Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-01-263-PLA.
Submitted: October 5, 2006.
Decided: November 8, 2006.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE GRANTED
This 8th day of November, 2006, upon consideration of the motion in limine filed by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. ("Honda") and Union Park, Inc. ("Union Park") (collectively "Defendants"), it appears to the Court that:
1. In January 2003, Denise Juliano and Geno Juliano (collectively "Plaintiffs") purchased a new CRV, a motor vehicle manufactured and warranted by Honda. The vehicle was purchased from Union Park. In the following months, Plaintiffs allegedly began hearing a rattling noise when driving the vehicle, and continuously brought the car in for service in an attempt to have the rattling problem corrected. Plaintiffs claim the rattling noise has never ceased and, as a result, the vehicle is "substantially impaired, unable to be utilized for its intended purposes, and is worthless to Plaintiffs." They subsequently filed this action against Defendants alleging violations of the Delaware Automobile Warranty Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301- 2312, the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511-2527, and the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2531-2536.
Docket 33, Ex. A, ¶ 10.
See id., Ex. A, ¶¶ 13-79.
2. Plaintiffs have identified Scot A. Turner, an ASE Master Automobile Technician, as their expert. Mr. Turner formed his opinions after reviewing the purchase and repair records of the Plaintiffs' vehicle. He opines that Honda failed to honor its warranty by not correcting the rattling problem in a reasonable period of time and in a reasonable number of repair attempts. He also considers that any damage which may have resulted from an alleged accident involving the Plaintiffs' vehicle is merely a "red herring" and not the cause of the rattling. Mr. Turner concludes that the rattling condition substantially impairs the use of the vehicle because of its repeated failure to operate as designed or intended, the number of times it has had to be returned for service, the number of days it has been out of service, and the inability to obtain satisfactory results from Honda repair facilities. He further concludes that because the rattling condition impairs the vehicle's value, in that its future reliability will be poor given its past reliability problems, the value of the vehicle is worth only 80% of its current trade-in-value.
See id., Ex. B. The Court is cognizant of Mr. Turner's report dated September 29, 2006, wherein he supplements and amends his previous findings, and also changes his opinion as to certain matters such as the value of the Plaintiffs' vehicle. However, the Court will not consider this report as it was created well after the expert report deadline articulated in the Court's Scheduling Order. See Docket 23.
3. Defendants have filed the instant motion in limine seeking to exclude Mr. Turner's testimony. They argue that his opinions are speculative and not based on reliable methods because he relied solely upon purchase and repair records, and failed to inspect the vehicle or use any instrumentation. This, according to Defendants, evidences Mr. Turner's failure to employ an objective methodology and, therefore, his testimony can not survive scrutiny under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702") and Daubert v. Merrill Dow.
509 U.S 579 (1993). See also Docket 33, ¶¶ 13-14.
4. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that Mr. Turner utilized his experience and observations to make his conclusions, and that this method is grounded in the accurate and reliable methodology of experts in automotive mechanics and valuation. Plaintiffs further contend that Mr. Turner is qualified in the areas for which he is being offered, his report and testimony would assist the trier of fact, and the probative value of his testimony substantially outweighs the risk of prejudice. Plaintiffs, therefore, claim that Mr. Turner's testimony is admissible.
See Docket 36, ¶¶ 10, 13-14.
5. The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 and the standards set forth in Daubert. The foundation of Rule 702 and Daubert require that the trial judge act as a gatekeeper by ensuring that any expert testimony that is offered is both reliable and relevant.
The Daubert decision was explicitly adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court "as the law of this state in recognition that our rules of evidence mirrored the federal counterparts upon which Daubert was decided." State v. McMullen, 900 A.2d 103, 112 (Del.Super.Ct. 2006).
6. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The Daubert interpretation of the phrase "scientific knowledge" is the "genesis of the so-called `reliability' requirement." "Scientific" coupled with "knowledge" "`implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.' And `knowledge' is more than unsupported beliefs, it must be derived from supportable facts." While scientific opinions are not required to be held to a certainty to be admissible at trial, "they must be grounded in the scientific method to qualify as `scientific knowledge.'"
Id. at 113.
Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
Id.
7. To ensure that an expert's opinion is relevant, Rule 702 and Daubert also require that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." If an expert's proffered testimony has no relation to the case, "then it will not aid in clarifying a contested fact and is, therefore, not relevant."
Id.
Id.
8. The "proponent of the proffered expert testimony bears the burden of establishing the relevance [and] reliability . . . by a preponderance of the evidence." Proponents need not demonstrate that the assessments of their experts are correct, only that their opinions are reliable. The proponent's focus, therefore, should be on the expert's methodology rather than her conclusions. In assessing whether the proponent has met its burden, "the trial court does not choose between competing scientific theories, nor is it empowered to determine which theory is stronger." Rather, the trial court determines only "whether the proponent of the evidence has demonstrated that scientific conclusions have been generated using sound and reliable approaches."
Minner v. Am. Mortgage Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 843 (Del.Super.Ct. 2000).
See McMullen, 900 A.2d at 114; In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
McMullen, 900 A.2d at 114.
Id.
9. In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing that Mr. Turner's proffered testimony is reliable. Mr. Turner did not employ "objective diagnostic techniques and a sound methodology" in reaching the conclusions that the rattling condition substantially impaired the use of Plaintiffs' vehicle and that the value of the vehicle is worth 80% of its trade-in-value. That is, Mr. Turner's opinions are not "derived from supportable facts" or other "sufficient facts or data" which provide an adequate foundation for his conclusions. Mr. Turner merely relied upon a review of the purchase and repair records without regard to whether an inspection of the vehicle would have confirmed or undermined his findings, or whether any type of instrumentation would have helped diagnose the alleged problem or, at the very least, provided some reinforcement for his conclusions. Mr. Turner also failed to objectively rule out that the accident caused the rattling problem, and articulated no objective method for which he determined the value of the vehicle. In short, Mr. Turner's expert opinion is entirely subjective. Plaintiffs' proposition that Mr. Turner's testimony is reliable because he utilized his experience and observations to make his conclusions is unconvincing and contrary to what is required of the Court in its gatekeeping function under Daubert. Therefore, Mr. Turner's proposed testimony does not meet the reliability threshold required by Daubert.
Id. at 119.
See McClaren v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 2006 WL 1515834, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Mar. 16, 2006) (holding that Mr. Turner's testimony should be excluded under Daubert because his opinions were based on his subjective "feelings" and were not the product of an objective and scientific method).
10. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Turner's testimony is excluded. Accordingly, Defendants' motion in limine is GRANTED.