Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof which denied those branches of the defendants' respective motions which were to dismiss the first and second causes of action of the amended complaint, and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the defendants' respective motions; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The Supreme Court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' first and second causes of action alleging violations of General Business Law §§ 349 and 350. These causes of action are premised on statements made to the plaintiffs and other patients about the course of treatment at the defendants' infertility clinic and the probable results of that treatment. We decline to extend the application of the consumer fraud statutes to the providers of medical services ( see, e.g., Foflygen v. Zemel, 615 A.2d 1345 [Pa]; Gatten v. Merzi, 397 Pa. Super. 148, 579 A.2d 974). To do so would lead to a drastic change in basic tort law where the Legislature has not explicitly expressed its intent to effect such a change ( see, Genesco Entertainment v Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 753). The plaintiffs possess a viable cause of action to recover damages for lack of informed consent which should not be augmented by rights to additional recovery ( see, Teller v. Bill Hayes, Ltd., 213 A.D.2d 141, 149).

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the fifth and sixth causes of action sounding in fraud. Where a fraud claim gives rise to damages which are not separate and distinct from those flowing from an alleged medical malpractice cause of action, it must be dismissed ( see, Luciano v. Levine, 232 A.D.2d 378; Romatowski v Hitzig, 227 A.D.2d 870; Spinosa v. Weinstein, 168 A.D.2d 32, 42). Here, the alleged fraud is part of the alleged malpractice ( see, Coppersmith v. Gold, 172 A.D.2d 982, 984).

Further, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the third cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary medical obligations, and the seventh cause of action to recover for unjust enrichment, as they were merely reformulations of the cause of action to recover damages for lack of informed consent.

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

Bracken, J.P., Santucci, Altman and McGinity, JJ., concur.