ORDER

RICHARD LAZZARA, District Judge

Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and supporting Affidavit. After carefully considering the Defendant's submissions, the Court concludes that the request for fees should be denied but that the request for costs should be granted in part, subject to the Plaintiff seeking review pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Defendant seeks attorney fees in this ERISA case under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) which vests discretionary authority in a district court to "allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." In determining whether to award fees and costs, a district court is instructed to consider several factors: (1) the degree of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against an opposing party would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions.See Dixon v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 878 F.2d 1411, 1412 (11th Cir. 1989). These factors are described as "nuclei of concern," with no one factor being considered decisive. Id. On review, an appellate court will only reverse for a clear abuse of discretion such that a district court is permitted an area of decision-making authority in which it can rule either way without fear of reversal. Id.

Measured against these standards, the Court would clearly be abusing its discretion in awarding fees and costs to the Defendant under § 1132(g). First, the Court does not glean from this record any culpability or bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff nor a lack of merit in her claim. The mere fact that the Court ultimately concluded after a de novo review of the administrative record that the Defendant was not "wrong" in its final discretionary determination not to award Plaintiff long-term disability benefits is certainly not tantamount to a finding of culpability or bad faith. Furthermore, although Defendant accuses Plaintiff of engaging in "vexatious" behavior related to Plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a copy of Defendant's claims manual, what Defendant ignores is Plaintiff's success relative to obtaining an order from this Court denying Defendant's motion to limit scope of review and motion for protective order and allowing discovery beyond the administrative record in the form of depositions. See docket 20.

Second, the Defendant has failed to provide any evidence of Plaintiff's ability to satisfy any award of fees and costs under the statute. Indeed, a casual review of the record suggests that Plaintiff is obviously not a person of means who is capable of paying an award of fees and costs in the sum requested by Defendant — $46,459 for fees and $459.41 for costs.

Third, in the Court's view, an award of fees and costs in this routine ERISA case would serve no deterrent effect in dissuading others from seeking long-term disability benefits to which they feel they are entitled and for which there is an arguable basis, as here, for seeking. Finally, the Court can find no evidence that the other beneficiaries of this ERISA plan will somehow benefit by saddling Plaintiff with the substantial burden of paying the fees and costs sought by Defendant. Additionally, this case did not present any significant legal issues involving ERISA law, except for the issue of discovery beyond the administrative record which, as noted, was decided in favor of Plaintiff.

The Defendant also seeks taxable cost pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Under the law, a court is precluded from taxing costs that are not explicitly authorized by the statute. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2499 (1987);accord United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. WO, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (11th Cir. 2000). Consequently, Defendant's request for taxable costs for long distance telephone charges, postage and parking fees, attorney traveling expenses, and mediation fee are denied because they do not fall within the explicit ambit of § 1920. However, the Defendant's request for taxable costs in the form of court reporter and transcription fees and copying costs is appropriate in light of the supporting affidavit which convinces the Court that they are the type of costs properly subject to taxation under the clear terms of § 1920(2) and (4) because they were "necessarily obtained for use in the case." See id. at 620-23.

ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons expressed, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1) The Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees (Dkt. 49) is denied.

2) The Defendant's Motion for Costs (Dkt. 49) is granted in part and denied in part.

3) The Clerk shall enter judgment against the Plaintiff and in favor of the Defendant in the sum of $559.19 for taxable costs, subject to the Plaintiff's right to seek review pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1).

DONE AND ORDERED