JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

The plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Rikers Island, brought this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated. By order dated December 11, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis ("IFP")

I.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) . The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475, has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must include enough facts to ..state a claim for. relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678-79.

II.

The plaintiff originally filed this complaint with 49 other detainees at the Vernon C. Bain Center ("VCBC"}. The original complaint alleged that the plaintiffs had been forced into unsafe living conditions, including by being housed in units without appropriate capacity limitations to allow for social distancing. See ECF No. 2. The plaintiffs alleged that certain other detainees had contracted or been exposed to COVID-19 as a result of these conditions. Id. at 6. The plaintiffs sought an improvement of conditions, including a reduction in housing capacity; monetary damages; and the release of detainees who met certain criteria. Id. at 6-7.

The original complaint was assigned to Judge George B. Daniels and opened under docket number 20-cv-8407. On October 29, 2020, Judge Daniels referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Aaron, who, in an order dated November 9, 2020, severed the plaintiffs' claims and directed that each plaintiff's claims be opened as a separate action. See Lee v. Brann, No. 20-cv-8407, ECF Nos. 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2020). This action is one of the newly opened actions.

On November 24, 2020, Lee filed an amended complaint in Lee v. Brann, which the plaintiff signed. Id., ECF No. 14. At Judge Aaron's direction, the amended complaint was docketed in each of the severed actions, including this one. Id., ECF No. 19. The amended complaint provided fewer details than the original complaint and did not specify how the defendants specifically violated any of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, on December 17, 2020, this Court issued a sua sponte order explaining that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and granting the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims. ECF No. 8.

The plaintiff filed the second amended complaint on January 25, 2022. ECF No. 12. In it, the plaintiff alleges that he has been denied adequate mental health treatment and other medical care, including the use of a "C PAP machine to sleep" and the ability to see and contact doctors inside the jail, id. at 2-3, 5, 11; has been detained in unconstitutional conditions of confinement, id. at 2; and has been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to communicate with individuals outside of prison, including an attorney, the media, members of the clergy, doctors, and this Court, as a result of a "court gag order" issued by a New York State judge and the actions of DOC personnel, id. at 3-5. The plaintiff also reguests release from custody and seeks a transfer to a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 2, 9.

III.

A. The plaintiff's second amended complaint contains serious allegations. However, the plaintiff fails to specify who the defendants are in this case. To the extent that the plaintiff continues to bring claims against the defendants named in the original complaint - specifically, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction, Cynthia Brann; "Health Director Commissioner, "' Patsy Yang; Board of Correction Executive Director, Margaret Egan; and the New York City Department of Correction (the "DOC") - the plaintiff's claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. First, as this Court explained in its December 17, 2020 Order, ECF No. 8, the DOC, as an agency of the City of New York, is not an entity that can be sued. See N.Y.C. Charter § 396. Second, an individual defendant may not be held liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Rather, ^tt[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official." Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). And, in this case, there are no facts demonstrating that each of the individual defendants were personally involved in the events underlying the plaintiff's claims. This is fatal to the plaintiff's claims. See Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F.Supp.2d 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[W]here the complaint names a defendant in the caption but contains no allegations indicating exactly how the defendant violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted."), aff'd sub nom. Dove v. O'Hare, 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000). The plaintiff is advised that, to the extent he seeks to brings claims against these or other individual defendants, he must identify those individuals with sufficient specificity, and must state facts in .his complaint showing how each of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged unlawful acts against the plaintiff.

B.

Some of the plaintiff's claims fail to state a claim for the additional reason that they seek this Court's intervention in a state criminal action that appears to be pending. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court may not generally intervene in a pending state-court criminal proceeding. See Heicklen v. Morgenthau, 37 8 Fed.Appx. 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). Younger abstention is required when: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claim. Diamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). However, a federal court may nevertheless intervene in a state proceeding "upon a showing of bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief." Id.

In this case, because the plaintiff does not assert any facts suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate, the Court declines to intervene in the plaintiff s ongoing criminal matter based on the facts pleaded in the second amended complaint. The plaintiff is advised that, if the plaintiff seeks his release, or is challenging the constitutionality of his conviction, he may file a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhausting his available state-court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (A) .

IV.

The plaintiff is granted leave to replead his claims in a third amended complaint. The plaintiff is advised that this amended complaint should include a clear and concise account of the facts giving rise to these claims. The plaintiff should provide sufficient detail as to each individual defendant (e.g., name, rank, place and time of employment, and physical description) to allow that defendant to be identified for purposes of service. To the greatest extent possible, the plaintiff's amended complaint must:

(a) give the names and titles of all relevant persons;

(b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support the plaintiff's case, including what each defendant did or failed to do;

(c) give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event;

(d) give the location where each relevant event occurred; (e) describe how each defendant's acts or omissions violated the plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries that the plaintiff suffered; and

(f) state what relief the plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Essentially, the body of the plaintiff s third amended complaint must tell the Court who violated his federally protected rights, what facts show that his federally protected rights were violated, when such violation occurred, where such violation occurred, and why the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Because the plaintiff's third amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the plaintiff's previous complaints, any facts or claims that the plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the third amended complaint.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiff's second amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).

The plaintiff must submit the third amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this Order, caption the document as a "Third Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 20-cv-9485 (JGK). A Third Amended Complaint form is attached to this Order. The plaintiff is advised to utilize this form.

No summons will issue at this time.

If the plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the third amended complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff and to note service on the docket. The plaintiffs current address is:

Matthew Karelefsky

Anna M, Kross Center (AMKC)

16-06 Hazen Street

East Elmhurst, New York

11370

SO ORDERED.