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Kipkirwa v. Ikea Property, Inc.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, N.D. California
Apr 29, 2004
03-1892 MMC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2004)

Opinion


LAZARUS KIPKIRWA, Plaintiff, v. IKEA PROPERTY, INC; et al., Defendants. No. 03-1892 MMC (Docket No. 40) United States District Court, N.D. California. April 29, 2004

          ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT IKEA PROPERTY, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REMANDING IN PART

          MAXINE CHESNEY, District Judge.

         Before the Court is defendant Ikea Property, Inc.'s ("Ikea") motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Lance Kipkirwa has not filed opposition. Having considered the papers filed in support of the motion, the Court rules as follows.

By order filed April 16, 2004, the motion was taken under submission on the moving papers.

         Plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint ("AC"), alleges that he was discharged from his employment with "Ikea Property, Inc.; Yes on Measure C" after he requested his paycheck. (See AC ¶¶ 4, 12-13.) Based on such discharge, plaintiff, in his First Cause of Action, alleges that Ikea violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). Plaintiff's remaining claims, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action, arise under the common law of the State of California and are also based on the allegation that Ikea discharged plaintiff after he requested a paycheck.

By order filed June 4, 2003, the Court dismissed plaintiff's Second and Seventh Causes of Action, without leave to amend. (See Order Granting Defendant Soto-Neira's Mot. to Dismiss at 5:6-7). Additionally, the Court dismissed plaintiff's Third and Eighth Causes of Action, with leave to amend. (See id. at 5:8-9.) Because plaintiff did not thereafter amend his AC, his Third and Eighth Causes of Action are no longer before the Court. (See id. at 5:10-13.)

         Ikea argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the First Cause of Action on the ground plaintiff cannot establish any conduct by Ikea in violation of either Title VII or FEHA. The Court agrees.

Based on this finding, the Court does not address Ikea's alternative argument that plaintiff lacks evidence to establish Ikea was plaintiff's employer.

         Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff does not allege that Ikea discharged him on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; rather, plaintiff alleges that Ikea discharged him because he engaged in the "activity of asking for his paycheck." (See AC ¶ 20.) In short, plaintiff cannot establish a violation of Title VII under his asserted theory.

         Under FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer, "because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of any person, to... discharge the person from employment..., or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). Plaintiff does not allege that Ikea discharged him on account of his race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation; rather, plaintiff alleges Ikea discharged him after he "complain[ed] that defendant did not provide him with his paycheck." (See AC ¶ 28.) In short, plaintiff cannot establish a violation of FEHA under his asserted theory.

         Accordingly, Ikea is entitled to summary judgment on the First Cause of Action.

         Moreover, because plaintiff seeks to establish the First Cause of Action against the other remaining defendant, Yes on Measure C, on the same grounds as alleged against Ikea, Yes on Measure C likewise is entitled to summary judgment on the First Cause of Action. See Silverton v. Department of Treasury , 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.) (holding dismissal of claims against defendant who has not moved to dismiss is appropriate where such defendant is in "position similar to that of the moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).

On January 29, 2004, plaintiff filed a document in which he asserts he caused Yes on Measure C to be served with a summons on January 29, 2004. (See Declaration of Proof of Mailing.) The propriety, or lack thereof, of this service attempt is not before the Court.

         Finally, with respect to plaintiff's remaining claims, the Court's jurisdiction over the instant action is based on the existence of a federal question. (See Not. of Removal, filed April 25, 2002, ¶ 2.) Because plaintiff's remaining causes of action arise under state law, the Court's jurisdiction over such claims is supplemental in nature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Where, as here, a district court has granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's federal claim, the district court, pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), may properly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See Bryant v. Adventist Health System/West , 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Accordingly, pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), the Court will exercise its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims.

         CONCLUSION

         For the reasons stated above:

         1. Ikea's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part, and summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Ikea and Yes on Measure C on the First Cause of Action.

         2. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action are hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Mateo.

         The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.

         IT IS SO ORDERED.

         JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

         [] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

         [x] Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

         IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

         1. Ikea's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part, and summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Ikea and Yes on Measure C on the First Cause of Action.

         2. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action are hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of San Mateo.


Summaries of

Kipkirwa v. Ikea Property, Inc.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, N.D. California
Apr 29, 2004
03-1892 MMC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2004)
Case details for

Kipkirwa v. Ikea Property, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LAZARUS KIPKIRWA, Plaintiff, v. IKEA PROPERTY, INC; et al., Defendants…

Court:United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, N.D. California

Date published: Apr 29, 2004

Citations

03-1892 MMC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2004)