Before the Court is a Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defense Expert Witness Michael Brave (Rec. Doc. 14) filed by plaintiffs Nadia Jarrow et al. Defendants, Lieutenant Steve Cupit, et al. oppose the motion. The motion, set for hearing on September 27, 2000, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. Finding that Plaintiffs' arguments have merit, the motion is GRANTED.

Background

This civil rights suit arises out of a high school graduation party gone awry. The St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff's Office responded to neighbors' complaints that the party had gotten out of hand. Deputies arrived on the scene with a canine unit in tow and attempted to disperse the crowd. According to Plaintiffs, deputies forced several guests to leave the house and walk to a pay phone, arrested one plaintiff without probable cause, and caused damage to the home during a warrantless search.

Nadia Jarrow and several of the other party attendees (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs") filed suit against Lieutenant Steve Cupit as well as several other members of the Sheriff's Office (hereinafter collectively "Defendants") alleging that Defendants had violated their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury trial in this matter is set for November 13, 2000.

Defendants retained Michael Brave ("Brave"), an attorney, as an expert in law enforcement practices and procedures. In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's scheduling order, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with a copy of Brave's report and notified Plaintiffs of their intent to call him as an expert witness at trial. Plaintiffs then filed the instant motion seeking to exclude Brave's testimony.

Discussion

Brave's report, attached as Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, consists of various dissertations on the law pertaining to civil rights litigation. These dissertations are then followed by his application of that law to the facts of this case, and by his conclusion that Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs assert that Brave's testimony should be excluded because it will not assist the jury in understanding or determining any factual issue, and it usurps the Court's duty to charge the jury. Rec. Doc. 14, at 5. In opposition, Defendants assert that Brave's testimony will assist the jury in deciding whether or not Defendants followed proper police procedures under the factual circumstances of this case. Rec. Doc. 15.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 704, expert opinion testimony may embrace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, it is well-established in the Fifth Circuit that Rule 704 does not permit an expert to render conclusions of law. United States of America v. $9,041.598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 255 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 98 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996)) Therefore, expert testimony that offers a legal opinion is inadmissible.Estate of Sowell v. United States of America, 198 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999); Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 1997)

In Askanase, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to exclude plaintiff's expert — an attorney whose specialty was corporate officer and director liability. Plaintiff sought to have the expert opine that the directors and officers involved in that case had breached their fiduciary duties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the expert's testimony as to whether the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties was an inadmissible legal opinion. Id. at 673.

One of the most interesting aspects of Askanase, given the case at hand, was the court's reliance on Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988). Specht was a § 1983 suit based on a warrantless search. The trial court allowed plaintiffs' expert, an attorney, to testify as to Fourth Amendment law and whether defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 806. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in allowing the expert to testify to such matters. Id. at 808. The court found that allowing an attorney to testify as to the law would usurp the court's role of instructing the jury on the law. Id. That in turn would be harmful in at least two ways. First, because the attorney would be "imbued with the mystique inherent in the title `expert,'" the jury might disregard the judge's instructions on the law and simply adopt the expert's conclusions as its own. Id. at 809. Second, the court noted that testimony by a legal expert as to ultimate issues of law would be detrimental to the trial process because each party in a dispute would likely hire its own legal expert to expound on the law favorable to its side. Then following instructions on the law by the court, the jury would surely be confused.Id.

Under the reasoning applied in Askanase and Specht, the Court finds that Brave's testimony should be excluded. Brave's testimony as to whether or not Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights is a legal opinion or conclusion, and as such, is inadmissible. Brave's dissertations on civil rights law are also inadmissible because it is the Court's role, not that of one party's expert witness, to instruct the jury on the law of this case. The law "requires only one spokesperson . . . who of course is the judge." Specht, 853 F.2d at 807 (quoting Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41 Den.L.Cent.J. 226, 237 (1964)).

Furthermore, expert testimony is appropriate only where it will assist the trier of fact. See Tasch. Inc. v. Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 596261 (E.D. La.). Expert testimony on matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without an expert's help should be excluded. Id. Surely, the jury in this case will be capable of determining, without testimony from an expert, whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. In short, whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights is an issue for the jury to decide and not for Brave to tell the jury what to decide. Askanase, 130 F.3d at 673. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defense Expert Witness Michael Brave should be and is hereby GRANTED. Defendants expert, Michael Brave, will not be allowed to testify at trial.