Opinion
NNHCV166062161S
08-29-2018
KEYBANK, N.A. v. Arden BRIGHTLY aka Arden L. Santana et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
SPADER, J.
The Court has considered the arguments of the defendant and the response of the plaintiff and is not persuaded to reopen the judgment pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-212a. The defendant has not presented good cause for the Court to reopen judgment and instead doubled-down on her earlier arguments that the Court has already considered and rejected as being without legal and/or factual basis.
The defendant argues that the Court showed prejudice by not ruling specifically on her Motion # 208 (Motion to Dismiss), the Court did reference it in its Memorandum of Decision, but for the defendant’s edification here, to the extent that the Motion cites Connecticut law (rather than federal "precedent" and procedural rules that may or may not be binding on this Court), the Court makes a factual finding that the plaintiff complied with the Court’s discovery Order and accepts the plaintiff’s Notice thereof (# 193).
The Order required the plaintiff to produce copies of the note, mortgage and modifications and assignments thereto; copies of correspondence with SBLI; and copies of payments from SBLI. Copies of the note and mortgage were supplied, multiple times, in attachments to motions and, as averred to by Plaintiff’s counsel, provided in response to discovery. There were no modifications or assignments thereto, because, as discussed at oral argument, transfer of the instruments was through bank merger, not assignment. From information provided at the oral argument on the motions, plaintiff has no correspondence with SBLI and no payments from SBLI, so could not, therefore, provide copies. The Motion to Dismiss for alleged discovery violations was properly denied.
The defendant provided the Court with a copy of its Order # 160.30 at oral argument in complaint that the Plaintiff did not provide a witness pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Order to testify as to payments. The paragraph is in an Order that denied the defendant’s motion to implead and is in a context of having a witness testify as to payments allegedly from SBLI. As noted above, there are no payments to testify about, so the Court factually finds that the plaintiff’s not producing a witness to testify regarding non-existing payments did not violate any Court Order.
The defendant then continues many of the same arguments made to the Court in previous pleadings, largely centering on the allegation that the plaintiff is acting in bad faith and without due diligence and that there is no subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The defendant also alleges that plaintiff’s counsel should not be authorized to make any representations regarding the plaintiff before the court. The Court is not convinced that these are compelling arguments, and had considered all of the arguments set forth prior to issuing its previous Memorandum of Decision.
"Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power of court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. See Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 261 Conn. 1, 21 (2002). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 527 (2002). Once raised, the court must consider and decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding further. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6 (2003).
The defendant appears to be largely making her subject matter jurisdictional claim as an issue of the plaintiff’s standing because of the Affidavit of Lost Note being used in the proceedings instead of the actual original note. The Court dealt with this issue in its original Memorandum and has not changed its mind following the additional briefing. The Court accepts the Affidavit of Lost Note as having attached to it a true copy of the original Note. The defendant alleges that the Affidavit of Lost Note evidences "falsification" and "self-serving" motivation by the plaintiff (see Page 11 of her Affidavit in Support of her Motion to Open), but there is no evidence that the attachment to the affidavit was false, and when asked at the July hearing, the defendant could not point to any credible reason to believe the attachment was not a true copy of the original.
If her argument is straight lack of "subject matter jurisdiction," The Superior Court has jurisdiction over foreclosure matters pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 51-164s. This Court (specifically the Superior Court for the Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven) is the venue statutorily mandated to hear foreclosure matters for properties situated in the City of New Haven pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 51-345.
The defendant alleges that the plaintiff was in default for failure to plead pursuant to her Motion # 196.00 and all subsequent activity in the case should be disregarded and the case dismissed. This default was granted by the Court Clerk on May 14, 2018. On May 17, 2018, the plaintiff filed a responsive pleading (Motion to Strike, Motion # 197.00), and as this responsive pleading was filed within 15 days of the granting of the default and before the defendant moved for judgment on the default, the default for failure to plead was automatically set aside as a matter of law.
The defendant also continues to seek legal advice from the Court, claiming a self-represented litigant is entitled to Court-provided legal assistance pursuant to Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 26 (1991). Platsky advises courts that "[p ]ro se [litigants] are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has instructed the district courts to construe pro se [pleadings] liberally and to apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se [pleading] than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel." Platsky at 28.
Recognizing this principle, generally (as it is also the position of the Connecticut Judicial Branch to provide accessibility to self-represented litigants), the Court carefully considered all of the defendant’s filings as well-pleaded and attempted to consider her arguments as best as possible to form a cause of action or defense in the instant matter. The defendant has severe credibility issues with her arguments. Even in footnote 3 to her Motion to Open, she again claims that the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt was fraudulent because it doesn’t include payments it received from the so-called "insurance policy." The affidavit does not include any of these fictitious payments because this Court found credible the plaintiff’s contention that it did not receive any insurance payments. Certain pleadings filed by the defendant also acknowledge that no payment was received from the insurance company. She even filed a complaint with the State of Connecticut to receive more information and provided the correspondence to the Court wherein it was found by the State that the policy was not in effect at the time of the defendant’s mother’s passing. The Court attempted to construe all of the defendant’s arguments, such as this example above, in the best light possible for the defendant’s claims, but still found it proper to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendant was not pleased that the Court accepted affidavits from the plaintiff. The defendant argues that this is an error because the affidavits are not "verified" and are not proper business records or are hearsay under New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corporation, 238 Conn. 745 (1996). As the Court noted in its Decision, the Court did not find the need for a trial in this matter which would require the production of witnesses, as the defendant’s theories of payment (by life insurance or U.S. Treasury "check") were not credible to the Court and the affidavit matches the defendant’s argument that she ceased making monthly payments in late 2015. The issue that the Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court on in Bedford is that the Court accepted transcripts from prior proceedings in the same case into evidence without a showing that the same witness was then-unavailable for the new trial. The Court did not admit a transcript here, it accepted an Affidavit of Debt that established the default under the mortgage and the amounts due thereunder, after finding that the defendant’s arguments regarding payment in full were not credible.
It should be noted in Bedford, as here, that the Appellate Court did NOT find error with the substituted plaintiff proceeding with an Affidavit of Lost Note and even admitting it was never in possession of the original note:
GHR is seeking to enforce a debt, evidenced by a promissory note, through the equitable remedy of foreclosure. "The mortgage secures the indebtedness itself, not the written evidence of it." G. Osborne, Mortgages (2d Ed. 1970) § 105. Because GHR has chosen to pursue the equitable action of foreclosure of the mortgage, rather than a legal action on the note, the fact that GHR never possessed the lost promissory note is not fatal to its foreclosure of the mortgage. Moreover, GHR has not sought a deficiency judgment. Thus, whatever restrictions § § 42a-3-301 and 42a-3-309 might put upon the enforcement of personal liability based solely upon a lost note, they do not prohibit GHR from pursuing an action of foreclosure to enforce the terms of the mortgage.Bedford at 759-60.
The defendant continues to allege that Keybank has no standing to be before this Court even though it clearly does as the successor in interest to New Haven Savings Bank.
This could also be another of the defendant’s "subject matter jurisdiction" claims, but, in any event, the Court finds that Keybank has standing in this matter.
The defendant again submits in her Motion to Open that the plaintiff was paid through the self-described "negotiable instrument" she "tendered" to the plaintiff. The defendant cites Spencer v. Sterling Bank, 63 Cal.App.4th 1055 (1998), a case about forged trustee checks, to support her position that the plaintiff accepted the "instrument" pursuant to UCC § 3-409 and § 3-410. And, she contends, that since the plaintiff only provided a prejudicial enlarged copy of the "instrument" in its pleadings without the accompanying instructions, the Court did not see the way in which the plaintiff followed those instructions and ledgered the "payment."
The defendant then cites Pub.L.No. 73-10, 28 Stat. 31 (1933) to support her contention that the Federal Reserve resolved this case with the plaintiff because of the tender of this "instrument," and helpfully provided the Court with a copy of the 1933 Act of Congress in her Exhibit B . While the defendant does not label her claims as "redemptionist theories," the Court adopts the findings of other Courts that have described these arguments accordingly. Just as those other Courts have done, this Court wholeheartedly and emphatically rejects these theories. For a full primer on the various theories (also known as "vapor money theory" and "unlawful money theory")- and the other Courts that have rejected them, see McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, 726 F.Supp.2d 201 (U.S. District of Connecticut, 2010).
The specific theory advanced by the defendant here is the so-called "bill of exchange theory." Nothing in the 1933 Act of Congress or the defendant’s cited case of Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939) obligates the Secretary of the United States Treasury to ascribe value to the worthless piece of paper provided to the plaintiff by the defendant in this case or for the plaintiff to accept that scrap of paper as legal tender against the debt owed on the mortgage.
At oral argument, the defendant provided the Court with copies of four additional filings that were mailed to the Court Clerk on Friday, August 24, 2018:
1) An "Affidavit of Denial of U.S. Citizenship" asserting her intention to be a "Moor Connecticuter Aboriginal National" rather than a citizen of the United States of America;
2) An alleged "Trademark Notice" of the defendant’s name;
3) A purported "Claim of Lien" against the Connecticut State Department of Health in the amount of nine billion dollars; and
4) A "Constitutional Challenge to State Statutes and Order to Intervene" addressed to the Connecticut Attorney General and purportedly filed by Nedra Yahsal El under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure noting an October 29, 2018 Court date to challenge the constitutionality of various statutes concerning strict foreclosures, foreclosures by sale, and court fees for motions to open.
The Court has no idea what bearing these documents have to the matters at hand. If the defendant is trying to claim an avoidance of personal jurisdiction to the Court by her as a defendant, there is no prohibition against non-citizens being made parties to foreclosure actions. (see Judge Abrams’ Order on Motion to Dismiss, Bank of America, N.A. v. Derisme, NNH-CV-09-6004583-S, (Superior Court, JD. New Haven, January 21, 2010).
To the extent that the defendant believes the "Constitutional Challenge" filing will cause the Court Clerk to schedule a Hearing for her with the Connecticut Attorney General on October 29, 2018, she is mistaken. The Attorney General is not a party to this case and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not bear on the Connecticut State Court Clerk’s scheduling of cases. Further, as this Court has already advised the defendant, it will not accept pleadings by non-parties. Nedra Yahsal El is not a party to this action and this party’s continual claim of ownership over the defendant is concerning to the Court. As Nedra Yahsal El is not a party to this action and cannot "own" the defendant, the Court is striking this "pleading."
By continuing to espouse oft-discredited (and non-logical) redemption theories and engaging in sovereign citizenship displays before the Court, the defendant harms her credibility in other legal arguments. The Court sincerely believes it tried to fairly consider the defendant’s arguments, but none are compelling to evidence payment in full of the plaintiff’s mortgage or act as a defense to the plaintiff’s proceeding herein. The defendant may, in good faith, really believe the veracity of her various claims here. That misguided belief, however, does not make the faulty claims actual defenses that the Court must accept. The Court has to act with fairness and impartiality to all parties and here the plaintiff has established its case for foreclosure.
The Court needs good cause to open its judgment, and the defendant has merely restated her already discredited arguments that the Court carefully considered and rejected. The Motion to Open is, therefore, DENIED.