Opinion
No. 5:19-CV-17-FL
08-19-2019
ELIAKIN JOHENKINS, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant.
ORDER and MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the court on the application [DE #1] by Plaintiff Eliakin Johenkins to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and for frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the matter having been referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Louise W. Flanagan, United States District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and it is recommended that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant be dismissed.
IFP MOTION
The standard for determining in forma pauperis status is whether "one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life." Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). Based on the information contained in Plaintiff's affidavit, the court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs. Thus, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of New Jersey ("New Jersey") challenging his child support debt. (Prop. Compl. [DE #1-1] at 5-7.) Plaintiff claims he is a subject of the "Empire Washhitaw de Dugdahmoundyah and Yahudah Washitaw of East Terra; a Muur/Moor and descendant of ancient Mound Builders" and states that the "inalienable rights of the Indigenous people be protected." (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges he has paid child support payments to New Jersey "[f]or around thirty years" and complains it took his child "without any adjudication." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states Defendant must "prove [its] claim lawful by verifying and validating the debt" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, as well as restitution. (Id.)
II. Standard for Frivolity Review
Notwithstanding the determination that Plaintiff is entitled to in forma pauperis status, the court is required to dismiss all or part of an action found to be frivolous or malicious, which fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or which seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Pro se complaints are entitled to a more liberal treatment than pleadings drafted by lawyers. See White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). However, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The court is permitted to "pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to give a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The statement must give a defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "A plaintiff must offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001); see also White, 886 F.2d at 723 (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit as frivolous where plaintiff's complaint "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). While the court must read the complaint carefully to determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support his claims, White, 886 F.2d at 724, the court is not required to act as the pro se plaintiff's advocate or to parse through volumes of documents or discursive arguments in an attempt to discern the plaintiff's unexpressed intent, Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 803 (4th Cir. 2013).
III. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff purports to raise claims: (1) asserting a violation of his rights as a member of the "Empire Washhitaw de Dugdahmoundyah and Yahudah Washitaw of East Terra" under the "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People Treaty" and Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, and (2) disputing a child support debt and the "kidnapping" of his child by New Jersey.
A. Violation of Rights
Plaintiff states his rights as an indigenous person have been violated as a subject of the "Empire Washhitaw de Dugdahmoundyah and Yahudah Washitaw of East Terra." Plaintiff cites to Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution and the "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People Treaty" stating that his inalienable rights as an indigenous person have been violated. (Prop. Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff challenges the New Jersey court's orders, asserting that he was not "given the means of clear understanding of matters concerning himself or his family in light of Plaintiff's spirituality and cultural customs." (Id. at 5.)
First, the constitutional provision that Plaintiff cites concerns the apportionment of representatives to the House of Representatives in Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Thus, it provides no legal basis for Plaintiff's claim.
Second, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People ("UNDRIP") is not a treaty. See U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2019 (2019), https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force (last visited Aug. 6, 2019); United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples FAQs, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/faq_drips_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2019) (stating that "UN Declarations are generally not binding" and that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples "is widely viewed as not creating new rights"). "[C]ourts have consistently held that UNDRIP does not create a federal cause of action." Yahudah Washitaw of E. Terra Indians v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 5:17-CV-00377-BR, 2017 WL 6541508, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2017), aff'd in part & dismissed in part, 724 F. App'x 281 (4th Cir. 2018)).
Third, the United States has not recognized the Washitaw or Moorish Nations, and "claims or arguments . . . which are based on those organizations or which rely on documents or arguments based on the doctrines of those organizations are clearly frivolous." El-Bey v. N.C. Bd. of Nursing, No. 1:09-CV-753, 2009 WL 5220166, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 31, 2009), rep. & recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3283070 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2010) (unpublished); Sanders-Bey v. United States, 267 F. App'x 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating the Washitaw organization is not recognized by the United States government); see also Yahudah Washitaw of E. Terra Indians, No. 5:17-CV-377-BR, 2017 WL 6541508, at *2 (concluding that purported affiliation with the Washitaw does not grant immunity from property taxation or foreclosure); Moorish Holy Temple of Sci. of the World v. Terry, No. 5:12-CV-134-FL, 2012 WL 2576782, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 11, 2012), mem. & recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2576219 (E.D.N.C. July 3, 2012) (finding as frivolous claims based on plaintiff's theory that state laws did not apply to Washitaw members); United States v. $7,000.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 1:07CV277, 583 F. Supp. 2d 725, 732-33 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2008) (collecting cases and finding the Washitaw organization "attempt[s] to benefit from the protections of federal and state law while simultaneously proclaiming their independence from and total lack of responsibility under those same laws").
Here, Plaintiff has not cited any enforceable law or treaty that shields Washitaw members from state child support or child custody laws. Membership in the Washitaw organization does not carve out an exception for Plaintiff. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claims are based on the theory that his membership in the Washitaw organization creates rights to protect him from state or federal laws, his claims are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. New Jersey Claim
Moreover, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and restitution for child support payments made to New Jersey. The underlying substance of Plaintiff's proposed claim is a request that this federal district court enjoin certain state-court orders and grant monetary relief from child support judgments with which Plaintiff disagrees. The only federal court with jurisdiction to hear such a lawsuit is the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam).
Because Plaintiff seeks relief from this court preventing or reversing the effectuation of state-court orders of child support payments, this court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 463 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits "lower federal courts . . . from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments"). "New Jersey courts are charged with monitoring, enforcing, and modifying child support obligations through the duration of a child support order." DiPietro v. N.J. Family Support Payment Ctr., 375 F. App'x 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff's right to appeal the state-court orders would lie in the New Jersey appellate courts and, thereafter, to the United States Supreme Court. Id. As recognized by the Supreme Court, "a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings." D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198-99 (4th Cir. 2000). "[J]urisdiction to review such decisions lies exclusively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court." Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim.
Lastly, Plaintiff cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1692, the FDCPA to argue the State of New Jersey must "prove [its] claim lawful by verifying and validating" his child support debt. (Prop. Compl. at 6.) The FDCPA applies only to debt collectors; "state officers and employees attempting to collect a debt in the performance of their official duties are not 'debt collectors' for purposes of the FDCPA." DiPietro, 375 F. App'x at 204 n.3 (citing Heredia v. Green, 667 F.2d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 1981)). Moreover, child support obligations are not "debts" under the FDCPA because "they were not incurred to receive consumer goods or services," but rather are imposed "to force individuals to fulfill their parental duty to support their children." See Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 32 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted on frivolity review.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. Plaintiff is hereby advised as follows:
You shall have until September 5, 2019, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
This 19th day of August 2019.
/s/_________
KIMBERLY A. SWANK
United States Magistrate Judge