Opinion
No. CV-02-0466932-S
July 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#112)
This is a lawsuit brought by Laurie Juleson, a former court monitor employed at the superior court for the judicial district of Ansonia/Milford, against her former supervisor, Alice Masterson, the Official Court Reporter. The plaintiff's amended complaint dated January 2, 2003 is in two counts. The first count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the second count alleges violation of General Statutes § 31-49 (failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work). The defendant has moved to strike both counts asserting that, as to the first count, the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme and outrageous and, as to the second count, the statute does not create a private cause of action.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike is denied as to the first count and granted as to the second count.
DISCUSSION
The amended complaint alleges the following facts which, for purposes of the present motion, are admitted and must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997).
Between June 12, 2000 and March 11, 2002, the plaintiff was employed by the State of Connecticut as a court monitor at the Milford superior court and the defendant was her supervisor. The defendant, as part of a pattern of conduct: (1) threatened the plaintiff's job because she filed an incident report and sought compensation for a work-related injury; (2) made an uncouth remark to the plaintiff when she needed time off from work to treat her work-related injury; and (3) threatened to fire plaintiff because her doctor had only cleared her for light duty, actually fired her that same week but then rehired her after plaintiff complained to the defendant's supervisors.
The amended complaint further alleges that the defendant created a hostile work environment by: (1) firing another employee because she made the mistake of talking to the plaintiff; (2) telling the plaintiff that she (the defendant) would do whatever it took to force the plaintiff to quit her job; (3) refusing to transfer plaintiff to Derby despite plaintiff's reports of harassment and abuse; and (4) firing plaintiff on the pretext that the office was overstaffed.
The amended complaint further alleges that the defendant encouraged others to harass plaintiff to quit and permitted others to: (1) loosen the controls on the plaintiff's chair so that when she sat down the chair fell apart causing the plaintiff to fall; (2) falsely complain to the Milford police and State Department of Children and Families that plaintiff left her children home alone; (3) give plaintiff "the finger" and, on one occasion, to run an index finger laterally across the other employee's throat implying slitting the plaintiff's throat; (4) spray door handles and phone receivers with Lysol knowing that the plaintiff was allergic to Lysol; (5) spray heavy amounts of hairspray and perfume near the plaintiff knowing that plaintiff was allergic to same; (6) denying plaintiff access to a hallway in the Milford courthouse; (7) tell other employees not to associate with the plaintiff; (8) place gum on the door handle of her car while it was parked in the courthouse parking lot; and (9) fail to inform plaintiff when court was back in session and then accuse her of wandering the hallways when the judge was looking for her.
The amended complaint alleges that such conduct was intentional and caused plaintiff severe emotional distress.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The defendant asserts that the motion to strike the first count should be granted because the allegations are not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the requirements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210 (2000). Connecticut has adopted the Restatement's view that:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse [the member's] resentment against the actor, and lead [the member] to exclaim, Outrageous!
Restatement (Second) Torts § 46, comment (d) p. 73 (1965). Conduct that is merely insulting or exhibits bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Carrol v. Allstate Insurance Company, 262 Conn. 433, 443 (2003).
Construing the amended complaint in favor of the plaintiff, as the court must, the allegations are sufficient to withstand the motion to strike. Whether the plaintiff can prove these allegations is, of course, a separate matter. As alleged, the amended complaint sets forth a course of conduct wherein the defendant, acting alone and through others, attempted to force the plaintiff to quit her job using extreme and outrageous tactics. Making false complaints to the police about parental neglect, disabling a person's workstation chair so it falls apart when sat on, and intentionally spraying work surfaces with products known to be noxious to the intended victim are actions well beyond what are categorized as bad manners.
The motion to strike the first count is denied.
B. Section 31-49
General Statutes § 31-49 places a duty upon a master to exercise reasonable care to provide the servant a reasonably safe place to work. General Statutes § 31-50 explicitly empowers the Commissioner of Labor to enforce the provisions of § 31-49. Cases construing § 31-49 have held that it does not give rise to a private right of action. See e.g., Swaney v. Pfizer, Inc. et al., 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 183, 1999 Conn.Super LEXIS 757, p. 9 (judicial district of New London (1999, Mihalakos, J.). Indeed, in this very case Judge Zoarski came to the same conclusion in ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss. See Memorandum of Decision Re: Motion to Dismiss # 104, p. 4.
The plaintiff's assertion that § 31-49 is cited in the second count merely to allege the applicable standard of care is unpersuasive. As drafted, the second count seeks damages as a direct consequence of the violation of § 31-49. The statute does not permit such an application and, accordingly the motion to strike the second count must be granted.
CONCLUSION
The motion to strike the first count (intentional infliction of emotional distress) is denied. The motion to strike the second count (violation of § 31-49) is granted.
By Devlin, J.