TERRELL, Justice.

Appellant hereinafter referred to as Ladas was employed by the City of Daytona Beach as a police patrolman June 6, 1944. He was promoted to Desk Sergeant April 1, 1945, subject to serving the satisfactory probationary period required by Section 17 of the Civil Service Act, Chapter 22253, Acts of 1943, as follows: "All original and promotional appointments shall be for a probationary period of not to exceed three months to be fixed by the rules of the Civil Service Commission, and no appointment or promotion shall be deemed finally made until the appointee has satisfactorily served his probationary period."

June 27, 1945, before the expiration of his probationary period, the Chief of Police recommended to the Civil Service Board that Ladas be dismissed from the service. August 10, 1945 he was notified of his dismissal which was made effective August 16 and there was attached to the notice of dismissal the reasons therefor. This was in compliance with Section 1(C) Article 11, Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service Commission. September 14, 1945, by request of Ladas, dated August 14th, he was given a hearing on the merits of his dismissal from the service. By order of the Civil Service Board dated October 2, 1945, the dismissal was approved.

January 8, 1946, Ladas was furnished a copy of the evidence and proceeding held at the hearing on the dismissal charges and on March 30th, motion for rehearing was filed. Said motion was referred to the legal department of the city and Ladas was notified. January 15, 1947, this suit was instituted in the Circuit Court. A rash of pleadings followed which culminated June 23, 1950, in a final judgment denying the motion of Ladas for peremptory writ of mandamus and dismissing the cause. Ladas has appealed from the final judgment so entered.

Several questions are urged for adjudication, all of which were discussed by the court below, but he disposed of the cause on the ground that Ladas was not diligent in prosecuting his case and being so, he was barred from any relief by laches. It is fair to present counsel in the cause to state that they are in no way responsible for this delay but since we have concluded that the trial court should be affirmed on this point, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other points presented.

Ladas says he was ill and out of the state for about three months in 1946, and for a few days in January 1947. We find no other explanation for his delay. There was entirely too much delay after the proceeding was brought but Ladas was not responsible for that. At the time he was discharged from the service, August 15, 1945, he was drawing compensation at the rate of $187 per month, yet he did not bring his case to the attention of the Civil Service Board till August 17, 1945. He was notified of the action of the Civil Service Board October 3rd, but this suit was not filed till January 15, 1947, nine months and 15 days after the motion for rehearing was filed and over seventeen months after he was dismissed from the police department.

This was more than four times as long as he would have been permitted to take an appeal from a final judgment if it had been a common law or equity case. Aside from this, the City of Daytona Beach is a growing municipality whose business is expected to be dispatched every day and whose policemen are subject to call any hour of the day or night. It would be most disastrous to permit the city's business to drag along in such a slipshod, hit or miss kind of a way. Those who have claims against the City are expected to present them promptly and if they must be reduced to judgment, those who are required to do so should move promptly.

The courts over the country generally hold that when a reasonable excuse is not given for delay in starting legal proceedings for reinstatement under such circumstances as are related here, relief may be denied for laches, the reason being, public policy requires that government service be disturbed as little as possible, that two salaries be not paid for a single service and that unusual delay imposes additional and unnecessary burdens on the city to sustain its position. Renshaw City Manager, v. State ex rel. Hickland, 149 Fla. 342, 5 So.2d 700; Cone v. Benjamin, 157 Fla. 800, 27 So.2d 90.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and BARNS, JJ., concur.