Opinion
CIVIL 6:23-CV-00392-ADA-JCM
10-12-2023
JABIAS JONES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM E. SICKING, et al, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JEFFREY C. MANSKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: THE HONORABLE ALAN D ALBRIGHT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), and Rules 1(f) and 4(b) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Before the Court are Defendants Brianna Bates-Marshall, Tiara Morrow, and Stephanie Muth's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5); Defendants Jonathon Pokluda and Harris Creek Baptist Church's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7); Defendant Greg Abbott's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8); and Defendant Cecile Young's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11). For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motions be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Jabias Jones bring her “Original Petition to Revoke Adoption” raising ten causes of action against many defendants. Pl.'s Compl. at 1, 8-10. Jones complains of actions taken in a custody dispute over her grandchildren in 2018. Id. at 1-2. Jones alleges that at some point she was the primary caretaker of her daughter's children and was granted custody of the children with the support of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services from 2017 through 2019. Id. at 3. Jones alleges that DFPS, through Brianna Bates-Marshall as a case worker for Jones's grandchildren, railroaded Jones resulting in Jones's eventual loss of custody of her three oldest grandchildren. Id.
Jones alleges that she “was not provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard in court before DFPS/CPS took custody of her grandchildren,” which resulted in a violation of Jones's due process rights. Id. at 5. Jones also alleges that she tried to have supervised visitation with the children, but DFPS and Charles Levy, the children's guardian ad litem, denied her access to the children. Id. at 6.
Based on these facts, Jones sued DFPS, CPS, and Charles Levy for violating her constitutional right to due process by failing to provide her notice of allegations against her and for denying her requests for visitation; DFPS and CPS for breach of its fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the children; Charles Levy, Justin Reed, and Amber Martinez for ineffective assistance of counsel; DFPS and CPS for negligence; DFPS and CPS for defamation; DFPS and CPS for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and DFPS, CPS, and Charles Levy for violations of the Texas Family Code. Id. at 8-12.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a “case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). “Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id. “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Id. “If the Court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
A. DFPS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Young's Motion to Dismiss should be granted because Jones's claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity.
Defendants Stephanie Muth, Tiara Morrow, and Brianna Bates-Marshal (the “DFPS Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (5), and (6). Defendant Cecile Young, Executive Commissioner of the Health and Human Services Commission also filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (5), and (6). Specifically, they argue that Jones's claims against them must be dismissed because they are barred by sovereign immunity, barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, barred by the Domestic Relations Exception, barred by qualified immunity, and Jones has not properly served the DFPS Defendants. DFPS Defs.' Mot. at 1; Young's Mot. at 1-2. Jones has not responded to any of the motions in this case but has filed a supplement to her complaint and over 200 pages of exhibits in support of her allegations. Pl.'s Supp. to Compl. (ECF No. 6); Pl.'s Ex. to Compl. (ECF No. 13).
In determining whether sovereign immunity applies, the Court must first determine whether Jones asserts her claims against the DFPS Defendants in their personal or official capacities or both. “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Ky., 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citations omitted). In a personal capacity suit, officials may assert personal immunity defenses such as qualified immunity. Id. at 166-67. In an official capacity suit, the only immunities available are forms of sovereign immunity. Id. at 167.
Here, Jones brings her claims against the DFPS Defendants in their official, not personal, capacities. Jones's Complaint contains few references to any actions taken by the DFPS Defendants. She mentions reaching out to Bates-Marshal for assistance with the children's care and not receiving an answer, “claims that Bates made statements to the children that caused them to act out only at school,” accuses Morrow of committing perjury, and does not mention Muth at all. Pl.'s Compl. at 3, 4. In her brief statements about her causes of action, Jones asserts that DFPS is responsible for nine of her ten causes of action. Id. at 8-12. Not once in her statements supporting her causes of action does she mention the DFPS Defendants' names. See Id. Accordingly, Jones's claims against the DFPS Defendants are official-capacity claims rather than personal capacity claims.
Jones's claims against Young are also in his official capacity. Her complaint contains no reference to any action taken directly by Young and only references CPS in her statements about her causes of action. Id. Jones's claims against Young are for his official-capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Health and Human Services Commission, rather than in his personal capacity. Young and the DFPS Defendants may, therefore, raise sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense to the claims against them.
Jones brings the following claims against the DFPS Defendants and Young in their official capacities: (1) violations of due process; (2) negligence; (3) defamation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violations of the Texas Family Code. Id. All of Jones's claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. “Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits against nonconsenting states in federal court.” City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Sovereign immunity also prohibits suits against state officials in their official capacity. Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-69 (1974)). States may, however, waive sovereign immunity. AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)). Courts will only find a waiver of sovereign immunity where the state invokes the court's jurisdiction, makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction, or Congress has abrogated the state's sovereign immunity pursuant to Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citations omitted).
In Texas, a “statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.” Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034. Section 1983, the vehicle for Jones's due process claim, does not contain an abrogation of sovereign immunity, nor has Texas waived sovereign immunity for Section 1983 cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2007). Texas has not waived sovereign immunity for tort claims (including Jones's negligence, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims) in federal court. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1996). Finally, the Texas Family Code does not contain a waiver of the Texas's sovereign immunity for alleged violations of the Family Code. Thus, Texas's sovereign immunity has not been waived or abrogated and Jones's claims are all barred by sovereign immunity. Jones's claims against the DFPS Defendants and Young should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and the Court need not address any remaining arguments raised by them.
B. Harris Creek Church Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Governor Greg Abbott's Motion to Dismiss should be granted because Jones lacks standing to bring them.
Defendants Jonathan Pokluda and All Elders of Harris Creek Baptist Church (“Harris Creek Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Petition under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant Greg Abbott, Governor of the State of Texas, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Petition under Rules 12(b)(1), (5), and (6). They argue that Jones lacks standing to sue Harris Creek. Harris Creek Mot. at 5; Abbott's Mot. at 2. As noted above, Jones has not responded to any of the pending motions to dismiss her complaint.
Federal courts have jurisdiction only over cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. There is no case or controversy without standing to sue. Williams v. Parker, 843 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). To establish standing, plaintiffs must show
(1) that they suffered an injury in fact, which is a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the [defendant]; and (3) it is likely, rather than merely speculative, the injury will be redressed by a particular decision.Id. (citations omitted). The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
The Harris Creek Defendants argue that Jones has failed to establish that her injury is fairly traceable to any action of the Harris Creek Defendants. Harris Creek Mot. at 5. Here, Jones has failed to identify a single action taken by the them. Her nineteen-page Complaint does not contain a single mention of the Harris Creek Defendants. Tellingly, she does not mention them in her statements regarding specific causes of action either. Jones has failed to establish that the Harris Creek Defendants had anything to do with her claims. Accordingly, this Court cannot say that her alleged injuries are fairly traceable to any action by the Harris Creek Defendants. The Court should, therefore, grant the Harris Creek Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing.
Governor Abbott argues that Jones has failed to establish that she has Article III standing for two reasons. First, he argues that Jones has failed to establish any causal connection between any of her alleged injuries and any conduct of Governor Abbott. Abbott's Mot. at 4. Second, he argues that “to the extent Plaintiff is seeking a modification or revocation of the adoption of her grandchildren under section 153.432 of the Texas Family Code, this Court cannot grant the specific relief Plaintiff seeks.” Id. at 5.
As with the Harris Creek Defendants, Jones's Petition does not contain a single allegation that Governor Abbott did anything in the underlying adoption case. See generally Pl.'s Compl. In fact, Jones does not mention Governor Abbott by name a single time in her nineteen-page complaint. Id. The Court cannot conclude that any of Jones's alleged injuries are fairly traceable to any action taken by Governor Abbott. The Court, therefore, should hold that Jones lacks standing to bring any of the claims she alleges against Governor Abbott and need not address any other arguments as it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the DFPS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5), the Harris Creek Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7), Governor Abbott's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), and Defendant Young's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) be GRANTED and all of Jones's claims against those defendants be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Should the Court adopt this Recommendation, Jones's claims against the following defendants will remain: Judge Nikki Mundkowsky, Amber Martinez, and Charles Levy.
V. OBJECTIONS
The parties may wish to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which they object. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Except upon grounds of plain error, failing to object shall further bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150-53; Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1415.