MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By AMOS L. MAZZANT JUSTICE.

John S. Kreighbaum and Joanne F. Kreighbaum appeal the trial court's judgment denying their motion for attorney's fees against Michael Lester. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

Appellee purchased a house from appellants. When a decorative feature of the swimming pool began to leak, appellee sued appellants for breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Appellants counterclaimed for attorney's fees under section 17.50(c) of the business and commerce code. Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (defendant awarded attorney's fees when plaintiff's DTPA suit is groundless or brought in bad faith or for purpose of harassment). After appellee rested, appellee moved to nonsuit its breach of contract cause of action. Appellants then told the court they wanted to amend their counterclaim to assert entitlement to attorney's fees "pursuant to Article 17 of the Contract of Sale which provides that the prevailing party in any legal proceeding related to this contract is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and all costs of proceeding incurred by the prevailing party." Appellee objected to the court's allowing the trial amendment. The trial court granted appellee's motion to nonsuit the breach of contract claim, and the court stated it would "allow" appellant's trial amendment, but appellants did not file a written trial amendment. The parties agreed to submit the attorney's fees issue to the court after the jury rendered its verdict. The jury found appellants did not commit fraud or violate the DTPA.

After the conclusion of the jury trial, appellants filed a motion for award of attorney's fees. The motion stated,

The prevailing party in a suit in this case is entitled to its reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. Section 17 of the One to Four Family Residential Contract attached to Plaintiff's First Amended Petition reads:

ATTORNEY'S FEES: The prevailing party in any legal proceeding related to this contract is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and all costs of such proceeding incurred by the prevailing party.

Appellants did not move for attorney's fees under section 17.50(c) of the business and commerce code. They attached the affidavit of their attorney with his attorney's fees statement. Appellee filed a response to the motion for attorney's fees, asserting, amongst other arguments, appellants were not entitled to attorney's fees because they did not file a written pleading requesting attorney's fees under paragraph 17 of the contract.

The court denied appellants' motion for attorney's fees. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found, "Defendants failed to file any pleadings supporting an award of attorney fees under paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Contract, despite being given the opportunity to do so after leave was granted." The court then concluded, "Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees under the DTPA or under paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Contract."

Appellants brings one issue on appeal, that the trial court erred in failing to award appellants their attorney's fees pursuant to paragraph 17 of the contract.

PLEADINGS

Appellants assert they pleaded their entitlement to attorney's fees under paragraph 17 of the contract. Appellants' live pleading, their first amended answer and counterclaim, sets out background facts, a general denial, and affirmative defenses. The last two paragraphs of the pleading state:

IV. Counterclaim for Groundless DTPA Lawsuit

10. Defendants would show that Plaintiff's claims are groundless in fact or law, brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment. Pursuant to Section 17.50(c) of the Texas Business Commerce Code, Defendants are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of this lawsuit.

V.

Prayer for Relief

11. WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully pray that upon final trial of this lawsuit, the Court (a) dismiss Plaintiff's Original Petition with prejudice, (b) deny all relief requested by Plaintiff, (c) award Defendants their attorney's fees and costs, and (d) award Defendants such other and further relief to which they show themselves entitled.

Texas follows a "fair notice" standard for pleading, meaning we look to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). "A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. The purpose of this rule is to give the opposing party information sufficient to enable him to prepare a defense." Id. at 897 (quoting Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)). "The test of fair notice is `whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence, with the pleadings before him, can ascertain the nature and the basic issues of the controversy and the testimony probably relevant.'" Bowen v. Robinson, 01-05-00605-CV, 2006 WL 2192792, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2006, pet. denied) (quoting State Fid. Mortgage Co. v. Varner, 740 S.W.2d 477, 479-80 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (quoting 2 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts, § 5.05 (rev. 1982))). If a party pleads generally and then goes further and pleads specifically on the same subject, the specific allegations control. The pleader cannot rely on the general allegations but is confined to the specific allegations. Monsanto Co. v. Milam, 494 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1973); Chuck Wagon Feeding Co. v. Davis, 768 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). Likewise, when a party pleads a specific ground for recovery of attorney's fees, the party is limited to that ground and cannot recover attorney's fees on another, unpleaded ground. See Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 731 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).

Although appellants' prayer for relief contains a nonspecific request for attorney's fees, appellants' counterclaim specifically sets forth the basis for the request for attorney's fees, section 17.50(c) of the business and commerce code. An opposing attorney of reasonable competence reading appellants' pleading would conclude the request for attorney's fees in the prayer was based on the statement in the counterclaim that appellants are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 17.50(c) of the business and commerce code. Because the pleading does not mention entitlement to attorney's fees under the contract, an opposing attorney of reasonable competence would not interpret the pleading as seeking attorney's fees under the contract. Because appellants specifically pleaded for attorney's fees under section 17.50(c) and did not plead for attorney's fees under the contract, appellants are limited to recovery of attorney's fees under section 17.50(c) and are not entitled to recovery of fees under the contract.

We conclude the trial court did not err in determining appellants' written pleading did not seek attorney's fees under paragraph 17 of the contract.

Appellants also assert they orally amended their counterclaim in the trial court to assert a claim for attorney's fees under paragraph 17 of the contract. During the trial, appellants dictated the text of their trial amendment into the reporter's record, but they never filed an amended answer and counterclaim asserting entitlement to attorney's fees under the contract. Pleadings in district court must be in writing. Tex. R. Civ. P. 45, 46, 67. "A trial amendment must be filed as a written pleading; an oral statement at trial is insufficient to modify the pleadings." City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex. 2000). However, a party waives its complaint of the pleading's failure to be in writing by failing to object to this defect in the pleading. Id. In this case, appellee objected to the oral pleading in his response to appellants' motion for attorney's fees. At the time appellee objected, the trial court had not taken the attorney's fees issue under advisement. We conclude appellee's objection was timely. See id.; cf. Roark v. Stallworth Oil Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991) (failure to plead affirmative defense asserted as basis for summary judgment motion waived when nonmovant did not object to lack of pleading in its response or before rendition of judgment).

Although appellants' counterclaim requested attorney's fees under the DTPA, their motion for attorney's fees requested attorney's fees only under paragraph 17 of the contract. Because no written pleading supported the award of attorney's fees under paragraph 17 of the contract, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for attorney's fees. See Colonial Am. Cas. Sur. Co. v. Scherer, 214 S.W.3d 725, 735 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.); O'Connell v. Hitt, 730 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for attorney's fees. We overrule appellants' issue.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.