OPINION

BLEIL, Justice.

Carrie James appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to two of her children, a boy and a girl, aged nine and eleven, respectively, at the time of trial. The trial also resulted in the termination of the parental rights of Sherman Goodson, the children's father. The significant issues material to our decision concern preliminary trial court rulings, evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions. We conclude that the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings which normally would dictate a reversal of the judgment. However, because other properly admitted evidence shows clearly and convincingly that there are grounds for termination, and that termination is in the best interests of the children, we find no reversible error and affirm.

PRELIMINARY RULINGS

Initially, we consider the complaints concerning the trial court's preliminary rulings. The complaints concern the action of the trial court in failing to grant all of James' special exceptions to the pleadings, in allowing the State to file amended pleadings three days before trial, and in failing to sever her trial from that of Sherman Goodson.

James shows no error with respect to these preliminary rulings. Concerning the special exceptions, no appellate complaint is preserved because the trial court did not rule on the special exceptions (TEX.R.APP.P. 52(a)); further, no special exceptions were levied against the pleadings on which the case was tried, thus no error is shown. Wray v. Lenderman, 640 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1982, no writ).

As to the amendment of the pleadings, James shows no error. Parties may amend their pleadings by filing such pleadings with the clerk at such time as not to operate as a surprise to the opposite party; pleadings offered for filing within seven days of the date of trial shall be filed only after leave of the court is obtained, which leave shall be granted by the court unless there is a showing that such filing will operate as a surprise to the opposite party. TEX.R.CIV.P. 63. Without a showing of surprise, the trial court must grant leave for a party to file the amendment when requested within seven days of trial or thereafter. Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. 1990). Thus, a party's right to amend under Rule 63 is subject only to the opposing party's right to show surprise. To reverse a trial court's ruling allowing pleadings to be amended, an appellant must show that the trial court abused its discretion; to establish abuse of discretion, the complaining party must claim surprise and request a continuance. Louisiana Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Blakely, 773 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1989, writ denied). The third amended petition raised no new substantive matters, and because James showed no surprise or prejudice, the trial court is not shown to have abused its discretion in allowing the pleadings to be amended.

With regard to the refusal of the trial court to sever this case from that seeking to terminate Sherman Goodson's parental rights, the court again is allowed wide discretion. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982); see also TEX.R.CIV.P. 41. The cases against James and Goodson involved common allegations and evidence; in fact, at the crux of the case were sexual acts which the two performed in the presence of the children. James shows no abuse of the trial court's discretion by its refusal to sever the cases.

EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AND SUFFICIENCY

The trial court erred in several particulars in allowing evidence which should have been excluded. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is related to our harm analysis, these questions are discussed together. The trial court erred in admitting a videotape of the children, hearsay statements made by them to several witnesses, and an opinion as to the truthfulness of the children.

a. The videotape

The Family Code allows for a videotaped statement of a child to be admitted in proceedings like these. This videotape, however, should not have been admitted for two reasons.

Firstly, TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 11.21(b) (Vernon 1986) provides that the statement must not have been made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement. By prohibiting leading questions in cases governed by Section 11.21(b)(4), the legislative branch adopted the common-law rule insofar as the uncross-examined videotaped testimony of children under the age of twelve is concerned. Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1990, writ denied). Under the strictures of TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 11.21 (Vernon 1986), questions directed to a child must be open-ended and not suggestive of a response. Id. We conclude that the videotape with these children's statements should have been excluded because the questioning was calculated to lead the children to a particular statement. The questioning itself was generally

leading. In addition, Sellers' nonverbal communication, such as her approving, affectionate pats in response to desired answers and her active, demonstrative use of the dolls, coupled with her argumentative refusal to accept undesired answers, contributed to making a particular statement. Thus, the statement should not have been admitted as evidence.

Secondly, the videotaped statement should have been excluded as a sanction for discovery abuse. The Department of Human Services failed to disclose the existence of the videotape in response to a discovery request. The videotape was revealed to James' attorney only five days before trial. This time was past the discovery deadline. A party who fails to respond or to supplement a response to a discovery request is not entitled to present the undisclosed evidence unless the court finds that good cause existed for the omission. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(6), 215(5). The party offering the evidence has the burden of proof to show good cause in the record. See Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement Nursing Center, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246-47 (Tex. 1985). The only exception to the automatic sanction of disallowing undiscovered or, as here, untimely disclosed evidence is when good cause is shown why the evidence should be admitted in spite of the rule requiring disclosure. See Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 297 (Tex. 1986); Braniff, Inc. v. Lentz, 748 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).

When the videotape was offered in evidence, it was objected to because it was not disclosed in response to discovery. No evidence of good cause was presented, nor did the trial court make a determination that there was good cause for the Department of Human Services not to have disclosed the videotape. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled the objections to the videotape and admitted it. Absent a showing of good cause on the record, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. See Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d at 299; TEX.R.CIV.P. 215(5).

The Department of Human Services here argues that, while it produced no evidence of good cause, its attorney argued good cause. The determination of good cause is a decision relegated to the discretion of the trial court. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d at 298. Basically, the Department of Human Services argued that one of its main witnesses, Jennifer Sellers — who took the videotaped statement — no longer worked for the Department of Human Services, that the Department of Human Services had left the videotape with the police department, and that no one at the Department of Human Services knew of the existence of the videotaped statement until a week before trial. Because the ruling on James' objection is within the trial court's discretion and because the court overruled the objection, the Department of Human Services now urges that we presume that the trial court found good cause and that there is support in the record (argument on the objection) to support the court's ruling. We decline to adopt such a proposal. The court did not find good cause; had it done so, we would find an abuse of trial court discretion absent a better showing on the record that the Department of Human Services had good cause not to disclose the existence of the videotape in response to the discovery questions.

b. Hearsay statements of the children

Jennifer Sellers, Linda Reynolds and Virginia Reed all testified about various statements that the children who are the subject of this suit made to them. Generally, the statements were to the effect that James and Goodson committed acts which would be characterized as sexually and emotionally abusive of the children.

To be clear, the statements made were not offered pursuant to any statutory hearsay statement exception for child witnesses. Neither were the statements offered under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.

Hearsay is a statement made by someone not while testifying at trial, offered in evidence as proof of the matter asserted. TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 801(d). The attorneys and the trial court agreed that the children's statements to the three witnesses were hearsay. James objected to the admission of the statements on that basis. The trial court overruled the objections and admitted what the children had told the three to show the children's "state of mind."

There is an exception to the rule excluding hearsay testimony dealing with state of mind. It is the following:

(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.

TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 803(3). The statements of the children do not seem to relate to their state of mind at the time they made the statements. However, if any of the children's statements can be said to relate to their state of mind, their state of mind is not relevant to any issue in this case. Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 402. What is relevant about the children's hearsay statements — the conduct of James and Goodson, their parents — is not admissible. The children's statements to others describing general acts of James and Goodson are not admissible under Rule 803(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule which permits statements pertaining to one's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition. Statements admitted under this exception are usually spontaneous remarks about pain or some other sensation, made by the declarant while the sensation, not readily observable by a third party, is being experienced. Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d at 959. The exception does not extend to statements of past external facts or conditions. Id. The trial court erred in allowing the three witnesses to testify as to the content of the statements the children had made to them.

c. Opinion as to truthfulness

Sellers qualified as an expert witness concerning sexually abused children and testified that, among other things, the children were sexually abused. The attorney for the Department of Human Services asked if she had an opinion as to what the children were telling her on the tape. She gave her opinion that they were telling the truth. The trial court overruled James' objection to this evidence.

Opinions as to the truthfulness of another are generally not allowed. See Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); see also Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a "Better Mousetrap," 32 S.TEX.L.REV. 37, 57 n. 109 (1990). Sellers' opinion of the truthfulness of the children was not admissible, and the trial court erred in overruling James' objection to that testimony.

HARM ANALYSIS/SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The trial court errors in the admission of evidence were serious, and the erroneously admitted evidence is of the type that almost always is harmful. Were this a criminal case, we would certainly reverse the judgment because we could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors made no contribution to the judgment as required by TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2). In this appeal, clear and convincing evidence must support the findings. We reverse if the errors were reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(1). The errors respecting the erroneously admitted evidence patently were reasonably calculated to cause the rendition of an improper judgment. However, under the facts of this case, we are convinced that it was the other clear and convincing evidence before the court, and not the improperly admitted evidence, that led the jury to find the facts it found.

When the improperly admitted evidence is not considered, all of the remaining evidence paints just one picture: James is mentally ill, incapable of caring for the children, and has subjected the children to conditions which jeopardize their well-being. The jury found on clear evidence that both parents had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed both children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of such children, had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of such children, that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the children, and that the Texas Department of Human Services should be appointed managing conservator.

Neither James nor Goodson testified. Evidence against them came from each witness who testified. The witnesses included her mother, two sisters and two older children whose father was not Sherman Goodson. While each of James' relatives did not relate all of the facts, when their testimony is taken together, it corroborates, rather than contradicts, the other evidence. Together, all the evidence clearly leads to the factual findings made by the jury.

James is mentally ill: a paranoid schizophrenic who, at the time of trial, resided in Terrell State Hospital. She has a long history of mental illness and can be both dangerous and violent. The children, who are the subject of this suit, have been sexually abused. James and Goodson routinely had sex in the presence of the children. Goodson sexually abused them in James' presence. James allowed this. The children either had sex or went through the motions of having sex in front of their parents. The two older children of James testified to having been sexually abused in the past by Goodson with their mother's knowledge. When they reported this abuse to their mother, she accused them of trying to take him from her. They also testified that Goodson and James sexually abused the younger children. Experts testified that James abused the children. All facts and matters in evidence compel a conclusion that the termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the children.

On the other hand, no evidence indicated that the children had not been abused or that termination of the parent-child relationship was not appropriate.

We conclude that the trial court errors in the admission of evidence did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. We find that sufficient, clear and convincing admissible evidence supports the verdict and the judgment.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

James' attorney requested the court to submit jury questions on a counterclaim she had filed. These were nine questions dealing with whether the Department of Human Services followed the correct procedure in attempting to terminate her parental rights. The questions which James requested are not controlling. The Department of Human Services may have deviated from its own regulations and the requirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. This, however, has no bearing on whether there were grounds for termination and whether the termination was in the best interests of the children. The standard for review of the charge is abuse of discretion, and abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principle. Texas Dep't of Human Serv. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990). The trial court properly submitted broad-form controlling questions, as contemplated by TEX.R.CIV.P. 271-279. We find no abuse of discretion or error in failing to submit the jury questions requested by James.

We have reviewed all of the points complained of on this appeal. We find no reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.