MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Shirley O'Bryant appeals from the trial court's order denying her plea to the jurisdiction. Generally, a party may appeal only a final order or judgment. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992). An interlocutory appeal from a nonfinal order or judgment is permitted only when authorized by statute. Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). An interlocutory appeal from an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction is available by statute only to governmental agencies. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Thus, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores, 128 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.), the court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction to review the probate court's denial of the appellants' pleas to the jurisdiction. See also Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995) (explaining in probate context when orders are considered final and appealable). We, therefore, ordered Shirley O'Bryant to show cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In response, Shirley O'Bryant argues that we have "jurisdiction over this case because the order denying [her] plea to the jurisdiction effectively confers fiduciary obligations upon [her] without her being duly qualified, or willing, to assume the responsibility of defending a suit against the Estate of Fred O'Bryant." Thus, according to O'Bryant, the order denying her plea to the jurisdiction "is analogous to an order appointing [her] Executor of the Estate of Fred O'Bryant and should be appealable as a matter of law." O'Bryant cites no case supporting this argument and we can find none. Moreover, O'Bryant has failed to distinguish Mobil Oil's holding. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.