Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV122042
RAYE, J.Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) charging defendant P.H.N. (the minor) with (1) fleeing the scene of an accident involving injury (Veh. Code., § 20001, subd. (a)), (2) driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and (3) running a red light (Veh. Code, § 21453, subd. (a)). The minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation.
The minor’s sole contention on appeal is that “there is insufficient evidence that [he] was the driver of the car that caused the collision,” and thus, “the disposition of wardship should be reversed and [he] should be released from the custody of the juvenile court.” Finding there is ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was the driver of the car, we shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling. (In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 726.)
On November 26, 2005, a Honda Civic ran a red light and “T-boned” a BMW driven by Rebecca Cohen. After the accident, the occupants of the Honda Civic fled. A witness followed two of the occupants -- B.L. and L.S. -- and convinced them to return to the scene. According to B.L., there were three additional people in the Honda at the time of the accident: the minor, C.D., and J.K. The four other occupants of the vehicle -- B.L., L.S., J.K., and C.D. -- said the minor was driving the Honda at the time of the accident. The Honda was registered to the minor’s father.
Two days after the accident, Elk Grove Police Officer Daniel Emerson interviewed the minor. During the interview, Officer Emerson observed a red mark on the left side of the minor’s neck and collar bone area, which was “consistent with . . . a shoulder injury from the seat belt of the driver.”
DISCUSSION
In an appeal “challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining the criminal allegations of a petition made under the provisions of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, we must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “[W]e ask not whether there is evidence from which the trier of fact could have reached some other conclusion, but whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent, and presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier reasonably could deduce from the evidence, there is substantial evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt, i.e., evidence that is credible and of solid value, from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, our sole function as a reviewing court in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Michael M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 726, fns. omitted.) “We do not second-guess the court’s credibility calls or reweigh the evidence.” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.)
Having reviewed the entire record, we have no trouble concluding there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the minor was driving the Honda at the time of the accident. Significantly, four of the Honda’s occupants identified the minor as the driver, and two days after the accident, the minor had marks on his body consistent with those caused by a seatbelt injury to a driver.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., BUTZ, J.