No. 14-07-00598-CR
Opinion filed April 15, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 209th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 948117.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices ANDERSON and BOYCE.
ADELE HEDGES, Chief Justice.
Appellant, John Paul Johnson, appeals from his conviction for murder and sentence to life in prison. In a single issue, he contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation by excluding certain testimony aimed at impeaching the key witness against him. We affirm.
Background
Chamera Levene testified that on May 7, 2003, she was in her apartment when appellant kicked open the locked door. Appellant then began firing a weapon into the apartment. Kirk Jeffers, who was also in the apartment at the time, produced his own weapon and followed appellant into the hallway. Levene heard additional gunshots coming from the hallway. Jeffers subsequently died in the hallway of a gunshot wound. During presentation of his case, appellant sought to admit the testimony of several witnesses regarding a confrontation between Levene and appellant, which occurred two days before Jeffers' killing. The State objected on relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. At trial, appellant argued in favor of admission of the testimony on the grounds that (1) the State had "opened the door," (2) the testimony would go to show that Levene testified the way she did because of her recent confrontation with appellant, (3) the jury was entitled to know about the incident to test Levene's credibility, and (4) the evidence would go to disprove or impeach her testimony. Discussion
In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation by excluding testimony that would have impeached Levene's credibility. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. We begin by considering whether appellant properly preserved this argument by making it in the trial court. To preserve error on exclusion of evidence grounds, the proponent must object, obtain a ruling from the trial court (or object to the trial court's refusal to rule), and make an offer of proof. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), (2); Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 489 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The proponent must also state the grounds for the ruling he desires "with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint." Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). In other words, the proponent must do everything necessary to bring to the judge's attention the evidentiary rule or statute under which admission is sought and its precise application to the evidence in question. Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177. More specifically, when a single objection encompasses complaints under both the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, the objection is not considered sufficiently specific to preserve error. Id. at 179. The Reyna case is particularly instructive. In Reyna, the defendant, charged with indecency with a child, sought to cross examine the victim about a false allegation of sexual abuse the victim had previously made against another man. Id. at 174. In support of admission, the defendant argued that the evidence went to the credibility of the victim. Id. at 179. Subsequently, on appeal, the defendant argued that the exclusion of the evidence violated his Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation. Id. at 175. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately held that the defendant waived review of the confrontation issue because the credibility argument he made in the trial court could have been based on either the rules of evidence or the right to confrontation; thus, the trial argument did not sufficiently bring to the trial court's attention the basis for the request. Id. at 179. Similarly, in the present case, appellant argued that the testimony should be admitted because it would impeach Levene's credibility, but he did not specifically assert his right of confrontation. Accordingly, under Reyna, appellant has failed to preserve the confrontation issue. We therefore overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.