Opinion
December 15, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Greenstein, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for entry of an appropriate judgment.
In this action to recover on a promissory note, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case by submitting proof of the note and of the defendants' default ( see, Bank of N.Y. v. Sterlington Common Assocs., 235 A.D.2d 448; Falco v. Thorne, 225 A.D.2d 582; Silber v. Muschel, 190 A.D.2d 727; Mlcoch v. Smith, 173 A.D.2d 443). It was then incumbent on the defendants to come forward with proof of evidentiary facts showing the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to a bona fide defense ( see, Colonial Commercial Corp. v. Breskel Assocs., 238 A.D.2d 539; Gateway State Bank v. Shangri-La Private Club for Women, 113 A.D.2d 791, affd 67 N.Y.2d 627; Silber v. Muschel, supra). Here, the defendants' vague suggestion that they may have been coerced was unaccompanied by any factual details as to how the plaintiffs allegedly forced them to borrow $77,000 at 3% interest by means of "a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of [the defendants'] free will" ( Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130; Sontag v. Sontag, 114 A.D.2d 892).
Finally, summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213 is appropriate where, as here, the full extent of the debtor's obligation can be gleaned from the face of the note alone ( see, e.g., Gregorio v. Gregorio, 234 A.D.2d 512; Joswick v. Rossi, 190 A.D.2d 656). Significantly, the defendants do not indicate what obligation, not apparent from the face of the note, might have been required of them by the note's boilerplate references to the mortgage. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should have been granted.
Santucci, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Luciano, JJ., concur.