Summary
reversing grant of summary judgment where there was a dispute over whether defendant driver's vehicle had been struck in the rear by an unidentified vehicle causing his vehicle to move forward and strike the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle
Summary of this case from Zitny v. ManciniOpinion
2014-04-2
Ruthi KURIS, respondent, v. EL SOL CONTRACTING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP., et al., appellants.
Cartafalsa, Slattery, Turpin & Lenoff, New York, N.Y. (Raymond F. Slattery and B. Jennifer Jaffee of counsel), for appellants. Law Office of Alex Klein, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
Cartafalsa, Slattery, Turpin & Lenoff, New York, N.Y. (Raymond F. Slattery and B. Jennifer Jaffee of counsel), for appellants. Law Office of Alex Klein, PLLC, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (McMahon, J.), dated January 28, 2013, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.
The plaintiff's vehicle was stopped in traffic when it was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned by the defendant El Sol Contracting and Construction Corp., and operated by the defendant Patrick Pranel. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
“The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; see Gifford v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 103 A.D.3d 773, 774, 959 N.Y.S.2d 728;Sehgal v. www. nyairportsbus. com, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 860, 955 N.Y.S.2d 604;Napolitano v. Galletta, 85 A.D.3d 881, 882, 925 N.Y.S.2d 163). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision ( see Martin v. Cartledge, 102 A.D.3d 841, 958 N.Y.S.2d 452;Kertesz v. Jason Transp. Corp., 102 A.D.3d 658, 957 N.Y.S.2d 730). In chain collision accidents, the operator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle ( see Raimondo v. Plunkitt, 102 A.D.3d 851, 852, 958 N.Y.S.2d 460;Hill v. Ackall, 71 A.D.3d 829, 895 N.Y.S.2d 837;Katz v. Masada II Car & Limo Serv., Inc., 43 A.D.3d 876, 841 N.Y.S.2d 370).
Here, in support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted evidence including the deposition testimony of the defendant driver, who testified that an unidentified vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear, causing his vehicle to move forward and strike the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. This testimony revealed the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver was at fault in the happening of the accident ( see Raimondo v. Plunkitt, 102 A.D.3d at 852, 958 N.Y.S.2d 460;Hill v. Ackall, 71 A.D.3d 829, 895 N.Y.S.2d 837;Katz v. Masada II Car & Limo Serv., Inc., 43 A.D.3d 876, 841 N.Y.S.2d 370). Since the plaintiff failed to establish her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, her motion should have been denied without regard to the sufficiency of the defendants' opposition papers ( see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion.