" for it determined that the maximum authorized sentence of two years' imprisonment clearly placed the offense there involved in the "serious" category. Id. at 1454. Subsequently, in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), the Court refused to draw the line on the basis of whether the offense was felony or misdemeanor, but rather fixed it on the basis of whether the maximum permissible confinement exceeded six months, referring to the congressional definition of "petty offenses." Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1888-90. Nevertheless, Baldwin does not expressly hold that all offenses for which the maximum authorized confinement does not exceed six months are necessarily to be considered "petty" for this purpose. Accordingly, although under the criteria applied in Baldwin the present offense is "petty," the question whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments nevertheless mandate that Louisiana afford for this infraction a right of trial by jury necessitates a closer examination of the "petty offense" doctrine and its development both before and after Duncan and Baldwin.

Before undertaking such an analysis, it is well to keep in mind three somewhat obvious general observations respecting the "petty offense" doctrine which is the core of our concern in this case. To begin with, the doctrine is one of federal constitutional law. It does not prevent the states — or the federal government — from granting a jury trial right in petty offenses; it speaks only to when the United States Constitution mandates such a right. As noted in more detail below, in many states the petty offense doctrine is simply not recognized, so that for all criminal prosecutions, whether or not the offense charged is "petty," there is a right to jury trial, by virtue of state constitutional or statutory law. In the second place, under our "petty offense" doctrine, the question is not whether the infraction is a "crime" or the penalty for it civil or criminal, nor whether the penalty may include any substantial confinement, as is determinative of jury trial right in a number of states. Rather, it is clear that an infraction may be a "petty offense," for which the United States Constitution does not require that there be a right of trial by jury, notwithstanding that it is clearly a "crime" which may be punished by as much as six months' imprisonment. See, e.g., Duncan, 88 S.Ct. at 1453 ("Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses."). Finally, the fact that an offense is "petty" for these purposes does not mean that in a prosecution for it the accused is not entitled to the other constitutional protections, including those of the Sixth Amendment, afforded the criminal defendant. Thus, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to petty offenses, and rejected "the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer." Id. 92 S.Ct. at 2009. See also id. at 2008 (indicating that other Sixth Amendment protections, such as those for public trial, confrontation, compulsory process, and notice, likewise apply to "petty" offenses).

We now turn to review, in somewhat more detail and in historical context, how the Supreme Court has defined "petty" offenses over the years.

In Callan, the Court noted that the Constitution's jury trial provisions are "to be interpreted in the light of the principles which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury." 8 S.Ct. at 1303. Callan concerned a conspiracy prosecution, and the Court, recognizing that at common law "petty" offenses were not triable by jury, proceeded to review in detail the authorities reflecting that conspiracy was an indictable offense at common law; hence it held that a jury was required even though the case was tried in municipal court. Id. at 1306-07. In Schick, the Court, in holding that a petty offense did not require trial by jury, relied on Callan and especially emphasized that the constitutional provisions relevant in this respect "must be read in the light of the common law." 24 S.Ct. at 827. The issue was next considered in Colts, where the accused, charged with the offense of driving "recklessly 'so as to endanger property and individuals,'" which "was an indictable offense at common law," was held entitled to a jury although the maximum punishment did not exceed thirty days in jail and a one hundred dollars fine. 51 S.Ct. at 53. Again, the Court stressed that in this respect the Constitution's jury trial "provision is to be interpreted in the light of the common law." Id.

The last of the Court's presently significant pre- Duncan decisions is Clawans. There the defendant was charged with selling secondhand property without the required license, an offense punishable by ninety days' imprisonment. Noting that the offense "was not indictable at common law," Clawans nevertheless considered whether "the severity of the penalty" might be "sufficient to bring it within the class of major offenses, for the trial of which a jury may be demanded." 57 S.Ct. at 662. The Court observed that at the time of the American Revolution there were petty offenses, triable without a jury "under English statutes, which carried possible sentences of imprisonment for periods from three to twelve months," and that of the statutes in that time of the "Colonies" or the "newly-created states" some sixteen authorized imprisonment for three months or more, and eight others for as much as six months, without a jury trial. Id. at 662-63. Obviously concerned with the prospect of imprisonment for as long as nine months or a year, or possibly more, being imposed without the safeguard of a jury's availability, the Court remarked that "commonly accepted views of the severity of punishment by imprisonment may become so modified that a penalty once thought to be mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which the Constitution prescribes, in some cases which were triable without a jury when the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 663. Then, in words that presaged Baldwin and its progeny, Clawans continued:

"But we may doubt whether summary trial with punishment of more than six months' imprisonment, prescribed by some pre-Revolutionary statutes, is admissible, without concluding that a penalty of ninety days is too much." Id. at 663 (footnote omitted).

Within that framework, however, the maximum permissible penalty for this purpose is not to be resolved "subjectively" but rather "by objective standards," principally the greatest penalties which Congress and at least some of the states allow to be imposed without entitlement to trial by jury. Id. at 663-64. This analysis was not a head counting exercise to determine the consensus practice around the nation, but rather simply reflected statutes (from as early as 1898) or decisions (from 1862 to 1932) or both in only thirteen different states. Id. at 663 n. 6, 664 n. 7.

In Duncan, though the Court did not precisely fix the standard by which "petty" offenses were to be distinguished, it noted that the authorized penalty was "of major relevance" for this purpose, and that "[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments'... [quoting Clawans] of the crime in question." 88 S.Ct. at 1453. Duncan likewise stressed the need "to refer to objective criteria," id. at 1453, and went on to observe:

"In the federal system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine [citing 18 U.S.C. § 1]. In 49 of the 50 states crimes subject to trial without a jury ... are punishable by no more than one year in jail. Moreover, in the late 18th century in America crimes triable without a jury were for the most part punishable by no more than a six-month prison term. . . ." Id. at 1453-54 (footnotes omitted).

Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), reiterated that "[i]n determining whether a particular offense can be classified as 'petty,' this Court has sought objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.... The most relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense is the severity of the penalty authorized for its commission."

In Baldwin, the Court again stated that "[i]n deciding whether an offense is 'petty,' we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense ... and we have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty." 90 S.Ct. at 1888. It continues by observing:

"In the federal system, as we noted in Duncan, petty offenses have been defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine [citing 18 U.S.C. § 1]. And, with a few exceptions, crimes triable without a jury in the American States since the late 18th century were also generally punishable by no more than a six-month prison term." Id. at 1889 (footnotes omitted).

Baldwin then concludes with the statement:

"Where the accused cannot possibly face more than six months' imprisonment, we have held that these disadvantages [of conviction and imprisonment], onerous though they may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications. We cannot, however, conclude that these administrative conveniences, in light of the practices that now exist in every one of the 50 States as well as in the federal courts, can similarly justify denying an accused the important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment." Id. at 1890-91 (footnote omitted).

It is to be noted that Duncan and Baldwin both reference the congressional definition of petty offenses, with its six months' maximum possible confinement. Since Baldwin, the Court has spoken only in terms of the length of possible confinement as establishing the dividing line between "petty" and serious offenses. Two years after Baldwin, the Court in Argersinger observed:

"The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to trials where the potential punishment was for six months or more." 92 S.Ct. at 2008.

And, two years after Argersinger, the Court in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 2691, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974), stated, referring to Duncan and Bloom ( see note 15, supra):

"Since that time, our decisions have established a fixed dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty crimes."

We do not suggest that Callan or Colts have been overruled sub silentio — certainly, that is not for us to say. An offense indictable at common law is not a "petty offense" for purposes of Article III, Section 2, clause 3, or the Sixth Amendment even though it carries no more than a one-month maximum sentence. Colts. Nevertheless, we believe three significant points emerge from an analysis of the Supreme Court's writings in this area.

First, it seems clear that the Court originally followed strictly common law precedent, but with some developing concern that this might allow severe penalties without the protection of a jury. This possibility — and doubtless the related danger posed by burgeoning statutory offenses without common law antecedents — in effect opened the prospect of a potentially troublesome gap in the protection which the Constitution's jury trial provisions were intended to afford. Ultimately, the Court chose to close that gap by employing Baldwin's objective, bright-line test grounded in the historical practice of the Colonies and the original states.

Second, the Court has never held or stated any crime is a "serious" rather than a "petty" offense on the basis of any criteria other than whether its maximum authorized confinement exceeded six months or whether it was indictable at common law. Otherwise put, the Court has never identified any particular offense as being nonpetty which was both not indictable at common law and carried a maximum authorized confinement of not more than six months.

Finally, the overall trend of emphasis in the opinions, and the language in the most recent, such as that above-quoted from Codispoti, strongly counsel against an expansive reading of Callan or Colts to authorize the federal courts to declare an offense nonpetty on the basis of any criteria other than whether it was indictable at common law and whether its maximum sentence exceeds the Baldwin line. These two criteria make for a bright-line, objective test. To add a third criterion — the judicial perception of the "seriousness" otherwise of the offense, either intrinsically or as the judges conceive the "public" to generally regard it apart from the status it had at common law and its current maximum penalty — is to inject an inherently and inescapably subjective and imprecise factor into the calculus. Essentially, this would involve judges in applying the same sort of criteria that the legislative branch did in the first place when it fixed the maximum sentence. Legislatures, however, are far better equipped to perform the task, and are likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.

It is, moreover, particularly undesirable to inject such imprecise and subjective criteria into the calculus now that the Sixth Amendment has been held applicable to the states, for to do so imposes a false national uniformity. What is "serious" in Vermont may not be "serious" in Louisiana, in terms either of a particular problem's concrete manifestations or of the popular perception or evaluation of it in each of those states. Not only do conditions vary from state to state, but so do people's attitudes, both normative and prudential. Accordingly, at least respecting offenses not indictable at common law, when the legislature of a state elects to make criminal certain conduct within that state's borders, it is likewise entitled to determine that the offense it has created shall not be a "serious" one by fixing for it a maximum penalty which is concededly "petty" under the bright-line rule of Baldwin. Inevitably, different determinations will be made in different states, and within any one state there will also be bona fide disagreement. But there is simply no warrant in history, precedent, or policy for the federal judiciary to second-guess that legislative determination on the basis of the judiciary's own conclusions, which are necessarily grounded in subjective, unquantifiable criteria, respecting the intrinsic or publicly perceived seriousness of that offense against the laws of that particular state.

III.

Turning now to the specific offense of DWI, the panel recognized the absence of "authority for the proposition that DWI constituted an indictable offense at common law." 818 F.2d at 1175. Indeed, the authorities hold that DWI was not such an offense. State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917); Whirley v. State, 450 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1984); State ex rel. Sellers v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924); State v. Morrill, 123 N.H. 707, 465 A.2d 882, 885 (1983); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479, 16 A.L.R.3d 1362, 1368 (1966) ("the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not a common law offense"). This is also made clear by our following discussion of Colts and Clawans.

Whether DWI in particular is such an offense as constitutionally requires a jury trial despite carrying only a "petty" maximum penalty has also been addressed by the Supreme Court, twice indirectly prior to Duncan and more recently in a summary affirmance respecting a Louisiana DWI prosecution.

The latter case is Bairnsfather v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1620, 95 L.Ed.2d 195 (1987), where the Court's memorandum order states, "The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." Justices Brennan, Powell, and Scalia "would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument"; and Justice Stevens "would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction." Id. We have examined the Jurisdictional Statement, and its several appendixes, as well as the State of Louisiana's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, and the appellant's motion for rehearing in Bairnsfather. There, Bairnsfather was charged in the Louisiana courts with second offense DWI, contrary to LSA-R.S. § 14:98. He filed a motion in the trial court requesting a jury trial, asserting that he was entitled to a jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because second offense DWI was a serious, and not a petty, offense by reason of its nature, the consequences of conviction and the sentence imposable, and that LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 779(B) ( see note 5, supra), denying the right to a jury trial, was invalid as contrary to the Sixth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and Bairnsfather sought review in the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which denied relief. The Louisiana Supreme Court likewise denied relief without opinion (Chief Justice Dixon dissenting). State v. Bairnsfather, 491 So.2d 1336 (La. 1986). Bairnsfather appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and his Jurisdictional Statement there presents essentially the same issues as those presented by Landry's appeal. The Jurisdictional Statement advances essentially the same arguments and authorities in support of Bairnsfather's contention that he was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment as does the panel opinion in this case. The state, in its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, relied almost exclusively on the ground that the maximum fine of five hundred dollars and the maximum confinement of six months authorized for the violation rendered it a "petty" offense under Baldwin. We conclude that a resolution adverse to Bairnsfather of the substantive merits of his appeal cannot in any principled manner be reconciled with the result reached by the panel here. We likewise conclude that by dismissing the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, the Supreme Court in Bairnsfather did reach and so resolve the substantive merits of the appeal, and this seems particularly clear in light of Justice Stevens' jurisdictional dissent. Bairnsfather is thus a ruling on the merits with precedential value, albeit with less such value than an opinion of the Court after full briefing and argument. Southern Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 99 S.Ct. 2388, 2398, 60 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1979); Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 97 S.Ct. 219, 223, 50 L.Ed.2d 227 (1976). Such dismissals are binding on the lower courts, which are not free in other cases to rule differently on the issues presented to and declared insubstantial by the Supreme Court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289-90, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975). This is at least so as to "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by" the dismissals, though such rulings "should not be understood as breaking new ground." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 97 S.Ct. 2238, 2240-41, 53 L.Ed.2d 199 (1977).

Clearly there is nothing in Bairnsfather which is in tension with or breaks new ground respecting Duncan, Frank, Baldwin, or Codispoti.

Moreover, Bairnsfather plainly follows Colts and Clawans, the two pre- Duncan cases in which the Court indirectly considered the offense of DWI in relation to the right to a jury trial.

In Colts, the Court considered a charge of driving over the speed limit and recklessly so as to endanger others. The statute prohibited, in separate clauses, speeding, reckless driving, and driving so as to endanger persons or property. Although the maximum imprisonment was only thirty days, the Court held a jury was required. It stressed that the accused was "not charged merely with ... exceeding the ... limit of speed ... or merely driving recklessly ... but with ... having driven at the forbidden rate of speed and recklessly, 'so as to endanger property and individuals.'" 51 S.Ct. at 53. Again, the Court made clear that the charge was not merely reckless driving, but rather driving " so recklessly 'as to endanger property and individuals.'" Id. (emphasis added). This, it was held, "was an indictable offense at common law" for which a jury was required. Id. Colts cited State v. Rodgers for the proposition that in petty offenses a jury was not required, and then went on to particularly rely on that case, stating:

"The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, in State v. Rodgers, supra, has discussed the distinction between traffic offenses of a petty character, subject to summary proceedings without indictment and trial by jury, and those of a serious character, amounting to public nuisances indictable at common law; and its examination of the subject makes clear that the offense now under review is of the latter character." 51 S.Ct. at 53.

It thus behooves us to see what State v. Rodgers had to say on the subject. There it was held that DWI, which carried a six-month maximum sentence, was not a public nuisance or otherwise an offense indictable at common law, and that accordingly there was no entitlement to trial by jury. Clearly Colts gave its approval to the holding of State v. Rodgers that DWI was, as Colts characterized it, one of those "traffic offenses of a petty character subject to summary proceedings without indictment and trial by jury." 51 S.Ct. at 53. Further, what the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Rodgers said of DWI is as true today of the Louisiana offense as it was in 1917 of the New Jersey offense, namely, "that it is not essential to the existence of the statutory offense that the driver ... be so intoxicated that he cannot safely drive," that it suffices that as a result of alcohol consumption the driver is under "an abnormal mental or physical condition ... which tends to deprive him of that clearness of intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess," and that conviction is possible "even though he drives so slowly and so skillfully and carefully that the public is not annoyed or endangered." State v. Rodgers, 102 A. at 435.

To refuse to accord significance to this distinction between DWI and driving recklessly so as to have actually endangered others is simply to disagree with Colts and its approval of Rodgers. Moreover, as the Court recognized in Duncan, drawing the line between "petty" and "serious" offenses will necessarily involve "attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, actually differ very little." 88 S.Ct. at 1453.

After Colts, the Supreme Court next indirectly considered DWI in Clawans. There, (then) Justice Stone's opinion for the Court, in upholding nonjury conviction for an offense punishable by three months' imprisonment, relied on the fact that:

"A number of states have continued in force statutes providing for trial, without a jury, of violations of municipal ordinances, and sundry statutory offenses, punishable by commitment for three months or more." 57 S.Ct. at 663 (footnote omitted).

The first specific offense statute (as opposed to statutes embracing violations of municipal ordinances generally) cited by Justice Stone in support of the above-quoted statement is:

"N.J. Comp. Laws (1924 Supp.), §§ 135-63(3), 135-76 (operating motor vehicle under influence of liquor; six months; see Klinges v. Court of Common Pleas, 130 A. 601, 3 N.J.Misc. 1084, 4 N.J. Misc. 7)." 57 S.Ct. at 663 n. 6.

The cited Klinges case holds that the New Jersey DWI statute, which authorizes confinement of up to six months, is not unconstitutional because a jury trial is not authorized. 3 N.J.Misc. 1084, 4 N.J.Misc. 7, 130 A. 601 at 602 (1925). In the Clawans text, Justice Stone continued by stating, "Convictions under such legislation have been upheld many times in the state courts, despite objections to the denial of a jury trial." 57 S.Ct. at 664 (footnote omitted). Among the cases cited by Justice Stone in support of this statement is State v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924), a DWI prosecution. See 57 S.Ct. at 664 n. 7. Surely, then, Clawans is another example of the Supreme Court's recognition that DWI may constitutionally be prosecuted without a jury where the maximum penalty does not exceed that applicable to petty offenses generally. The Nebraska Supreme Court, among others, has read Clawans as categorizing DWI as a petty offense. State v. Amick, 173 Neb. 770, 114 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1962). See also City of Albuquerque v. Arias, 64 N.M. 337, 328 P.2d 593, 594 (1958) (same).

Accordingly, Colts and Clawans plainly indicate that the Supreme Court regards DWI as properly a petty offense where the maximum confinement authorized does not exceed six months. Taken together with Bairnsfather, these cases, the only ones in which the Supreme Court has addressed the matter, should be decisive of the issue.

Certainly, there is no convincing body of lower federal court decisions to the contrary. The panel relied heavily on United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1981), which held that DWI in a national park, for which the maximum penalty was a five hundred dollars fine and six months' imprisonment, was not a "petty" offense. However, the relevance of Craner is undermined by the fact that there the majority in part expressly relied on the fact that the Secretary of the Interior, who set the maximum penalty, fixed it at the highest level authorized. The Craner majority observed, "We cannot hazard that the Secretary's indiscriminate authorization of this penalty for varied offenses, or Congress's general limitation on the sentence the Secretary may authorize, represents a considered legislative judgment of the gravity of the offense of DUI." Id. at 25. Judge Sneed, in his Craner special concurrence, would have relied exclusively on this ground; absent that special factor, he was "inclined to treat the DUI offense as 'petty.'" Id. at 28. Here, by contrast, the maximum penalty fixed by the Louisiana Legislature does, of course, represent its "considered legislative judgment of the gravity of the offense." United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335 (D.Md. 1978), also relied on by the panel, is, like Craner, a DWI in violation of a national park regulation, and thus is distinguishable for the same reasons. 450 F. Supp. at 1345. To the extent that Craner and Woods are not so limited, we respectfully disagree.

On the other hand, in United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161, 106 S.Ct. 2283, 90 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986); United States v. Fletcher, 505 F. Supp. 1053 (W.D.Va. 1981); and Matos v. Rodriguez, 440 F. Supp. 673 (D.P.R. 1976), it was held that a DWI prosecution did not give rise to Sixth Amendment jury entitlement where the maximum penalty, though including imprisonment, did not exceed the Baldwin threshold. The same holding was also made by the district courts in Craner, Jenkins, and in the present case.

We are unable to conclude that the lower federal courts have developed any clear concensus which is contrary to the plain implication of Bairnsfather, Clawans, and Colts that DWI is a "petty" offense for Sixth Amendment purposes unless its maximum authorized sentence exceeds the Baldwin line.

IV.

For its holding, the panel relied in large part on its perception of the adverse collateral consequences of a DWI conviction, "particularly the suspension of driving privileges" which it held "constitutes a significant collateral consequence, and therefore a trial by jury is necessitated." 818 F.2d at 1177. The panel also noted "serious economic repercussions, such as increase in insurance premiums" and "public opprobrium." Id. We disagree.

So far as concerns the potential effects of conviction, the Supreme Court's emphasis has been on the maximum sentence imposable and particularly on the maximum possible confinement. This was the case in Clawans ( see, e.g., note 14, supra, and accompanying text) and increasingly thereafter. In both Duncan's and Baldwin's discussions of current and late eighteenth century practice in the states, the only reference made is to the length of possible confinement. Duncan, 88 S.Ct. at 1454; Baldwin, 90 S.Ct. at 1889-90. And, as we have noted, Argersinger, 92 S.Ct. at 2008, and Codispoti, 94 S.Ct. at 2691, speak of the dividing line between serious and petty offenses as being fixed by the length of maximum potential confinement. Moreover, Baldwin observed:

"Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation. Where the accused cannot possibly face more than six months' imprisonment, we have held that these disadvantages, onerous though they may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications." Id. 90 S.Ct. at 2191 (emphasis added).

As Baldwin justly notes, anyone sentenced to six months' imprisonment is likely to have his "reputation" and "career" suffer "quite serious" adverse repercussions. This, it seems to us, refers to, and holds nondeterminative for offenses with a maximum sentence not exceeding six months' confinement, the same considerations as those the panel characterized as "serious economic repercussions" and "public opprobium." We know of no basis or standard by which we can say that such repercussions and opprobium resulting from a DWI conviction are as a matter of law different in kind from those resulting from confinement for conviction of numerous other concededly petty offenses, such as public drunkenness. As for increased insurance premiums, these can as easily result from a couple of speeding tickets, or from a fender-bender or two never criminally prosecuted.

Nor does the maximum sixty-day driver's license suspension provided for by LSA-R.S. § 32:414 A(1) alter the result.

It seems wholly incongruous to hold that possible license suspension tips the scale to jury trial entitlement, when we have long-recognized "that a defendant need not be informed, before pleading guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated, that as a collateral consequence of his conviction, his driver's license will be suspended." Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975). Indeed, several courts have held that license suspension does not suffice to take DWI out of the "petty" offense category. See, e.g., Jenkins, 780 F.2d at 474 (six-month automatic suspension); Fletcher, 505 F. Supp. at 1054; Amick, 114 N.W.2d at 895; State v. Morrill, 123 N.H. 707, 465 A.2d 882, 886 (1983) (sixty-day to two-year suspension). Further, license suspension is often incident to multiple minor moving traffic violations.

Certainly, the Louisiana sixty-day maximum suspension for first offense DWI cannot suffice to render it a "serious" offense. Under LSA-R.S. § 32:414 A(1), the suspension period commences to run upon notification of conviction or guilty plea. It hence cannot be said to increase the maximum potential hardship beyond that resulting from six months' imprisonment, as one who is imprisoned for six months suffers nothing more by virtue of the fact that his license was suspended during the first two months of his confinement, as throughout that time he is by virtue of his imprisonment in any event unable to drive. And it is, of course, the maximum potential sentence which is looked to for these purposes, rather than the sentence actually imposed. See, e.g., Duncan, 88 S.Ct. at 1453. Further, license suspension can be said to make the penalty actually imposed more onerous than it otherwise would be only to the extent that the defendant serves less than sixty days in prison. It is obvious that a sentence with no confinement and license suspension for the next sixty days is less severe than one under which the defendant serves those same sixty days in prison though his license is unsuspended. Or, to take another example, a sentence under which the defendant serves twenty days in jail and is also unable to drive for the next succeeding forty days because his license is suspended is obviously less severe than one under which the defendant serves all those same sixty days in jail (during which he is for that reason unable to drive) though suffering no license suspension. These commonsense observations are reinforced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Frank. There, three years' probation, though a significant infringement of freedom, was deemed not sufficiently onerous to make an otherwise "petty" offense serious. As Frank stated ( 89 S.Ct. at 1506-07 n. 6):

"Probation is, of course, a significant infringement of personal freedom, but it is certainly less onerous a restraint than jail itself.[6] In noncontempt cases, Congress has not viewed the possibility of five years' probation as onerous enough to make an otherwise petty offense 'serious.'

" ____

"[6.] Petitioner is required to make monthly reports to his probation officer, associate only with law-abiding persons, maintain reasonable hours, work regularly, report all job changes to his probation officer, and not leave the probation district without the permission of his probation officer."

These same considerations likewise demonstrate that the probationary conditions provided for by section 14:98 B, see note 2, supra, which only come into play if the sentence is suspended, do not suffice to render this otherwise "petty" offense a "serious" one.

V.

Finally, the panel, citing, inter alia, Jenkins, 780 F.2d at 474 n. 4, and Annot., Right to Trial by Jury in Criminal Prosecution for Driving While Intoxicated or Similar Offense, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373 (1967 and Supp. 1986), considered that in some twenty-four states a defendant charged with DWI was entitled to a jury trial, and "a study of the authorities indicates that only six states deny defendants the right to a trial by jury on DWI charges." 818 F.2d at 1174 n. 2.

We are not persuaded that the majority state practice in this respect sets the constitutionally required minimum for all states. While in Baldwin the Court was influenced by the fact that "[i]n the entire Nation, New York City alone denies an accused the right to interpose between himself and a possible prison term of over six months, the commonsense judgment of his peers," id. 90 S.Ct. at 1889-90 (footnote omitted), the practice in six states surely cannot be regarded as comparable to that of but a single city. We observe that more recently the Court has refused to condemn a practice as unconstitutional notwithstanding that it had been rejected by forty-eight states and was followed only by two. Martin v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1103, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987).

While, as noted, we do not consider the general state practice to be determinative, nevertheless, since the panel has addressed the matter, we deem it appropriate in the interests of completeness to likewise do so. The panel's conclusion that most states regard DWI as a "serious" rather than a "petty" offense is implicitly based on the circumstances that in the majority of states a DWI defendant has a right to jury trial. However, this fails to take into account the fact that most states do not follow the "petty offense" doctrine at all (or do so only for offenses as to which no confinement is authorized). Basing our analysis on the United States' amicus brief filed before us en banc, the figures and relevant citations in which have not been challenged, there appear to be thirty states in this category. The fact that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for DWI in these states thus tells us nothing about how "serious" or "petty" that offense is regarded, because all offenses (or all traffic offenses or all offenses where any confinement is authorized) entitle the accused to a jury. Hence, as to these thirty states, the "seriousness" or "pettiness" of DWI can be measured only by the maximum sentence authorized, which is, of course, what the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us is either the most relevant or the only relevant way to make that determination. Of these thirty states, in nineteen the maximum authorized confinement for first offense DWI does not exceed six months. These nineteen states must hence be counted as states which regard DWI as a "petty" offense. The remaining eleven of these thirty states which do not recognize the "petty offense" doctrine have maximum penalties for first offense DWI which exceed the Baldwin six months' level. These eleven states hence may be counted as ones in which DWI is regarded as a "serious" offense. Thus, so far we may count nineteen states regarding DWI as "petty" and eleven regarding it as "serious."

Of the remaining twenty-two jurisdictions (twenty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico) which have not rejected the "petty offense" doctrine (or have not rejected it for all traffic offenses or restricted it to offenses for which incarceration is not authorized), eleven entitle the accused to a jury trial. The other eleven jurisdictions in this group, though following the "petty offense" doctrine, all provide maximum penalties for first offense DWI which do not exceed six months' confinement (or their own, lower Baldwin threshold); none of these has by statute or judicial decision held that first offense DWI entitles the accused to a jury; and six have reported judicial opinions to the effect that there is no such entitlement. Thus, of the twenty-two jurisdictions which do not reject the "petty offense" doctrine, eleven may be counted as viewing DWI as serious (either by the penalty exceeding that for petty offenses or "intrinsically") and eleven as viewing it as "petty."

Thus, of fifty-two jurisdictions, thirty-two (those referenced in notes 33 and 37, supra, plus Arizona and Hawaii, as referenced in note 36, supra) have penalties for DWI which do not exceed the Baldwin threshold, and thirty of these thirty-two jurisdictions (all except Arizona and Hawaii, which hold DWI "serious" despite its "petty" penalty, see note 36, supra) may hence properly be counted as jurisdictions which regard DWI as a "petty" offense under the standard set by the United States Supreme Court. The remaining twenty-two jurisdictions (twenty with over Baldwin level penalties, see notes 34 and 36, supra, plus Arizona and Hawaii) can be counted as regarding DWI as "serious" rather than "petty." The thirty-to-twenty-two result reflects that a clear majority of the jurisdictions (with room for the possibility that a few states may have been misallocated) classifies DWI in a manner which entirely meets the standards of the Supreme Court's definition of "petty." Louisiana has not fixed an aberrationally low maximum penalty for an offense generally regarded as deserving of a higher maximum.

Conclusion

We do not minimize the gravity of the social problem presented by excessive drinking and dangerous driving. However, DWI was never an indictable offense at common law, and neither the elements of the crime nor its potential first offense penalty under Louisiana law are such that the Sixth Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires Louisiana to afford one accused thereof the right to trial by jury. The district court therefore correctly denied appellant's petition for habeas corpus, and its judgment is accordingly

AFFIRMED.