Summary
dismissing Bivens complaint against a federal district court judge at the screening stage on the ground that the judge was "absolutely immune from monetary damages and declaratory or injunctive relief for any actions taken with respect to Plaintiff's habeas petition"
Summary of this case from Pettus-Brown v. CooperOpinion
No. 02-71626-DT
June 12, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Anthony M. Kipen's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a prisoner currently confined at the Mid-Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan. Plaintiff is suing Judge David M. Lawson, a federal district court judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff requests compensatory damages in the amount of five hundred thousand ($500,000.00) dollars, punitive damages in the amount of five million ($5,000,000.00) dollars, and hedonic damages in the amount of ten million ($10,000,000.00) dollars. Plaintiff also requests declaratory and injunctive relief in this case. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Complaint and now dismisses it for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees. See 28 § U.S.C. § 1915(a); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) states:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that:
(B) the action or appeal:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore, 114 F.3d at 612; Goodell v. Anthony, 157 F. Supp.2d 796, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
A pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Middleton v. McGinnis, 860 F. Supp. 391, 392 ( E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); that is, such complaints are held to a "less stringent standard" than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Such complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a legal wrong has been committed from which plaintiff may be granted relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp.2d 748, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
III. Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the United States District Court for the Eastern District, Northern Division, on January 29, 2001. The case was assigned to Judge David M. Lawson. The respondent was ordered to file an answer to the Petition by April 19, 2001. When the respondent failed to file a timely answer, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default with the Clerk's office. On April 30, 2001, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for Judge Lawson to either issue the writ of habeas corpus or to proceed to a Rule 8 hearing on the merits of the petition. See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 8. On May 28, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to compel Judge Lawson to issue the writ of habeas corpus. On September 21, 2001, the Sixth Circuit denied the writ of mandamus. In Re Kipen, U.S.C.A. 01-1725 (6th Cir. September 21, 2001). On June 6, 2001, respondent filed a late motion for an enlargement of time to file their answer, which Judge Lawson granted. On August 13, 2001, respondent filed an Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Plaintiff filed a response to the answer on August 17, 2001. On September 4, 2001, Judge Lawson denied Plaintiffs request for the appointment of counsel. On December 12, 2001, Plaintiff filed an amended brief in support of his ex parte motion to issue the writ of habeas corpus and an amended brief in support of a motion that he had filed earlier to strike the respondent's motion for an enlargement of time to file the answer. On January 25, 2002, Judge Lawson issued an order denying the motion for enlargement of time as being moot.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Lawson has failed to abide by the time limits imposed by the United States Constitution, federal court rules and laws, and the U.S. Supreme Court rules, for disposing of his habeas petition in a timely manner.
IV. Discussion
The instant lawsuit must be dismissed, because Judge Lawson has absolute judicial immunity from being sued for monetary damages or for declaratory or injunctive relief.
This Court initially notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to actions against Federal officials, because they are not state actors acting under color of state law. See Benson v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 1129, 1135 (N.D. Ill. 1997). However, a plaintiff may file suit in federal court for damages arising from a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal law. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). A Bivens action is considered the federal counterpart of a Section 1983 action. Shannon v. General Electric Co., 812 F. Supp. 308, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). Accordingly, this Court construes Plaintiffs § 1983 action against Judge Lawson as a Bivens action.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants state and local judges absolute immunity for their judicial acts. Federal judges possess identical § 1983 immunity. Tinsley v. Widener, 150 F. Supp.2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2001). Federal judges are absolutely immune from liability for monetary damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction or judicial duties. Mehdipour v. Purcell, 175 F. Supp.2d 1165, 1166 (W.D. Okla. 2001); Glendora v. City of White Plains, 53 F. Supp.2d 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity serves to protect federal judges from injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240-1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). Federal judges are also immune from Bivens suits for equitable relief. Newsome v. Merz, 17 Fed. Appx. 343, 345 (6th Cir. 2001). The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity also precludes the granting of declaratory relief against a federal judge. Mehdipour v. Purcell, 175 F. Supp.2d at 1167.
In the present case, Judge Lawson would be absolutely immune from monetary damages and declaratory or injunctive relief for any actions taken with respect to Plaintiffs habeas petition, because the disposition of habeas petitions is a judicial act. See e.g. Maus v. Curran, 945 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (federal judge could not be held personally liable under § 1983 action for allegedly conspiring to deny inmate his civil rights; judge had jurisdiction to hear and deny inmate's habeas petition and his request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and therefore could not be liable under the one exception to the rule of absolute judicial immunity; i.e. where the judge has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction). Because Judge Lawson is acting within his jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs habeas petition, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity would preclude a lawsuit against him for monetary damages or declaratory or injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.