EISENHAUER, J.

The petitioner, Christine Edwards, appeals the property distribution provisions of the parties' dissolution decree. Christine argues the district court erred in awarding an inequitable division of marital property by failing to (1) consider gifts her mother made to her during their marriage, (2) consider her personal and financial contributions to the marriage, (3) properly calculate the appreciation in value of the marital real estate, and (4) properly divide the respondent's pension benefits. Christine requests an award of appellate attorney fees. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Daniel and Christine Edwards were married in 1996. Daniel was a police officer in Macomb, Illinois, and Christine was attending college at Western Illinois University. At the time of trial, Daniel was thirty-three years of age and Christine was twenty-five. Daniel's first marriage ended when his wife and son were killed in an automobile accident. As a result of their deaths, Daniel received insurance proceeds of $100,000. Daniel used that money to pay off the mortgage on the marital home, valued at $48,000, and add $39,000 in improvements. Although most of the home improvements were completed just prior to their marriage, Christine and her mother contributed to the improvements by performing redecorating and providing some financial assistance. In 1999, Daniel transferred ownership of the marital home to himself and Christine as joint owners.

In July of 1999, Daniel obtained a position as an officer with the Pleasant Hill, Iowa, police force. Christine enrolled at the University of Osteopathic Medicine in Des Moines. They purchased a home in Pleasant Hill for $122,000, using $24,000 from the sale proceeds of their prior home as a down payment. The remainder of the money was used to pay marital debt and make improvements to the home.

The parties separated in November 1999, and Christine filed a dissolution petition. Christine quit medical school and moved back to Macomb. She obtained a masters degree in community health education. She currently earns $20,000 per year as an employment counselor. Daniel earns $28,000 per year as an officer and $4,000 per year as a reservist with the Iowa National Guard.

The main issues at trial concerned the division of marital assets. Christine argued she should be awarded the increased value of the marital properties during their marriage. She maintained she and her mother contributed at least $3,000 toward improvements in the Macomb residence and provided most of the labor for painting and floor work. Christine also asserted the value of the Pleasant Hill home increased $8,000 due to her contributions. She additionally claimed she used monetary gifts from her mother toward family expenses. Christine noted that she incurred a $12,000 student loan to attend medical school, but she is now liable for payment without any educational benefits.

Daniel argued most of the improvements to the Macomb home were completed prior to their marriage, and Christine offered no tangible evidence of the amount of gifts from her mother. He introduced testimony from the realtor who sold them the Pleasant Hill home that the improvements Christine and her mother made would not generally increase a home's value.

The district court declined to award Christine any portion of the marital properties' increased value because she provided no concrete evidence of the value of her contributions. The court awarded her a cash payment of $4,091.17 as her share of Daniel's pension benefits accumulated during the marriage, her personal property and furnishings, and her 1996 Dodge automobile. Daniel was awarded the remainder of the marital property. The district court denied Christine's Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion to enlarge or amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Christine has appealed.

II. Scope of Review . Our scope of review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We give weight to the fact-findings of the district court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).

Christine also requests this court conduct an independent review of the record since the district court's decree is a verbatim copy of one proposed by Daniel. However, we already conduct an independent review of the record on de novo review. Our courts have highly discouraged district courts from adopting verbatim a copy of a party's proposed decree because the customary deference accorded trial courts cannot be fairly applied when the decision on review reflects the findings of the prevailing party. Rubes v. Mega Life and Health Ins. Co., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 2002); In re Marriage of Siglin, 555 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). However, while we recognize legitimate concerns as to the extent of the judge's actual input into the process when adopting a proposed decree verbatim, these concerns do not necessarily mean the decision was not a product of independent judicial judgment. Siglin, 555 N.W.2d at 848. We conclude the record supports the findings made by the district court.

III. Division of Marital Property . Christine contends her property distribution award was inequitable. She maintains the district court failed to consider her contributions and sacrifices during the marriage. Christine asserts she and her mother contributed much of the labor in redecorating the Macomb residence, and her redecorating efforts contributed to an $8,000 increase in the value of the Pleasant Hill home. She claims that because Daniel placed her name on the Macomb residence as a joint owner, she should be awarded one-half the increase in the home's value acquired during their marriage. She further argues the district court failed to take into consideration her mother's cash gifts to her that were used for marital expenses, including materials for home improvements. Christine further argues the district court's division of Daniel's pension fund is inequitable.

Partners to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated during the marriage through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Iowa law does not require an equal division or percentage distribution, but rather merely requires us to determine what is fair and equitable under the circumstances. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). We must take into consideration those factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (1999). Miller, 552 N.W.2d at 463.

A. Gifts . Christine contends her mother gave her a total of $12,380 in gifts. She argues that while she used some of the money for education expenses and personal trips, much of it went toward improvements to the marital properties. She claims her contributions toward those improvements and her labor should be considered when determining an equitable property division. Christine additionally contends the fact she sacrificed her desire to attend medical school in order to support Daniel's career, and incurred a $12,000 student loan, should be taken into consideration.

We note, however, that aside from Christine's testimony, there is no evidence of the amount of money given, or the value or extent of any labor to improve the homes. Although, generally, premarital or gifted property received during a marriage by one party is considered that person's property and not subject to a property division, an exception is made when refusing to divide the property is inequitable. In re Marriage of Mentel, 359 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984).

We cannot ascertain the intent of Christine's mother in providing these gifts. Although Christine used some of the money for her personal educational expenses, most of the money was apparently used for family expenses. Christine provided no evidence of how these funds were actually divided and for what purposes they were expended. Because these funds were commingled with other marital funds, there is no evidence they were intended to be gifts solely to Christine and not to both parties. As such, we do not believe the district court erred in failing to award Christine a credit for these gifted funds. Likewise the settlement received in the personal injury claim was compensation for injuries to both parties and spent on family expenses. Nothing remains to divide.

B. Increase in Value of Real Estate . Christine next maintains she should be awarded half of the increase in value of the Macomb and Pleasant Hill properties accumulated during the marriage. She notes she provided considerable labor in repainting and redecorating the homes, and Daniel named her a joint owner on the Macomb property deed.

At the time of the marriage, the value of the Macomb property was $48,000. Daniel owned the home prior to the marriage and it was mortgage free. Daniel made $39,000 improvements to the home, most of which were completed prior to the marriage. The home sold for $80,000. We agree with the district court that taking into consideration the value of the home and adding the cost of improvements, the value would exceed the $80,000 received from the sale.

We do not believe the district court erred in declining to award Christine a share of any increased value of the Macomb property. The parties were married only three years. The Macomb property was a premarital asset of Daniel's, and he did not place Christine's name on the Macomb property deed until just prior to its sale in 1999. Most of the improvements were made prior to their marriage with premarital funds. Much of the remainder of the insurance proceeds was used to pay marital debt and pay off Christine's 1996 Dodge automobile. While her redecorating efforts improved the overall aesthetics of the home, they did not increase the property's overall value. Although Christine and her mother contributed physically and financially toward these improvements, Christine introduced no evidence of the value of these efforts.

The parties purchased the Pleasant Hill property in 1999 with a down payment of $24,000 from the sale proceeds of the Macomb home. The home was valued at $122,000. Christine and her mother testified that the home increased $8,000 in value due in part to their redecorating efforts. However, Leo Worrell, the real estate agent who sold the parties the Pleasant Hill home, testified that while the improvements Christine made assisted in selling the home, they did not enhance its value.

The district court was correct in declining to award Christine a share of any increase in the value of the Pleasant Hill property. Christine lived in the home only a few months before the parties' separation. When she moved out of the home, Daniel assumed all payments on the mortgage. The down payment came from the sale proceeds of the Macomb property, which was Daniel's premarital asset. Despite Christine's testimony to the contrary, Leo Worrell testified there was little, if any, increase in the home's value during the marriage. We believe the district court carefully considered all factors set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) in declining to award her any share of the marital properties. We therefore affirm the district court.

C. Pension Benefits . Christine argues the district court's division of Daniel's pension benefits was inequitable. She contends Daniel accrued a $12,000 increase in pension benefits during their marriage. We agree with the trial court's determination that Daniel accrued $7,910.33 in benefits from the Macomb police department, and $272.59 from Pleasant Hill, for a total of $8,182.92 during their three-year marriage. The district court awarded Christine a lump sum payment of $4,091.17, representing one-half of the marital increase. Where the district court's valuation of property is within the permissible range of the evidence, we will not disturb it on appeal. In re Marriage of Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We affirm on this ground.

IV. Attorney Fees . Christine requests an award of appellate attorney fees. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, but within the district court's sound discretion and the parties' financial positions. In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). We look to the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court's decision on appeal. Hoffman, 493 N.W.2d at 90. We decline to award Christine appellate attorney fees.

We therefore affirm the district court's decree.

AFFIRMED.