Per Curiam.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Laura Moody, Chief Legal Counsel, and Michael J. Dittenber, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Transportation.

Ringsmuth Wuori PLLC (by Blake K. Ringsmuth and Thomas J. Wuori ) for Jane Doe.

Before: Shapiro, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and O'Brien, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals as of right the opinion and order of the Court of Claims granting plaintiff's motion to transfer the case back to the circuit court, denying as moot defendant's motion for summary disposition, and denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Defendant only appeals the order with respect to its granting plaintiff's motion to transfer and denying defendant's motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court on August 31, 2015, alleging that while employed by defendant, she was sexually harassed by her manager in violation of the Elliott–Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . On April 1, 2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging sexual harassment and illegal retaliation by defendant in violation of the ELCRA. Both complaints included a jury demand. On May 25, 2017, defendant filed a notice of transfer to the Court of Claims, "effective immediately," pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3). On the same day, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that it was entitled to summary disposition because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements for filing in the Court of Claims.

On June 5, 2017, plaintiff filed an emergency motion to transfer the case back to the circuit court, arguing that the jury-trial exception in MCL 600.6421(1) to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims applied. In response to plaintiff's motion, defendant argued that the jury-trial exception did not apply because plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA against a state defendant.

On June 20, 2017, the Court of Claims issued its opinion. The court found that it was "well established in this state's jurisprudence that [plaintiff] enjoys" the right to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA and that Michigan's appellate courts had extended this right "to claims against the state or state agencies." The Court of Claims concluded that because a jury-trial right existed in this case, the circuit court and the Court of Claims had concurrent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's motion for transfer to the circuit court and denied as moot defendant's motion for summary disposition.

This appeal followed.

Defendant argues that the Court of Claims erred by transferring the case back to the circuit court because the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. MCL 600.6419(1) states, in pertinent part, "Except as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive." If an exception does not apply, then the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over this action pursuant to MCL 600.6419(1)(a). The only exception that may apply to the Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction is MCL 600.6421(1), which provides as follows:

Nothing in this chapter eliminates or creates any right a party may have to a trial by jury, including any right that existed before November 12, 2013. Nothing in this chapter deprives the circuit, district, or probate court of jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law, including a claim against an individual employee of this state for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a party has the right to a trial by jury and asserts that right as required by law, the claim may be heard and determined by a circuit, district, or probate court in the appropriate venue.

If plaintiff had the right to a jury trial in her case against defendant, defendant does not contest that transfer back to the circuit court was otherwise proper.

On appeal, defendant concedes that a right to a jury trial exists under the ELCRA but argues that this right does not extend to state defendants. Defendant contends that because a plaintiff does not have an established right to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA when the state is the defendant, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. This argument fails because the question is not whether a plaintiff enjoys the right to a jury trial against a state defendant in an action under the ELCRA; plaintiffs already enjoy the right to a jury trial under the ELCRA. The proper inquiry is whether the Legislature waived the state's immunity from jury trial in the ELCRA.

A challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims requires interpretation of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq., which presents a statutory question that is reviewed de novo. Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev. Auth. , 468 Mich. 763, 767, 664 N.W.2d 185 (2003). The availability of governmental immunity presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers , 292 Mich. App. 574, 578, 808 N.W.2d 578 (2011). "Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo." Klooster v. City of Charlevoix , 488 Mich. 289, 295, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011).

" ‘The State, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and any relinquishment of sovereign immunity must be strictly interpreted.’ " Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing) , 420 Mich. 567, 601, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), quoting Manion v. State Hwy. Comm’r , 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942).

In addressing the issue before us, we find instructive our Supreme Court's reasoning in Anzaldua v. Band , 457 Mich. 530, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). Anzaldua involved the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq . After finding that a plaintiff had a statutory right to a jury trial in an action under the WPA, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the argument of the defendant Michigan State University (MSU) that "even if a jury right exists generally under the act, MSU is immune from suit before a jury because it is an arm of the state." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 550, 578 N.W.2d 306. Our Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning as follows:

Defendant has confused the test we use to determine whether the state is immune from liability with the test used for determining whether the state is immune from suit . As the Court noted in Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing ), the state's sovereign immunity from liability and its immunity from suit are not the same.

Defendant MSU and amici curiae argue that the state's sovereign immunity from a trial by jury can be waived only by "express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute." They are incorrect. The quoted language comes from this Court's opinion in Mead v. Public Service Comm. , 303 Mich. 168, 173, 5 N.W.2d 740 (1942). In Mead , we examined portions of the motor vehicle law, 1929 CL 4724. In ruling on Mead , we overturned one of our own prior decisions, Miller v. Manistee Co. Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs , 297 Mich. 487, 298 N.W. 105 (1941). We held that Miller had given the language of the motor vehicle law too broad a construction when it extended liability to the state. Mead , supra at 172–173 .

In Miller , the Court had construed the motor vehicle law to waive the state's immunity from liability as the owner of a vehicle. Id . at 490 . However, the motor vehicle law made only the driver of a vehicle liable. The act provided:

"The provisions of this act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways, shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by this State or any county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision of the State subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this act." [ Mead , supra at 172–173 , quoting 1929 CL 4724.]

In overruling Miller , the Court in Mead explained:

It is sufficient to note that the above-quoted portion of the statute by its express terms affects only the duties and liabilities of drivers. It does not enlarge or modify the duties or liabilities of the State as owner of a motor vehicle. [ Id . at 173, 5 N.W.2d 740.]

The motor vehicle law did not, by its express terms or by necessary implication, provide liability for the state as an owner. Therefore, we held that the state had not waived its immunity to liability. Id . at 173–174, 5 N.W.2d 740.

The Whistleblowers' Protection Act satisfies the Mead test for waiver of

immunity from liability. The Legislature expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of "employer." See MCL 15.361(b) ; MSA 17.428(1)(b). Because the state is expressly named in the act, it is within the act's coverage.

However, Mead does not provide a test for determining whether a jury right exists against the state. The Court of Appeals dissent cited Mead for the proposition that the state's immunity from suit before a jury could be waived only by express statutory enactment or by necessary inference. [ Anzaldua v. Band , 216 Mich. App. 561, 590, 550 N.W.2d 544 (1996) ] ( O'CONNELL , J., dissenting). However, Mead does not concern the state's immunity from suit. Rather, the state was subject to suit in the Court of Claims, and we held merely that it was immune from liability under the act involved in that case. As we noted above, immunity from suit and immunity from liability are distinct matters. See Ross , supra at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641.

Thus, the language from Mead to the effect that the state waives immunity only by express statutory enactment or by necessary inference applies only to the state's immunity from liability. It has no application to the state's immunity from suit, or to immunity from trial before a jury, which is at issue here.

The rule for immunity from suit was recognized by this Court in Ross : " ‘The State, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and any relinquishment of sovereign immunity [from suit] must be strictly interpreted ....’ " Id . at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641, quoting Manion v. State Hwy. Comm'r , 303 Mich. 1, 19–21, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942).

The Legislature created the Court of Claims in 1939, permitting the state to be sued before a judge. Ross , supra at 600, 363 N.W.2d 641. The broad language of the act creating the Court of Claims mandates that suits against the state for money damages are typically brought in that forum. Id . See MCL 600.6419 ; MSA 27A.6419.

As Ross makes clear, the Legislature was free when enacting the Whistleblowers' Protection Act to waive the state's immunity from suit. Ross , supra at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641. Section 3 of the act allows suit to be brought in the circuit courts. The statute specifically includes the state among the bodies to be regulated by defining "employers" subject to the act to include the state and its political subdivisions. Nothing in the act suggests that the state is not to be treated the same as a business for purposes of the act's protection of noncivil service employees like the plaintiff. We find it significant that the Legislature chose to subject the state to suit in the circuit court rather than in the Court of Claims.

The express language of the act indicates that the Legislature intended to submit the state to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. As indicated above, the court rules govern in civil actions in circuit court. They provide that legal actions for money damages are to be tried by a jury upon request. Hence, it necessarily follows, the Legislature consented that the state may be tried by a jury in Whistleblowers' Protection Act cases.

We uphold the result reached by the Court of Appeals on the question whether the case against MSU may be tried by a jury. We find that MSU is subject to a trial by jury under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act as provided by the court rules, generally. Plaintiff is entitled to a jury in her suit against both defendants. [

Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 550–554, 578 N.W.2d 306 (citation omitted; some alterations in original).]

The WPA is constructed similarly to the ELCRA, see id . at 545–548, 578 N.W.2d 306, and, therefore, we find our Supreme Court's interpretation of the WPA to be instructive for how the ELCRA should be interpreted. To reiterate, defendant concedes on appeal that a jury-trial right generally exists under the ELCRA. But like MSU in Anzaldua , defendant in this case argues that it is not subject to jury trial because it is an arm of the state. And like MSU's argument in Anzaldua , defendant's argument fails.

Pursuant to MCL 37.2202 :

(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:

(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.^{[ ]}

Pursuant to MCL 37.2201(a), " ‘Employer’ means a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that person." MCL 37.2103 provides:

As used in this act:

* * *

(g) "Person" means an individual, agent, association, corporation, joint apprenticeship committee, joint stock company, labor organization, legal representative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bankruptcy, unincorporated organization, the state or a political subdivision of the state or an agency of the state , or any other legal or commercial entity.

(h) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, village, township, school district, or special district or authority of the state. [Emphasis added.]

Based on the foregoing, "[t]he Legislature expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition" of "person." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 551, 578 N.W.2d 306. Relevant to the case before us, the Legislature defined "employer" as "a person" with one or more employees. MCL 37.2201(a). Therefore, like the WPA, the ELCRA satisfies "the Mead test for waiver of immunity from liability." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 551, 578 N.W.2d 306. This conclusion is well grounded in our caselaw. See Manning v. City of Hazel Park , 202 Mich. App. 685, 699, 509 N.W.2d 874 (1993) ("Concerning the sex and age discrimination claims, defendants do not have a governmental immunity defense because the Civil Rights Act specifically includes state and political subdivisions and their agents as employers covered by the act."); Does 11–18 v. Dep't of Corrections , 323 Mich. App. 479, 490, 917 N.W.2d 730 (2018) ("Contrary to defendants' assertions, the law is clear that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims."); In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 393 n. 60, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013).

However, this does not resolve whether the Legislature in the ELCRA waived the state's "immunity from suit, or to immunity from trial before a jury, which is at issue here." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 552, 578 N.W.2d 306. A cause of action under the ELCRA is provided in MCL 37.2801, which states as follows:

(1) A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate

injunctive relief or damages , or both.

(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business.

(3) As used in subsection (1), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney’s fees. [Emphasis added.]

When enacting the ELCRA, the Legislature was free to waive the state's immunity from suit. See Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. MCL 37.2202(1) prohibits discrimination by an "employer"; MCL 37.2201(a) defines an "employer" as "a person"; and MCL 37.2103(g) specifically includes the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of a "person." It is therefore clear that the Legislature intended for the state and its political subdivisions to be regulated by and subject to the ELCRA. See Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. MCL 37.2801(2) allows suit under the ELCRA to be brought in circuit court. Nothing in the ELCRA indicates that the state is to be treated differently from any other employer, indicating that "the Legislature chose to subject the state to suit in the circuit court rather than in the Court of Claims." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. Therefore, based on "[t]he express language of the act ...[,] the Legislature intended to submit the state to the jurisdiction of the circuit court." Id . And the court rules governing civil actions in circuit court allow a party seeking money damages "to be tried by a jury upon request." Id ."Hence, it necessarily follows, the Legislature consented that the state may be tried by a jury in" ELCRA cases. Id . at 553–554, 578 N.W.2d 306. In other words, the Legislature waived the state's immunity from jury trial in actions brought under the ELCRA.

Defendant argues that Anzaldua employed improper reasoning and was ultimately wrongly decided. Whatever issues defendant may take with Anzaldua , "it is the Supreme Court's obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until [that] Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority." State Treasurer v. Sprague , 284 Mich. App. 235, 242, 772 N.W.2d 452 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original); see also People v. Mitchell , 428 Mich. 364, 369–370, 408 N.W.2d 798 (1987).

Defendant also contends on appeal that Anzaldua 's"persuasive value" was "undercut" by the enactment of 2013 PA 164 because that act "abrogated the primary rationale for affording plaintiffs a right to [a] jury—the ELCRA's grant of jurisdiction to the circuit courts." This is apparently a reference to MCL 600.6419, which defendant argues "[b]y its plain terms ... superseded MCL 37.2801(2), which granted circuit courts jurisdiction over ELCRA claims."

Defendant's argument fatally ignores MCL 600.6421(1). By its plain language, MCL 600.6419 is expressly subject to MCL 600.6421. See MCL 600.6419(1) ("Except as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive."). MCL 600.6421(1) states that "[n]othing in this chapter eliminates ... any right a party may have to a trial by jury ...." Therefore, pursuant to MCL 600.6421(1), the Court of Claims' expanded jurisdiction in MCL 600.6419 cannot be construed to deprive a party of an existing right to a jury trial.Accordingly, because plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial against defendant in her action under the ELCRA, the Court of Claims had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court by virtue of MCL 600.6421(1). Therefore, the Court of Claims did not err by transferring the case back to the circuit court.

Affirmed.

SHAPIRO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and O’BRIEN, JJ., concurred.