Summary
affirming Superior Court's denial of third motion for postconviction relief in which Johnson claimed that 1998 conviction could not serve as basis for sentencing as habitual offender and warning Johnson that this Court would not invest scarce judicial resources addressing repetitive claims
Summary of this case from In re JohnsonOpinion
No. 423 2014.
2014-10-27
Derious J. JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
Court Below—Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID No. 0304007340.
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.
ORDER
KAREN L. VALIHURA, Justice.
This 27th day of October 2014, after careful consideration of the appellant's opening brief, the appellee's motion to affirm, and the record below, we find it manifest that the Superior Court's July 23, 2014 order, which denied Derious Johnson's third motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), should be affirmed. The motion was untimely, repetitive, procedurally defaulted, and formerly adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) and Johnson failed to demonstrate any cause for relief from the procedural default, that consideration of his claims was warranted in the interest of justice, or a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice.
Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (barring claim not asserted in proceedings leading to conviction unless movant shows cause for relief from procedural default and prejudice).
Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(i)(2), (i)(4) (barring untimely and formerly adjudicated claims unless consideration is warranted in interest of justice).
Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1), (i)(2), and (i)(3) are not applicable to colorable claim of miscarriage of justice because of constitutional violation).
We also note that this is Johnson's third postconviction motion. In the future, if Johnson files additional petitions, we do not intend to invest scare judicial resources addressing repetitive claims. We encourage Johnson to be mindful of Rule 61(j).
Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(j) (“If a motion is denied, the state may move for an order requiring the movant to reimburse the state for costs and expenses paid for the movant from public funds.”).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED and the judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED.