Opinion
HHDCV166068755
01-10-2017
George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut v. Assured Rx, LLC et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS #107
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
Presently before the court is a motion jointly filed by the respondents, Assured Rx, LLC and Boots Rx, Inc., that seeks to dismiss an application for an order of compliance with investigative subpoenas issued by the petitioner, George Jepsen, Attorney General of the state of Connecticut (Attorney General), pursuant to General Statutes § § 1-3b and 4-61dd(d). The respondents claim that the court lacks both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to grant the Attorney General's application. For the reasons set forth herein, the court denies the respondents' motion.
In furtherance of his authority to investigate potential violations of the False Claims Act (FCA), General Statutes § 4-274 et seq., the Attorney General pursuant to § § 4-61dd(d) and 4-276, served the subpoenas duces tecum on the respondents during his investigation of the marketing of compound drugs to members of the state's employee benefit plans. As noted by the Attorney General, the investigation particularly concerns whether false claims were submitted to the state of Connecticut employee benefit plans. Although the respondents provided some responsive material, the Attorney General claims that they have not fully complied with the subject subpoenas, thus prompting him to commence this proceeding; in his application for an order of compliance, the Attorney General cites § 1-3b as the authority for this court to enforce the subject subpoenas. Significantly, the parties do not dispute that the respondents are corporate entities that are registered or incorporated in the state of Florida.
General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 4-61dd(d) provides that " [t]he Attorney General may summon witnesses, require the production of any necessary books, papers or other documents and administer oaths to witnesses, where necessary, for the purpose of an investigation pursuant to this section or for the purpose of investigating a suspected violation of subsection (a) of section 4-275 until such time as the Attorney General files a civil action pursuant to section 4-276. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the Attorney General shall where necessary, report any findings to the Governor, or in matters involving criminal activity, to the Chief State's Attorney. In addition to the exempt records provision of section 1-210, the Auditors of Public Accounts and the Attorney General shall not, after receipt of any information from a person under the provisions of this section or sections 4-276 to 4-280, inclusive, disclose the identity of such person without such person's consent unless the Auditors of Public Accounts or the Attorney General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable, and may withhold records of such investigation, during the pendency of the investigation."
General Statutes § 4-276 provides that " [t]he Attorney General may investigate any violation of subsection (a) of section 4-275. Any information obtained pursuant to such an investigation shall be exempt from disclosure under section 1-210. If the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating any provision of subsection (a) of section 4-275, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford under this section in the name of the state against such person."
General Statutes § 1-3b provides that " [w]henever any section of the general statutes or any section of any special act authorizes any person, committee, board, officer, commission, council or agency to issue any subpoena, and such section does not specifically provide for the enforcement of such subpoena, if the person to whom such subpoena is issued fails to appear or if having appeared refuses to testify or produce the evidence required by such subpoena, the Superior Court, upon application of such person, committee, board, officer, commission, council or agency, shall have jurisdiction to order such person to appear or to give testimony or produce such evidence, as the case may be."
The Attorney General alleges in his application for an order of compliance that Assured Rx, LLC is a compound pharmacy holding a nonresident pharmacy license issued by the Connecticut department of consumer protection and is registered in the state of Florida.
In opposing this court's enforcement of the subject subpoenas, the respondents first contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Attorney General's investigative subpoenas because § 4-61dd(d) does not authorize the Attorney General to issue investigative subpoenas to out of state companies regarding information that is not located in the state of Connecticut. In other words, the legislature did not expressly provide the Attorney General with the authority to issue extraterritorial investigative subpoenas regarding violations of the FCA. According to the respondents, because the Attorney General is not authorized to issue such extraterritorial subpoenas, the petitioner's enforcement action in this context does not fall within the parameters of § 1-3b and, therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas. Alternatively, the respondents claim that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them because a court's subpoena power ends at the state's borders. More specifically, the respondents contend that the Attorney General cannot rely on the relevant longarm statutes, General Statutes § § 33-929 and 52-59b, to establish personal jurisdiction for the enforcement of the subject subpoenas. According to the respondents, those statutes only apply to a " cause of action arising out of" business conducted in this state, and this " enforcement application is not a 'cause of action arising out of' any conduct enumerated in the longarm statutes." Finally, the respondents contend that the materials sought by the investigative subpoenas exceed the scope of the Attorney General's investigative authority.
Contrary to the respondents' position, the Attorney General asserts that the state of Connecticut has sufficient " specific jurisdiction" over the respondents due to their business contacts with this state. Although not directly responsive to the respondents' arguments targeted at this court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Attorney General essentially argues that § 1-3b affords this court with jurisdiction to enforce the subject investigative subpoenas because the respondents' actions " clearly come within the purview of Connecticut's long-arm statutes." Additionally, the Attorney General asserts that the respondents' claims regarding the " scope" of the subpoenas are impermissibly presented in a motion to dismiss. According to the Attorney General, the respondents argue that the investigative subpoenas at issue here exceed the Attorney General's authority, which is an argument impermissibly presented by a motion to dismiss. This latter argument also relates to the respondents' challenge to this court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court will address each issue in turn, and additional facts will be included as necessary.
See Attorney General's memorandum of law in opposition to motion to dismiss (#109), p. 12.
DISCUSSION
The standard governing this court's review of the present motion to dismiss is well settled. " [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . Where . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014); see also Practice Book § § 10-30(a) and (c).
I
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
" [J]urisdiction of the subject matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 31, 848 A.2d 418 (2004); accord Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 542, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). Indeed, " [a] court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 728, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999). Moreover, as previously noted, a motion to dismiss is not to be used to determine the merits of a particular claim. See, e.g., Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 147 Conn.App. 740.
This court's subject matter jurisdiction, as argued by the respondents, is called into question because the legislature did not expressly authorize the Attorney General to issue extraterritorial investigative subpoenas in the FCA context. Such argument misconstrues the nature of the court's subject matter jurisdiction and is also misplaced. The relevant inquiry is whether the court has the authority " to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [Indeed, ] [a] court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has the competence to entertain the action before it." (Emphasis added.) Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 727-28; see also Gurliacci v. Mayer, supra, 218 Conn. 542 (" Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong"). The court, by operation of § 1-3b, has the competence to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. Moreover, although framed as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, whether the Attorney General is " authorized" to issue the subject subpoenas; see General Statutes § 1-3b; goes to the merits of the present application for an order of compliance. See, e.g., Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 147 Conn.App. 740; see also In re Jose B., 303 Conn. 569, 573-74, 34 A.3d 975 (2012) (noting distinction between court's subject matter jurisdiction and authority to act); Cantoni v. Xerox Corp., 251 Conn. 153, 162, 740 A.2d 796 (1999) (attack on propriety of exercising statutory authority implicates authority to act, not subject matter jurisdiction). In other words, it hinges on whether the Attorney General has exceeded the scope of his authority under § 4-61dd(d). Thus, the respondents' argument is misplaced in this procedural setting.
Additionally, the court is unpersuaded by the authority cited by the respondents from the Superior Court and foreign jurisdictions. The respondents' reliance on State v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4034076 (April 20, 2010, Graham, J.) [49 Conn.L.Rptr. 665, ], is misplaced because the court did not conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena; rather, Judge Graham concluded that the Attorney General was not entitled to information outside of Connecticut dealing with matters unrelated to Connecticut. The court's decision went to the merits of the Attorney General's claim, not the court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the cases cited by the respondents from foreign jurisdictions--many of which involve disputes between private parties--do not hold that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce extraterritorial investigative subpoenas; indeed, the cases cited by the respondents highlight the difference between a court's jurisdiction and the authority to enforce a subpoena. Accordingly, the respondents' claim that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is misplaced and, indulging every presumption favoring jurisdiction, the court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction.
The respondents also cite our Supreme Court's decision in Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 463, 804 A.2d 152 (2002), where the Court held that the Attorney General possesses only that power which the legislature confers to his office by way of legislation. Although relevant to the merits of the Attorney General's application for an order of compliance, it does not resolve the issue of this court's jurisdiction.
In support of their motion to dismiss, the respondents cite the following cases in their joint memorandum of law: Colorado Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains & Foods Inc., 269 P.3d 731, 2012 CO 4 (Colo. 2012); In re Special Investigation No. 219, 52 Md.App. 17, 445 A.2d 1081 (1982); Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 908 So.2d 121 (Miss. 2005); Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 289 Va. 426, 770 S.E.2d 440 (2015). The respondents also attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Silverman v. Berkson, 141 N.J. 412, 661 A.2d 1266 (1995).
II
Personal Jurisdiction
In Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 923 A.2d 638 (2007), our Supreme Court addressed the standards utilized to determine when a court, within the context of an action to enforce an administrative investigative subpoena, may exert personal jurisdiction over an out of state entity. " When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, the court must undertake a two part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising such jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court must first decide whether the applicable long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 514-15. " If the defendant challenging the court's personal jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the court's jurisdiction." Id., 515.
Moreover, " where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts . . . An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652-54, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
Before turning to the relevant personal jurisdiction inquiries, it is prudent to briefly revisit the respective positions of the parties. As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that § § 33-929 and 52-59b are implicated; therefore, the court limits its analysis to those particular statutes. Moreover, as previously noted, the respondents solely oppose this court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over them because " this subpoena enforcement application is not a 'cause of action arising out of' any conduct enumerated in the long-arm statutes." Thus, the main thrust of the respondents' argument is that this enforcement action does not constitute a " cause of action" for purposes of longarm jurisdiction. In response to this novel argument, the Attorney General generally argues that the respondents' conduct that he seeks to investigate falls within certain enumerated categories of § § 33-929 and 52-59b. As to the main thrust of the respondents' argument, however, the Attorney General responds in a footnote that " [a] cause of action under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-3b is surely a 'cause of action' within the meaning of Connecticut's long arm statutes, Conn. Gen. Stat. § § 52-59b(a), 33-929(e), 33-929(f)."
See respondents' memorandum of law in support of motion to dismiss (#108), p. 11.
See Attorney General's memorandum of law in opposition to motion to dismiss (#109), p. 12 n.9.
Following the dictates of Cogswell, this court begins by addressing the first inquiry: whether the applicable longarm statutes authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over the respondents. Section 33-929(e) provides that " [e]very foreign corporation which transacts business in this state in violation of [§ ]33-920 shall be subject to suit in this state upon any cause of action arising out of such business ." (Emphasis added.) Further, § 33-929(f) provides in relevant part that " [e]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows : (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state; (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers . . ." (Emphasis added.) Lastly, § 52-59b(a) provides in relevant part that " [a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association . . . who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state . . ." (Emphasis added.) Thus, on their face, the longarm statutes apply to causes of action.
In making this determination, the court is guided by well established rules of statutory construction. See General Statutes § 1-2z; Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 517-18, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
General Statutes § 33-920(a) provides in relevant part that " [a] foreign corporation, other than an insurance, surety or indemnity company, may not transact business in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority from the Secretary of the State."
This court begins by noting that the respondents have not provided this court with any controlling authority on the issue of whether an action seeking to enforce an investigative subpoena is a " cause of action" for purposes of § § 33-929 or 52-59b; this court is also unaware of any such authority. Nonetheless, this court initially observes that, in factually and legally distinct contexts, courts have held that proceedings to enforce investigative subpoenas are not necessarily civil actions. See, e.g., Commissioner of Health Services v. Kadish, 17 Conn.App. 577, 581, 554 A.2d 1097, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 806, 563 A.2d 1355 (1989) (investigation by commissioner of health services is not " civil action" within meaning of statute preventing discovery of dental society peer review proceedings " in any civil action"): Rubenstein v. Reservation Services International, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV13-6042594 (September 2, 2016, Elgo, J.) (63 Conn.L.Rptr. 24, 26, ) (writ of summons requirements not applicable to " special proceedings" such as application to enforce civil investigative demand); Rubenstein v. Vacation Smart International, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-13-6039784-S (July 9, 2013, Schuman, J.) (56 Conn.L.Rptr. 436, 437, ) (statutory application to enforce investigative subpoena not " civil action" that would require writ of summons); Commissioner v. William W. Backus Hospital, 40 Conn.Supp. 188, 192, 485 A.2d 937 (1984) (commissioner's investigation, " which is not initiated by a complaint in the legal sense, does not fall within" definition of " civil action"). It would appear that the respondents' argument implicitly relies on this line of authority to claim that this enforcement action is not a " cause of action."
At first blush, such holdings would appear to support the respondents' position that the Attorney General's application to enforce his investigative subpoenas, pursuant to § § 1-3b and 4-61dd(d), is not a cause of action within the meaning of § § 33-929 or 52-59b. This court, however, is mindful of the fact that the phrase " cause of action" is a technical phrase that has acquired a particular meaning in our law. See General Statutes § 1-1(a) (where statute uses technical words and phrases that have acquired peculiar meaning in law, such words and phrases " shall be construed and understood accordingly"). Generally speaking, " [a] cause of action is that single group of facts which is to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute a cause of action ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn.App. 286, 299, 925 A.2d 441 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905, 942 A.2d 414 (2008). Often, " [c]ourts speak of a 'cause of action' as a set of facts on which a recovery (or a specific result) may be had and the cause of action is distinct from the remedy in that the remedy is the means by which that cause may be satisfied or its results effectuated." Taravella v. Stanley, 52 Conn.App. 431, 441-42, 727 A.2d 727 (1999).
With these general principles in mind, this court concludes that the Attorney General's enforcement action in this particular context is a " cause of action" within the parameters of § § 33-929 or 52-59b. This court notes that, pursuant to § 4-61dd(d), the Attorney General has the statutory right to investigate suspected violations of the FCA. He also has the statutory right to issue subpoenas for the production of witnesses or documents in connection with his investigative authority. Moreover, the only statutory right available to the Attorney General in this context when a party fails to comply with his investigative authority is to petition the Superior Court, pursuant to § 1-3b, to seek enforcement of such subpoenas; this is so whether or not the noncomplying party is a domestic or foreign entity. Such facts sufficiently constitute a " cause of action" under our law. Moreover, the court is cognizant of the fact that, if these facts failed to constitute a " cause of action" within the meaning of § § 33-929 or 52-59b, the legislature would have effectively created a statutory scheme within the FCA context whereby a corporate entity located in Greenwich would be treated less favorably than a similar entity located in Springfield, Massachusetts. Such a position, implicitly advanced by the respondents, leads to an absurd result that this court rejects.
Additionally, as argued by the Attorney General, this cause of action seeking to enforce investigative subpoenas arises out of various acts contained in § § 33-929 and 52-59b. As presented by the Attorney General's application to enforce his investigative subpoenas, respondent-Assured Rx, LLC holds a nonresident pharmacy license issued by the department of consumer protection, and respondent-Boots Rx, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Assured Rx, LLC. Moreover, the conduct that the Attorney General seeks to investigate involves the respondents' marketing and shipping of pharmaceutical products into Connecticut, along with their receipt of reimbursement from the state of Connecticut's employee benefit plans, Connecticut consumers, and other persons located in Connecticut. This cause of action, therefore, arises out of a contract made or performed in this state, out of business solicited in this state, and out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods that would reasonably be expected to be consumed in this state. See General Statutes § § 33-929(f)(1), (2), and (3). Similarly, this cause of action arises from an entity or entities transacting business within the state. See General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(1). Therefore, this court is unpersuaded by the respondents' argument that the Attorney General's application to enforce investigative subpoenas is not a " cause of action arising out of" any conduct enumerated in the longarm statutes. Accordingly, this court concludes that § § 33-929 and 52-59b authorize the assertion of jurisdiction over the respondents. See Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 514.
This court also notes that its conclusion is not altered by the out of state cases cited by the respondents. Although the cases cited by the respondents generally hold that a state may not enforce a subpoena on an individual or entity located outside of its jurisdiction, it is significant that none of those cases directly address the issues actually presented by the respondents. Specifically, none of the cases cited by the respondents hold that an enforcement action is not a " cause of action arising out of" any business conducted in those particular states.
With regard to the second due process inquiry under Cogswell, courts are guided by the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny. " [I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id., 316. " The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the 'minimum contacts' inquiry and the 'reasonableness' inquiry." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 524. As to the initial minimum contacts inquiry, " [e]ither specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction can satisfy the constitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum. A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities . . . Alternatively, even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum [s]tate, due process is not offended by a state's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction if the defendant has had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the state." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " Once minimum contacts have been established, [t]he second stage of the due process inquiry asks whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice--that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 525.
Considering the significant factual findings that this court must make for this second due process inquiry, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish the requisite jurisdictional facts. See Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 652-54. Notably, when pressed by this court during oral argument regarding whether an evidentiary hearing would be necessary, counsel for the respondents indicated that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary due to contested issues of fact. Accordingly, this court orders an evidentiary hearing to determine whether this court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the respondents would comport with due process. See Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 524.
As our Supreme Court noted in Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 653 n.15, 974 A.2d 669 (2009), " [a] preliminary evidentiary hearing ordinarily will suffice where the jurisdictional issue is distinct and severable from the merits of the action, for example, when personal jurisdiction is called into question."
III
Scope of the Investigative Subpoenas
The respondents' final argument relates to the scope of the investigative subpoenas that the Attorney General seeks to enforce. According to the respondents, the Attorney General's " subpoenas here purport to require the production of many materials patently unrelated to any Connecticut health or human services program" and this exceeds the scope of his authority because the FCA only authorizes him to investigate matters that have a nexus to Connecticut. As previously noted, a motion to dismiss is not to be used to determine the merits of a particular claim. See, e.g., Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 147 Conn.App. 740. To the extent that the Attorney General's investigative subpoenas exceed the scope of his authority under § § 4-61dd(d) and 4-276, which this court does not address, the respondents' challenge is improperly raised by way of a motion to dismiss. See id. ; Practice Book § 10-30(a).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the respondents' motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety and the parties are hereby ordered to appear before the court on a mutually acceptable date requested of and assigned by the caseflow office. The court, at that time, will accept any evidence to determine the requisite jurisdictional facts. It is so ordered.
Additionally, the Attorney General alleges that Boots Rx, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Assured Rx, LLC.