Opinion
No. 05-16-00467-CV
03-09-2017
MEREDITH KING, Appellant v. GILBERT DWAYNE KING, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-15-1086
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Evans, Stoddart, and Boatright
Opinion by Justice Boatright
Appellant Meredith King filed a petition for post-divorce division of property, alleging that the parties' divorce decree failed to award or divide appellee Gilbert Dwayne King's total retirement benefit. The case proceeded to trial before the court. After hearing evidence, the trial court granted Dwayne's motion for judgment. In a single issue, Meredith contends the trial court erred by denying Meredith's request for post-divorce division of property. We affirm.
"Dwayne" is the name appellee's brief uses.
BACKGROUND
Dwayne participated in the Texas Municipal Retirement System ("TMRS"). Meredith alleges that Dwayne's TMRS plan had two parts, (1) Dwayne's individual contribution and (2) the municipality's matching contribution, but that their divorce decree addressed only the individual contribution, not the matching one. The decree provided in relevant part:
Property to Husband
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the husband, Gilbert Dwayne King, is awarded the following as his sole and separate property, and the wife is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property: . . .
H-4. Husband's TMRS account with the City of Mesquite, except for the amount of $32,000.00 of Husband's TMRS which is awarded to Wife.
H-5. Husband's deferred compensation plan. . . .
Property to Wife
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the wife, Meredith Lyn King, is awarded the following as her sole and separate property, and the husband is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property: . . .
W-4. Wife's TRS, Vanguard and 457 account. . . .
W-7. The equivalent of $32,000.00 from husband's TMRS, plus any interest on that award after July 22, 2014 ([date] of mediation) to be awarded to wife through a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
The decree was the merger of a mediated settlement agreement ("MSA") that provided in part:
2. Husband is awarded his deferred compensation.
3. Wife is awarded her TRS, Vanguard account and 457 account. Wife is also awarded $32,000.00 in husband's TMRS by Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
4. Father [Husband] is awarded balance of $40,000 (cp) of his TMRS, plus his separate property interest.
The parties agreed that "cp" was an abbreviation for "community property."
The parties agreed that the decree would control in the event it differed from the MSA. The parties also agreed the decree was "a full and complete resolution of this case" effecting "a just and right division of the marital debt and assets. . . ."
At trial, Meredith offered expert testimony by William C. Clifton that TMRS is a "hybrid plan." The employee or "member" makes contributions to an individual account. The municipality may also make a matching contribution when the member retires. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 851.001-855.608 (West 2012 & Supp. 2016). Clifton explained that "the member gets the benefit" of the municipality's matching contribution on retirement, but the matching contributions are credited only to the municipality's account in a "benefit accumulation fund," not to the member's account. Clifton testified that paragraph H-4 of the decree included only Dwayne's individual contribution to the account, not the municipality's contributions.
Meredith testified that she did not intend to award Dwayne the municipality's matching contributions in the decree. She assumed that the matching contributions would "follow" the portion of the TMRS that was awarded to her in the decree.
When Meredith finished presenting evidence, Dwayne moved for judgment. The court granted the motion, and eventually issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Among other things, the court found that the parties had intended "to divide all property at the time of divorce, and not leave any assets to be divided at a later date." The court concluded that the decree and MSA partitioned all property rights concerning Dwayne's TMRS.
Specifically, he made a motion for a "directed verdict," even though this was a bench trial.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
If a divorce decree fails to dispose of property subject to division, either former spouse may file suit to divide the property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.201(a) (West 2006). Under section 9.201, Meredith had the burden to establish that community property existed when the marriage was being dissolved and that the property was not divided or considered by the court when rendering the final divorce decree. Brown v. Brown, 236 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
When construing an agreement incident to divorce, we look to the intentions of the parties in the written agreement. Bishop v. Bishop, 74 S.W.3d 877, 879-80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). We construe the decree as a whole to harmonize and give effect to the entire document. Beshears v. Beshears, 423 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).
We review the court's legal conclusions de novo, and will uphold them if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Brown, 236 S.W.3d at 348.
DISCUSSION
The question presented is whether the divorce decree "failed to dispose of property subject to division." FAM. § 9.203(a). Meredith argues that the decree divides only Dwayne's individual member account and not the municipality's matching contribution. Dwayne argues the decree disposed of his entire retirement benefit.
Supporting Meredith's interpretation, the parties described the interest they were dividing in the decree as "husband's TMRS" or "Husband's TMRS account." Dwayne's contributions to the retirement system are credited to a "member's individual account." GOV'T §§ 855.306; 855.401-.402. In contrast, the municipality's contributions are deposited in "an account of a participating municipality in the benefit accumulation fund." Id. §§ 855.307(a)(1). The terms "husband's TMRS" and "Husband's TMRS account" in the decree correspond with the term "member's individual account," rather than "account of a participating municipality in the benefit accumulation fund." This suggests that "husband's TMRS" and "Husband's TMRS account" do not refer to the municipality's matching funds, and that the decree did not dispose of those funds.
Supporting Dwayne's interpretation, the parties agreed in the decree that they had made a "full and complete resolution of this case," which included a "just and right division of the parties' marital estate." If the parties had not intended the decree to dispose of the municipality's matching funds, the divorce decree could not have been a full and complete resolution of the case. This suggests that the parties intended the decree to dispose of the matching funds. Meredith's testimony supports that suggestion. She could not have assumed, at the time of divorce, that the municipality's matching funds would follow the portion of the TMRS awarded to her under the decree if she did not also think that the decree disposed of those funds.
The trial court agreed with Dwayne's interpretation, concluding that the decree "partitioned all property rights concerning Husband's Texas Municipal Retirement System." The trial court's conclusion is supported by evidence that the parties intended to make a full and complete resolution of the case. See Brown, 236 S.W.3d at 348 (noting that appellate courts uphold a conclusion of law if the judgment can be sustained on a legal theory supported by evidence).
CONCLUSION
Because evidence supports the conclusion that the final decree of divorce disposed of both Dwayne's individual contribution to TMRS and the municipality's matching funds, the trial court did not err in denying Meredith's request for post-divorce division of Dwayne's TMRS benefit. We overrule Meredith's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Jason E. Boatright/
JASON E. BOATRIGHT
JUSTICE 160467F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court, Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-15-1086.
Opinion delivered by Justice Boatright; Justices Evans and Stoddart participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's Order Denying Relief in Suit for Postdivorce Division of Property is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Gilbert Dwayne King recover his costs of this appeal from appellant Meredith King. Judgment entered this 9th day of March, 2017.