Opinion
20-CV-02874 (JPC) (SN)
07-08-2021
ANTHONY JOYNER, Petitioner, v. DONALD UHLER, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH NETBURN, United States Magistrate Judge.
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN P. CRONAN:
Anthony Joyner (“Joyner”) petitions pro se for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Joyner asserts that his conviction for robbery in the second degree stemmed from evidence admitted as the result of an unconstitutional arrest and subsequent search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Respondent argues that Joyner's Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on habeas review under Supreme Court precedent because he has already received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Because I find that the Stone doctrine bars habeas review of Joyner's sole claim, I recommend that his Petition be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Joyner contests his conviction of robbery in the second degree, for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 16 years to life. ECF No. 17, Ex. 1 Trial Transcripts Part 1 (“Tr. 1”) at 315; ECF No. 17, Ex. 2 Sentencing Minutes (“Sen.”) at 13. His conviction stems from a robbery of a Claire's store in Manhattan that took place on December 22, 2014. Tr. at 315; ECF No. 17 Suppression Hearing Minutes (“SHM”) at 20-21.
At trial, it was established that Joyner walked into the store around closing time and threatened one store clerk with what appeared to be a firearm inside of a bag (that was later revealed to have been a water bottle). Tr. 1 at 99-110; ECF No. 17, Ex. 2 Trial Transcript Part 2 (“Tr. 2) at 113. He demanded that the clerk open the cash register and proceeded to steal $1,578 in cash and coins. Tr. 1 at 52-58, 155. Another clerk signaled to a store patron to call 911, and she was on the phone with the dispatcher outside the store when she watched Joyner exit and proceeded to follow him into a subway station and onto the platform. Id. at 105-108, 190-201. At the same time, one of the clerks dialed 911 and described the robbery. Id. at 41-42, 119.
Several NYPD officers responded to the call and began searching for Joyner from both sides of the subway platform. Id. at 135-37, 217-19. Soon thereafter, an officer observed a woman gesture toward Joyner, who was promptly arrested. Id. at 136-37, 200-201. The officers proceeded to frisk Joyner, and-feeling a large bulge in his pocket-retrieved approximately $1,700 in cash and coins. Id. at 155, 219-220.
Though unbeknownst to the officers at the moment of the arrest, the woman who pointed to Joyner was the patron who had followed him from the scene of the robbery. See RT at 163.
Subsequently, officers escorted one store clerk to the subway station, where she positively identified Joyner as the robbery suspect. Id. at 120-21, 232. The officers took Joyner to the police station where he was read his Miranda warning. Id. at 163. He then proceeded to confess to the robbery and provided a written statement. Id. at 203-05. At trial, both store clerks and the store patron identified Joyner as the man who robbed the store on December 22, 2014. Id. at 51, 101, 188.
II. Procedural Background Relevant to Joyner's Fourth Amendment Claim
A. Suppression Hearing
In a pretrial motion, Joyner's attorney moved to suppress evidence of the money that was stolen from the store and found in his coat, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest. He argued that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him because they only had a very general description of a 35-year-old black man, approximately 5'11” tall, wearing dark clothes and dark sneakers with white stripes. SHM at 66-69, 75-76, 81-82, 101-104, 11115. Because he was 53 at the time, and because he was sitting down when the officers approached making it difficult to estimate his height, he argued that the generalized description of the suspect provided to the police could not support probable cause for his arrest. Id. at 11519.
At a suppression hearing, Justice Thomas Farber found that Joyner's arrest was supported by “abundant probable cause, ” given that Joyner matched the “detailed description” of the suspect in “every respect, except possibly age, ” that he was found within close temporal and spatial proximity to the crime, and that a witness identified him to the officers. Id. 137. Justice Farber held that it was “hard to imagine” a situation wherein the police had more probable cause, especially considering that the entire episode occurred within a “matter of two to three minutes.” Id. 137-38. Accordingly, he denied Joyner's suppression motion. Id. 141.
B. Direct Appeal
Joyner appealed his conviction to the New York Appellate Division, First Department, seeking to overturn his verdict. He argued, among other things, that his arrest was not supported by probable cause, and that therefore the money evidence recovered from the search of his coat should have been suppressed. See People v. Joyner, 176 A.D.3d 607 (1st Dep't 2019).
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgment of Joyner's conviction. In so doing, they held that Justice Farber properly determined that the police had probable cause to arrest Joyner. They noted that within minutes of the robbery the police received a description that was “sufficiently specific and accurate in context, because of the close spatial and temporal proximity between the crime and the police encounter with [Joyner] at a subway station two blocks from the store, where he was reported to be heading.” Id. at 607 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court concluded that the record supported Justice Farber's finding that “the police action could also be justified as a stop and frisk based on, at least, reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 607-08.
Joyner sought leave to appeal his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals on the same question, which it denied. People v. Joyner, 37 N.Y.2d 1129 (2020).
C. Joyner's Habeas Petition
Joyner filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus on April 1, 2020, which was transferred to this Court from the Eastern District of New York. See ECF No. 1. He challenges his conviction by raising the sole claim that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause. Id. On July 28, 2020, Joyner informed the Court that he had no pending appeals before the state court, which the Court interpreted to mean he had exhausted his direct appeals. See ECF No. 13. The Respondent filed his opposition to the petition and Joyner filed a traverse. See ECF Nos. 14, 19.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
Joyner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). His sole claim challenges the constitutionality of his arrest under the Fourth Amendment. He argues that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest him, and that therefore the evidence of the stolen money found in his coat from a subsequent search should have been suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Federal courts, however, are barred from reviewing such claims in habeas proceedings under most circumstances under the Stone doctrine.
In Stone v. Powell, a case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule . . . is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.” 428 U.S. at 486. Therefore, enforcing the rule at trial and upon direct appeal serves to “discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Id. at 492-93. But, the Court reasoned, “the additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.” Id. at 493.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that “the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule” would not “be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.” Id. at 493. As such, it held that Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims are not cognizable in habeas proceedings where the state courts had “provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of the claim. Id. at 482.
Generally, a petitioner will have been denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims only “(a) if the state has provided no corrective procedures at all to redress the alleged fourth amendment violations; or (b) if the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from using that mechanism because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process.” Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992). All Fourth Amendment claims that were fully and fairly litigated, including illegal stops, arrests, searches, or seizures are barred from habeas review. Additionally, review is barred regardless of the type of evidence the petitioner sought to suppress. See Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572-73 (1983) (per curium).
II. Application
The New York courts provided Joyner with the appropriate corrective procedures to address his alleged Fourth Amendment violation. First, he was afforded a pre-trial suppression hearing and challenged the denial of his suppression motion on direct appeal. These are the exact corrective procedures embodied in CPL § 710 that “federal courts have approved . . . for litigating Fourth Amendment claims.” Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 n.1 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Joyner's claim is cognizable only if he can show that there was an unconscionable breakdown in those corrective procedures. To do so, he must show that the state's corrective process was rendered “meaningless because the totality of state procedures allegedly did not provide rational conditions for inquiry into federal law questions.” Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 456-57 (1963) (cleaned up)).
Joyner fails to show that there was an “unconscionable breakdown” in New York's corrective processes. At most, his petition raises disagreements with the state courts' conclusions. Such disagreements, however, do not rise to the level of an unconscionable breakdown in the corrective process. Instead, an “unconscionable breakdown in the state's process must be one that calls into serious question whether a conviction it obtained pursuant to those fundamental notions of due process that are at the heart of a civilized society.” Cappiello v. Hoke, 698 F.Supp. 1042, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 852 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1988). Compare Allah v. LeFevre, 623 F.Supp. 987, 991-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (describing bribery of a judge, use of torture, and use of perjured testimony as examples of what may show an “unconscionable breakdown” (citations omitted)); with Grajales v. Brown, No. 08-cv-00788 (JG), 2008 WL 2313137, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2008) (finding that no “unconscionable breakdown” took place when police destroyed 911 tapes that could have been used in a petitioner's suppression hearing).
The record shows that Joyner sought and was granted a hearing on his suppression motion, where he cross-examined witnesses and argued in favor of his motion. Following the hearing, Justice Farber issued his factual findings and legal conclusions, finding that the motion was without merit. Joyner raised the same claim on direct appeal, which the Appellate Division considered and rejected in a reasoned opinion. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. All of this is evidence that the corrective procedures afforded to Joyner were not hampered by an unconscionable breakdown.
Accordingly, because Joyner availed himself of New York's corrective processes for addressing his Fourth Amendment claim, and because he has failed to demonstrate or even allege an unconscionable breakdown in those processes, the Court finds that he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. As such, the Court is precluded from reviewing the sole claim of his habeas petition under Stone.
CONCLUSION
I conclude that Joyner's sole claim is not cognizable for habeas review pursuant to Stone, 428 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, I recommend that his petition be DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen days from the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable John P. Cronan at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007, and to any opposing parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Cronan. The failure to file these timely objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).