Opinion
H12-CP-15-016051-A H12-CP-15-016052-A H12-CP-15-016053-A
06-18-2019
IN RE ROBERTO A. Jr., DOB 8/14/05, A child under the age of eighteen years[1] In re Brooklyn E., DOB 8/13/08, A child under the age of eighteen years In re Janiyah E., DOB 6/23/10, A child under the age of eighteen years
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hoffman, J.
Before this court is the termination of parental rights petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families ("DCF" or "Department") in the interest of Roberto A., Jr. (DOB August 14, 2005); Brooklyn E. (DOB. August 13, 2008); and Janiyah E. (DOB June 23, 2010). The termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 11, 2017. The original petition filed included Respondent Father, Anthony E., who is the father of Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. The Respondent Mother of Roberto A., Jr. is Tykeeley W. Respondent Father, Roberto A., Sr. is the father of Roberto A., Jr. The respondent parents were properly served. All parties appeared and were advised and appointed counsel. The children were appointed an attorney. The court finds it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor children.
This matter was tried to the court on October 19, 2018, December 13, 2018 and May 1, 2019. All parties were present for trial with counsel. The children’s attorney was present for trial. Mother, Tykeeley W., Father, Roberto A., Sr. and Father, Anthony E. were present for trial. On May 1, 2019, the petitioner withdrew the petition as to Father Anthony E. All parties were advised pursuant to In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 795, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 921 (2015).
The court takes judicial notice of the entire record of the prior non-delinquency proceedings, including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific steps, as well as the dates and contents of the court’s findings, orders, rulings and judgments. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending cases affecting the custody of the minor children.
The statutory grounds alleged in the petition against Mother and Father allege that Roberto A., Jr. was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that Mother and Father failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of their child. The petition also alleges that there is no ongoing relationship with Father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met, on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs of the child or youth, and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child or youth relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Roberto A., Jr.
The statutory grounds stated in the petitions against Mother allege that Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that Mother failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, considering the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children. The petition further alleges that Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. have been abandoned by Mother in the sense that Mother has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the children. The petitions further allege that reasonable efforts were made: (1) to locate Mother and Father, Roberto A., Sr.; (2) to unify Roberto A., Jr. with Mother and Father, Roberto A., Sr.; or (3) Mother and Father, Roberto A., Sr. are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The petitions further allege that reasonable efforts were made: (1) to locate Mother and Father, Roberto A., Sr.; (2) to unify Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. with Mother; or (3) Mother is unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The petition further alleges reasonable efforts were made to unify Father Roberto A., Sr. with Roberto A., Jr. and that Father is unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
The court has carefully considered the termination of parental rights petition; the criteria set forth in the relevant General Statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented; the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses; the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence; and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. With regard to the termination of parental rights petitions, the court makes it findings by clear and convincing evidence.
Mother, Tykeeley W.
Tykeeley W. was born on July 9, 1985 in Phoenix, Arizona to Tonya W. and an unidentified father. Mother has four children: Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Danaerys S. Roberto A. Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. were adjudicated neglected on March 19, 2015 and committed to the Department. Sole custody of Danaerys S. was given to David S., her biological father.
Mother has lived in four different states: Arizona, California, Florida and Connecticut. She indicated that she had a rough upbringing as her mother abused substances and she was raised mostly by her grandmother, Frances T. Tykeeley W. lived in Phoenix, Arizona until she was two years old and then she moved to Florida with her grandmother. When she turned ten years old, she moved to Orange County, California but only for a few months before moving back to Arizona with her Mother. She reported that her relationship with her mother was nonexistent, as her mother was incarcerated for the majority of her life. During the time she did live with her mother, their relationship was unstable because her mother abused substances. She began to stay with relatives until moving back to California with her grandmother. For about a year at age fourteen, Tykeeley W. was placed in a group home in Arizona where she received therapy and was diagnosed with depression; she was prescribed Zoloft which she took for only a few months. After she left the group home she returned to California, but due to defiant behaviors such as running away, partying, experimenting with crack cocaine, and not obeying the rules, she was sent back to a group home in Arizona for another year. When she was released from the group home, her grandmother moved back to Arizona to care for her.
When Tykeeley W. was fifteen years old, her mother, who was sober, was released from jail. She paid for a plane ticket for her daughter to come to Connecticut to live with her. Tykeeley W. claims that she was not able to develop a bond with her mother because of her mother’s substance abuse, and her physical and verbal abusive toward her. She was often left to care for herself when her mother disappeared. Tykeeley W. does not know the identity of her father and believes neither does her mother.
Mother attended Chandler High School in New Britain, CT. where she received her GED. Mother also attended Sawyer School for Medical Assistant and Capital Community College for Veterinary Assistance.
Tykeeley W. reported that she worked in a strip club from age sixteen to nineteen until she was six months pregnant with Roberto A., Jr. Her work history includes working at Forever 21, Claire’s, Showplace Gentleman’s Club, Connecticut Veterinary Center, Kahoot’s Restaurant and Gentleman’s Café . Mother currently works at Connecticut Transitional Living part time.
Tykeeley W. met Roberto A., Sr. when she was seventeen. They broke up when she was twenty-one years old, because Mother felt overwhelmed by motherhood and the seriousness of her relationship. She indicated she remained in Roberto A., Jr.’s life for about a year, believing that he should remain in the care of his father because he was a better financial provider. She made minimal effort to stay in contact with the child until contact ceased all together.
Mother met Anthony E. when she was twenty-one years old after his release from prison. She claims that infidelity was an issue in her relationship with Anthony E. They also abused substances such as heroin, Percocet, and Oxytocin together. Mother had two children with Anthony E., Brooklyn E., and Janiyah E.
When Mother was twenty-six she was involved with David S. Shortly after she conceived Danaerys S. that relationship ended.
At the age of seventeen Tykeeley W. started to abuse substances, including marijuana, opiates, alcohol, and heroin, her drug of choice. Her heaviest usage was four to five bundles a day.
Mother has criminal convictions for assault 3rd and Interfering with an officer. She was sentenced on March 30, 2016 to one year execution suspended, probation for two years.
On June 23, 2015, petitions of neglect were filed by the Department on behalf of Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. due to Mother’s unresolved mental health and substance issues.
Specific Steps were issued to Mother on March 19, 2015. She ceased contact with the Department and with her children’s foster mother from December 2016 through April 2017. Mother moved to Willimantic during that time period and did not inform DCF. When the Department was able to speak to Mother in April 2017, she indicated that she did not see the point in continuing communication with the DCF, as she believed she would never be in a position to care for her children. She subsequently ceased contact with DCF despite numerous phone calls, letters and e-mails sent to Mother.
While on probation, Mother was admitted to Connecticut Valley Hospital’s S.T.A.R. program on September 20, 2016, and was successfully discharged on October 27, 2016. On April 18, 2017, Mother participated in an intake appointment at Community Health Resources (CHR) for a relapse prevention group. It was reported by CHR that Mother did not attend any of her sessions after her intake. On August 1, 2017, Mother attended CHR for Drug and Alcohol classes. However, due to her substance abuse and testing positive for cocaine during treatment, Mother’s probation officer indicated that she was enrolled in the IOP program on December 7, 2017. Since then, Mother has attended drug and alcohol classes once a week. She continues to attend CHR for substance abuse but is inconsistent with remaining substance-free.
CHR disclosed on February 8, 2018, that Mother reported that her boyfriend with whom she was cohabiting, was using substances. DCF visited Mother’s home and deemed it was unsuitable for Mother and her children. On April 5, 2018, Mother’s probation officer reported that Mother had finished her probation and disclosed her plans to continue with treatment. On March 28, 2018, DCF contacted CHR regarding Mother’s treatment and it was reported that she had revoked DCF’s releases. In May 2018, DCF was able to make contact with Mother and although she was recommended to attend individual counseling, she did not attend. Mother did complete the Therapeutic Family Time Program through the Village for Families and Children on January 9, 2016. The recommendation at the time of discharge was that Mother not transition to the Reunification program because of her instability.
Mother has not visited the children since December 2016. From October 2017 thru July 2018, DCF reached out to Mother on numerous occasions by phone calls, letters and e-mail to engage her in services; she refused. In May 2018, the Department asked Mother why she did not respond to calls from DCF regarding visitation and she responded that there was no point in speaking to DCF since she was not participating in services and was no longer able to care for her children.
On December 13, 2018, Mother appeared for the second day of the termination of parental rights trial. At that time the DCF social worker made contact with Mother. The social worker arranged for Mother to meet her at the Manchester DCF office at a later date to discuss her engagement with DCF. Mother did not arrive, informing her social worker that she had forgotten. At the December 13, 2018 court date Mother expressed a desire to see the children. It was recommended by the therapist that Mother engage in preliminary work to address her inconsistency before visitation could take place.
On February 2, 2019 the children’s placement disrupted. DCF reached out to Mother. She expressed a desire to see the children. Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. expressed a desire to see Mother but Roberto A., Jr. was ambivalent. In an effort to facilitate visits with Mother, it was recommended that she meet with the children’s therapists. Mother met with Janiyah E.’s therapist but did not participate in an appointment with Brooklyn E.’s therapist. Mother claims she reached out to Roberto A., Jr.’s therapist but the therapist had not returned her call.
Mother lives in a two bedroom apartment with her boyfriend. DCF was able to gain access to this apartment on December 12, 2017 and deemed that it was inadequate to accommodate her children’s needs.
Mother works 30 hours a week at Connecticut Transitional Living.
Father Roberto A., Sr.
Roberto A., Sr. was born on April 29, 1983. He denies any military background or Native American heritage. He reports that his father was not involved in his life but that his mother’s boyfriend was a father figure to him from age six until his teenage years. His mother separated from her boyfriend after he molested Roberto A., Sr.’s sister.
Roberto A., Sr. earned his GED from Job Corp in New Haven. He attended Capital Community College for one year. He obtained a Class B License from DMV in 2000. He has worked as a truck driver for over ten years until he was laid off due to receiving a speeding ticket.
Father has been in a relationship with Mother for about four years. Because Tykeeley W. had expressed to him that she no longer wanted to be a mother, he became the primary caretaker for Roberto A., Jr. and the sole caretaker for the child from age one to nine. During that timeframe, Father reported that mother did not see Roberto A., Jr. Father indicated when Roberto A., Jr. was nine years old they became homeless due to his job loss and eviction. DCF became involved with the family at this time. The child was adjudicated neglected on November 19, 2015 and committed to the Department. Specific steps were issued by the court on November 19, 2015.
Roberto A., Sr.’s whereabouts were unknown to DCF for two years. The Department did make contact with Father until May 2017 when he reported that he was living in a homeless shelter and had struggled with substance use over the previous two years. On June 12, 2017, a referral was made to Hartford Behavioral Health for a substance abuse evaluation. Father failed to schedule his intake appointment and was unsuccessfully discharged on July 14, 2017. He attended an Advanced Behavioral Health Evaluation at Hartford Behavioral Health on February 26, 2018, but since he was forty minutes late for his appointment, he was rescheduled for later that day. When he arrived late for the second appointment, he reeked of alcohol. When the worker asked him questions he was evasive, extremely talkative, erratic, and his speech was rapid. The session ended because Father was under the influence. He completed the evaluation and urine screen the next day. He tested positive for methadone on February 27, 2018. He was recommended to participate in outpatient treatment to address his mental health and substance abuse issues. On April 6, 2017, the present for therapy that day. He failed to attend the following appointment on April 10, 2017, and was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Father did not indicate to DCF that he was involved in any further services.
Roberto A., Sr. began services at Hartford Dispensary Clinic on August 31, 2016, for his for his Opiate dependence. Father remained in Phase One of treatment with no take-home privileges. He rendered negative urines for seven months of his treatment. He tested positive on a breathalyzer reading and was placed on probation for ninety days. He continued to provide positive breathalyzer readings during probation and was placed on a tapered dose of methadone. He was unsuccessfully discharged on March 1, 2018 due to noncompliance with program rules. Upon receiving his last dose he was referred to Intercommunity Recovery Center for aftercare treatment. He did not follow the recommended discharge referral.
Father informed DCF in October that he had been attending Connecticut Addiction Medicine (CAM) since April 2018. He refused to provide DCF with releases so they could obtain the treatment records from CAM. It was not until April 2019, when the DCF social worker stopped Father on the street, that he signed the release. No records were available from CAM at the time of trial. Roberto A., Sr. was referred to Catholic Charities eight week Fatherhood Group. It was reported that Father did attend and was an active participant.
Father is not employed and is presently living in a one bedroom apartment. Father has not visited with Roberto A., Jr. since April 2015. The child does not want to see his Father because of the trauma he suffered while in Father’s care. It was not clinically recommended for the child to visit with his Father. It was not until April 31, 2019, the evening before the final day of trial that Roberto A., Sr. indicated to his attorney that he wanted to see his son.
Child, Roberto A., Jr.
Roberto A., Jr. was born on August 14, 2015 and raised mostly by his Father, Roberto A., Sr. When he was nine years old, he and his father were homeless due to an eviction and his father’s loss of employment. Roberto A., Jr. was adjudicated as neglected due to inadequate supervision conditions injurious to well-being. The Department became involved and placed the child in Mother’s care in March 2015. While in Mother’s care, Roberto A., Jr. was exposed to substance abuse, an unsafe environment, and family violence.
On June 9, 2015, co-guardianship of Roberto A., Jr. was granted by the East Hartford Probate Court to maternal cousin, Margo J. On November 19, 2015, Roberto A., Jr. was adjudicated Neglected and committed to DCF. He had been living in a foster home with foster parent Margo J., as well as his sisters, Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. On February 7, 2019 the placement with Margo J. disrupted and Roberto A. Jr. was placed in therapeutic foster care placement. He reported he is happy with that placement.
In 2015, Roberto A., Jr. was diagnosed with Mixed Anxiety Adjustment Disorder and Depression with a Global Assessment Functioning with a score of 50. He attended The Village Families and Children for Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) Therapy which he continues to receive. In 2017, he received a mental health diagnosis of PTSD.
Mr. Jason T., LMSW, Roberto A., Jr.’s clinician, reported to the social worker that it was not clinically recommended for Roberto A., Jr. to see his parents and that the child had communicated to DCF that he did not wish to see his parents. At trial, Jason T. indicated he did not remember making that statement, however he testified that Roberto A., Jr. did not want to see his Father because while in his care, the child had suffered sexual abuse and a lack of medical and dental care; he had to beg for food and had been run over by a car. He indicated that he did not feel safe with his Father and did not want to see him.
Roberto A., Jr.’s placement with Margo J. disrupted on February 7, 2019. After this disruption, he was ambivalent about seeing Mother as he reported not really knowing her. As a result of the placement disruption, Roberto A., Jr. was placed in a therapeutic foster home. He reported that he loves his new foster care placement and gets along with all the members of the family. On the evening of the last day of trial, Roberto A., Jr. indicated to his attorney that he wished to see his Father.
Child, Brooklyn E.
Brooklyn E. was born on August 8, 2008. She is 10 years old. While in the care of Mother and Father, Anthony E., Brooklyn was exposed to neglect by substance use, an unsafe environment, and family violence. On June 9, 2015, co-guardianship was granted by the East Hartford Probate court to maternal cousin, Margo J. and maternal aunt, Sarah J. on behalf of Brooklyn E. The co-guardianship expired on June 8, 2016.
On June 23, 2015, a petition of alleged neglect was filed in Hartford Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. On November 19, 2015, Brooklyn E. was Adjudicated Neglected and committed to the Department. She was placed in the same kin foster home as her siblings. Brooklyn E. had reported that she loved living with her foster mother, Margo J. However on February 7, 2019, that placement disrupted and the child was placed in a Therapeutic Foster care home. She has had a difficult time coming to terms with that placement ending. It was reported to the court on May 3, 2019, that DCF was withdrawing their petition as to Father, Anthony E. because Brooklyn E. was being placed with her paternal grandmother. Brooklyn E. has expressed a desire to see her Mother.
Brooklyn E. attended a diagnostic assessment on July 21, 2015, at The Village and was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety and Depression. She attended trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy. On March 30, 2015, she was prescribed Sertraline to treat PTSD, and the trauma-anxiety impacting her ability to concentrate and have positive interactions with others. She is currently engaged in EDT with The Village. There are no concerns at school with Brooklyn.
Child, Janiyah E.
Janiyah E. was born on June 23, 2010. While in the care or her parents, Tykeeley W. and Anthony E., she was exposed to neglect and family violence. On June 9, 2015, co-guardianship was granted by East Hartford Probate Court to Maternal Aunts, Margo J. and Sarah J. on behalf of Janiyah E. This co-guardianship expired on June 8, 2016. On June 23, 2015, a petition of alleged neglect was filed by the Department in Hartford Superior Court for Juvenile Matters on behalf of Janiyah E. On November 11, 2015, the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the Department. She was placed in the same kin foster home with her siblings, Roberto A., Jr. and Brooklyn E. She reported that she got along with her foster mother and did not want to live anywhere else.
Janiyah E. is in the second grade, receiving special educational services. She is diagnosed with PTSD and is currently engaged in weekly therapy at The Village for Families and Children.
On February 7, 2019, Janiyah E.’s placement with Margo J. disrupted. The child was placed in a therapeutic foster home. DCF withdrew its petition as to Janiyah E.’s Father, Anthony E., and the plan is for Janiyah E. to be placed with her paternal grandmother in the near future.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The court must first determine whether DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of mother and father should be terminated. "A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citation omitted). In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 629, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932 (2012).
ADJUDICATION
Pursuant to section § 17a-112 (j), adjudication involves the court finding by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent and that one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists.
REASONABLE EFFORTS
Section § 17a-112(j) provides in relevant parts "The Superior Court ... may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] ... if by clear and convincing evidence that (1) [DCF] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent ... unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts...." (Emphasis added.) "[T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate .... In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App.117 (2014). Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section § 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584 (2014) citing In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191 (2011); see also In re Jermine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). "[I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed.... [The court, when making its reasonable efforts determination ... is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., Id. citing In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7. In the present case, the petition for termination of Mother’s and both Fathers’ parental rights was filed on October 11, 2017.
"[Section 17a- 112] imposes on the department the duty ... to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible". In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632 (2004). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 55, 872-73, cert denied, 311 Conn.923 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7. The department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts. In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App 637, 644 (2002). But "[t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts’. It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act". In re Anthony B., 54 Conn.App. 63, 476 (1999). In addition, "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances ...." In re Vincent B ., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, cert. denied 268 Conn. 924 (2004).
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mother and Father as contemplated by § 17a- 112(j)(1). The evidence clearly established that Father and Mother were properly served with the termination of parental rights petition and were provided notice of the termination of parental rights trial. Mother and Father appeared for court proceedings prior to the trial of this matter and were present for trial.
Reasonable Efforts as to Tykeeley W.
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. with Mother. As discussed above, Mother was offered numerous services to aid in attaining reunification with her children, including Administrative Case Reviews, CHR for Drug and Alcohol classes, Therapeutic Family Time, IOP program, drug tests, breathalyzer tests, supervised visitation, bus passes, individual counseling and supportive housing.
Mother stopped contact with DCF and with the children’s foster mother from December 2016 to April 2017. When DCF was able to speak with Mother in April 2017, she reported she did not see the point in continuing communication with the Department, as she did not think she would ever be in a positon to care for her children. In April 2017, Mother participated in an intake at CHR for a relapse prevention group. CHR reported that she did not attend any group sessions after her intake. As noted above, Mother did attend Therapeutic Family Time parenting program in 2016. The recommendation at discharge was for Mother not to transition to the Reunification program because it was beyond her capability due to her instability issues.
Mother is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts in that despite the numerous services offered to her, she has not consistently participated in treatment, and she has not made sufficient progress regarding her identified treatment needs. Mother has not visited with the children since December 2016, despite being offered weekly supervised visits with them. It was not until December 13, 2018, that DCF had contact with Mother after court and made arrangements to meet with her to discuss services. An appointment was set for Mother but she did not attend. When the children’s placement disrupted in February 2019, DCF again reached out to Mother. She requested visitation and DCF reached out to the children’s therapists to see if visits could take place. Mother was told that the therapist supported visits but that she needed to show consistency. Mother met with Janiyah E.’s therapist but did not arrive for the meeting with Brooklyn E.’s therapist. Mother indicated she was waiting to hear back from Roberto A., Jr.’s therapist.
DCF made contact with Mother again in March 2019 and she indicated she was not involved in counseling. Mother has been unable to change her circumstances, and she has failed to attain a level of stability to permit her children to be safely placed in her care. Mother has failed to gain the necessary insight needed to care for her children. She has been unable to put Roberto A., Jr.’s, Brooklyn E.’s, and Janiyah E.’s needs ahead of her own and has been unable to so for the majority of their lives.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Mother and to reunify her with Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. and further that Mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
Reasonable Efforts as to Roberto A., Sr.
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Father, Roberto A., Sr. as contemplated by § 17a-112 (J)(1). The evidence clearly established that Father was properly served with the termination of parental rights petition and was provided notice of the termination of parental rights trial. He appeared for the court proceedings prior to trial and was present for trial. The petition for Termination of Parental Rights was filed on October 11, 2011.
DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Roberto A., Jr. with Father. As discussed above, Father was offered numerous services to aid in the reunification with Roberto A., Jr. Father’s whereabouts were unknown to the Department for two years of attempting to contact him. DCF was able to speak with Father in May 2017. He indicated he had struggled with substance use over the past two years, and was currently living in a homeless shelter. He was referred to Hartford Behavioral Health (HBH) to undergo a substance use evaluation and to Catholic Charities. Father was offered outpatient individual treatment, Hartford Dispensary for Opiate dependence, Inter-Community Recovery Center for aftercare and to the Fatherhood group. Father told the Department in October 2018 that he was attending Connecticut Addiction Medication (CAM) but refused to sign a release for DCF to communicate with the provider. It was not until April 2019 when the DCF social worker tracked him down on the street that he agreed to sign the releases. The Department scheduled a home visit but Father canceled the visit and did not reschedule. Father has failed to visit with Roberto A., Jr. since April 2015. The child has indicated he does not wish to visit with his Father and visitation was not clinically recommended. Roberto is thirteen years old. He had indicated he did not feel safe with Father because he had suffered neglect, homelessness and had been run over by a car while in father’s care. Father indicated he wanted visits with Roberto A., Jr. but did not cooperate with services offered.
Father received housing assistance and was living at the YMCA. He moved into a one bedroom apartment on February 14, 2018. DCF conducted a home visit and discovered that there was no furniture in the living room.
Father has failed to secure and maintain legal employment. He has failed to successfully complete services and change his circumstances to attain a level of stability that would permit Roberto Jr. to be safely placed in his care. DCF was ready and willing to provide visits to Father but the child’s refusal to see Father prevented that from occurring. Roberto A., Jr. did eventually express a desire to see Father on the evening before the last day of trial. In light of foregoing, the court finds that DCF did everything reasonable toward reunification. DCF was in touch with Roberto A., Jr. every month regarding his attitude toward visitation with Father and DCF was in monthly contact with his therapist. Father has failed to gain the necessary insight needed to care for Roberto A., Jr. He has been unable to put Roberto A., Jr.’s needs ahead of his own for the majority of Roberto A., Jr.’s life. The Department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts. In re Vincent B. 73 Conn.App. 637 , 644, (2002), but "[t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts’. It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, (1999). "In addition, making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances ...." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Father, Roberto A., Sr. and to reunify him with Roberto A., Jr., and further, that he is unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
FAILURE TO REHABILITATE
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must next determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights - Failure to Rehabilitate. Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of the six statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17-112 [See General Statutes § 17a -112 (j) (3) (B) (1)]. "The [grounds] alleged in this petition [are] that...mother and father failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j) (3) (B) (1) which allows for termination if a child has found to be neglected, and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible positon in the life of the child". See In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App 48, citing In re G.Q., 158 Conn.App. 24, 25, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 918 (2015).
"Personal rehabilitation ... refers to the restoration of the parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ... [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents’] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such ...rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time...the statute does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [their child’s] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their child], unaided by available support systems." In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507 (2013). "It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the level of rehabilitation [the parents have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child’s] life." (Citations omitted, emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507 (2013). "The critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their own lives], but rather whether [they have] gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 67, (2010). The ultimate question is whether the person at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable time. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000); In re Latifa K., 62 Conn.App. 742, 748 (2002). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 839, 858-59, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923 (2008).
"A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is driven from both the trial court’s factual findings and from its weighing the facts in assessing whether these facts satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17-112 (j) (3) (B)." (Emphasis omitted.) In re Shane M ., 38 Conn. 568, 587-88 (2015). "Terminating a parent’s rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate, it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying the child a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] ... continues to be incapable of providing such a home for the child." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477 (1977), aff’d 51 Conn.App. 376 (1998), cert. denied, 902 (1999). In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has meet its burden as to Mother and Father.
Ground B1 - Failure to Rehabilitate After Adjudication as to Mother Tykeeley W. with respect to Roberto A., Jr.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Tykeeley W. with respect to Roberto A., Jr. on the grounds set forth in § 17a- 112 (j) (3)(B1). Section § 17-12(j) (3) (B1) authorizes the termination of parental rights where the child or youth has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and Mother has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child or youth she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial, as discussed in detail above, prove clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute, that Roberto A., Jr. was found to have been neglected on November 19, 2015. Mother was provided with court order specific steps to facilitate the return of Roberto A., Jr., to her care. DCF assisted Mother by referring her to the appropriate services. Mother’s minimal compliance with her specific steps was not sufficient to achieve rehabilitation. As discussed above, she only minimally engaged in her court ordered services and continued to engage in substance use. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 760 (2001); In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, (2008).
Mother stopped contact with the Department and the children’s foster mother from December 2016 through April 2017. She moved to Willimantic during that time and did not inform DCF of her whereabouts. DCF spoke to her in April 2017 at which time she reported that she did not see the point in continuing communication as she believed she would never be in a position to care for her children.
Mother participated in an intake at Community Health Resources (CHR) for a relapse prevention group. She did not attend those classes. Mother began attending CHR again in August 2017. She continues to be inconsistent with remaining substance use free. She revoked DCF’s release of information in March 2018. Mother did complete the Therapeutic Family Time parenting program. The recommendation at discharge was for Mother not to transition to the Reunification program because it was beyond her capability due to instability issues. When DCF made contact with Mother in December 2018 and tried to set up a meeting with her she did not attend.
Mother has not visited with the children since 2016. Upon the disruption of the children’s placement, DCF contacted Mother and she requested visits with the children. The children’s therapists were in favor of the visitation provided Mother could remain consistent. Mother made her appointment with Janiyah E.’s therapist but did not attend a meeting with Brooklyn E.’s therapist.
There is clear and convincing evidence that when the termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 11, 2017, Mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of her children, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. Mother has failed to gain insight and ability to care for her children given their ages and needs within a reasonable time. Mother fails to demonstrate her ability to rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.
Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Roberto A., Jr. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-667 (2017). Roberto A., Jr.’s need for permanency far outweighs any remote chance that Mother may rehabilitate in the future. Either due to lack of ability or desire, Mother has failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Roberto A., Jr. cannot afford to wait for his Mother to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that he needs permanency and stability now. He has the same needs as those of all children for permanency and stability in his life.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial, Mother had not sufficiently rehabilitated to the extent she could assume a responsible position in Roberto A., Jr.’s life in view of his age and needs, or within a reasonable time.
Ground B1 - Failure to Rehabilitate After Adjudication as to Mother, Tykeeley W. with respect to Brooklyn E.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Tykeeley W. with respect to Brooklyn E. on the grounds set forth in § 17a- 112 (j) (3)(B1). § 17-112(j) (3) (B1) authorizes the termination of parental rights where the child or youth has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and Mother has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child or youth, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial, as discussed in detail above, prove clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Brooklyn E. was found to have been neglected on November 19, 2015. Mother was provided with court order specific steps to facilitate the return of Brooklyn E. to her care. DCF assisted Mother by referring her to the appropriate services. Mother’s minimal compliance with her specific steps was not sufficient to achieve rehabilitation. As discussed above, she only minimally engaged in her court ordered services and continued to engage in substance use. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 760 (2001); In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, (2008).
Mother stopped contact with the Department and the child’s foster mother from December 2016 through April 2017. Mother moved to Willimantic during that time and did not inform DCF of her whereabouts. DCF spoke to her in April 2017 when she reported not seeing any point in continuing communication with the Department, as she believed that she would never be in a position to care for her children.
Mother participated in an intake at Community Health Resources (CHR) for a relapse prevention group but did not attend those classes. Mother began attending CHR again in August 2017. Mother continues to be inconsistent with remaining substance use free. She revoked DCF’s release of information in March of 2018. She did complete the Therapeutic Family Time parenting program. The recommendation at discharge was for Mother not to transition to the Reunification program because it was beyond her capability due to her instability issues.
When DCF made contact with Mother in December 2018 and set up a meeting with her she did not attend. Mother has not visited with the children since 2016. Upon the disruption of the children’s placement, DCF contacted Mother and she requested visits with the children. The children’s therapists were in favor of the visitation if Mother could maintain consistent. Mother made her appointment with Janiyah E.’s therapist but did not attend a meeting with Brooklyn E.’s therapist.
There is clear and convincing evidence that when the termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 11, 2017, Mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of her children, she could assume a responsible position in the children’s lives. Mother has failed to gain insight and ability to care for her children given their ages and needs within a reasonable time. Mother continues with her failure to demonstrate the ability to rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.
Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Brooklyn E. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-667 (2017). Brooklyn E.’s need for permanency far outweighs any remote chance that Mother would be able to play a significant role in the child’s life, either because of lack of ability or lack of desire. She has failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Brooklyn E. cannot afford to wait for her Mother to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that she needs permanency and stability now. She has the same needs of all children for permanency and stability in her life.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial, Mother had not sufficiently rehabilitated to the extent she could assume a responsible position in Brooklyn E.’s life in view of her age and needs, or within a reasonable time.
Ground B1 - Failure to Rehabilitate After Adjudication as to Mother, Tykeeley W. with respect to Janiyah E.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Mother, Tykeeley W. with respect to Janiyah E. on the grounds set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3)(B1). Section § 17-112(j) (3) (B1) authorizes the termination of parental rights where the child or youth has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and the parent has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child or youth, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial, as discussed in detail above, clearly and convincingly prove the first element under the statute that Janiyah E. was found to have been neglected on November 19, 2015. Mother was provided with court order specific steps to facilitate the return on Janiyah E. to her care. DCF assisted Mother by referring her to the appropriate services but Mother’s minimal compliance with her specific steps was not sufficient to achieve rehabilitation. As discussed above, she only minimally engaged in her court ordered services and continued to engage in substance use. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 760 (2001); In re Coby C. 107 Conn.App. 395 , 406, (2008).
Mother stopped contact with DCF and the child’s foster mother from December 2016 through April 2017. Mother moved to Willimantic during that time and did not inform DCF of her whereabouts. The Department spoke to her in April 2017 when she reported that there was no point in continuing communication with the DCF as she did not see herself ever being in the position to care for her children.
Mother participated in an intake at Community Health Resources (CHR) for relapse prevention group but did not attend those classes. She began attending CHR again in August 2017. Mother continues to be inconsistent with remaining substance use free. She revoked DCF’s release of information in March of 2018. Mother did complete the Therapeutic Family Time parenting program. The recommendation at discharge was for Mother not to transition to the Reunification program because it was beyond her capacity due to issues of instability. When DCF made contact with Mother in December and set up a meeting she did not attend. Mother has not visited with the children since 2016. Upon the disruption of the children’s placement in February 2019, DCF contacted Mother and she requested visits with the children. The children’s therapists were in favor of visitation if Mother could maintain consistency. Mother made her appointment with Janiyah E.’s therapist but did not attend an appointment with Brooklyn E.’s therapist.
There is clear and convincing evidence that when the termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 11, 2017, Mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of her child, she could assume a responsible position in her life. Mother has failed to gain insight and ability to care for her children given their ages and needs within a reasonable timeframe. Mother continues with her failure to demonstrate the ability to rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.
Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Janiyah E. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-667 (2017). Janiyah E.’s need for permanency far outweighs any remote chance that Mother could play a significant role in her life, either because of lack of ability or desire and she failed to successfully accomplish what is necessary to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Janiyah E. cannot afford to wait for her Mother to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that she needs permanency and stability now. She has the same needs of all children for permanency and stability in her life.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that, as of the end of the trial of this matter, Mother had not sufficiently rehabilitated to the extent she could assume a responsible position in Janiyah E.’s life in view of her age and needs, or within a reasonable timeframe.
ABANDONMENT
Ground A - Abandonment as to Mother, Tykeeley W. with respect to Brooklyn E.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Tykeeley W. with respect to Brooklyn E. on the grounds set forth on 17a-112 (j) (3) (A). Section 17a- 112 (J) (3) (A) authorizes the termination of parental rights where the child has been abandoned by the Mother in the sense that the parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child or youth. The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings it has made in this memorandum of decision regarding Mother’s failure to rehabilitate. In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has meet its burden as to Mother with regard to this ground.
Mother is the parent of Brooklyn E., who was born on August 13, 2008. While Brooklyn E. was in DCF’s care, Mother had been offered weekly visitation with the child. She has not visited Brooklyn E. since 2016. From December 2016 until April of 2017, Mother made no contact with the children or the Department. During this time she did not inquire as to the children’s well-being and failed to provide any gifts or letters to Brooklyn E. Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct. A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment. Attempts to achieve contact with child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. Abandonment occurs when a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare. In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 513-14 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911 (2009); In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47 (2007), cert. denied 285 Conn. 918 (2008); In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, (1998). The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden of proving that Brooklyn E. has been abandoned by Mother. Mother has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the Brooklyn E.
Accordingly, the court finds that as of the date of filing of the petition, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother has abandoned Brooklyn E.
Ground A - Abandonment § 17-112 (j) (3) (a) as to Mother, Tykeeley W. with respect to Janiyah E.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Tykeeley W. with respect to Janiyah E. on the grounds set forth on 17a-112 (j) (3) (A). Section 17a- 112 (J) (3) (A) authorizes the termination of parental rights where "the child has been abandoned by the Mother in the sense that the parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child or youth". The court incorporates by reference all of the factual findings made herein regarding Mother’s failure to rehabilitate. In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has meet its burden as to Mother with regard to this ground.
Mother is the parent of Janiyah E., who was born on August 13, 2008. While Janiyah E. was in DCF care, Mother had been offered weekly visitation with the child, however she has not visited the child since 2016. From December 2016 until April of 2017 Mother made no contact with the children or the Department. During this time she did not inquire as to the children’s well-being and failed to provide any gifts or letters for Janiyah E. Mother did complete the Therapeutic Family Time parenting program in 2016. The recommendation at discharge was not to transition to the Reunification program because it was beyond her capacity due to instability issues. Abandonment focuses on parental conduct. A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment. Attempts to achieve contact with child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. Abandonment occurs when a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare. In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 513-14 (2008), cet. denied, 290 Conn. 911 (2009); In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 (2008); In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52 (1998). The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of Janiyah E. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden of proving Mother has abandoned Janiyah E.
Accordingly, the court finds that as of the date of filing of the petition, by clear and convincing evidence that Janiyah E. has been abandoned by Mother.
Ground B1 - Failure to Rehabilitate after Adjudication as to Roberto A., Sr. with respect to Robert A., Jr.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Roberto A., Sr. with respect to Roberto A., Jr. on the grounds set forth in § 17a-112 (j)(3)(B1). Section 17a-112 (j)(3) (B1) authorizes the termination of parental rights where the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and a parent as failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable timeframe, considering the age and needs of the child or youth, she could resume a responsible position in the life of the child.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial, as discussed above, prove clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Roberto A., Jr. was found to have been neglected on November 19, 2015. Mother and Father were provided with court ordered steps to facilitate the return of Roberto A., Jr. to their care. DCF assisted Father by referring him to appropriate services. At the time the petition was filed Father’s whereabouts were unknown to the Department for two years. When the Department made contact with Father in 2017, he reported that he had struggled with substance use over the last two years and was living in a homeless shelter. Father did receive housing assistance and the DCF social worker testified that he lives in a one bedroom apartment. She indicated that there was no couch in the home.
Father was referred to substance use evaluations but he failed to cooperate with services provided. Father’s minimal compliance with specific steps was not sufficient rehabilitation. Father testified he has been attending Connecticut Addiction Medicine. At the time of trial there were no records available. Father had refused to sign releases in order for DCF to obtain those records. It was not until Father was stopped on the street by a DCF worker in April 2019 that he consented to a release of information. Father failed to follow through with services at Hartford Behavioral Health. He did engage in a Fatherhood group in April 2018. There is clear and convincing evidence that when the termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 11, 2017, Father had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and needs of his child, he could assume a responsible position in the child’s life. Father has failed to gain the insight and ability to care for Roberto A., Jr. who is almost fourteen years old. Given his age, the length of time he has not seen Father and the trauma Roberto A., Jr. has suffered while in Father’s care, it is unlikely Father could meet his needs within a reasonable period of time.
With regard to personal rehabilitation, Father has failed to successfully engage in substance use services offered by DCF. Father testified he has attended Connecticut Addiction Medicine since April 2018. No records were available at the time of trial. He attend the Father Engagement program which he successfully completed. He did not engage in visitation with Roberto A., Jr. because it was not clinically recommended.
Despite DCF’s reasonable efforts, Father is unable to parent Roberto A., Jr. He is unable to meet the developmental, emotional, educational, medical, and moral needs of the child. He cannot provide for the shelter, nurturance, safety, and security of the child. Father does not have stability in his life to enable him to care for Roberto A., Jr.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial of this matter, Father had not sufficiently rehabilitated himself to the extent he could assume a responsible position in Roberto A., Jr.’s life given his age and needs, or within a reasonable time thereafter.
NO-ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Ground D - No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship as to Father, Roberto A., Sr. with respect to Roberto A., Jr.
DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of Roberto A., Sr. with respect to Roberto A., Jr. on the grounds set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D). Section 17a-112 (j) (3) (D) authorizes the termination of parental rights where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with Father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. The court must make findings that no parent child relationship exists, and it would not be in the best interest of the child to allow for the development of such a relationship. In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525 (2001). "In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.... The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.... Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Id; see also In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 268-70 (2006) (mother did not pursue visitation while children were in foster care; In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 471 (2003) (relationship had been irrevocably damaged by mother’s assault on daughter). In cases involving very young children, whose feelings are not readily discernible, consideration must be given to positive feelings of the parent toward the child. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 532, (1992) (DCF’s assumption of guardianship at child’s birth prevented a relationship from developing). In re Alexander C., Conn.App. 417, 422 (2001), aff’d 262 Conn. 308, 311 (2002) (father could have pursued relationship but did not).
Factors to be considered in determining whether it would be in the best interest to allow a relationship to develop include: (1) the length of stay with foster parents; (2) the nature of the child’s relationship with the foster parents; (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parents; and (4) the nature of the relationship with the natural parents. In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 22 (1993). Father was the solo caretaker for Roberto A., Jr. from the ages of one to nine. Roberto A., Jr. indicated that he suffered homelessness, neglect, sexual abuse and being run over by a car while in Father’s care.
On November 19, 2015, Roberto A., Jr was adjudicated neglected and committed to the Department. Roberto A., Jr. was placed with Maternal Aunt, Margo J., until February 2, 2019 when that placement disrupted. Father was issued specific steps to facilitate the return of Roberto A., Jr. to his care. Father’s whereabouts were unknown to the department for two years. It was not until May 2017, that DCF was able to reach Father. Roberto A., Jr. reported to his therapist, Jason T., that he did not want to see Father and did not feel safe with him because of the trauma he suffered while in his care. The day before the last day of trial, Roberto A., Jr. indicated that he wanted to see Father. Father testified he had asked DCF numerous times to visit Roberto A., Jr. but that it was not clinically recommended because the child was refusing to see Father.
Roberto A., Jr. has no current relationship with Father. He is presently living in a new Foster Care Home where he claims to be very happy. To allow additional time to develop a parent-child relationship with Roberto A., Sr. would be detrimental to best interest of the child. Roberto A., Jr. is almost fourteen years old and has not seen his Father in four years. Father’s failure to cooperate with DCF’s recommendations does not encourage the court to adopt the belief that Father would be in a position to restart a relationship with Roberto A., Jr. or to maintain one in the future.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the date of the filing of the petition, no parent-child relationship exists and it would not be in the best interest of the child to allow time for the development of such a relationship.
DISPOSITION
For all the above reasons, the court having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged in the petition for the termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights have been proven, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17-112 (k). In re Romance M. 229 Conn. 345 (1994). "In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts to from the conduct of the parent to the interest of the child.... [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of [respondent’s] parental rights is not in the best interest of the [child]." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted). In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98 (2009). "The best interests of the [child] includes the [child’s] interest in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability in [her] environment. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-5 (2008).
Findings Under 17a-112 (k) (2)
This court finds that the seven statutory findings have been established by clear and convincing evidence as follows:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.
As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Mother in an effort to facilitate reunion with Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E. Mother was offered case management services, parenting programs and substance use treatment. All of the recommended services where appropriate and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
As noted above, DCF offered Father timely and appropriate services in an effort to facilitate his reunion with Roberto A., Jr. Father was offered case management services, parenting services and supportive housing. All the recommended services were appropriate and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
2. Whether the Department of Children’s and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 as amended.
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts were made by DCF to reunify Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. with their Mother pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. The services offered were appropriate and offered on a consistent and timely basis. Mother failed to benefit from the services offered and provided. She failed to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Brooklyn E., Janiyah E., and Roberto A., Jr. to return to her care. She has failed to demonstrate her ability to appropriately parent Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts to reunify Roberto A., Jr. with Father were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. The services offered were appropriate and offered on a consistent and timely basis. Father failed to benefit from the services offered. He failed to adjust his circumstance, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Roberto A., Jr. to return to his care as he has failed to demonstrate his ability to appropriately parent Roberto A., Jr. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.
Mother has not successfully fulfilled her obligations pursuant to the specific steps ordered by the court in that she failed to rehabilitate to a degree that would allow Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. to be safely returned to her care. Mother did attend CHR for substance use treatment, however, at best, she continues to be inconsistent with remaining substance use free. She revoked her signed releases allowing the Department to communicate with her service providers. Mother has been unable to benefit from services required of her as she has not fully addressed her history of substance use. Thus, she has not sufficiently benefitted from the services in which she engaged and clearly has not made sufficient progress in addressing her longstanding child protection concerns.
Father did attend some services for his substance use, however, he failed to complete those services and was unsuccessfully discharged. Father indicated he was currently attending substance use treatment but because of his refusal to sign releases up until April 2019, there were no records available for the court to review. Father completed a parenting education program.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody of control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
Brooklyn E. is ten years old. She has indicated in the past that she did not want to see Mother. After the disruption of her placement from Margo J.’s home on February 2, 2019 after being in her aunt’s care since May 2015, she indicated she would like to see her Mother. She was subsequently placed in a therapeutic foster care home. Brooklyn E. has not had a visit with her Mother since 2016 and there presently is no relationship between Brooklyn E. and Mother. At the time of trial DCF was pursuing placement with paternal grandmother.
Janiyah E. is eight years old. She has indicated on a consistent basis that she did not want to see Mother. After the disruption of her placement from Margo J.’s home on February 2, 2019 after being in her aunt’s care since May 2015, she indicated she would like to see her Mother. She was subsequently placed in a therapeutic foster care home. Janiyah E. has not had a visit with her Mother since 2016 here presently is no relationship between Janiyah E. and Mother. At the time of trial DCF was pursuing placement with paternal grandmother.
Roberto A., Jr is thirteen years old. He has indicated that he does not wish to see Mother and does not remember her. Mother has not visited with Roberto A., Jr. since December 2016. There is no relationship between Roberto A., Jr. and Mother. Roberto A., Jr. was placed with Margo J. from May 2015 until February 7, 2019. Upon disruption from that home, the child was placed in a therapeutic foster home where he indicates that he is very happy. Roberto A., Jr. has not visited with Father since April 2015. Up until recently, the child did not want to see Father because he does not feel safe with him. However, since the disruption, he indicated that he would like to see Father.
5. The ages of the children:
Janiyah was born on June 23, 2010. She is eight years old.
Brooklyn was born August 13, 2008. She is eleven years old.
Roberto A., Jr. was born on August 14, 2005. He is thirteen years old.
6. The efforts the parents has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.
Mother has not made sufficient effort or adjustment to her individual circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. to return to her care in the foreseeable future. She continues to have unresolved issues that impede her ability to safely and appropriately provide care for Brooklyn E., Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. Mother has failed to consistently remain substance use free. She has refused services offered to her. In March 2019, Mother indicated she was not involved in treatment. Mother has not visited with the children since December 2016.
Father was unsuccessfully discharged from the court ordered substance use treatment. He claims to be attending substance use treatment with Connecticut Addiction Medicine, but no records were presented to the court to prove Father’s engagement in that program. Father has not adjusted his circumstances and has failed to demonstrate that he is likely to resume a responsible position in the life of Roberto A., Jr. Father has not visited with Roberto A., Jr. since April 2015.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
There is no credible evidence that Mother has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Brooklyn E, Janiyah E. and Roberto A., Jr. It was not clinically recommended that Mother visit with the children unless she could show consistency. She failed to do so. DCF offered Mother services to help her achieve that goal. No unreasonable act or conduct of any person, including Mother, has prevented her from having a relationship with her children. There has been no claim that Mother was unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources. Legal counsel was appointed for her. She was offered programs and services at no cost to assist her with her issues. There is no claim that Mother was unable to obtain services due to the lack of financial resources.
There is no credible evidence that Father has been prevented from having a meaningful relationship with Roberto A., Jr. No unreasonable act or conduct of any person, including Father, has prevented him from a meaningful relationship with the child. His economic circumstances have not prevented him from having a relationship or visits with Roberto A., Jr. Father was offered and provided programs to assist him with his issues. As father was offered and provided programs and services due to a lack of financial resources, there is no claim that he was unable to obtain services. Visits with Roberto A., Jr. were not clinically recommended as the child indicated that he did not feel safe with Father. Up until the time of trial Roberto A., Jr. had stated he did not want to see Father. Legal counsel was appointed for Father at no cost to him.
BEST INTERESTS
Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination is in the best interest of the child. In Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52 (1998). "[T] determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738 (2009). The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact specific to each child giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individual factors that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determining whether terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights would be in the best interest of children, the court has considered various factors, including interest in sustained growth, development well-being, and the continuity and stability of her environment. Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, (1985); In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766, n. 15 (2011); the ages and needs of the child, the length and nature of her stages of foster care, the contact and lack thereof that the child has with her biological mother and father, the potential benefit or detriment of retaining a connection with her biological mother and father, and her genetic bond with her birth parents. In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816 (1999)
Best Interest as to Roberto A., Jr.
The court finds that termination of Mother’s and Father, Roberto A., Sr.’s parental rights is in the best interest of Roberto A., Jr. The clear and convincing evidence has established that Mother and Father, Roberto A., Sr. are in no better position today to provide for Robert A., Jr. than they were at the time of his removal. The problems that led to his removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are bleak especially in light of Mother’s failure to consistently participate in services. Mother’s ability to play a responsible role in the life of Roberto A., Jr. in the future is small, at best.
Mother continues to have unaddressed mental health issues and has not engaged in mental health services. She has been inconsistent in her substance abuse treatment. Mother did complete the Therapeutic Family Time Program. Recommendations at discharge were for her not to transition to the reunification program due to her instability issues. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at trial.
Roberto A., Jr has been in the continuous care of the Department since November 2015. He desperately needs the permanency and stability that he now has in his foster home. Roberto A., Jr.’s placement with Margo J. disrupted after almost three and half years. The child has been in the care of his current foster mother since February 2019. He indicates that he loves his foster home and gets along with the family members. He claims that he does not remember his Mother and is not sure he wants to see her. Roberto A., Jr. has not seen his Father since he was 9 years old and had indicated to DCF that he did not want to see his him because he had suffered neglect, sexual abuse and was run over by a car while in his Father’s care. Therefore, he indicated that he did not feel safe with his Father. Although Roberto A., Jr. expressed an interest in seeing his Father the night before the close of evidence, that interest cannot control what is in child’s best interest. It is only one of the factors the court takes into consideration. Roberto A., Jr. has suffered significant trauma in his life as the result of the homelessness, neglect and sexual abuse while in Father’s care. The disruption from Margo J.’s home is also a significant trauma and its effect cannot be completely measured at this time. To allow Father an opportunity to reestablish a relationship with Roberto A., Jr., when it is unclear to the court to what extent or how successfully Father has pursued treatment, is foolish at best. The child cannot wait.
The court has weighed the potential benefit of maintaining a relationship with Father with the stability and permanency of the Termination of Parental Rights will bring to Roberto A., Jr.’s needs are those of all children. He has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment.
At the conclusion of the trial, the attorney for the minor child asked the court not to find that it is in the best interest of Roberto A. Jr to terminate Father’s rights. The court cannot do that for the above stated reasons.
Accordingly, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, the court finds that it is in Roberto Jr.’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.
Best Interest as to Brooklyn E.
The court finds that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of Brooklyn E. The convincing and clear evidence has established that Mother is in no better position today to provide for her than she was at the time of the child’s removal. The problems that led to the removal of the child mostly have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are not encouraging. At the conclusion of the trial the attorney for the minor child requested the court to find it was not in the best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court cannot do that. The court finds that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of Brooklyn E. The clear and convincing evidence has established that Mother is in no better position today to provide for her than she was at the time of removal. The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are not good especially in light of Mother’s failure to effectively engage in treatment. The conclusion is supported by the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at trial.
The disruption from Margo J.’s home was traumatic and hard for Brooklyn E. to accept. The child desperately needs permanency and stability. The plan at the time of trial was for transfer of guardianship to paternal grandmother. Termination of parental rights will bring that much needed stability and permanency to her and the opportunity to have a healthy and emotionally stable life. Brooklyn E. needs are those of all children. She has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment.
Accordingly, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, it is in Brooklyn’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Mother.
Best Interest as to Janiyah E.
The court finds that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of Janiyah E. The convincing and clear evidence has established that Mother is in no better position today to provide for her than she was at the time of her removal. The issues that led to the removal of the child, in large part, have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are not encouraging. At the conclusion of the trial the attorney for the minor child requested the court find it not in the best interest of Janiyah E. to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court cannot do that. The court finds that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of Janiyah E. The clear and convincing evidence has established that Mother is in no better position today to provide for her than she was at the time of removal. The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are not good especially in light of Mother’s failure to effectively engage in treatment. This conclusion is supported by the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at trial.
The disruption from Margo J.’s home was traumatic. Janiyah E. desperately needs the permanency and stability that she deserves. The plan at the time of trial was for transfer of guardianship to paternal grandmother. Termination of parental rights will bring that much needed stability and permanency to her and the opportunity to have a healthy and emotionally stable life. Janiyah E. needs are those of all children. She has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment.
Accordingly, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, it is in Janiyah E.’s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Mother.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, and after due consideration of the children’s need for a secure, permanent placement, it is accordingly ordered:
The parental rights of the respondent Mother, Tykeeley W. are terminated as to Roberto A., Jr., Brooklyn E. and Janiyah E.
The parental rights of respondent Father, Roberto A., Sr. are terminated as to Roberto A., Jr.
The commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Roberto A., Jr.
A written report of the plan for the children shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such report shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.
SO ORDERED.