MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of appellee, Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. ["Citibank"] on a credit card debt. On appeal, appellant, Tiffany J. Koontz, contends that (1) there was no evidence of an agreement to arbitrate, (2) any arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to what law applied, and (3) the arbitrator failed to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In March 2005, Citibank sued Koontz for an unpaid credit card debt. Koontz answered and filed a counterclaim. On October 4, 2005, Citibank filed an amended motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. §§ 1- 16 (LexisNexis 2008) ("FAA"). Attached to the motion were the arbitration agreement and the affidavit of Susan Wills, a Citibank employee. On November 15, 2005, the trial court granted Citibank's motion to compel arbitration.

Koontz filed an appeal to this Court, which we dismissed for want of jurisdiction because no interlocutory appeal lies from the granting of a motion to compel arbitration. See Koontz v. Citibank, No. 01-05-01140-CV, 2007 WL 1299674, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st] May 3, 2007, no pet.) (memo op.).

The case proceeded to arbitration, and on February 25, 2008, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of Citibank. On March 11, 2008, the trial court signed a final judgment confirming the arbitrator's award. This appeal followed.

IS THERE PROOF OF AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE?

In issue one, Koontz contends the that there is no proof of an agreement to arbitrate because (1) under Texas law the agreement is invalid because it was never signed by Koontz, (2) the affidavit by Susan Wills in support of Citibank's motion to compel arbitration is not competent proof of an agreement to arbitrate, and (3) there is no evidence that Koontz ever applied for a credit card. Before respectively addressing each issue, we determine whether the case is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act or Texas law.

Does the FAA Apply?

First, Koontz argues that, because "the purported agreement does not specify which law controls, the presumption is that Texas law applies." However, the record shows that the arbitration agreement contains the language, "This arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Artibration Act [the `FAA']."

The FAA may govern a written arbitration clause enforced in Texas state court if the parties have expressly contracted for the FAA's application. In re Advance PCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 605-06, 606 n. 3 (Tex. 2005). When parties have designated the FAA to govern their arbitration agreement, their designation should be upheld. See id. at 606 n. 3. "Courts honor the parties' agreement to be bound by the FAA, upholding choice-of-law provisions providing for application of the FAA." In re Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 888, 896 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); see In re Kellogg Brown Root, 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2002, orig. proceeding) (applying FAA when agreement expressly invoked it); In re Alamo Lumber Co., 23 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding) (same).

Koontz also argues that the FAA does not apply because there is no evidence that the case involves interstate commerce. Again, we disagree. The extension of credit by an out-of-state institution to a Texas resident demonstrates a loan made in interstate commerce. See In re First Merit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001).

Because the agreement specifies that the FAA will apply and the extension of credit by a foreign bank to a Texas resident involves interstate commerce, we conclude that the FAA is applicable to the agreement.

Does the FAA require the Arbitration Agreement to be Signed?

Koontz argues that, under Texas law, TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 301.002(a)(2), 342.455(c) (Vernon 2006), a credit card agreement is invalid unless it is in writing, signed by both the lender and the borrower. Thus, Koontz argues that, because the credit card agreement is invalid, the arbitration clause found therein is invalid.

We reject this argument because we have already held that the arbitration agreement in this case is governed by the FAA. The record shows that Koontz had a credit card account with Citibank. On October 2003, Citibank send Koontz a Notice of Change in Terms amending the existing agreement with Citibank to include a "provision regarding binding arbitration." The agreement to arbitrate sent to Koontz with the Change in Terms included an "opt out" provision, which, if exercised, would have permitted Koontz to decline the arbitration agreement, while still using her account until the later of her current membership year or the expiration of her card. Koontz did not elect to opt out of the arbitration agreement. Instead, she continued to make purchases and payments after the date that the arbitration agreement became effective.

Numerous courts have, pursuant to the FAA, enforced almost identical Citibank arbitration provisions that were added to existing credit card agreements by amendment. See Taylor v. Citibank USA, N.A., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2003); see also Eaves-Leonos v. Assurant, Inc., No. 3:07CV00018, 2008 WL 80173 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 8, 2008); Dumanis v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., No. 6:07CV06070, 2007 WL 3253975 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007); Lowman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., No. 2:05CV08097, 2006 WL 6108680 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2006); Koenick v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., No. AW-05-1006, 2005 WL 1363982 (D. Md. June 7, 2005); Egerton v. Citibank, N.A., No. 2:03CV06907, 2004 WL 1057739, *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2004); Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Walker, No. A117770, 2008 WL 4175125 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008).

Does the Affidavit Support Citibank's Motion to Compel Arbitration?

Nevertheless, Koontz argues that Citibank's evidence in support of its motion to compel arbitration is incompetent. Specifically, Koontz argues that the affidavit by Susan Wills, which was used to authenticate Citibank's business records, is of no evidentiary value because Wills averred that "the statements set forth in this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. . . ."

Citibank argues that Koontz's objection is that the Wills affidavit is not based on personal knowledge and that, by failing to object at trial, Koontz waived this objection. We also perceive Koontz's complaint to be that the Wills affidavit fails to satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that, therefore, the business records attached to her affidavit are of no evidentiary value.

An objection that an affidavit fails to comply with the business records exception to the hearsay rule, as well as an objection that the affiant does not have personal knowledge, are objections to the form of the affidavit and must be preserved in the trial court. Dulong v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 261 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); Seidner v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 201 S.W.3d 332, 334-35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2006, pet. denied); Choctaw Props., L.L.C. v. Aledo I.S.D., 127 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.). Because Koontz did not object to Wills's affidavit before the trial court, she has failed to preserve for review her objections to the affidavit. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).

Is there Evidence that Koontz Applied for Credit Card?

Finally, Koontz contends that there is no evidence that she ever applied for a credit card. We disagree. Even though there is no copy of a credit card application in the documentary evidence, there is undisputed evidence that Citibank routinely extended Koontz credit, that Koontz made purchases with that credit, and that Koontz made payments toward her indebtedness. From this, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Koontz had, at some time in the past, applied for a credit card with Citibank.

However, the terms of the initial agreement with Citibank are irrelevant. Again, it is undisputed that after receiving the Notice of Change in Terms and the accompanying arbitration agreement, Koontz continued to use the card and did not "opt out" of the arbitration agreement. Koontz's continued use of the card after receiving the arbitration agreement established her assent to its terms. See e.g., Boomer v. AT T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (customer accepted terms of contract by failing to follow non-acceptance instructions in contract and continuing to use services); Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, NA., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2000) ("[Tlhe plaintiffs accepted the terms of the arbitration agreement by continuing to utilize their accounts."); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Tex. 2000) ("Plaintiffs continued to use their First USA credit cards after receipt of the amendments. Therefore, Plaintiffs . . . are contractually bound by the arbitration provision of their Cardmember Agreements."); Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (enforcing arbitration provision contained in amendment to credit card agreement because plaintiff maintained account after effective date of arbitration clause); Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that plaintiff "unequivocally manifested acceptance" of cardholder agreement by making purchases and payments on account).

We overrule issue one.

IS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AMBIGUOUS?

In issue two, Koontz contends that the arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to what law applies. We disagree. As stated above, the agreement specifically provides that the FAA will govern, and we previously concluded that the contract involves interstate commerce. Nevertheless, Koontz complains that the arbitration award and the judgment based thereon are silent as to what law applies. However, Koontz cites no authority requiring such a recitation to be in the award or the judgment.

We overrule issue two.

DID ARBITRATOR FAIL TO COMPLY WITH AGREEMENT?

In point of error three, Koontz contends that the arbitrator failed to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement because the arbitrator did not provide a brief statement of the reasons for the award. Essentially, Koontz argues that by failing to provide a statement of the reasons for the award, the arbitrator exceeded his powers, which is one of the grounds for setting aside arbitration agreements under the FAA. See 9 U.S.C.S. § 10(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2008).

However, the record shows that Koontz failed to timely request a statement of reasons. The American Arbitration Association ["AAA"] is one of three firms identified by the agreement to arbitrate from which either party could select. Citibank selected the AAA. Per the terms of the agreement to arbitrate, selection of the AAA had the effect of incorporating the AAA's procedures and rules:

The arbitration will follow procedures and rules of the arbitration firm . . . unless those procedures and rules are inconsistent with this Agreement, in which case this Agreement will prevail.

As Koontz correctly states, the agreement to arbitrate permits either party to request a statement of the arbitrator's reasons:

The arbitrator will make any award in writing and, if requested by you or us, will provide a brief statement of the reasons for the award.

The record is silent whether the arbitrator gave any oral statement of his reasons for the award. There is no written statement of such reasons.

However, to be entitled to such a written statement of reasons, Koontz was required to comply with Rule 42 of the AAA procedures, which provides:

R-42. Form of Award

(a) Any award shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators. It shall be executed in the manner required by law.

(b) The arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.

Consistent with the language in the agreement to arbitrate, Rule 42 permits a party to request a reasoned award. Rule 42, however, details (1) how such a request is to be made, in writing, which Koontz did, and (2) when such a request must be made, prior to appointment of the arbitrator, which Koontz did not do.

The arbitrator heard the matter beginning on February 12, 2008. Koontz's request for a statement of reasons is dated February 18, 2008, clearly after appointment of the arbitrator and after the hearing. Without a timely request by Koontz, the arbitrator was not required to provide a statement of reasons for the award, and, as such, did not exceed his authority.

We overrule issue of error three.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.