LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge

ORDER TO AMEND

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff, who currently resides in the Bronx, brings this pro se action, alleging that Defendants violated his rights when he was detained in the Vernon C. Bain Center (VCBC) on Rikers Island. Named as Defendants are “Correction Officers”; the “Department of Corrections,” which the Court understands to be the New York City Department of Correction (DOC); the “Warden of Correction,” which the Court understands to be the warden of VCBC; and several VCBC detainees whose names appear to be Johnson, Williams, Bowman, and Thone. The Court construes the complaint as asserting federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated January 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that his claims arose at “New York City Correction Facilities” on June 17, 2022, August 5, 2022, and “November through December, 2022.” (ECF 2, at 4.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On June 17, 2022, an unidentified correction officer told another inmate to “beat [Plaintiff] up.” (Id.) The inmate began punching Plaintiff in the face, causing Plaintiff's face and mouth to bleed and causing Plaintiff to lose a tooth.

In what may be a separate incident, on an unspecified date, a correction officer “made” an inmate spit on Plaintiff and pour soapy water on him while he was sleeping, and then the inmate beat, spit on, and slapped Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff also alleges that a correction officer “allow[ed] her inmate putting their hands on me multiple time breaking my tooth and also they pass out life threatening message.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Emergency Search Unit searched him by “getting [him] naked” and “scanning [his] body trying to steal [his] organs.” (Id.)

At the top of each page of the complaint, Plaintiff states that his state-court criminal proceedings on charges of “persistent sexual abuse” were dismissed following a jury trial on December 16, 2022. (See id. at 2, 3, 4, 5.)

Plaintiff seeks money damages.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

A. Claims against DOC

Plaintiff's claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against DOC for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

To the extent Plaintiff's complaint can be construed as attempting to assert claims against the City of New York, those claims must also be dismissed. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).

Here, nothing in the complaint suggests that Plaintiff's rights have been violated by a policy, practice, or custom of the City of New York. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a municipal liability claim under Section 1983. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state a municipal liability claim against the City of New York.

B. Claims against the “Warden of Correction”

The Court understands Plaintiff to be asserting claims under Section 1983 against the warden of VCBC. (See ECF 2, at 3) (listing “Warden of Vain Bein Correction Bronx” and “Warden of the Boat” as defendants). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how the warden of VCBC was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. He therefore fails to state a viable Section 1983 claim against the warden of VCBC.

C. Claims against other inmates

Plaintiff also purports to assert claims against several inmates. A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). As the VCBC inmates are private parties who are not alleged to work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under Section 1983.

Plaintiff may, however, be able to assert claims under state law against these defendants. If Plaintiff repleads claims against individual VCBC detainees in his amended complaint, he should clearly identify those individuals involved in the alleged attacks.

D. Rule 8

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

Plaintiff's allegations that a correction officer or officers directed other detainees to assault him may be sufficient to state a claim under Section 1983. However, the complaint does not provide enough information about the correction officers involved in the events giving rise to his claims - and therefore who may be held liable - for violating Plaintiff's rights. He sues “correction officers,” but does not provide sufficient information that would allow the DOC to identify the officers he seeks to sue. Moreover, it is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff is alleging that he was assaulted on multiple occasions or whether he is describing the same assault multiple times.

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his claims arising from being assaulted by other detainees at the direction of correction officers. First, because it is unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging that he was assaulted on multiple occasions, Plaintiff should provide the date of each incident in which he alleges his rights were violated. Second, as described in more detail below, Plaintiff should name each individual officer he seeks to sue as a separate John Doe defendant (i.e., John Doe 1, John Doe 2, etc.). He should also allege any additional information he may have that would allow DOC to identify the individual officers. For example, Plaintiff should state where in the facility and at what time each incident occurred, as well as any other information that may help identify the officer, such as the officer's gender, race, height, weight, or badge number.

E. Claims under state law

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal district court is authorized to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims once it has dismissed all of the federal claims of which it had original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“Generally, when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”).

Because it is not clear that Plaintiff can state any federal claim, the Court will determine at a later time whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff seeks to raise in the amended complaint. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2000) (directing dismissal of supplemental state-law claims where no federal claims remained).

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid Section 1983 claim against the officers who directed other detainees to assault him, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.

First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:

a) the names and titles of all relevant people;

b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;

c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and

d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.

The Court also strongly advises Plaintiff to contact the New York Legal Assistance Group (NYLAG), an organization that provides legal advice to self-represented plaintiffs and defendants, for assistance in drafting his amended complaint. A flyer from NYLAG is attached to this order.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims Section 1983 claims against the “Department of Corrections” for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-0233 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.