MEMORANDUM ORDER

RICHARD B. SURRICK, District Judge

Presently before the Court is Defendant Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania's ("HUP") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be granted.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff, Carol Jones, began employment with Defendant, the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, as a night shift patient care observer ("PCO") on July 30, 2001. Plaintiff was not pregnant when she began her employment with Defendant. (Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-3.) Between September 15, 2001, and November 24, 2001, Plaintiff used three sick days, two vacation days, and one personal day. (Jones. Aff., attached as Ex. B of Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) On November 27, 2001, Plaintiff's supervisor, Tilly Heggs, prepared Plaintiff's performance evaluation. The evaluation was generally favorable, as Plaintiff earned marks of "2" on a 0-4 scale, indicating that Plaintiff "Consistently Meets Standards." However, due to Plaintiff's absenteeism, Heggs extended Plaintiff's probationary period for an additional ninety days. In late November or early December 2001, Plaintiff informed Heggs that she was pregnant. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that in March 2002, Plaintiff explained that she was experiencing problems with her pregnancy, including back pain. Plaintiff states that on March 20, 2002, she was "forced to call out sick due to back pain which was related to her pregnancy." (Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) On March 26, 2002, Plaintiff's doctor wrote Defendant a letter, requesting that Plaintiff be moved to the day or evening shift. For the purposes of this Motion, Defendant admits that it denied this request. (Def. HUP's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that during this same time, Heggs stated that Plaintiff needed to rethink her job options at HUP, that Plaintiff should rethink what she wanted to do, and that she "couldn't just keep calling out and bringing her notes." (Jones Dep. at 33, Ex. P to Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a request for a leave of absence. It was granted. (Id. at 33-34.)

Plaintiff began her maternity leave on April 1, 2002, gave birth on July 18, 2002, and returned to work on October 1, 2002. When Plaintiff returned from leave, Heggs was on vacation for her honeymoon and did not return until October 10, 2002. (Heggs Dep. at 7-10, Ex. R to Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.) During Heggs's absence, Williams supervised patients on the night shift. On October 8, 2002, during her second shift back from maternity leave, Plaintiff was terminated for sleeping during a one-on-one (1:1) observation of a suicidal patient. Plaintiff denies this allegation.

According to Elizabeth Miller, a part-time nursing coordinator at HUP, Plaintiff was sitting in a chair, with her eyes closed, and she did not move or respond as Miller came into the room, and stood in front of Plaintiff, observing her for one to two minutes. (Miller Dep. at 13-14, Ex. S to Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.) Miller testified that after determining that the patient was not in need of immediate assistance, she went to the nurse's station to ask Pat Piesieski, a nursing coordinator, to witness Plaintiff sleeping. (Id. at 14.) Miller indicated that when she and Piesieski returned to the room, Piesieski pushed the door open, which made a loud noise. The noise awakened Plaintiff causing her to sit up. Miller describes Plaintiff's eyes as "very red" indicating that Plaintiff "appeared to be sleepy." (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff contends that she was not asleep when Miller walked into the room. Plaintiff states that her back was to the door, but through the reflection in the window, she saw that someone had partially entered the room for a moment, but left immediately. (Jones Dep. at 45-46, Ex. P to Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.)

Piesieski spoke with Jones in a conference room and explained that she could be disciplined for sleeping on the job. She instructed Plaintiff to go home until a supervisor could be notified. Miller and Piesieski explained their observations in individual email messages. Williams decided that termination was appropriate. Defendant's Human Resources Generalist Jeanne Esposito confirmed that termination was appropriate. Williams called Plaintiff and asked her to return to work for a meeting. At the meeting Williams informed Plaintiff that her employment would be terminated.

On March 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC dismissed Plaintiff's charge on August 1, 2003. (Jt. Case Rep. at 1.) On August 29, 2003, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. On December 19, 2003, the parties agreed to a voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff's FMLA claim. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6.) Plaintiff presently claims that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff, sleeping while on suicide watch, was a pretext for Defendant's pregnancy discrimination. Defendant claims that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Defendant asserts that following Plaintiff's six-month leave, she was restored to her previous position. (Jt. Case Report at 2.) Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was terminated for performance reasons; specifically, for sleeping during suicide watch.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once the moving party carries this initial burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations in its pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). However, in considering the motion, we will not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations, and we must view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff claims pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, for allegedly "discriminating against, retaliating against, failing to reasonably accommodate, and terminating plaintiff based on her pregnancy." (Compl. at ¶ 14.) To establish this claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that "she was treated less favorably than a nonpregnant employee under identical circumstances and that her pregnancy was the reason she was treated less favorably."Sacavage v. Jefferson Univ. Physicians, Civ.A. No. 99-3870, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8634, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000) (citing Piraino v. Int'l Orientation Resources, Inc., 137 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff must establish that "Defendant treated similarly situated nonpregnant employees `more favorably.'" Id. (citing Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, Plaintiff carries the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to Defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment decision. Id. Once Defendant has "demonstrated a legitimate reason for the employment action, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case is rebutted." Sacavage, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8634, at *6 (citingSt. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). Plaintiff will then be required to "satisfy her ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's proffered reason is not the `true reason' for the decision, but instead is merely a pretext for discrimination." Id. (citing Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). "A reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason."Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516. Further, "it is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the fact-finder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. at 520.

III. DISCUSSION

1. Prima Facie Case

A. Alleged Pregnancy Discrimination

Defendant first asserts that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) because Plaintiff was not a member of the protected class. To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, Plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence that she was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably. Goosby v. Johnson Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not a member of the protected class at the time of the October 8, 2002, termination because she was no longer pregnant. Plaintiff had returned from maternity leave one week prior to her termination, and had delivered her baby on July 18, 2002, two and one-half months prior to the adverse employment decision. Plaintiff contends that, despite her non-pregnant state, she was still covered by the PDA because "protections of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 extend not only to women who are presently pregnant, but also extend before and after their pregnancy." (Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 16, n. 6.) Although the Third Circuit has not had opportunity to address this issue directly, in Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., that court indicated that the elements of a prima facie case "must not be applied woodenly, but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type of illegal discrimination." 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996). While theGeraci court focused on the defendant employer's knowledge of the employee's pregnancy, not whether a nonpregnant employee is covered by the PDA, their approach is instructive. Acknowledging this approach, the district court in Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Co. stated: "Pregnancy also differs from most other protected personal attributes in that it is not immutable. While some effects of pregnancy linger beyond the act of giving birth, at some point the female employee is no longer `affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,' for purposes of the PDA." 183 F. Supp. 2d 748, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). The Solomen court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff, who had given birth eleven months before being terminated, and had returned to work seven months prior, was no longer covered by the PDA. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court stated that "[i]n many pregnancy discrimination claims, concerns about the plaintiff's membership in the protected class do not arise because the employee obviously suffered the adverse employment action during pregnancy, maternity leave, or shortly after returning to work." Id. at 753 (emphasis added). See also Briody v. American Gen. Fin., Co., Civ.A. No. 98-2728, 1999 WL 387269 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1999) (questioning whether plaintiff's previous pregnancy (plaintiff had returned from maternity leave approximately four weeks prior) had influenced employer's decision to transfer); Hayman v. WYXR-FM, Civ.A. No. 91-6444, 1992 WL 210113 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1992) (defining class membership as pregnant or on maternity leave). The Solomen court went on to conclude that when a plaintiff is not within temporal proximity to her pregnancy, her membership in the protected class is less clear and she must therefore "introduc[e] evidence sufficient to allow the case to go to a jury, that she was `affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions' at the time of the adverse employment action." Id. at 754. In the instant case, Plaintiff had given birth two and one-half months prior to being terminated and had only returned to work one week prior to being terminated. We conclude that Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient temporal proximity to her pregnancy to fall within the protected class of the PDA.

With regard to the remaining elements of a prima facie case, in light of Plaintiff's satisfactory work evaluation, we conclude that she was qualified for the position. Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff's allegation that members outside of the protected class were treated more favorably is problematic. For reasons discussed hereinafter in greater detail, we conclude that Plaintiff's comparators are not sufficient to support Plaintiff's position.

2. Legitimate Reason for the Termination

Defendant contends that even if Plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff cannot meet her ultimate burden under McDonnell Douglas. "Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination." Rhett v. Carnegie Center Associates, 129 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)). Defendant has rebutted Plaintiff's prima facie case by proffering that it fired Plaintiff for sleeping while on suicide watch. Defendant has provided the statements of Miller and Piesieski, both of whom observed Plaintiff sleeping while performing a one-on-one suicide watch in support of this legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. While Plaintiff denies that she was asleep during that shift, we note that "[i]n pretext discrimination cases such as this, `[t]he employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff." Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)).

3. Pretext

Since Defendant has come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Plaintiff's termination, Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to Defendant's true reasons for her termination. To meet this burden, Plaintiff "must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of" Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Id. at 644. We conclude that Plaintiff has failed to show pretext through either option.

Applying the first option to the instant case, it is apparent that Plaintiff has not discredited Defendant's reason for her termination. Miller reported observing Plaintiff asleep for one to two minutes while on suicide watch, and Pieskieski informed Williams that Plaintiff appeared to be waking up as Pieskieski walked into the room. Plaintiff insists that she was not asleep and suggests that her testimony is sufficient to demonstrate pretext. Even if we were to assume that Miller and Piesieski fabricated their stories, (or misinterpreted Plaintiff's actions), Plaintiff has not demonstrated either that Williams, or the human resources personnel involved in Plaintiff's termination, actually knew that Plaintiff was not sleeping. "[I]t is not enough to show that an employer's decision was wrong; the issue is `whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent.'" Younge v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., Civ.A. No. 01-4218, 2002 WL 32351166, *6 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2002) (quoting Jones v. School Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (1999)); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997). "To survive summary judgment, [plaintiff] must demonstrate: such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them `unworthy of credence,' and hence infer `that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.'"Id. (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). See also Quinn v. Pennsylvania Civil Serv. Com'n, Civ.A. No. 01-4044, 2002 WL 32349097, *3 (E.D.Pa. March 25, 2002) ("Instead, it must be shown that the employer's articulated reason was `so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.'") (internal citations omitted).

In this case, two employees reported to Williams that Plaintiff was asleep on suicide watch. Based on that information, Williams moved forward with disciplinary measures, in accordance with Defendant's disciplinary policy. Plaintiff suggests that because Williams's shift often overlaps with that of Heggs, Williams was aware of and influenced by Heggs's discriminatory animus toward Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support the alleged influence or Heggs's discriminatory animus. Without at least some evidence supporting the alleged influence, we cannot accept Plaintiff's accusations as true. Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that there was no negative history between her and Williams.

Q. And how about Nancy Williams, had you worked with her before?

A. She gave me my assignment when I came in or if I called out, she might have took the call out or something, but that was it.

Q. So you hadn't had much interaction with her?

A. No.

Q. Had you ever had any bad interaction with her?

A. No.

(Jones Dep. at 85, Ex. A. to Def. HUP's Mot. for Summ. J.) Because Plaintiff has provided no evidence to discredit the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by Williams and supported by two witnesses, we are compelled to conclude that Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext for discrimination.

We are also not persuaded that Plaintiff has demonstrated pretext by proving that invidious discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of Defendant's decision. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating her was pretext because there was "substantial evidence of discriminatory intent based upon the disparate treatment she experienced as a pregnant woman as compared to her non-pregnant coworkers." (Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J. at 22.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide support for the allegation of disparate treatment with appropriate comparators. The record indicates that Plaintiff, like the comparators proffered by Plaintiff, received warnings before being terminated for sleeping on the job. Heggs testifies that prior to Miller and Piesieski observing Plaintiff sleeping on October 8, 2002, she gave Plaintiff two verbal warnings for sleeping.

Q. Is it true that you never — you personally never caught Carol Jones ever sleeping; is that correct?

A. That's incorrect.

Q. Incorrect?

A. That's incorrect.

Q. You caught Carol Jones sleeping?

A. I caught Carol —

Q. When?

A. — Jones sleeping, yes.

Q. When?

A. I don't recall the dates, but I caught her sleeping on two separate occasions.

Q. Did you give her a written warning?

A. I gave her a warning, mm-hmm, and I documented on my file.

(Heggs Dep. at 20-21, Ex. R to Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.) Heggs testified that on September 19, 2001, she wrote the following for Plaintiff's file: "Found Carol Jones doing 1:1 with eyes closed, blanket around shoulders, opened eyes upon entering the room. Reviewed sleep policy with employee and gave Carol Jones a verbal warning." (Heggs Dep. at Ex. 1, Ex. R of Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) Heggs also testified that sometime in January 2002, she wrote: "Carol Jones assigned to do 1:1 with [illegible] found eyes closed, blanket around shoulders, curtain pulled. Opened eyes when called name, eyes red. Again reiterated the sleeping policy. Told employee if found sleeping again she may be terminated." (Id.)

Even if the personnel notes in question are problematic, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate pretext because she has relied upon inappropriate comparators to support her position. Plaintiff has failed to find a single comparator who was under Williams's supervision and was found sleeping while performing a 1:1 observation of a suicidal patient. In concluding that a plaintiff had failed to prove pretext because his comparators were not similarly situated, the court in Bailey v. United Airlines stated: "In order for employees to be deemed similarly situated, `the individuals with whom a plaintiff seeks to be compared must have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.'" Civ.A. No. 97-5223, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11636, at *26 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2002) (citing Bullock v. Children's Hosp. of Phila, 71 F. Supp. 2d 482, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). "Comparators should have worked with the same supervisor, have been subjected to the same standards, and have engaged in the same conduct."Id. (citing Taylor v. Procter Gamble Dover Wipes, 184 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (D. Del. 2002); O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Grande, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 565.).

In comparing herself to nonpregnant PCOs who were found sleeping on the job, but were not terminated, Plaintiff cites to the personnel files of D.K. and A.G. However, Plaintiff has failed to cite anything in the record that indicates that D.K. was sleeping during suicide watch. D.K.'s first warning was documented on March 10, 1999. At that time, D.K. was found sleeping while on break in the break room. Approximately four years later, on January 28, 2003, D.K. was found sleeping while observing a patient, but there is nothing to indicate that the patient was suicidal. D.K. was suspended for three days, and was limited in the number of overtime shifts she could work. Finally, when D.K. was found sleeping just two weeks later, her employment was terminated. Even if D.K. had been observing a suicidal patient on January 28, 2003, nowhere in D.K.'s personnel file does it indicate that Williams was involved in the decision to suspend, rather than terminate D.K. In fact, references in D.K.'s personnel file indicate that, at least prior to the January 28, 2003 incident, D.K. had worked the night shift, which was not under Williams's supervision. (Ex. J of Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) In any event, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that D.K. received different discipline by the same supervisor, for the same offense.

With respect to A.G., it appears that she was found sleeping while on scheduled breaks. (Ex. K to Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) While this behavior is less than satisfactory, we cannot agree that A.G.'s actions were similar to Plaintiff's act of sleeping while on a one-on-one observation of a suicidal patient. The record indicates that on September 28, 2002, A.G. returned from break forty minutes late because she had fallen asleep. (Id.) She received a written warning and was suspended for three days. Then, on April 4, 2003, A.G. fell asleep a second time while on break, and a note was placed in her file. (Id.) Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that A.G. was found sleeping while performing a one-on-one observation of a suicidal patient. It is self evident that sleeping on break, even if it does violate employment policies, does not meet the standard of "engag[ing] in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or their employer's treatment of them for it." Bailey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11636, at *26. Moreover, the record indicates that despite the fact that A.G. was a night shift worker and was normally under Heggs's supervision, (Heggs Decl. at ¶ 4), Romano was responsible for A.G.'s discipline on September 28, 2002, because Heggs was on vacation, (Romano Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6). Unlike Plaintiff, Williams was not responsible for disciplining A.G.

Plaintiff also attempts to compare her actions to those of D.J. and D.A. While it appears that D.J. left a patient unattended while performing one-on-one observation, on July 5, 2001, and again on July 21, 2001, it is undisputed that as a day shift PCO, she was under the supervision of Romano, not Williams. (Romano Decl. at ¶ 3 ("In July 2001, D.J. was working on day shift. Accordingly, I was responsible for her management and discipline.").)

Plaintiff's comparison to D.A. is also unavailing. D.A. was found reading a magazine, not sleeping, while performing a one-on-one. (Electronic Correspondence from Sullivan to Williams of 10/3/2002, Ex. O to Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.) The patient's wife was in the room at the time. Again, these facts are not comparable to those involving Plaintiff. Plaintiff was found sleeping while performing a one-on-one observation of a suicidal patient, an offense with potentially very serious consequences for both the patient and the hospital.

We are also unpersuaded by Plaintiff's argument that she was required to file a Motion to Compel in order to obtain the personnel files. We are aware of the procedural history of this case and we fail to see the relationship between the fact that Plaintiff was required to file a motion to compel and the appropriateness of the comparators. Plaintiff next contends that the paperwork in the personnel files indicate that the comparators were actually supervised by Williams. In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites to an email message from Amy Avellino to Williams, discussing A.G.'s sleeping on September 30, 2002. Plaintiff claims that the fact that Avellino addressed the message to Williams indicates that Williams was A.G.'s supervisor. However, Plaintiff fails to address the fact that the message begins by stating, "I'm not sure who I should direct this to." (Electronic Correspondence from Avellino to Williams of 9/30/02, Ex. K of Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.) In addition, the Plan for Improvement Form that documents A.G.'s suspension for this incident clearly identifies Romano as A.G.'s supervisor. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that it was the same human resources department that was involved in all of these disciplinary decisions. (Sur Reply Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at unnumbered 2-3.) However, Plaintiff does not even attempt to establish that the same person in that department was involved in each of these decisions.

Plaintiff points to the fact that Defendant's policy did not require automatic termination for sleeping on the job. Nevertheless, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's assertion that the policy provides that sleeping on the job could lead to termination. (Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 12.) Moreover, it is clear that Defendant has terminated other individuals for sleeping on the job. The affidavit of Jeanne Esposito, Defendant's Human Resources Generalists, lists three patient care observers, D.K., C.D., and L.M., who were terminated between February 2003 and June 2004 for sleeping while on duty. (Esposito Aff. at ¶ 3.)

We are also unpersuaded by Plaintiff's attempt to establish pretext through Heggs, the individual that Plaintiff claims demonstrated animus toward her. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff there is no evidence that Heggs was involved in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. As discussed above, Heggs was on vacation when the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made. Heggs has testified that she was not aware of the firing until after it took place. Williams, Miller, and Piesieski, testified that they did not communicate with Heggs until after Plaintiff had been terminated, and Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff also fails to provide evidence that Williams was influenced by Heggs's alleged discriminatory motive. In addition, Plaintiff states that she had had no negative interactions with Miller and Piesieski, the employees who reported observing Plaintiff sleeping. In fact, Plaintiff completely fails to address why Miller and Piesieski would cooperate in Heggs's alleged discriminatory acts by fabricating such a story. In addition, as discussed herein, Plaintiff testifies that she had had no negative interactions with Williams prior to the termination. (Jones Dep. at 85, Ex. A to Br. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J.)

Plaintiff's case appears to depend on Plaintiff establishing Heggs's discriminatory animus. Plaintiff's attempts to characterize Heggs's statements concerning her conduct as discriminatory are contradicted by Plaintiff's own assertions that Heggs did not like her subordinates to call out sick. The fact that Heggs strictly enforced attendance policies does not suggest that she was acting in a discriminatory manner in violation of the PDA. In fact, Plaintiff's own brief suggests that Heggs put pressure on D.A., a non-pregnant employee who had missed several days of work. It appears that Heggs was consistent in her disapproval of employees utilizing what she observed as "too much sick time."

It is well-established that the PDA does not mandate that an employer excuse a pregnant employee's absences, if it would not excuse those of a non-pregnant employee. "The Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires the employer to ignore an employee's pregnancy, but . . . not her absence from work, unless the employer overlooks the comparable absences of nonpregnant employees . . . in which even it would not be ignoring pregnancy after all." Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 911 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994)).

In sum, we conclude that Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing that Defendant's decision to terminate her, after two eye witnesses reported seeing Plaintiff sleeping while performing a 1:1 observation of a suicidal patient, was pretext for discrimination under the PDA.

B. Plaintiff's Request for Accommodation

While unclear from the Plaintiff's filings, it appears that Plaintiff may be claiming that Defendant's refusal to move Plaintiff to the day or evening shift was a form of discrimination under the PDA. However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Defendant was more willing to move nonpregnant employees from the night shift. In addition, Williams's deposition testimony demonstrates that a move from the night shift was a difficult request to accommodate because the night shift was less desirable.

Q. So you have no problem getting people to work night shift as opposed to day shift?

A. It's more of a problem working night shift.

Q. Most people want to work the day shift, right?

A. Well, when we established this patient care observer job, it was realized that we would have to rotate everyone, that there wasn't really a permanent shift unless they would want permanent evenings or permanent nights.

. . . .

Q. There are some people that are permanently night shift, but not really anybody that's permanently day shift; is that what you're saying?

A. That is correct.

(Williams Dep. at 7-8, Ex. Q to Br. in Opp'n to Summ. J.) Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to support her suggestion that Defendant was willing to accommodate the transfer of nonpregnant employees or that nonpregnant employees were provided with the requested accommodation. Plaintiff's claim that Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff is without merit.

C. Retaliation Claim

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has also failed to establish a discriminatory retaliation claim under the PDA. In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) "she engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action." Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). Like other discrimination, courts analyze retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). Therefore, in light of our conclusion that the facts viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff fail to demonstrate that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff was pretext, Plaintiff's retaliation claim will be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.

An appropriate Order follows.

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.