Summary
voicing the "well settled" principle that "a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle" requiring the driver "to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision," and thereby reflecting the view that the rear driver is better positioned to explain the cause of the collision
Summary of this case from Estate of Gustafson v. Target Corp.Opinion
2013-01-23
Alestine MARTIN, appellant, v. Junco CARTLEDGE, et al., respondents.
Janus Law, P.C. (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, N.Y., of counsel), for appellant. Karen L. Lawrence, Tarrytown, N.Y. (David Holmes of counsel), for respondent.
Janus Law, P.C. (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, N.Y., of counsel), for appellant. Karen L. Lawrence, Tarrytown, N.Y. (David Holmes of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated January 17, 2012, which denied her motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“It is well settled that a ‘rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle’ ” ( Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726, quoting Stalikas v. United Materials, 306 A.D.2d 810, 810, 760 N.Y.S.2d 804 [internal quotation marks omitted], affd.100 N.Y.2d 626, 769 N.Y.S.2d 191, 801 N.E.2d 411), “thereby requiring that [driver] to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” ( Giangrasso v. Callahan, 87 A.D.3d 521, 522, 928 N.Y.S.2d 68).
Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that her vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle owned and operated by the defendants while she was stopped on an entrance ramp, waiting to merge onto Route 9A in Peekskill. However, the defendants raised triable issues of fact in opposition to the motion by submitting evidence that the collision actually occurred after the plaintiff's vehicle had already completed the merge and then came to a sudden and unexplained stop in the middle of the roadway ( see Foti v. Fleetwood Ride, Inc., 57 A.D.3d 724, 725, 871 N.Y.S.2d 215;Delayhaye v. Caledonia Limo & Car Serv., Inc., 49 A.D.3d 588, 856 N.Y.S.2d 142;Niemiec v. Jones, 237 A.D.2d 267, 654 N.Y.S.2d 163). Given these sharply disputed factual and credibility issues regarding the manner in which the accident occurred, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.