Opinion
W.C. No. 4-767-757.
February 14, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant and Pinnacol Assurance (Pinnacol) seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mottram (ALJ) dated June 30, 2010, that found the claimant was a joint employee of both employers at the time of her industrial injury and determined both were equally liable for the claimant's injuries arising out of her concurrent employment and awarded a specific medical benefit. We affirm.
This matter has previously been before us. In an order dated August 14, 2009 the ALJ determined that DeClark Granite and Fabrication, Inc. (DeClark Granite) and Builders Association of Pagosa Springs (Builders Association) were equally liable for the claimant's injuries arising out of her concurrent employment with both employers. Petitions to Review were filed and in an order dated January 13, 2010 we dismissed without prejudice both petitions to review the ALJ's order dated August 14, 2009. The order of the ALJ dated June 30, 2010 awards a specific medical benefit and so is reviewable. However, we remanded the matter for completion of the record in an order dated December 10, 2010 because certain transcripts appeared to be missing from the record. The matter is again before us.
The following facts in the case appear to be largely undisputed. The claimant worked as an executive officer for Builders Association. In May 2008, the claimant was approached by Ms. DeClark to work for DeClark Granite. The claimant, out of concern for Builders Association, negotiated an agreement with Ms. DeClark that she would begin working for DeClark Granite for two and one half days per week beginning on July 30, 2008 and later transition to full-time employment. The claimant was scheduled to start work for DeClark Granite on July 30, 2008. However, a new tenant of Builders Association had rescheduled an appointment and the claimant agreed to meet the new tenant on July 30, 2008. The claimant met the new tenant at the office of Builders Association. Ms. DeClark drove to the office of Builders Association and met with the claimant to discuss her new job. At the end of the meeting, Ms. DeClark asked the claimant to proceed to the office of DeClark Granite to begin learning the business. The claimant agreed to follow Ms. DeClark and began shutting down the office for Builders Association. Ms. DeClark proceeded to the parking lot where, accidentally, her car accelerated backwards and collided with the claimant's car, pushing it through the front of the Builders Association office door, pinning the claimant and causing injuries. The ALJ concluded DeClark Granite and Builders Association were equally liable for the claimant's injuries arising out of her concurrent employment with both employers.
The claimant appeals the ALJ's order contending the ALJ erred in determining the claimant was in "travel status" for DeClark Granite at the time of her injuries. The claimant argues that she was at the office of Builders Association and performing duties for Builders Association when she was struck by the automobile.
The respondent, Pinnacol Assurance Company (Pinnacol), appears separately from its two insureds, DeClark Granite and Builders Association, and also petitions to review the ALJ's order. Pinnacol joins the arguments and briefing made by the claimant and contends that the claimant was only working for Builders Association and was not working for DeClark Granite at the time of the accident. Pinnacol argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was on travel status and thus an employee of DeClark Granite at the time of her injury. Pinnacol also argues in its Petition to Review specifically that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was a joint employee of both employers at the time of her injury as Colorado law does not recognized "joint employment" under the facts of this case.
Builders Association contends the ALJ's order should be affirmed. Builders Association argue that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that the claimant was employed by DeClark Granite and was in travel status at the time of her injury. DeClark also argues that the claimant was working for both Builders Association and DeClark at the time of the injury and requests that the ALJ's order be affirmed.
I. Standing
DeClark argues that the claimant does not have standing based upon a potential for recovery in a district court action brought against DeClark in the event that DeClark is not deemed to be an employer of the claimant. DeClark contends that the claimant's claim for standing to assert that DeClark is not her employer is based entirely on the claimant's intention to bring suit against DeClark under some negligence theory. DeClark argues that the standing argument assumes a successful suit against DeClark which is speculative and the claimant has no injury-in-fact.
Builders Association also contends that the claimant does not have standing to appeal the ALJ's order. Builders Association argues that the claimant does not have standing to appeal the ALJ's order because § 8-43-301(2) allows dissatisfied parties to seek review of an order and that the claimant here did not sustain an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest. Builders Association argues that under the ALJ's order the claimant will receive 100 percent of the benefits she sought in her claim and therefore cannot allege any injury-in-fact to a legally protected right which would grant her standing to appeal the ALJ's order. Builders Association argues that the ALJ and we lack jurisdiction to determine whether the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Act would apply to the asserted injury. Builders Association, citing CCIA v. Jorgensen, 992 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 2000), argues that the determination of the "exclusive remedy" lies strictly within the authority of the civil courts.
Standing to challenge the order of an adjudicative tribunal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal that order. See O'Bryant v. Public Utilities Commission, 778 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1989); In re Trust of Malone, 658 P.2d 284 (Colo. App. 1982). However, we are not persuaded that the claimant lacks standing.
The ALJ has "original jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters arising under [the Act]." Section 8-43-201(1), C.R.S. Accordingly, the ALJ may conduct a hearing "to determine any controversy concerning any issue arising under [the Act]." Section 8-43-207(1), C.RS. Appeals from ALJ's order are first made to the Panel. Section 8-43-301, C.RS.
We acknowledge that in Jorgensen v. Colorado Compensation Ins. Auth., 967 P.2d 172 (Colo. App. 1998), the appellate court determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to apportion settlement proceeds from tortfeasor between economic and non-economic damages. However, the ALJ clearly has jurisdiction to determine whether the claimant has carried her burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that her condition arose out of and in the course of her employment with a particular employer. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S.; Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999); Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 12 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2000).
We recognize that the ALJ does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claimant was an employee of a particular employer at the time. In Packaging Corp. v. Roberts, 169 Colo. 316, 320, 455 P.2d 652, 654 (1969), the supreme court rejected a similar argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction until the Industrial Commission had determined the plaintiff was not an employee because "the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether the plaintiff was an employee at that time."
However, in our view the claimant does have standing to posit a legal basis for asserting a claim for relief. To demonstrate standing, one must assert an injury-in-fact; this alleged injury must fall within the scope of a legal right protected by the statutory or constitutional provisions asserted to have been violated. See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). The existence of standing necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts depends upon a showing that the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury to an interest protected by law. See Romer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 572 (Colo. 1998).
Here, the ALJ's determination may have significant impact on any ability the claimant later has to pursue a negligence action in district court against DeClark. In the context of agency action, the injury-in-fact element of standing does not require that a party undergo actual injury, as long as the party can demonstrate that the administrative action threatens to cause an injury. Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Trigen Nations Energy Co. L.L.L.P., 982 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1999). There is a justiciable controversy because there are adverse parties, i.e., a party seeking to establish a right (immunity as an employer from suit) and a party against whom the right is asserted (claimant's ability to sue). See Barker v. District Court, 199 Colo. 416, 609 P.2d 628 (1980). Therefore, we perceive no barrier to the claimant's pursuit of the present appeal based on a lack of standing argument.
In any event, Pinnacol has raised or adopted the same arguments as the claimant in its own Petition to Review. No party has questioned the standing of Pinnacol to seek review of an order finding it liable as the insurer to pay benefits. Therefore, even if we assumed that the claimant had no standing to pursue the present appeal, the same issues have to be addressed because of the Petition to Review filed by Pinnacol.
II. Joint Employment
Pinnacol, appearing separately from its insureds, argues in its Petition to Review that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was a joint employee of both employers at the time of her injury as Colorado law does not recognize "joint employment" under the facts of this case. In its brief Pinnacol generally joins the arguments made by the claimant on appeal, and does not cite any authority on the issue of "joint employment" in Colorado. We note that this case does not appear to involve the "loaned employee" line of cases in Colorado. We further note that no party has offered any case authority on the issue of "joint employment" in Colorado.
DeClark argues that the claimant was obviously transitioning between two jobs and that the claimant could be employed by both the Builders Association and DeClark at the instant of injury. DeClark argues that events prior to the injury support the conclusion that the claimant's actions just prior to her injury had mixed motives that evidence a dual employment relationship.
Builders Association argues that the ALJ was correct in determining that the claimant was jointly employed by both Builders Association and DeClark and properly ordered each employer to pay 50 percent of the claimant's benefits. Thus, Builders Association argues that the ALJ's order should be affirmed. Builders Association, citing sections from Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, argues that a claimant may be simultaneously performing activities that arise out of and in the course of more than one employment. Although stating that Colorado has not yet addressed this topic, Builders Association directs our attention to cases from other jurisdictions deciding that the claimant may have the status of a joint employee and that the consequence of such joint employment is an award calling for joint and several liability.
We note that in Larson, § 68.01, a distinction is made between the terms "dual employment" and "joint employment." "Dual employment" is viewed as the situation where the employee is under contract of hire with two different employers and his activities on behalf of each employer are separate and can be identified with one employer or the other. When this separate identification can clearly be made, the particular employer whose work was being done at the time of the injury will be held exclusively liable. Larson contrasts this with "joint employment," which occurs when a single employee, under contract with two employers, simultaneously performs services for both employers, and when the service for each employer is closely related to that for the other. In a "joint employment" situation both employers are said to be liable for workers' compensation benefits. However, it does not appear to us that Colorado has necessarily accepted Larson's nomenclature and for the limited purposes of this decision we will use the terms "joint employment" and "dual employment" interchangeably.
We begin our analysis of "joint employment" by stating that although the appellate courts of Colorado have not provided much guidance, we do not necessarily accept the assertion of Builders Association that Colorado has not yet addressed this topic. In doing so we do acknowledge the court's decision in Bigby v. Big 3 Supply Co. 937 P.2d 794 (Colo. App., 1996). In Bigby a former employee brought an action against an employer and the company for which the employer loaned the employee to work, alleging violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against him on his ADA claim. The court of appeals agreed the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the ADA claim. In so doing the court of appeals noted that "using an analysis known as the 'joint employer doctrine,' some courts hold that when an entity exercises sufficient control over an individual's compensation, terms, and conditions of employment, it will be considered the individual's employer, even though the individual may be directly employed by another entity as well." Bigby, 937 P.2d at 797. Other courts have analyzed the issue of who is an employer using a "single employer" theory. In remanding the matter in Bigby the court of appeals noted that it need not decide whether to adopt the joint employer doctrine or the single employer theory because it would reach the same result using either analysis. Id. at 799.
Certainly, Colorado has not imposed a blanket prohibition against imposing joint liability on multiple respondents in a workers compensation action. In Industrial Commission v. Lopez, 150 Colo. 87, 371 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1962), the court held that the employers, each of whom were subject to Workers' Compensation Act in its own operations, were also subject to Act with respect to their joint enterprise. The court held that the workers' compensation carrier was liable for injuries sustained by an employee of the joint enterprise by which the insured was engaged, although the insured had paid no premium on the employee's employment. See Snyder v. Industrial Comm 'n of Colo. 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (Colo. 1959) (an unlicensed cement contractor and the licensed contractor were engaged as principals in joint enterprise and were jointly responsible under Workers' Compensation Act). See also Micciche v. Billings 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986) (Colorado Corporation Code imposed joint and several liability upon all persons who assume to act as corporation without authority and matter remanded to determine whether veil of corporation should be pierced to permit claimant to recover workmen's compensation from corporate officer); D. E. Jones Const. Co. v. Jones' Heirs, 29 Colo. App. 482, 487 P.2d 822 (Colo. App. 1971) (claimants could assert claim against any one or against all of those engaged in joint venture and their respective insurer or insurers were required to discharge the claim, and claimants were not limited to asserting claim for benefits only against the joint venture and its carrier).
We realize that the above cases dealt with the issue of liability of a joint venture, which is not precisely what is involved in the present case. But they do stand for the general proposition that multiple parties can be held liable as employers under the Act in cases involving a single industrial injury.
More directly on the issue of joint employment where a single employee, under contract with two employers, simultaneously performs services for both employers, and when the service for each is the cause of the injury, is the case of Raftshol v. Centura Health/St. Anthony Health Services D/B/A Granby Medical Center And/Or Teverbaugh K-Healthon Management Company, W. C. Nos. 4-412-518, 4-417-006 (February 28, 2000). In Raftshol, the claimant was employed as a full-time housekeeper for one company and as a part-time housekeeper for another. The ALJ found that both jobs required the claimant to wash, wipe, sweep, mop, vacuum, and change bed linen. The ALJ found that the last injurious exposure rule did not apply because there was insufficient evidence concerning where the claimant suffered the last exposure. The claimant sustained a work related occupational disease affecting her upper extremities. The ALJ determined the occupational disease developed as a result of the claimant's dual employment. One of the employers appealed and the Panel affirmed the award of 20 percent of the claimant's temporary disability and medical benefits against it. The ALJ's award of 50 percent liability between the two respondents here is consistent with the ruling in Raftshol.
Most importantly is the case of City and County of Denver v. Dore, 176 Colo. 367, 490 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1971), where the claim was based on an injury sustained by the claimant while attempting to arrest a bank robber and the issue of "dual employment" of the claimant as a city police officer and as a bank guard was raised but not considered by the Industrial Commission. The claimant filed separate claims for workers' compensation against the city and the bank, noting on each claim that he was filing the other claim, but stating that he was not claiming full compensation from both employers. The State Compensation Fund was the insurer of both employers and admitted liability on behalf of the bank and denied liability on behalf of the city. The referee entered an award denying recovery against the city, but allowing it against the bank. The referee stated that the sole question for determination was whether the claimant was employed by the bank or the city. The supreme court disagreed and found that the question was not as limited as indicated because the claim of dual employment was not addressed. The supreme court remanded the matter for the development of facts concerning the issue of "dual employment."
In our view if the supreme court in Dore had determined that there was no "dual employment" or "joint employment" in the arena of Workers' Compensation in Colorado, then no remand would have been necessary. Therefore, we do not agree with Pinnacol or the claimant that Colorado law does not recognize "joint employment." Therefore, we perceive no reason to interfere with the ALJ's order on this ground.
III. Arise Out Of and In the Course
Even assuming dual employment, the claimant submits that it is not the absence of a provision in the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) or case law requiring that only one employer be liable that supports holding only Builders Association liable for her work-related injuries, but that the conditions of § 8-41-301, C.R.S. have been satisfied. The claimant contends that her injury arose solely out of and in the course of her employment with Builders Association. The claimant notes that at the time of her injury she was on Builders Association's premises during her normal work hours to have a tenant sign a lease and was in the process of closing down its offices. In contrast, the claimant argues that at the time she was struck by the vehicle she had ended her discussion with Ms. DeClark and was finishing up her job duties for Builders Association. The claimant argues that based on the evidence introduced at the hearing the ALJ's determination that the claimant was an employee of DeClark Granite at the time of her injury is not supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record.
Section 8-43-301 is that part of the Act dealing with the necessary conditions of recovery under the Act and establishing a compensable injury. Section 8-41-301 provides that a compensable injury is an injury which "arises out of and in the course of employment. Price v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 919 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1996). An injury "arises out of and in the course of employment when the origins of the injury are sufficiently related to the conditions and circumstances under which the employee usually performs his or her job functions to be considered part of the employee's services to the employer. General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 878 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1994). In this regard, the injury does not have to be the result of a mandatory employment activity. City of Boulder v. Streeb, 706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953). Rather, it is sufficient if the injury arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental to the conditions and circumstances of the particular employment. Phillips Contracting, Inc. v. Hirst, 905 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1995).
The claimant had the initial burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that her condition arose out of and in the course of her employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c); Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999); Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 12 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2000). Whether the claimant has sustained her burden of proof is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. Coven v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 366 (Colo. App. 1984). We must uphold the ALJ's determinations if supported by substantial evidence and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S.; Arenas v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 8 P.3d. 558 (Colo. App. 2000).
The claimant argues that it is undisputed that at the instant the claimant was injured she was performing work-related duties solely for Builders Association and was not performing any duties for De Clark Granite. The claimant argues that there is not one fact that would bring her within the ambit of employment with De Clark Granite.
In contrast DeClark Granite argues that it wanted a full-time employee, but the claimant's concerns over leaving Builders Association without any replacement produced a general understanding of how the claimant's position would change over a short period of time from full-time employment with Builders Association to full-time employment with De Clark. DeClark argues that the meeting between Ms. DeClark and the claimant had not concluded just before the injury. DeClark argues that the claimant's work at the Builders Association office had largely finished when she was hurt and that Ms. DeClark and the claimant planned on continuing their meeting at the DeClark shop after leaving the Builders Association office. At that time Ms. DeClark considered the claimant to be employed by DeClark Granite because she had agreed to the terms of the employment agreement. DeClark Granite further argues that it is undisputed that the claimant met with Ms. DeClark for approximately an hour and 15 minutes after any work-related duties for the Builders Association ended. DeClark compares this with the ten to fifteen minute lease signing that took place for the Builders Association with a tenant. DeClark argues that the claimant's one particular task to be completed at the Builders Association, the execution of a lease agreement, ended well before the injury.
DeClark Granite characterizes the tasks that the claimant performed at the office of the Builders Association immediately before the injury such as turning off her computer and turning off the lights as merely ministerial. DeClark Granite argues that the claimant was obviously transitioning between two jobs and that the claimant was employed by both the Builders Association and DeClark Granite at the instant of injury.
Builders Association argues that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that the claimant was employed by DeClark Granite and in travel status at the time of her injury. Builders Association points out the following. The record shows that the claimant was scheduled to work for DeClark Granite from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm on the date of the injury and the claimant was in fact paid by DeClark for one hour of work that day. DeClark Granite specifically requested the meeting with the claimant at the office of Builders Association and the claimant was required to attend. DeClark Granite specifically requested the claimant travel from the office of Builders Association to DeClark's facility in order to continue her employment activities.
The ALJ found that that the duties the claimant was engaged in at the time of the injury, such as filing the lease signed by the new tenant, shutting down her computer, cleaning her work area, and turning off the lights to the office were normal incidents to the employment relation between the claimant and Builders Association. Therefore, the ALJ determined that an injury occurring within a reasonable interval after the claimant finished her employment activities was deemed by the ALJ to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment with Builders Association. It appears that no party contests this determination.
However, the ALJ also found that the meeting between the claimant and Ms. DeClark took placed immediately prior to the injury and that the claimant, in order to complete the work for her new employer, needed to close up the office and travel to the DeClark office. The ALJ found that the claimant was on travel status at the time of the injury.
The claimant argues that she was not in "travel status" for DeClark Granite at the time of her injury. The claimant, citing Madden v. Mountain W. Fabricators, 977 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1999), argues that none of the variables that must be considered for determining whether a claimant is in "travel status" are present here.
DeClark contends that the ALJ's finding that the claimant was in "travel status" is supported by substantial evidence in the record. DeClark concedes that the claimant had not technically started driving to the DeClark offices when the injury occurred, but argues that the steps she took such as turning off her computer, cleaning her desk, and moving toward the door were all steps taken in anticipation of having to physically drive to the DeClark offices. DeClark argues that these actions were not activities taken in furtherance of the Builders Association work, but were instead actions taken in preparation for driving to the DeClark office. DeClark Granite argues that the ALJ's order is supported by the evidence in finding that the claimant was in travel status for DeClark at the time of the injury, while also still performing work functions for Builders Association.
Ordinarily, an employee injured while traveling to or from work is not entitled to compensation. See Berry's Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Palomba, 161 Colo. 369, 423 P.2d 2 (1967); Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194 (Colo. App. 1983). Off-premises injuries may be compensable, however, under special circumstances in which a causal connection exists between the employment and the injury. Perry v. Crawford Co., 677 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1983). Thus, if an employee's travel is at the express or implied request of the employer, or if the travel confers a benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of the employee's arrival at work, the travel is within the scope of employment. Varsity Contractors and Home Ins. Co. v. Baca 709 P.2d 55 (Colo. App. 1985); Loffland Brothers v. Baca, 651 P.2d 431 (Colo. App. 1982).
In Madden v. Mountain W. Fabricators, the supreme court addressed the going to and coming from work rule. The Madden court held that "the determination of whether a traveling employee's injury warrants an exception to the going to and from work rule is such a fact-specific analysis that it cannot be limited to a predetermined list of acceptable facts and circumstances." Madden, 977 P.2d at 864. Accordingly, the Madden court ruled that the proper approach was to consider a number of factors to determine whether special circumstances warrant recovery under the Act. According to the Madden court, those factors include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the travel occurred during working hours; (2) whether the travel occurred on or off the premises; (3) whether the travel was contemplated by the employment contract; and (4) whether the obligations or conditions of employment created a "zone of special danger" in which the injury arose.
Because the issue is factually specific, as noted above, we must uphold the ALJ's order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S.; Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1998). The ALJ made the following findings. The travel in this case of proceeding to the office of DeClark Granite was at the direct request of Ms. DeClark. Additionally, the meeting that took place immediately prior to the injury occurred at the Builders Association office at the direct request of Ms. DeClark. In order for the claimant to complete the request of her new employer to travel to the office of DeClark Granite, the claimant needed to close up the Builders Association office.
The claimant does not challenge any of these specific facts. Rather, the claimant questions the ultimate conclusions reached by the ALJ. In our view the ALJ engaged in the fact-specific analysis contemplated by the Madden court in his determination of whether the claimant was in travel status and that substantial evidence supports such determination. The claimant was injured while she was preparing to follow her employer when Ms. DeClark, intending to drive to her office, instead drove into the claimant. We cannot say that under these circumstances that the ALJ was compelled to conclude that the industrial accident was not causally connected to the claimant's employment with the person who drove into her. Therefore, we decline to interfere with the ALJ's determination that the claimant was a joint employee of Builders Association and DeClark at the time of the injury.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order issued June 30, 2010 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ John D. Baird
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
SHARON CRUMP, 1012 COUNTRY ROAD 700, PAGOSA SPRINGS, CO, BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF PAGOSA SPGS, Attn: KAREN DAVISON, PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D FLEWELLING, FOGEL KEATING WAGNER POLIDORI SHAFNER, PC, Attn: BRADLEY UNKELESS, RITSEMA LYON, Attn: CAROL A FINLEY, GRAND JUNCTION, CO, HALL EVANS, L.L.C., Attn: FRANK M CAVANAUGH, DENVER, CO, 80202 (Other Party), NATHAN, BREMER, DUMM MYERS, L.L.C., Attn: KAREN R WELLS, TRACY, PINNACOL ASSURANCE, MS JILL JENNINGS/NICK BASLER, DENVER, CO.
DECLARK GRANITE AND FABRICATION, INC., KATHLEEN DECLARK.