Summary
In Lake Brady Spiritualists Camp Association v. Brown, 62 Ohio St.2d 43, 402 N.E.2d 1187 (1980), a camp with summer gatherings for religious services, lectures, healing services, rummage sales and cook-outs at a camp with 10 acres, a church building, a "hotel" building and 36 cottages was held to be a "religious organization" in that the "gatherings constituted regular worship and religious observance." Id. at 1188.
Summary of this case from Whatley v. StateOpinion
No. 79-1037
Decided April 9, 1980.
Criminal law — Bingo license — Unlawfully denied, when — "Religious organization," construed — R.C. 2915.01(I).
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County.
This appeal arises from appellee-Lake Brady Spiritualists Camp Association's attempt to obtain a charitable bingo license. (See R.C. 2915.07 et seq.) Appellee is an association of approximately 3,000 members throughout the United States who share in the common belief of spiritualism and the "Infinite Intelligence." Appellee has been incorporated in Ohio as a not-for-profit organization since 1899. Every year since the early 1900's, during the months of July and August, the members have gathered at Brady Lake for religious services, lectures, healing services, rummage sales and cookouts. The camp consists of approximately 10 acres with a church building, a "hotel" building, and 36 cottages. The association's president and secretary-treasurer are ministers who, along with other spiritualist ministers, preach and lecture to the membership. Appellee has been exempted from federal taxation since 1948.
The Articles of Incorporation set forth appellee's purpose as "* * * investigating the phenomena and calling the attention of the people to the merits and claims of Modern Spiritualism. In order to form more perfect union of Spiritualists, to establish more effectual working plans and committees. To organize for the liberty of investigating said phenomena and to secure for ourselves the strict and faithful observance of the laws of our country in relation to worshippers, with malice toward none and charity toward all, we form this organization for the mutual protection of the members thereof and their families."
Appellee's application was rejected on the basis that the association was not a "charitable organization" as defined by R.C. 2915.01(H), since it was not a "religious organization" as defined by R.C. 2915.01(I). Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119, appellee exercised its right to an administrative hearing. The hearing officer concluded that appellee was not a "religious organization." The Attorney General's office issued an adjudication order which approved the hearing examiner's report and rejected the license application. In an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the court found that the adjudication order was contrary to law and not supported by the evidence and ordered that a license be issued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and stated:
"In the absence of specific definition in the statute, the term `regular worship and religious observances' is susceptible to many interpretations. * * * It is only when `regular worship' is construed in the logical context of `being in the manner conducted by a given religious faith' that the intent of the legislature can conform harmoniously with constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom."
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Freeman, Igoe, Hanson Polhamus and Mr. William R. Polhamus, for appellee.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Ms. Toba Jeanne Feldman, for appellant.
The issue in this cause is whether appellee is a religious organization as that phrase is used in R.C. 2915.01(I). That section states: "`Religious organization' means any church, body of communicants, or group that is not organized or operated for profit, that gathers in common membership for regular worship and religious observances."
The record established that appellee met the requirements of R.C. 2915.01(H). It received a letter from the Internal Revenue Service stating that it was tax exempt and it was in continuous existence for a period of two years before applying for a bingo license.
The only portion of this definition in question is whether appellee gathers for regular worship and religious observance. It is undisputed that appellee meets the other criterion presented in R.C. 2915.01(I). The statute does not define what is meant by "regular worship and religious observance," and that phrase is open to various interpretations. When a statute is facially ambiguous, it is the function of the courts to construe the statutory language to effect a just and reasonable result. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 208, paragraph two of the syllabus. See, also, R.C. 1.47(C). The Court of Appeals construed the statute reasonably. When it addressed the manner in which a religious organization conducted its worship, it concluded that appellee's summer gatherings constituted "regular worship and religious observance." We agree with the Court of Appeals' interpretation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., HERBERT, W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.