Opinion
February 1, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Amann, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
We reject the defendants' contention that since the promissory note in question refers to a mortgage to define events of default, the note does not qualify as an instrument for the payment of money pursuant to CPLR 3213. As it is undisputed that no such mortgage was ever in fact executed, there is no other document to look at to define an event of default. Thus, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case by proof of the note and the failure to make payments (see, Seaman-Andwall Corp. v Wright Mach. Corp., 31 A.D.2d 136, affd 29 N.Y.2d 617; cf., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v Hixon, 124 A.D.2d 488). We also reject the defendants' contention that their alleged defense or counterclaim prevents an award of summary judgment to the plaintiffs (see, Danann Realty Corp. v Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317). Finally, the court's award of counsel fees was reasonable. Mangano, P.J., O'Brien, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.