Opinion
2:23-cv-06035-RMG-MGB
04-24-2024
Azeez Sayfa Al-Din Bey, Plaintiff, v. One80 Place; Hope Center; and Neighborhood House Community Outreach, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Azeez Sayfa Al-Din Bey (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against One80 Place; the Hope Center; and Neighborhood House Community Outreach(“Neighborhood House”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that he was denied housing and employment because of his national origin. (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
Based on the address provided (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3), the Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to Our Lady of Mercy Community Outreach's Neighborhood House. See Our Lady of Mercy Community Outreach, https://www.olmoutreach.org/ (last visited April 24, 2024).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that One80 Place has denied him housing since September 15, 2023, because he “do[es] not possess a Social Security number as well as on account of [his] national origin.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff further claims that the Hope Center “also denied [him] housing and work due to national origin and not possessing a [Social Security number].” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he has suffered “psychological trauma” as a result of being unemployed and without adequate housing. (Id.) He therefore seeks $3 million in damages pursuant to the Zodiac Constitution; the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 3, 6.)
Upon reviewing the initial allegations in this case, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 8.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned afforded him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to submit an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his Complaint. (Id. at 5.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow these instructions within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not comply with or otherwise respond to the undersigned's instructions.
In an abundance of caution, the undersigned issued a second order affording Plaintiff another opportunity to submit an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in his original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.) Unfortunately, Plaintiff never filed an amended pleading and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, the instant action remains limited to the claims presented in the original Complaint as summarized above. (Dkt. No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite receiving ample time to comply with this Court's instructions, Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in his initial pleading. As a result, this action remains subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
Turning first to Plaintiff's reference to the Zodiac Constitution (Dkt. No. 1 at 3), federal courts have routinely dismissed claims based on treaties, declarations, and/or resolutions regarding Moorish heritage as frivolous. See Nasi El for Collins v. South Carolina, No. 2:22-cv-506-BHH-MHC, 2022 WL 2835752, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2022) (collecting cases), adopted sub nom. El v. South Carolina, 2022 WL 2835373 (D.S.C. July 20, 2022). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, any such claims are subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2.)
With respect to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this declaration is not a legally binding instrument under international law and does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., Singletary v. Internal Revenue Serv. N. Carolina, No. 5:17-cv-231-FL, 2017 WL 7736168, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 19, 2017), adopted, 2018 WL 1006451 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 30, 2018); Johenkins v. New Jersey, No. 5:19-cv-17-FL, 2019 WL 4309037, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 19, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 4309005 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 11, 2019); Bey v. Colon, No. 2:19-cv-941-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 3557920, at *3 (D.S.C. July 10, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 3547086 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2019). Thus, any such claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2.)
With respect to the Privacy Act of 1974, Section 7(a) generally makes it unlawful for a federal, state, or local governmental agency to deny an individual a right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because the individual refuses to disclose his Social Security number. Privacy Act § 7(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. at 2194 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Note)). Section 7(b) further provides that any agency directing an individual to disclose his Social Security number must “inform that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory authority such number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.” Id. § 7(b). Because none of the named Defendants are government agencies, Section 7 of the Privacy Act does not apply to the facts as alleged in the Complaint and any such claims must be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 8 at 2.)
With respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this statute “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Courts have routinely held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds, do not qualify as “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Garcia v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:21-cv-1359-JMC-SVH, 2021 WL 1947303, at *2 (D.S.C. May 14, 2021) (“Groups of individuals in a building . . . do not qualify as a ‘person' who can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.”). Because Defendants appear to be local facilities/nonprofit organizations, they do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and are not amendable to suit under the same.
Moreover, to qualify as state action, the conduct in question “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). Purely private conduct, “no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory,” does not provide a basis for bringing a claim under § 1983. Id.; see also Woodbury v. Stepping Stones Shelter, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-1674-PWG, 2018 WL 3122457, at *6 (D. Md. June 25, 2018) (explaining that a plaintiff cannot invoke § 1983 simply because a private homeless shelter is regulated and/or funded by the State). Most, if not all, of the Defendants appear to be private actors here; thus, absent further information, they do not act under color of state law as required under § 1983.
It is worth noting that municipalities and other local government units may be held liable under § 1983 where certain unconstitutional actions are taken pursuant to an official policy or custom of the local government. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). It appears the Hope Center was created by the Mayors' Commission on Homelessness and Affordable Housing. See Mayors' Commission on Homelessness and Affordable Housing, https://homelesstohopefund.org/mayors-commission/ (last visited April 24, 2024); Hope Center, https://www.charleston-sc.gov/2712/Hope-Center (last visited April 24, 2024); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). Without deciding the issue here, the undersigned notes that to the extent the Hope Center is somehow considered a local government body or unit for purposes of § 1983, the Complaint does not allege that a purported deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights was carried out pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.
Nevertheless, even if Defendants were amenable to suit under § 1983, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state an actionable constitutional violation.As the undersigned previously noted, Plaintiff does not identify which of his constitutional rights were supposedly violated by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 8 at 3-4.) The undersigned can only assume that Plaintiff is referencing the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that: “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” or “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
As a threshold matter, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). However, Neighborhood House does not appear anywhere in the Complaint beyond the initial list of Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) Consequently, the Complaint fails to establish the requisite personal involvement with respect to Neighborhood House as required under § 1983. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (finding claims frivolous where, other than naming defendants in the caption of her complaint, plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of any personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020).
With respect to due process, a plaintiff must show, at minimum, the deprivation of a protected fundamental liberty interest. See Bauer v. Summey, 568 F.Supp.3d 573, 586 (D.S.C. 2021). Contrary to what Plaintiff may contend, however, adequate housing and employment are not constitutionally guaranteed interests. See Perry v. Hous. Auth. of City of Charleston, 486 F.Supp. 498, 503 (D.S.C. 1980), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). Moreover, the Complaint does not provide any context regarding the process or procedures through which Plaintiff sought housing and/or employment from Defendants-only that they denied his requests. See City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 84546 (1998) (explaining that procedural due process requires a state to employ fair procedures when depriving a person of a protected interest). Thus, Plaintiff's cursory allegations do not demonstrate any actionable due process violations as currently written.
With respect to equal protection, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Aside from his conclusory opinion, Plaintiff makes no such allegations here. See Chapman v. Smith, No. 3:18-cv-597, 2020 WL 5742538, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2020) (dismissing equal protection claim where plaintiff “offered nothing, aside from his own speculation and subjective beliefs, to indicate that any decision made by [the defendant] was motivated by race in any way, shape, or form, much less that she harbored any animosity towards him because [of his race]”). Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that the Complaint does not state an actionable claim to relief under § 1983.
Notwithstanding the above, the substance of Plaintiff's allegations indicates that he may be attempting to raise a discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act and/or Title II/Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (directing federal courts to liberally construe a Pro se complaint to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case). However, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that would support an inference of discrimination based on Plaintiff's national origin; in fact, the Complaint does not even specify Plaintiff's national origin in the first instance. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (finding that a complaint fails to state a claim where it offers merely “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement” and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]”) (referencing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557); see also Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory, No. 3:14-cv-403-RJC-DCK, 2014 WL 12639858, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 8, 2014) (dismissing Fair Housing Act claim where plaintiff failed to allege any facts, beyond her race, that suggested defendants' refusal to allow her to reside in any of the homeless shelters was because of her race), aff'd, 841 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2016); Minor v. Salvation Army, No. 1:13-cv-750, 2013 WL 5216228, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Sept. 16, 2013) (“[S]imply invoking the term[] . . . ‘discrimination' does not suffice to state a claim.”). As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 8 at 4-5), the Court simply cannot fill in these blanks on his behalf, see Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1277-78 (stating that the court cannot serve as a “mind reader” or “construct full-blown claims” for a Pro se plaintiff), and any such claims must therefore be dismissed.
The undersigned makes no determinations regarding the potential merits of such additional claims. This Report and Recommendation merely attempts to clarify Plaintiff's causes of action and the scope of this case; it does not speak to whether such claims would be successful, or even colorable, in this Court. The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,” and to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b). Title II states that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Title VII makes it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Indeed, the only context Plaintiff offers regarding his national origin is the statement that he does not have a Social Security number. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) To the extent Plaintiff is suggesting that he is part of the Moorish Nation or a “sovereign citizen,” the United States has not recognized the sovereignty of the Moorish Nation. See Pleasant-Bey v. City of Baltimore, No. 8:16-cv-3879-DKC, 2016 WL 7491624, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 30, 2016), aff'd, 690 Fed.Appx. 115 (4th Cir. 2017). To that end, courts have consistently held that “persons claiming to be Moor or Moorish-American are not immune from the laws and rules imposed by the United States or the individual states.” See Mack v. Wells Fargo Fin. S.C., Inc., No. 2:19-cv-3335-SAL-BM, 2020 WL 1942342, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 1939069 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2020).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The Clerk of Court shall not forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).