Opinion
No. 05-16-01398-CV
06-07-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF C.T.H. AND H.V.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-14-07021
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
This is an appeal from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the intervention of the purported biological father of C.T.H. in this divorce proceeding. The day after C.T.H. was born, his mother and her eventual husband signed an acknowledgment of paternity and filed it with the bureau of vital statistics. Family code section 160.308(c) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a collateral attack on an acknowledgment of paternity signed under this chapter may not be maintained after the issuance of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment, including an order relating to support of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308(c). The question in this appeal is whether an order granting a bill of review and vacating an order terminating the acknowledged father's parental rights to the child is an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment. We conclude that it is. We dismiss the appeal of one party and affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
The parties to this appeal are appellants Grandmother, Mother, and Jared, intervenor and claimed biological father of C.T.H., and appellee Matthew, who signed an acknowledgment of paternity for C.T.H., married Mother after C.T.H. was born, and is the counter-petitioner in this divorce proceeding.
We refer to the intervenor and the counter-petitioner in the divorce case by their first names only in order to protect the identity of the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
Mother and Matthew began dating in October 2008 while they were attending college. In January 2009, Mother told Matthew she was pregnant. Matthew proposed and the couple were engaged to be married. C.T.H. was born on August 1, 2009. Matthew was in the delivery room for the birth. Mother and Matthew executed an acknowledgment of paternity identifying Matthew as the biological father of C.T.H. on August 2, 2009. Matthew testified the acknowledgment was filed with the State of Texas. After the birth of C.T.H., Mother lived with her parents in Coppell while Matthew returned to college.
The child was named C.T.C. until his name was changed to C.T.H. on June 28, 2013.
In October 2009, Mother told Matthew she was concerned her parents would seek a financial contribution from him for C.T.H.'s medical expenses. Mother told Matthew that if he signed a waiver of interest in C.T.H., her parents would be unable to seek money from him and they could use the money when they married. Believing he would live with Mother and C.T.H. after he graduated from college, Matthew signed an affidavit of waiver of interest in C.T.H.
According to Matthew's affidavit in support of his bill of review, Mother's parents paid approximately thirty to forty thousand dollars in medical expenses related to the birth and wanted Matthew to contribute ten thousand dollars.
On November 10, 2009, Mother filed a petition to terminate parent-child relationship against Matthew in cause number 09-20238 in the 254th District Court of Dallas County (the SAPCR). Based on the waiver of interest in C.T.H., the trial court signed an agreed order of termination on November 24, 2009 (the Termination Order). In March 2010, Mother broke their engagement and ended her relationship with Matthew.
Believing he had been deceived into signing the waiver of interest, Matthew filed a petition for bill of review regarding the Termination Order on September 29, 2010 in cause number 10-17191 in the 254th District Court. Matthew alleged that Mother obtained the waiver of interest and order of termination by extrinsic fraud and sought to vacate the Termination Order. Mother filed a plea to the jurisdiction and argued the bill of review was not timely under family code section 161.211(a) because it was not filed within six months of the signing of the Termination Order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211(a). The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the bill of review proceeding on July 30, 2011. Matthew appealed that decision to this Court.
While the appeal was pending, Grandmother filed a petition in the SAPCR seeking custody of C.T.H. Grandmother alleged that Matthew was the biological father of C.T.H., but his parental rights had been terminated by the Termination Order in the SAPCR. Grandmother also alleged Mother was a danger to C.T.H. The trial court determined that Grandmother had standing in the SAPCR under section 102.003(a)(9) as a person who had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days before the filing of the petition. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9). As a result, the trial court on July 25, 2012, denied Mother's motion to dismiss Grandmother's petition in the SAPCR.
In the bill of review proceeding, this Court affirmed the order dismissing Matthew's bill of review in In re C.T.C., 365 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.). While Matthew's petition for review was pending, the supreme court decided In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012) and concluded that the strict time limit to challenge a termination order could not override a parent's right to constitutionally adequate notice of the proceeding. Id. at 555. Around the time of that decision, Mother and Matthew became engaged a second time in June 2012. On July 30, 2012, pursuant to an agreement between Mother and Matthew, the trial court signed an agreed order granting bill of review and vacating the agreed order of termination. The supreme court then granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss, vacated the judgments of this Court and the trial court without regard to the merits, and remanded the bill of review case to the trial court for rendition of judgment pursuant to the parties' agreement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 56.3. The supreme court's mandate issued on September 27, 2012.
The child's name was changed to C.T.H. after the date of this opinion.
Mother and Matthew were married on August 30, 2012. Then, on October 29, 2012, and pursuant to the supreme court's mandate, the trial court in cause number 10-17191 granted Matthew's bill of review (the Bill of Review Order). In the Bill of Review Order, the trial court vacated the Termination Order and found "that reestablishing the parent-child relationship between Petitioner MATTHEW [] and the subject child is in the best interest of the subject child."
On November 27, 2012, Grandmother, her husband, Mother, and Matthew entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) in the SAPCR. The MSA states in part that Mother and Matthew "are married and are the biological parents of [C.T.H.] and both have parental rights."
Mother became pregnant with Matthew's child, H.V.H., who was born on April 27, 2013. Afterwards, Mother and Matthew filed a motion to change the name of C.T.H. in the SAPCR. The trial court signed an order changing C.T.H.'s name on June 28, 2013 (the Name Change Order).
However, by the spring of 2014, the marriage had become unsupportable and Mother filed for divorce in cause number 14-07021 on April 11, 2014. Matthew filed a counter-petition for divorce on May 8, 2014. The parties agreed to consolidate the SAPCR regarding C.T.H. with the divorce proceeding and an order was signed on July 31, 2014.
On September 11, 2014, Grandmother filed an amended petition in intervention in the divorce case. She requested to be appointed joint managing conservator with Mother over the children and that Matthew not be appointed as a conservator for C.T.H. She alleged that although Matthew was the adjudicated father of C.T.H., he was not the biological father and that Jared was the probable biological father of C.T.H. On November 12, 2014, Jared sent a letter to the trial court stating he recently learned he was the biological father of C.T.H. and asked to participate in the suit.
Jared filed a pro se petition to intervene in the divorce proceeding on May 27, 2015. He alleged he was the biological father of C.T.H. and attached a DNA test report showing his paternity. The next day, Matthew filed a plea to the jurisdiction and argued the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Jared's petition to intervene because Jared did not have standing under section 160.308(c), which precludes collateral attacks on acknowledgments of paternity after entry of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308(c). Matthew argued that the Bill of Review Order and the Name Change Order were orders affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment and were issued before Jared's intervention. Therefore, he asserted, Jared could not collaterally attack the acknowledgment. Jared did not file a response to the plea or attend the hearing. However, Grandmother and Mother filed responses in support of the intervention and requested the court deny the plea. After hearing the arguments of counsel, a visiting judge denied the plea to the jurisdiction.
Matthew filed a motion to reconsider the ruling on October 13, 2015. Jared did not file a response to the motion or attend the evidentiary hearing which followed. Grandmother filed a response and presented evidence and argument at the hearing. Mother appeared and testified at the hearing. The trial court granted the motion to reconsider and the plea to the jurisdiction. On October 28, 2016, after a bench trial on the remaining issues in the case, the trial court dismissed Jared's intervention and signed the final divorce decree. The final divorce decree appointed Matthew and Mother as joint managing conservators of C.T.H. and H.V.H., established terms for possession of the children by Matthew and Mother, ordered Matthew to pay child support, and required Grandmother to provide secondary health insurance for the children. The trial court later signed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the order granting the motion to reconsider the plea to the jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction without regard to the merits of the claims asserted. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). We review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively showing the court's jurisdiction. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent. Id. We also consider evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tex. 2012).
This case also requires us to construe a statute. We review matters of statutory construction de novo. Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolón II, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 487, 493 (Tex. 2017). Our primary goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). We defer to the plain meaning of a statute as the best indication of the Legislature's intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context of the statute or the plain meaning would yield absurd results. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). Moreover, we determine legislative intent from the entire act, not merely from isolated portions. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 454; TGS-NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 439.
ANALYSIS
Although their arguments vary in some respects, Grandmother and Jared raise the same six issues on appeal. Mother raises three issues, which substantially overlap the issues raised by Grandmother and Jared. The issues can be summarized as follows: (1) the trial court erred by finding Matthew was an acknowledged father and applying section 160.308(c); (2) the intervention was timely because the orders Matthew relies on are not orders adjudicating paternity; and (3) the trial court denied Jared's due process rights by dismissing his intervention.
Matthew argues Grandmother lacks standing to appeal and that Jared failed to preserve error on the issues raised in his brief.
A. Appellate Standing
We begin with Grandmother's standing to appeal the granting of the plea to the jurisdiction. An appeal is limited to only those orders in which an appellant has a justiciable interest. In re J.P., 196 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Kenseth v. Dallas Cty., 126 S.W.3d 584, 594 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). An appellant "may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others." Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). Grandmother has not shown how she was harmed by the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction. Grandmother sought managing conservatorship in the SAPCR and in her intervention in the divorce proceeding. However, the final divorce decree appointed Matthew and Mother as joint managing conservators of the children, and Grandmother does not challenge the divorce decree on appeal.
Instead, Grandmother relies on an order entered in the SAPCR to argue she has standing to appeal. The order found that Grandmother had standing under family code section 102.003(a)(9) as a person who had actual care, control, and possession of the child for six months ending not more than ninety days before the filing of the petition. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9). However, Grandmother's standing to seek conservatorship over C.T.H. is not at issue in this appeal. The issue is whether Jared may intervene and seek an adjudication of parentage, and Grandmother has not shown how she has a justiciable interest in that issue.
Further, Grandmother has not shown she has standing in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage. Although the statutory basis was not stated in his petition, the purpose of Jared's intervention was to adjudicate the parentage of C.T.H. A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child is governed by chapter 160 of the family code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.001-.637. The proceeding may be joined with a divorce or other appropriate proceeding. See id. § 160.610. Grandmother is neither a person who may maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage, id. § 160.602, nor a person who must be joined as a party to such a proceeding, id. § 160.603.
Grandmother suggests that she is an "intended parent" under subsection 160.602(a)(8), but the record contains no evidence to support this contention. "Intended parents" are "individuals who enter into an agreement providing that the individuals will be the parents of a child born to a gestational mother by means of assisted reproduction, regardless of whether either individual has a genetic relationship with the child." Id. § 160.102(9).
The mother of the child and a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated "must be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage." Id.
We conclude Grandmother lacks standing to appeal the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction regarding Jared's intervention. See In re H.M.J.H., 209 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (grandmother lacked standing to appeal termination of father's parental rights to child); In re J.P., 196 S.W.3d at 439 (father did not have justiciable interest in appealing order striking child's paternal aunt's intervention in suit to terminate father's parental rights). Accordingly, we dismiss Grandmother's appeal.
Normally, Mother would be bound by her signature on the acknowledgment of paternity unless she rescinded or successfully challenged it within the time allowed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.637(a) (binding nature of determination of parentage), 160.307 (rescission), 160.308 (challenge). Mother did not file her own petition for adjudication of paternity, nor did she expressly join in Jared's intervention, which sought to adjudicate paternity. However, she did not oppose the intervention and filed a response to the plea to the jurisdiction in support of Jared. Thus, Mother expressed to the trial court her position that Jared's claim of paternity should be adjudicated. Although she did not directly challenge the acknowledgment of paternity, Mother's support of Jared's intervention necessarily challenged the acknowledgment on the ground of material mistake of fact. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308(a) (after period for rescission, a signatory to an acknowledgment may challenge it only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact), (d) ("For purposes of Subsection (a), evidence that, based on genetic testing, the man who is the signatory of an acknowledgement of paternity is not rebuttably identified as the father of a child in accordance with Section 160.505 constitutes a material mistake of fact.").
Section 160.308 places the same limitation on challenges by signatories to an acknowledgment, like Mother, as it does on collateral attacks on acknowledgments, like Jared's intervention—the proceeding may be commenced at any time before "the issuance of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment [], including an order relating to support of the child." id. § 160.308(a), (c) (collateral attack may not be maintained after the issuance of an order affecting the child). Therefore, to decide whether Mother may challenge the acknowledgment by supporting Jared's intervention and whether Jared may intervene seeking an adjudication of his paternity, we must determine whether the intervention and challenge were made before the issuance of an order affecting the child. As such, we conclude Mother has standing to appeal the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction on her first two issues.
We reach a different conclusion on Mother's third issue, in which she contends the trial court violated Jared's due process rights. Mother does not point to any evidence showing a violation of her constitutional rights. A party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect them or which affect only the rights of others. Torrington Co., 46 S.W.3d at 843. Accordingly, we conclude Mother does not have standing to assert a violation of Jared's constitutional rights. See In re T.N., 142 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding Mother lacked standing on appeal to complain about violation of Father's due process rights). We reject Mother's third issue.
B. Preservation of Error
Next, we consider whether the parties preserved error on their issues in the trial court. As a general rule, a party is required to present a complaint to the trial judge before being allowed to raise the issue on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003) (to preserve issue for appellate review, including constitutional error, party must present it to trial court in timely request, motion, or objection, state specific grounds therefor, and obtain ruling).
Although Jared raises the same issues on appeal as Grandmother, he did not file a response to the plea to the jurisdiction or the motion for reconsideration and did not appear at either of the hearings on those matters. He did not file a motion for new trial. Thus, the record fails to show that Jared presented his complaints to the trial court. We conclude Jared failed to preserve error on any of his issues and overrule those issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 711; Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001) (constitutional claim on appeal in paternity suit was not raised at trial).
Mother filed a response to the plea to the jurisdiction and appeared at the hearings on the plea and the motion to reconsider where she addressed the merits of her first two issues on appeal. The trial court overruled her issues when it granted the plea to the jurisdiction. Those issues are preserved for appeal.
C. Acknowledgment of paternity
Mother contends that as a result of the Termination Order, Matthew was no longer an acknowledged father and section 160.308 does not apply. She further contends Matthew did not become an adjudicated father until October 19, 2012, when the Bill of Review Order was signed. Based on these contentions, she argues Jared's intervention was timely because he filed within four years of October 19, 2012. She relies on family code section 160.609(b), which provides:
(b) If a child has an acknowledged father or an adjudicated father, an individual, other than the child, who is not a signatory to the acknowledgment or a party to the adjudication and who seeks an adjudication of paternity of the child must commence a proceeding not later than the fourth anniversary of the effective date of the acknowledgment or adjudication.TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.609(b). Mother maintains that section 160.609 applies rather than section 160.308(c). We disagree. The legislature expressly stated that section 160.308(c) applies "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter[.]" Id. § 160.308(c). Therefore, if the child has an acknowledged father, a collateral attack on the acknowledgment of paternity may not be maintained after "the issuance of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment," notwithstanding that the attack is made within four years of the effective date of the acknowledgment. See id.
An acknowledged father is a man who has established a father-child relationship under chapter 160. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.010. Except as provided in section 160.307, allowing rescission of an acknowledgment within sixty days, and section 160.308, allowing challenges after the period for rescission, "a valid acknowledgment of paternity filed with the vital statistics unit is the equivalent of an adjudication of the paternity of a child and confers on the acknowledged father all rights and duties of a parent." Id. § 160.305(a).
It is undisputed that Matthew and Mother signed a written acknowledgment of paternity and filed it with the bureau of vital statistics. As a result, Matthew became the acknowledged father of C.T.H. See id. § 160.304(c) (acknowledgment effective on date of birth of child or filing of acknowledgment, whichever is later). It is also undisputed that Matthew and Mother did not rescind that acknowledgment within sixty days of the effective date. Nor is there any evidence of the filing of a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment as permitted by section 160.308. Therefore, the acknowledgment established the father-child relationship between Matthew and C.T.H. See id. § 160.201(b)(2) (father-child relationship is established by "an effective acknowledgment of paternity by the man under Subchapter D, unless the acknowledgment has been rescinded or successfully challenged").
Turning to the Termination Order, that order terminated Matthew's parental rights, but it did not vacate or rescind the acknowledgment of paternity. More importantly, the Bill of Review Order vacated the Termination Order. A judgment that has been vacated has no legal effect. Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, LLC, 345 S.W.3d 139, 147 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Pringle v. Moon, 158 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Once a judgment is vacated, the matter stands precisely as if there had been no judgment. Cessna Aircraft, 345 S.W.3d at 147; Pringle, 158 S.W.3d at 610. The effect of the Bill of Review Order was to return the parties to the position they were in before the Termination Order was rendered, that is, with Matthew as the acknowledged father of C.T.H. as of August 2, 2009. Because Matthew was an acknowledged father, we conclude section 160.308 applies to this case.
D. Order Affecting the Child Under Section 160.308
Section 160.308 of the family code provides, in part:
(a) After the period for rescission under Section 160.307 has expired, a signatory of an acknowledgment of paternity or denial of paternity may commence a proceeding to challenge the acknowledgment or denial only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. The proceeding may be commenced at any time before the issuance of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment or denial, including an order relating to support of the child.
. . . .
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a collateral attack on an acknowledgment of paternity signed under this chapter may not be maintained after the issuance of an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment, including an order relating to support of the child.TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308(a), (c). Matthew argued in the plea to the jurisdiction that the Bill of Review Order and the Name Change Order are both "orders affecting the child" and were issued long before Jared intervened in the divorce proceeding.
Matthew relies on the 2011 amendment to section 160.308(c). The 2011 amendment, however, applies only to an acknowledgment that became effective on or after the effective date of the act, September 1, 2011. Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1221, sec. 11, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2356, 2359. The acknowledgment in this case was signed on August 2, 2009 and filed with the State sometime thereafter. Thus, the prior version of section 160.308 applies in this case. See Act of May 24, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 478, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1337, 1337 (amended 2011) (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.308). Under that version, a collateral attack on an acknowledgment of paternity is barred four years after the acknowledgment is filed with the bureau of vital statistics. Id. Our decision would be the same under either version of the statute because Jared did not intervene in the divorce proceeding within this time period. However, because none of the parties raised the matter in the trial court or assign error about it on appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, we decide the appeal as briefed by the parties and argued in the trial court.
Because we conclude the Bill of Review Order is an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment, we need not discuss the Name Change Order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
In the alternative to her argument regarding section 160.609, Mother argues the Bill of Review Order is not an order adjudicating paternity and cannot be used to bar an attack on the acknowledgment. She contends that Jared's intervention was timely because there was no order adjudicating paternity until the final divorce decree was rendered over a year after he intervened. This argument is based on the premise that an "order affecting the child" under section 160.308 must be an order adjudicating paternity. Mother cites no authority for this premise and we find no language in section 160.308 supporting this construction.
The plain language of section 160.308 bars proceedings to challenge and collateral attacks on an acknowledgement of paternity after the issuance of "an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment, including an order relating to support of the child." Id. § 160.308(a), (c). In title 5 of the family code, the word "order" means a final order unless "identified as a temporary order or the context clearly requires a different meaning. The term includes a decree and a judgment." Id. § 101.023. The Bill of Review Order was a final order disposing of all parties and issues in that proceeding. The court expressly denied all relief requested and not expressly granted in the order. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W. 3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001); Jasek v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 529-30 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (order in a SAPCR that purports to dispose of all issues and all parties is a final appealable order).
The word "affect" generally means "to produce an effect on; to influence in some way." Affect, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The Bill of Review Order produced an effect on and influenced C.T.H. by vacating the order terminating Matthew's parental rights. As a result, the parties were returned to their status under the acknowledgment of paternity, with Matthew being C.T.H.'s father. By undoing the termination of his father's parental rights, the Bill of Review Order was an order affecting C.T.H. under the terms of section 160.308.
Moreover, the language used in other sections of chapter 160 indicates that when the legislature intended to reference orders adjudicating parentage, it used the words "order adjudicating parentage" or similar words. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.608(e) ("order adjudicating the presumed father to be the father of the child"), .623(b) ("order adjudicating the child to be the child of the man admitting paternity"), .634 ("order adjudicating parentage"), .636(b) (same). The legislature did not use the words "order adjudicating parentage" in section 160.308(a) and (c), instead it used the words "an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment." Had the legislature intended to limit orders affecting the child to orders adjudicating parentage, it would have used those words. It did not. We conclude the language of section 160.308 means what it plainly says, challenges and collateral attacks on an acknowledgment of paternity may not be maintained after an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment is issued. We also conclude the Bill of Review Order is an order affecting the child identified in the acknowledgment and Jared may not maintain a collateral attack on the acknowledgment after the issuance of the Bill of Review Order.
We overrule Mother's first and second issues.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the Bill of Review Order was an order affecting C.T.H. and was issued before Jared sought to intervene in this case to challenge the acknowledgment of paternity. Therefore, Jared's attack was barred by section 160.308(c). We dismiss Grandmother's appeal for lack of standing and affirm the trial court's order granting the motion to reconsider Matthew's plea to the jurisdiction.
/Craig Stoddart/
CRAIG STODDART
JUSTICE 161398F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 302nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-14-07021.
Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Justices Lang-Miers and Fillmore participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the appeal by appellant Tina Chapman is DISMISSED for lack of standing and the trial court's October 28, 2016 Order on Respondent's Motion to Reconsider Plea to Jurisdiction to Jared Zoch's Intervention is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Matthew Hopkins recover his costs of this appeal from appellants Tina Chapman, Christina Chapman, and Jared Zoch. Judgment entered this 7th day of June, 2018.