Summary
directing district court to dismiss the complaint for a section 10(j) injunction as moot in light of the Board's decision
Summary of this case from Frankl ex rel. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Adams & Assocs., Inc.Opinion
No. 74-2453.
August 25, 1975.
Michael W. Josserand, Atty. (argued), N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for petitioner-appellant.
William R. Sweeney (argued), Torrance, Cal., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
OPINION
The National Labor Relations Board filed a complaint and amended complaint against Queen Mary Restaurant Corp. and Q. M. Foods, Inc., alleging violations of section 8(a)(1), (3), (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5), and seeking certain orders. A hearing before an administrative law judge of the NLRB on the amended complaint was held between January 23 and February 19, 1974. On March 28, 1974, petitioner filed an application for an injunction under section 10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), in the district court. On May 20, 1974, after a hearing, the district court issued its order denying the injunction. The NLRB appealed from that order, and that appeal is now before this court. On July 30, 1975, the Board rendered its decision on the unfair labor practices complaint.
Generally courts issue section 10(j) injunctions only to preserve the status quo while the parties are awaiting a resolution of their basic dispute by the Board. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated as moot, 385 U.S. 533, 87 S.Ct. 637, 17 L.Ed.2d 588 (1967). The parties are in accord that the decision of the Board of July 30, 1975, has rendered the resolution of the injunction proceeding moot. We agree. The Board's decision and order on the unfair labor practices complaint are now independently on review. In Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Carpet Layers, 397 U.S. 655, 90 S.Ct. 1299, 25 L.Ed.2d 637 (1970), the Supreme Court held that under circumstances such as these an injunction is only authorized, if at all, pending the final adjudication by the Board on the complaint on its merits. Id. at 658, 90 S.Ct. 1299. See 29 U.S.C. § 160( l). See also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).
The judgment of the district court is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint as moot.
It is so ordered.