Opinion
September 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nathan Z. ("Nathan") is now an eight-year-old boy. This court and the commissioner of the department of children and families ("DCF") have been involved with him for most of his life. DCF has been appointed as his statutory parent. Unfortunately, because of the intransigence, stubbornness and single-mindedness ("intransigence") of some DCF employees, including but not limited to their refusal to accept court orders and recommendations of Nathan's hospital and other treatment providers, in the latter part of 2004 and throughout 2005, until recently, DCF failed to provide appropriate services and placement for Nathan, and the child incurred, inter alia, three hospitalizations, the latest of which was at Riverview Hospital for Children and Youth ("Riverview"). The good news for Nathan is that he currently is living in a professional foster home where, despite his issues that are described below, he is seemingly happy and doing well. The saga of the past year that led him to such home is set forth in summary below. The full history of Nathan's involvement with the court and DCF is also described in more detail below.
DCF's motto is "Making a difference for children, families and communities." DCF website. The court's experience is that the great majority of DCF supervisors and workers appearing before it are professional, dedicated, caring and they do make a positive difference in the lives of many children and families. No organization made up of individuals, however, is perfect and thus free from mistake. Unfortunately, even if an inflexible position is taken with the best of intention and belief, such a posture can be an example of the aphorism ". . . there is no mistake so great as that of being always right." Samuel Butler's Notebooks, page 250 (1951 ed.), quoted in The Columbia World of Quotations (1996 ed.).
Summary of events of the past year:
On September 14, 2004, Nathan, who was then seven, was admitted to the Institute of Living ("IOL"), because of "increased physical aggression and acting out behaviors . . ." (DCF quarterly case status report, filed December 27, 2004, page 2), which behavior was subsequently described by Riverview as ". . . aggressive behavior (hitting, kicking, biting, throwing items), hyperactive and impulsive behaviors, property destruction and threats to harm himself and others (Riverview letter report filed June 1, 2005, page 1) ("Riverview report").
On November 3, 2004, David T. Stone, Esq., Nathan's attorney, filed an emergency motion for an in-court review, because DCF was unwilling to implement the IOL discharge recommendations for Nathan described below. Attached to his motion was an order of the Hartford probate court (Killian, J.), entered after consideration of DCF's motion filed in such court that Nathan be voluntarily hospitalized at IOL, which order contained the following: "Accordingly, the Court will authorize [Nathan's] continued admission to the Institute of Living while the parties go back to the Superior Court in an effort to determine whether the discharge plan of DCF is adequate. The Court must also express its disappointment that since it rescheduled this matter from the 22nd of October to the 1st of November 2004, for the express purpose of encouraging the CPT which would explore the availability of a residential program, that DCF has been unable to advance the CPT process event to the point of exploring if a residential program may be available." Judge Killian found that Nathan was ready for discharge, that IOL recommended an appropriate residential program to enable Nathan to transition to an appropriate foster family, and that DCF's proposed discharge plan was inadequate: ". . . that proper transition programs for this young man, for whom previous [DCF] plans had proved disastrous, will take a minimum of three months . . .," that "[a]ll parties recognize that the [DCF] safe house itself would not have the expertise to facilitate the transition . . .," and that DCF believes that the trauma center [DCF proposed] is an appropriate facility "to assist transition to a therapeutic foster family . . ." Judge Killian "seriously question[ed] whether the DCF plan [was] adequate given the demonstrated needs of this young man and the failure of the [DCF] system to adequately meet them in the past several years . . . He stated that if the probate court could order the discharge plan, ". . . it would require a residential placement for Nathan as the best means of facilitating a healthy transition to a therapeutic foster family . . ." IOL recommended a transitional residential placement so that Nathan could be carefully and cautiously transitioned into a professional foster home (the most highly specialized type of foster home utilized by DCF).
Previously, on October 6, 2004, a hearing had been held in this court before Judge Mack. If there was no agreement in the probate court on a discharge plan for Nathan, Judge Mack invited DCF and Attorney Stone to file emergency motions for this court's consideration concerning the appropriate discharge plan for Nathan. DCF and Attorney Stone did so, and the motions were scheduled for hearing on November 10, 2004.
Both in the probate court and at the hearing before this court on November 10, 2004, DCF continued to reject the IOL discharge plan and to insist on the superiority of its plan. After hearing the parties both on November 10 and November 17, 2004, and reviewing the file, on November 17, 2004, this court ordered DCF to comply with and to implement the IOL discharge plan. Instead of doing that, on December 1, 2004, DCF filed a motion to reargue. It alleged that "[t]he Commissioner maintains that placement of Nathan in a residential facility is not in his best interest, and [the Commissioner] is filing an affidavit prepared by [one of its Area Research Group consultants, a licensed clinical social worker] relating to this claim." DCF thus had refused to accept Judge Killian's efforts to resolve the question of Nathan's transition and placement after discharge from IOL, and the clear position he set forth in his order that IOL's discharge recommendations were in Nathan's best interest. DCF likewise refused to accept and implement this court's November 17, 2004, ruling, which also directed it to find a transitional residential placement for Nathan as recommended by IOL.
On December 8, 2004, DCF pressed its motion to reargue. As described in more detail below, because of DCF's intransigent and uncompromising insistence that its discharge plan was better than IOL's discharge plan for Nathan, and that DCF knew of no appropriate residential facility suitable for Nathan, this court reluctantly gave DCF permission to implement its plan for Nathan. The court stated its intention to hold DCF responsible for any failure in its obligations to Nathan. For a number of reasons that are set out below, DCF's implementation of its discharge plan was a failure, and caused unnecessary but sadly predictable additional distress and suffering to Nathan.
2000-2004 Chronology of Nathan in the care and custody of DCF:
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes ("CGS") 17a-101g, on March 28, 2000, DCF took Nathan into its care and custody (an action referred to as a "ninety-six hour hold"). On March 30, 2000, DCF filed a petition alleging that Nathan was neglected because he had been denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally; he was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to well-being; or, because he had been abused and had a physical injury or injuries inflicted other than by accidental means, or that he had injuries that were at variance with their reported history. Also, on March 30, 2000, DCF sought an ex parte order of temporary custody, which order was issued by the court. On August 2, 2000, Nathan, who was then three years, four months old, was adjudicated as neglected and committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF for an initial period not to exceed twelve months.
On February 9, 2001, DCF filed a motion for review of its permanency plan for Nathan. The permanency plan goal was termination of parental rights and adoption. DCF also sought a finding that continuing efforts to reunify Nathan with either of his parents were not appropriate. On March 28, 2001, the court approved the permanency plan but denied DCF's request for a "no further efforts" finding.
On June 1, 2001, DCF filed another motion for approval of its permanency plan and for extension of commitment. For this review DCF sought a finding, and the court found, that continuing efforts to reunify Nathan with the mother were appropriate. On June 13, 2001, the court approved the permanency plan and extended Nathan's commitment to DCF.
On June 25, 2002, DCF filed its annual motion to review its permanency plan and to maintain the commitment. For this review DCF sought a finding that continuing efforts to reunify with the mother and the father were not appropriate. On July 31, 2002, the court maintained the commitment, approved the permanency plan goal of termination of parental rights and adoption, and found that DCF was not required to make further efforts to reunify the father with Nathan. On November 14, 2002, the court terminated the mother's visitation and found that reasonable efforts by DCF toward reunification of the mother and Nathan were no longer appropriate.
On November 27, 2002, DCF filed a petition for the termination of the parental rights of the mother and the father. On December 4, 2002, DCF filed another motion to review its permanency plan and to maintain the commitment. The permanency plan goal continued to be termination of parental rights and adoption. On March 26, 2003, the court approved the plan and maintained the commitment.
On June 24, 2003, the mother's parental rights were terminated. On July 28, 2003, the father's parental rights were terminated. On July 28, 2003, DCF became Nathan's statutory parent.
On April 7, 2004, the annual review of DCF's permanency plan took place. The plan continued to be adoption. The court approved the plan.
The history of Nathan's many foster home placements during this period is set forth below.
Nathan's September 14, 2004 hospitalization: October 6, 2004 hearing before Judge Mack; November 2004 motions for immediate court review and related proceedings:As set forth above, on September 14, 2004, Nathan was hospitalized at IOL. On October 6, 2004, the parties appeared before Judge Mack. Present were two assistant attorneys general, the DCF social work supervisor for Nathan's case, and Attorney Stone. Transcript of October 6, 2004, hearing. One of the assistant attorneys general stated that after Nathan's discharge from IOL, IOL had recommended a residential placement for him, but DCF did not believe it was in his best interest. Id., pages 1-2. Nathan's attorney thereafter emphasized that IOL was making "a very strong residential recommendation," which DCF was minimizing in its report to the court. Id., page 3. Attorney Stone raised the following issue: ". . . has [DCF] decided that they're no longer going to listen to the therapists for children and . . . [to the] people that are the treatment providers? . . . I can understand why [IOL is] saying that he needs a residential treatment facility, and I don't understand why the department doesn't get it." Id., page 5. Attorney Stone understood that the residential placement was to enable Nathan to be transitioned to a foster or group home. Id., page 20. However, IOL and DCF shared the same goal: to provide Nathan with the services that would enable him (if possible) to be ready for adoption. Id., page 23.
The DCF supervisor set forth the reasons she disagreed with the IOL recommendation for residential placement. Id., pages 12-13. She said that all DCF personnel agreed that Nathan should be in a foster home instead of a residential treatment facility. Id. DCF's alternative was ". . . therapeutic foster care, modeled with intensive outpatient treatment at a trauma resolution center." Id., page 13. The social work supervisor stated that the last foster mother prior to Nathan's hospitalization at IOL ("the second CRI foster home") thought that Nathan's behaviors were more disturbing than those Nathan's psychiatrist had diagnosed. Id., page 15. "She [the foster mother] was saying she was focused on him having a bipolar disorder; the psychiatrist was saying I don't see that." Id. "She [the foster mother] wanted the psychiatrist to change the medication; [the foster mother] didn't feel the medication was working." Id. The social work supervisor concluded: "So I'm having a hard time capturing what was going on in the foster home . . . But it was more foster mother seeing more into this than his behaviors warranted." Id., page 16. This may be another example of DCF ignoring, resisting or dismissing information from sources upon which it would usually rely. Evidently, this contact occurred shortly before Nathan was hospitalized at IOL.
The DCF supervisor asserted that IOL did not understand that residential treatment facilities are generally "more behaviorally oriented than treatment oriented . . . So I think they have a misconception of what treatment centers really offer for our kids." Id., page 18. DCF's plan was that Nathan would be discharged from IOL to a therapeutic foster care setting. However, on October 6, 2004, DCF had not identified a specific therapeutic foster home for Nathan.
Between October 6, 2004, and November 10, 2004, Probate Judge Killian heard testimony in connection with DCF's motion for a voluntary commitment of Nathan to IOL. Also, Judge Killian tried to facilitate an agreement between DCF, IOL and Attorney Stone concerning Nathan's transition after his discharge from IOL.
On November 1, 2004, DCF filed a motion in this court for an immediate in-court review of the discharge plan for Nathan. On November 3, 2004, Attorney Stone also filed a motion for an immediate in-court review of the DCF discharge plan for Nathan.
Attached to Nathan's motion was a November 2, 2004, Hartford Probate Court decree wherein Probate Judge Killian found by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Nathan suffers from a mental disorder, (2) Nathan was in need of hospitalization at Riverview for treatment, (3) such treatment was available, and that (4) hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative. Judge Killian ordered and decreed, inter alia, the following: "1. Nathan . . . has probably achieved the maximum benefit . . . and is ready for discharge providing that there is an appropriate discharge plan in place . . . (2) The hospital has recommended a residential program in which he would have all the necessary supports to assist him in transitioning to a therapeutic foster family. It is the opinion of the hospital that proper transition programs for this young man, for whom previous plans have proved disastrous, will take a minimum of three months . . . (5) The Court seriously questions whether the DCF plan is adequate given the demonstrated needs of this young man and the failure of the system to adequately meet them in the past several years . . . If this Court could order the discharge plan, it would require a residential placement . . . as the best means of facilitating a healthy transition to a therapeutic foster family . . ." The probate court hearing had commenced on October 12, 2004, and continued on two additional days.
Also attached to Nathan's motion was a letter dated October 12, 2004, from an IOL supervising psychiatrist and an IOL treatment manager. It confirmed "the recommendation of the clinical team that Nathan . . . not be returned to either the therapeutic or traditional foster care system." It set forth a summary of Nathan's ". . . significant trauma history: severe physical abuse, neglect, witness to domestic violence, numerous moves within the foster care systems (i.e., `failed placements'), numerous school placements, and inconsistencies in treatment providers." It continued: "Nathan clearly needs the opportunity for a longer-term placement with the clinical support necessary for the trauma-based therapy he must do. Due to his age, developmental delays, and cognitive limitations, this therapy work is likely, at times, to lead to behavioral outbursts which have historically disrupted his foster care placements. Continued removal from foster homes (many of which seem to have been presented as potential adoptive homes) will have a continued detrimental effect on his already fragile ego, as well as his self-esteem, behavior, mood regulation, and ability to form appropriate and lasting attachments to care-givers and peers . . . "Nathan's ability to function well within the structure, supervision, and clinical support while a patient at the Institute of Living is further evidence that he needs more than a therapeutic foster home can provide. Clearly, placement in a residential treatment center is in Nathan's best interest as a means of gaining long-term mental health."
The third attachment to Nathan's motion was an October 19, 2004, letter from Nathan's clinician prior to his IOL hospitalization. She wrote, in part, that "Nathan made significant gains in his most recent foster placement. He was placed with an exceptional foster family [the second CRI therapeutic foster family] that was able to provide a structured yet very warm and nurturing environment in which limits and consequences were consistent and clear. Despite the unusually high level of expertise, caring and commitment of his family to Nathan, his needs were such that the family began to approach `burn-out.' I think that it is critical to keep this in mind when planning Nathan's placement following his discharge from IOL . . . To help insure that Nathan is ready to enter an adoptive family successfully, I would strongly urge [IOL] that he enter residential treatment upon discharge from your facility."
On November 10, 2004, the court heard argument on the motions. Attorney Stone stated that residential placement for Nathan was not necessarily what he wanted for Nathan, but Nathan's clinician, psychiatrist, prior psychologist and the probate court after three days of hearing believed that an approximately three-month transitional residential placement was in his best interest. Transcript of November 10, 2004, page 6. Attorney Stone said that he filed the motion because, despite the consensus that Nathan needed transitional residential treatment, DCF was determined to place Nathan in a therapeutic foster home. Id. Attorney Stone stated: ". . . I think there's some things that . . . everybody in this room agrees on: that Nathan has specialized needs[;] that he needed to be hospitalized when he was; that his behaviors and everything had escalated; that . . . another failed foster placement would have an impact on him and that nobody . . . wants to see a failed placement." Id.
IOL recommended that Nathan be placed at the Children's Center in Hamden or similar residential facility for a sub-acute level of care. Id., pages 11-12. DCF did not believe that Nathan needed that level of care. Id., page 12. Instead of a transitional residential placement after he was discharged from IOL, DCF wanted Nathan immediately in a therapeutic foster care and family setting. Id., page 13. The DCF social work supervisor said that ". . . the department is really steadfast on trying to make a therapeutic foster care setting work for Nathan so we can move him on to an adoptive setting." Id. The DCF decision that IOL's recommendation should not be implemented was made by its Area Resource Group ("ARG"). Id., pages 13-14. "They really felt that his behaviors didn't warrant residential treatment and that what he really needs is some trauma work. And one of the ARG folks gave us the name of a place in South Windsor that has just established a child trauma program. And we felt that our plan would be to place him in a therapeutic setting through the DARE Foster Family Services with his participation in intensive trauma work at this South Windsor program, would be most beneficial for him in order for him to move on to an adoptive home." Id., page 14. The November 10, 2004, hearing was the DCF social work supervisor's last appearance before the court concerning this matter.
The child's attorney questioned how DCF could ignore and oppose the recommendations of Nathan's therapists, psychiatrists and IOL: "The [DCF] plan has been . . . that the department's going to do their plan regardless of what the therapists . . . say." Id., page 17. Because of DCF's opposition to residential placement, Nathan lost the opportunity, inter alia, to be discharged from IOL and to be placed at the Children's Home of Cromwell which had an opening for him. Id. In addition, it was clear that DCF intended to ignore or resist both of IOL's discharge recommendations: (1) that Nathan go to a transitional residential facility for approximately three months, and (2) that Nathan not be placed again in either a traditional or therapeutic foster home. That meant that Nathan should have been placed in a professional foster home, the most highly skilled level of foster home utilized by DCF, or in a small residential group home.
The court continued the matter to November 17, 2004, so it could become more familiar with the file and the issues. On November 17, 2004, the court again heard that IOL strongly recommended that after his discharge from IOL. Nathan be placed in an appropriate residential facility for approximately three months, so that he did not lose the benefit of his progress at IOL and so that he would have a better opportunity successfully to transition into a specialized professional foster care placement. DCF continued strenuously to object to the IOL recommendation. Its plan continued to be that Nathan would be placed in a DARE therapeutic foster home. As a reason for its position, DCF explained that Nathan (who was then a seven year old with serious mental health issues) "didn't want to go to the hospital, which he is understanding as the residential treatment facility." Transcript of November 17, 2004, hearing, page 2. The assistant attorney general stated that DCF was "trying to recruit a therapeutic home to address Nathan's needs. But they did not give us a handle on how that might be able to be accomplished." Id., page 3. Because DCF admitted that it had not identified an appropriate foster home for Nathan by the November 17, 2004, hearing, it is difficult to understand why DCF was so resistant to a transitional residential placement until an appropriate foster or group home was identified, and Nathan could be properly integrated into such home.
IOL had determined that Nathan's ability to function relatively well within the structured setting at IOL was a reason in favor of transitional residential placement into a professional foster or group home instead of placement in the less structured environment of a therapeutic foster home. IOL believed that an approximately three-month residential placement was necessary to enable Nathan to transition into a professional foster home or small group home. In the fall of 2004, DCF either did not understand or refused to accept Nathan's need, if his chances of success were to be maximized, for this approach.
Prior to Nathan's placement at IOL, he had been living with "an exceptional foster family," the second CRI foster family. However, "his needs were such that the family began to approach . . . burnout . . ." Id., page 4. The substance and meaning of this information seemingly was ignored by the DCF ARG and other DCF employees. See below. As set forth above, Nathan's clinician wrote to IOL: "To help insure that Nathan is ready to enter an adoptive family successfully, I would strongly urge that he would enter residential treatment upon discharge . . ." Id., pages 4-5.
DCF also offered a new, untried trauma center alternative in South Windsor to help Nathan transition into the as yet unidentified therapeutic foster home that it was recommending: ". . . there's a trauma center that has opened in South Windsor to help children address trauma issues — a pediatric trauma center. It's an outpatient . . . facility. So with that in mind . . . we're also looking to see if we can find a place for him that would be nearby to that, so that they could be more especially geared towards addressing the trauma issues . . ."
"I think the department is also mindful of the burnout situations; so that in talking about a therapeutic home, they are, I think, mindful of the probable need for some respite care in the meantime, by my recollection, so there isn't burnout . . ." "And . . . that's the view of the people within the department with the expertise regarding treatment of children such as Nathan; that it's their feeling that given his age, that trying to put him into a residential facility to do some of this work just won't work. That it's going to be delaying things. It's not going to be beneficial in the way that the IOL believes it would be." CT Page 13069 Id., pages 5-6.
The court noted that the dispute between DCF and the professionals involved with Nathan was over the approximately three-month transitional residential placement. Id., page 7. The court ordered that DCF comply with the discharge and transition recommendations made by Institute of Living: "IOL knows Nathan's history and clearly believes that [the discharge and transition recommendations including but not limited to the transitional residential placement are] in Nathan's best interest in order to insure a successful transition into a therapeutic foster home." Id. (The court now understands that IOL was recommending ultimate placement in a professional foster home or group home, not a transitional home.) The court scheduled the matter for another hearing on December 8, 2004, to see what possible residential placements for Nathan were identified in the interim by DCF. Id.
On December 8, 2004, the court again heard the parties, and learned that DCF (as it earlier had not responded to a similar probate court request) had not identified any residential placement possibilities for Nathan. Instead, on December 1, 2004, DCF filed a motion for rehearing of the motions and reconsideration of the court's decision. On December 8, the licensed clinical social worker who is and was an ARG consultant for DCF, was present in court for the first time. On December 1, 2004, with the filing of its motion for rehearing, DCF also filed her affidavit. In that affidavit, the ARG consultant averred that "Nathan had a history of trauma . . . he has received psychiatric care and has been diagnosed with PTSD, ADHD, and ODD . . ." Social Worker Affidavit, page 1. She averred that on September 14, 2004, Nathan was hospitalized at IOL after he "became angry, ran into the road and expressed a desire for a car to hit him." Id.
The ARG consultant averred and clearly understood that Nathan's primary therapists "feel strongly that Nathan needs to be placed in a residential treatment facility so that when an appropriate therapeutic [sic] foster family is identified the transition process of joining the family can be done very gradually and with close monitoring." Id., page 2. She and other DCF employees either ignored or did not notice that the IOL professionals were recommending a professional foster home or group home for Nathan, and not another therapeutic foster home.
Although the ARG consultant had met Nathan only once and had not treated Nathan in any therapeutic setting, she had "read every report that has been made on him since 2000 . . ." (See summary below of those reports.) She averred that "[a]t last report, Nathan is not demonstrating any of the classic behaviors that would indicate a need for confinement in a residential setting nor is he demonstrating any acute symptoms of emotional or mental disorder." Id.
Her "proposal" on behalf of DCF for Nathan included "placement in a therapeutic foster home, providing extensive wrap around services for Nathan and his foster parents and providing specialized trauma treatment by a licensed child psychologist trained in childhood trauma treatment techniques . . ." (Except for a very short placement in the ARG approved therapeutic foster home, none of this took place — see discussion below.)
"DCF is proposing that, pending acceptance into a therapeutic foster home, Nathan be discharged from The Institute of Living and transferred to the NAFI SAFE Home in Windham. This is a small home-like facility that is specifically designed to care for younger children who have been removed from their homes due to neglect. There are trained therapists and childcare workers that have extensive experience facilitating the integration of foster children into new families . . ."
"The placement specialist at [DARE] has already interviewed Nathan and a potential therapeutic foster family has been identified. A Trauma Treatment Specialist for children has been contacted and agreed to see Nathan. The NAFI Safe Home in Windham has an opening and will accept Nathan. This constellation of supportive care and services would seem to provide all of the elements that both DCF and The Institute of Living Staff feel would serve Nathan's best interests." Id., pages 2-3.
At the December 8 hearing, the ARG consultant stated that she was not sure that IOL knew that DCF had "identified and have ready a pediatric trauma treatment specialist that has agreed to treat him . . ." Transcript of December 8, 2004, hearing, page 4. She described the "SAFE home" as having "master's level clinicians that are used to helping transition children into foster care." Id., page 5. She described the SAFE home as "a place where he could gradually transition to a foster family . . . the trauma specialist . . . [as a] safe island while he's working through the things; and then he'll get to have a family." Id.
She described the DCF area resource group as "licensed social work clinicians that are clinical consultants. We've been around a long time and we work with the social workers and with the other clinicians to help them, to get them clear and to educate them and to help make decisions on a clinical basis that they may not have the experience to make." Id., page 6. She is employed by DCF. Id.
She estimated that it would be a "slow process" to integrate Nathan into a new foster home, and that Nathan would be in the NAFI SAFE home for one or two months. Id., page 7. "And in the same time he will also be doing work with the private therapist." Id. She assured the court that she would be personally involved in Nathan's transition process. She again said that "Nathan is going to see a trauma treatment specialist at the Trauma Stress Institute in South Windsor." Id., page 9. She explained: "Trauma treatment specialists work with strategies and techniques that help children learn how to recognize what they are feeling and they learn what to do when those feelings are happening. They learn to give words to feelings instead of behaviors. And they talk to them and give them language for their losses. They help them integrate the kinds of things that have happened to them so they don't forget them, but it becomes a part of the past and it doesn't keep popping up in ways they can't control or predict." Id., page 10. Earlier, the ARG consultant had explained: "The other thing that hadn't occurred previously is this intensive trauma work that DCF is trying to get going on. And that it's really the department's belief that with that intensive outpatient trauma treatment that that would go a long way to quieting down some of this arousal — I mean, PTSD's floating of anxiety. And it would help him to really contain that and direct it in a way that would make him less needy, for lack of a better way to say it." Id., page 3.
The court asked her: "Now, is it your professional opinion, independent of DCF policy, initiatives or priorities, that what you are proposing is in Nathan's best interest and provides Nathan with the best chance for success at this time?" Id. She responded: "Yes, it is." Id. The assistant attorney general added: ". . . we're coming back here because of the strong beliefs that there's clinical placements that are more in keeping with this little guy's needs." Id., page 11.
The court also asked ". . . whether the proposal of DCF is a proposal that would provide the kind of medical, psychological, psychiatric, and other support and help that Nathan would be likely to get in a residential placement. Will it?" Id., page 12. The ARG consultant responded: "Yes. There are very well defined requirements that we have that address a full scale look at all his medical needs; his educational needs; his psychiatric, his psychological needs; his medication needs. I meet with another team around each child in the SAFE home once a week; visit each home every other week or once a week as necessary, depending on what's happening with each child, and make sure that all of the clinicians are looking at all of the parts and that all of those things that that child will need will get tended to. And we will provide them and we will pay for them and we will make sure that they happen." Id., pages 12-13. She added: "Well, the treating clinicians there that take care of the needs for the children . . . are both master-level clinicians and they're child specialists. And since there are only eight children, they get pretty close attention from their clinicians there . . ." Id., page 13.
The attorney for the child protested DCF's intransigent noncompliance with the court's November 17, 2004 order. He stated that DCF had made itself "judge and jury" about what was going to be put in place for Nathan, and that it refused to listen to IOL, the probate court or this court: "They're not only making the decision on what they want to happen for Nathan, but then they're the ones who actually are failing to put in place the things that would actually have to happen in order for the plan that they have opposed to actually occur . . ." Id., page 27.
He continued: "So . . . frankly how do you overcome that? There's no way for the therapist at IOL to get a placement for Nathan, except for going through a CPT packet and getting the Department of Children and Families to do it. And if they're not going to do it, I'm not sure what the remedy is." Id.
The court commented: "And the irony and the sadness . . . is that if DCF is wrong and if this is for policy or DCF priority reasons and not really for Nathan as an individual . . . Nathan will end up in a much longer, much more costly residential placement than that recommended by [IOL] . . ." Id., page 28. That additional cost will be borne by the taxpayers of Connecticut. The court also noted "that DCF has been resistant throughout." Id. However, the court was unwilling to "make Nathan a pawn . . . while the residential option was explored perhaps not with great fervor . . ." by DCF. Id. The court stated that it would monitor the case "to make sure that Nathan gets the best chance that he can with what DCF is willing to do." Id. Given DCF's intransigence against the transitional residential placement recommended by IOL, the court put DCF on notice that if its discharge plan for Nathan failed, the court would report both to the federal court monitor and the child advocate DCF's intransigence and consequent harm to Nathan. The court will thus forward a copy of this memorandum of decision to each of them. The court will also forward a copy to Commissioner Dunbar, in whose name DCF's actions were taken.
In summary: Upon the representations of the ARG consultant as approved by DCF supervisors and/or other DCF employees, the court granted the DCF motion to reargue and upon re-argument allowed DCF to implement the detailed program it had proposed. This resulted from this court's assessment that DCF had overwhelmingly demonstrated that it was unwilling to obey this court's order and that Nathan would be at a greatly increased risk of failure and harm if DCF were forced to proceed with a transitional residential placement as the court had ordered and as had been recommended by everyone other than DCF, because DCF would have a vested interest in the failure of that alternative.
The failure of DCF's discharge plan and its transition of Nathan to the DCF approved foster home:
As set forth below, the approach DCF insisted upon was not successful. DCF, inter alia, failed (1) to execute the elements of its proposed and promised discharge plan for Nathan; (2) to understand and accept the severity of Nathan's problems and his need for immediate treatment, especially of his PTSD issues; (3) to find itself or have found by one of its contractors an appropriate professional, instead of therapeutic, foster home; (4) to locate an experienced foster family with two fully available parents; (4) to have PTSD trauma treatment implemented for Nathan immediately upon his discharge from IOL; and (5) to provide other necessary services for Nathan. It is unclear whether DCF's options for Nathan were limited by a rumored DCF policy against residential placement (if true, likely implemented during 2004) or because of a sincere belief against residential placement for children of Nathan's age as stated to the court, or a combination of these and other factors. In any event, DCF's ineffectual, failed execution of its discharge plan of therapeutic foster home placement with additional community-based services for Nathan caused him unnecessary pain and suffering. Unfortunately for Nathan, because of DCF's inexplicable choice of an inexperienced, essentially one parent new foster home for him, including a seven-month-old baby, after DCF had months to find an appropriate foster home, Nathan again experienced failure in another foster home, and three additional hospitalizations, the most recent at Riverview. His hospitalization at Riverview, however, has led to his current professional foster home placement.
Despite everything that the ARG consultant said that DCF was going to do for Nathan to transition him into a therapeutic foster home selected and approved by her, the result was that Nathan stayed there four days, from February 23 through February 27, 2005, and then he was hospitalized for a month at Natchaug Hospital. On March 25, 2005, he was returned to such foster home. One day later, on March 26, 2005, he had to be transferred to another DARE foster home. He stayed there for nine days, when he was transferred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center ("CCMC"). Three days later, on April 7, 2005, he was admitted to Riverview, where he remained through August 2005.
On April 6, 2005, the court was informed about DCF's failure to transition Nathan successfully to an appropriate therapeutic foster home. On May 18, 2005, the court was informed of Nathan's hospitalization at Riverview and the identification of a possible professional foster home. The court was informed that if the professional foster home did not work out for Nathan, Riverview would assess if residential placement was appropriate for him.
On June 1, 2005, the court was told that DCF would "collaborate" with Riverview's (e.g., DCF's) therapist and psychiatrist on Nathan's transition to the professional foster home that had been identified as suitable for him. DCF Report filed June 1, 2005, page 8. DCF employees at Riverview recommended Nathan's direct transition from Riverview into a professional foster home, the highest level foster home available to DCF. Thereafter, Riverview staff performed the transition work while Nathan remained hospitalized there. The transition became a slow, careful process that took several weeks more than originally anticipated. Hearing of July 6, 2005. Nathan had many issues that had to be treated and resolved before he could successfully be placed in the professional foster home. The experienced professional foster family met at Riverview for family integration sessions with Nathan.
The foregoing process, of course, is that envisioned by IOL in its October 2004, discharge recommendations: (1) an extremely carefully monitored residential facility transition, and (2) an experienced professional foster home with two available parents, instead of a therapeutic or traditional foster home as the goal for Nathan.
Given Nathan's difficult and sad history (set forth below) before he was placed in the inexperienced new therapeutic foster home, the ARG consultant and other involved DCF employees should have understood that he was an inappropriate candidate for placement in most if not all therapeutic or traditional foster homes. IOL and Nathan's clinician clearly said that to DCF. It remains to be seen whether Nathan's eventual placement in the latest foster home selected by DCF, the highest level "professional" foster home, will be successful on a long-term basis, especially since that home contains another (but older) child.
Reports in court file claimed to be read by the ARG consultant, and Nathan's DCF history:
On March 30, 2000, for the first time, Nathan was placed in foster care. In a July 28, 2000, case status report to the court, on page 2 DCF described Nathan as ". . . a very active little boy [who] needs constant supervision . . . Nathan appears to be jealous of his brother when his mother was visiting . . . Nathan will in turn behave negatively to gain his mother's attention . . ."
Approximately fifteen months later, in the October 30, 2001, DCF ongoing individual treatment plan, page 6, DCF stated that Nathan had been removed from one foster home placement, because the foster mother did not renew her license after approximately seventeen years. Nathan then was placed in another foster home with a family who spoke only Spanish (while Nathan understood, within his limitations, only English). He then went to his third foster home. The plan also noted that Nathan was ". . . extremely active and needs to be watched constantly . . . Nathan tends to be quite aggressive in his play with others, which includes pushing, poking, hitting and choking." Id., page 5.
On May 10, 2002, DCF filed its child in placement treatment plan. It reported that Nathan was confused and that he continued to act out, including ". . . aggressive behavior, hearing and seeing things in his mind and out of control behavior." (Page 1). Family therapy was stopped because ". . . Nathan was not able to contain himself during sessions."
On November 13, 2002, DCF reported that Nathan then resided in a CRI " professional [foster] home" (first CRI home) (emphasis supplied). Nathan had stabilized to the point where he could stop therapy sessions. He was attending school and doing well academically and socially. The foster family reported that ". . . Nathan had learned to handle his anger, verbalize what is bothering him and [that he] behaves like a normal five-year old boy." November 13, 2002, case status report, page 4.
In a December 2, 2002, DCF study (page 9), the home was described as a "therapeutic foster home," instead of a "professional home." It was noted that while at the first CRI home, ". . . Nathan has made great progress in his behaviors, development and speech. The foster parents work with him daily, trying to develop creative and sensitive ways to deal with his behaviors . . ." Id., page 11. Than April 29, 2003, DCF addendum to the study ("Addendum"), the home was described as a "professional foster home." Addendum, page 29.
In the second evaluation performed on January 22, 2003, by a consulting psychologist, she wrote: "Nathan is a five year old . . . He is presently in his fourth foster placement since removal in March 2000. DCF characterizes him as having a difficult time adjusting to foster care. He was removed from his first placement shortly after the last evaluation [on July 3, 2001]. His next placement was brief as, reportedly, the foster parents only spoke Spanish. His next placement lasted six months. His foster mother requested his removal because of his poorly regulated and aggressive behavior. Since that time he has been placed at [CRI]. DCF characterizes him as bonded to his foster family and happy there." February 16, 2003, Psychological Evaluation Report, page 6 (emphasis supplied).
Additionally, she reported: ". . . The child's speech continues to be poorly articulated, and this was accompanied by stutter-like repetition. Unlike most stuttering, however, the child repeated only phrases, not sounds or words . . . Nathan exhibited a high rate of activity. Much of this was spastic in character, and he was quite wiggly and fidgety. He was very insistent and tested limits from the outset. Much of his action seemed in an effort to elicit a reaction, as he experimented with screaming, then stomping . . ." Id., page 7.
Part of the psychologist's conclusions were as follows: ". . . Clinically, however, it is clear that the child continues to be markedly distractible and hyperactive, and that he is highly prone to test authority, if not consistently oppose it. Diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type, and Oppositional Defiant Disorder were strongly supported . . . Much more than at [the] previous evaluation, Nathan showed compelling symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. His nightmares, generalized agitation, violent play, disassociation, and poor focus all seem consistent with such a diagnosis . . . Even in consideration of his age, his grasp of reality seems quite poor, and often fluid. As previously observed, the child's speech is disturbed, and he shows symptoms consistent with Phonological Disorder. Testing, and clinical observation, readily support a Developmental Coordination Disorder, as well." Id., page 12.
The psychologist also concluded: "As already noted, the child's psychological state has appreciably worsened since [the] last evaluation. In his present condition, he requires, and will likely continue to require, intense and skilled care in all venues, including the home . . . Nathan most certainly needs stability, and it seems likely that the multiple translocations through foster homes have been to his detriment. Identification of a long-term, special needs foster placement is critical to his future adjustment, and such a placement should be effected as soon as possible. Ideally given the boy's behavior and needs, he should be the only child in that placement. Institutional care is strongly discouraged, as the boy has a high probability of becoming dependent upon such care." (Emphasis supplied.)
In July 2003, the therapeutic or professional foster parents in the first CRI home had a biological child. Unfortunately, the development caused an escalation of Nathan's problematic behaviors. By September 29, 2003, Nathan's behaviors had escalated to the point where the foster parents were questioning whether they could continue to care for him. September 29, 2003, 30-day case status report, page 2.
On November 7, 2003, Nathan was moved to another CRI foster home (the second CRI foster home). This home was described as a therapeutic foster home. December 12, 2003, quarterly case status report, page 2. In the February 10, 2004, quarterly case status report, page 2, Nathan's continuing display of behavioral issues was noted. In the March 30, 2004, study, Nathan's progress in this foster home was noted.
In the July 7, 2004, quarterly case status report, Nathan continued to reside in the second CRI foster home. It was reported that ". . . Nathan had a difficult period for five days while his foster family had a respite child in the home. The child was one year older than Nathan and Nathan was unable to cope with the other child in his space. Nathan has been on respite to this child's home, and is able to get along with him and other family members while he is in the other child's home . . . [The foster parents report that] Nathan does well with children much younger than himself or with children at least five years older." It was also reported at page 4 that Yale Child Study Center advised that " Nathan requires the stability of an intact home with both foster parents and siblings to experience the sense of participation in the family process and develop a healthy relationship with foster siblings, who can act as positive role models in shaping his behavior . . ." (emphasis supplied).
In the October 5, 2004, DCF quarterly status report, the following was reported: "following an incident of Nathan becoming upset, hitting his foster mother, running out into the road in front of oncoming traffic and threatening to harm himself, police were contacted, and Nathan was transported to CCMC for evaluation. Nathan was assessed to be in need of further hospitalization due to his suicidal ideation, and he was admitted to the Institute of Living under a Physician's Emergency Certificate on 9/14/04, where he currently remains."
2005 chronology of DCF's care and custody of Nathan and DCF reports to the court:
On January 5, 2005, DCF reported to this court that Nathan "had a good transition" and that there were many services and supports in place for him. Transcript of January 5, 2005 pages 1-3. On January 26, 2005, DCF again reported that Nathan was doing well in the transition process. The ARG consultant reported that the identified foster mother was "an early education major; very calm, placid, patient person. She's on board for the — kind of trauma institute coaching, bonding, anticipating behavior. She's going to work with Nathan on that. So I don't want to push this too quickly; I want to see how it goes." Transcript of January 26, 2005, page 3. However, DCF did not take advantage of the slow transition process to start Nathan in the PTSD trauma treatment program it believed to be extremely important for him.
On April 6, 2005, the court conducted the annual review of the DCF permanency plan for Nathan, which continued to be adoption. On that day the court learned for the first time that Nathan had been hospitalized at the Natchaug Hospital and then at CCMC. Attorney Stone had visited Nathan and he opined that he was much worse than he had been at his discharge from IOL. Attorney Stone stated that "it's been very hard on all of the service providers here to see Nathan have these two recent hospitalizations and to see how poorly he's been doing." Transcript of April 6, 2005, page 2. The assistant attorney general representing DCF stated: "The placement in the DARE home did not work and consequently he's been hospitalized again." Id., page 3.
The DCF treatment worker stated: "Nathan was discharged from the Natchaug Hospital and returned to his previous DARE home. He only lasted there two days and he was placed in a respite home where he disrupted out of due to his behaviors of just threatening others, threatening himself, being harmful and unsafe behaviors . . ." Id.
On Monday, April 4, 2005, Nathan had been transferred from Natchaug to CCMC ". . . for an evaluation and he was admitted to the . . . ER, which is where he remains now [two days later]. They have not done a full evaluation. They are looking to have him hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital and IOL does not have any beds available for him at this time." Id. (On April 7, 2005, one day after this hearing, Nathan was transferred to Riverview where he remained through August 2005.)
The ARG consultant stated: "It's a sad morning for us all. I know that I've looked back and thought I would still have tried this, because I think it was important to give him that chance and to do it differently. And this . . . result I think has led to revealing that there is something that is not being addressed with Nathan; something clinical, I believe. Because you don't get this amount of chaos and discontrol with just mood disorder and PTSD . . ."
"And I believe that there is an underlying clinical disorder; and that rather than go to residential where you just get treated for whatever it says on the paper, that if he can go to Riverview — I've talked to the director of Riverview and the intake person and — going over the clinical picture — and I think that a stay there to get stabilized, to get a med wash, to see what — who this boy is without meds; what are we really looking at; is there an underlying psychotic disorder that needs treating. This has not really been addressed . . ."
"He would have his educational and cognitive testing. He may have something, you know, that we don't know about — PDD, something on the autism spectrum. But there's something here that's really serious that needs assessment. And I think that Riverview does . . . the best job . . ."
"But right now there's something that's going untreated." Id., pages 4-5.
On April 6, 2005, the ARG consultant did not mention to the court that Nathan had not received any treatment for the previously identified PTSD.
It also seems that the ARG consultant believed that DCF, after five years of responsibility for Nathan, had not identified and did not understand all of Nathan's mental health issues. She also failed to acknowledge what IOL and Nathan's clinician had stated in October 2004: after his discharge from IOL, Nathan needed a slow residential transition to a professional foster home.
On May 18 and June 1, 2005, the court conducted additional in-court reviews. Nathan remained at Riverview. By June 1, a professional foster home had been identified for Nathan. It was reported by a DCF supervisor that the home has "over ten years experience with children." Transcript of June 1, 2005, page 2. "They have currently in their care a child that has had 16 placements throughout his course of involvement with our agency and is doing extremely well . . ." (How and why any child in DCF care could have 16 placements is not before the court.)
"This is a very seasoned professional foster home . . ." Id.
As of June 1, Nathan was being slowly introduced by Riverview to the professional foster family: "They're trying to do this transition very slowly." Id.
Comparison of Riverview and IOL recommendations for Nathan:
On June 1, 2005, DCF filed the Riverview report concerning Nathan. Riverview noted the inadequacy (at least based on Nathan's level of need) of the inexperienced, first time, essentially single parent foster home approved by ARG. Riverview also concurred with IOL's recommendation of a professional foster home: "It is the recommendation of Riverview that Nathan be discharged to a professional foster home. A potential foster family has been identified through [a program] . . . The potential foster family differs from previously attempted foster families and Nathan's functioning has also improved. The previous foster family was a new foster family with a seven month old child. The foster father was rarely available due to his career as a Merchant Marine. The current foster family is very experienced . . . The foster father is a very involved parent . . ." Riverview report, page 2 (emphasis supplied).
Previous court proceedings involving DCF:
DCF's actions and inaction have been the subject of other cases. Unfortunately, DCF is no stranger to review by judges. Juan F. v. Rowland, Civil No. H-89-859, United States District Court, District of Connecticut (Nevas, J., February 10, 2004) (". . . the October 7, 2003, Order . . . was an agreed-upon solution that avoided court-ordered receivership for DCF as a remedy for the defendants' significant, undisputed, and repeated failures to comply with the 1991 Consent Decree, Manuals, and 2002 Transition/Exit Plan . . ."); In re Niasia M., Docket No. N05-CP01-02125-A, Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven (Turner, J., November 12, 2004) ("Ms. Duran's testimony clearly established that the major issue Ejnar, Sr. [the father] faced in losing his child was his lack of housing. When asked what did she do to help him obtain housing her reply was a resounding "nothing . . . Ms. Duran further testified that she understood that she was under a legal obligation to provide reunification services to Ejnar Sr. and yet admitted that she failed to do so . . . the efforts by DCF to reunify Ejnar Sr. with his son were characterized by [DCF's] witness as ineffective and that she did nothing with regard to the most important issue which [led] to the filing of the TPR petition; homelessness, and that the few services which were offered by DCF were not very effective and were tantamount to an utter failure to provide rehabilitative services . . ."); In re J., Docket No. MO8CP03-009268-A, Superior Court, Judicial Matters, District of Middlesex at Middletown (Baldwin, J., September 30, 2004) ("DCF's failure to act appropriately and promptly threatened [the c]hild, burdened foster families, disrespected parents and imposed unnecessary emotional and financial burdens on them. In the process DCF also failed to implement services . . . that were ordered by this court . . ."); In re Lindsey P., 49 Conn.Sup. 132, 149-52, 864 A.2d 888 (2004) ( 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 40) ("Notwithstanding the findings, the court does not enter an order of contempt. The court determines that a finding of contempt will not adequately address the significant issues presented in this case. Although the [c]ourt is not ordering that DCF be held in contempt, that does not mean that it finds the conduct of DCF, or its employees, to be acceptable. The conduct was outrageous and insensitive . . . Although the court does not enter a finding of contempt, under the inherent supervisory authority of the court, the court can deter similar conduct by DCF in the future."); In the Interest of Jessica M., Superior Court Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session, at Middletown (Munro, J., February 17, 1999) ("This finding of the court does not excuse or vitiate the fact that the court (Petroni, J.) found DCF in contempt of court for failure to provide `intensive rehabilitation services.' The issue before the court was whether a court order was adhered to by DCF.").
Conclusion and Order:
This case, and other cases that have come before the court, demonstrate that DCF generally handles and attempts to resolve at least some cases at best opportunistically. DCF placement "specialists" seemingly look for what is available rather than what is the best, necessary solution or placement for the child given that child's specific needs and circumstances. On one level this is understandable because "cases have to be moved," and in many circumstances the market of appropriate individualized placements is extremely inefficient. In Nathan's case, DCF's plan in the fall of 2004, despite the warning that no excellent therapeutic foster family could tend to and satisfy all of Nathan's needs without inevitable "burnout," was another therapeutic foster placement with a so-called safe house (e.g. small group home) transition instead of the specific and necessary professional foster placement, residential or group home placement best able to respond to Nathan's situation and needs after an appropriate residential transition period. The 2004 DCF discharge plan should have been seen as, and was, likely to fail. Despite having been professionally advised that Nathan needed to be the sole focus of an available two adult family's attention, DCF identified a foster home where the foster father was away two of every four weeks and where the foster mother had to parent a seven-month-old baby (another previous cause for decompensation by Nathan). It was "a foster home," or "the foster home that was currently available," instead of "the best or most appropriate foster home for Nathan given his difficult history, needs and circumstances."
A recent example of such opportunism was evidenced in another case recently before the court for an in-court review, where the mother lives near I-84 in Massachusetts, the father lives in the northeast corner of Connecticut and for several months the children have been in a DCF safe house in the northeast part of Connecticut. DCF's goal is reunification of the children with one or both parents. Successful visitation regularly has occurred in the northeast part of Connecticut. Since the children had stayed in the safe house for longer than permitted under DCF policy, a foster home was sought and found for the remaining period prior to the expected reunification — in Groton — not in Windham County, not even in Tolland County, but in Groton. It is difficult to accept, after several months, in order to continue to facilitate family reunification, that DCF could not find a foster home in the northeast part of Connecticut or somewhere in Windham County (see next paragraph). Given the location of the parents, it is equally difficult to understand why DCF would believe that a Groton foster home is in the best interest of the children, and why, given that alternative, it is an appropriate solution to end their tenure at the safe house. The additional distance and travel time limit visitation opportunities and may delay reunification.
A similar case involves a child placed in a foster home in the northeast corner of Connecticut. That child's therapist is located in New London. Seemingly, DCF did not take steps to find a therapist for the child in northeast Connecticut. It is unclear why DCF could not place the child in a foster home in the New London area (see above paragraph).
Another example of opportunism relates to three cases before the court. One involved the placement of a child in a mid Atlantic state with his grandmother and several siblings. Another involved placement of a child in a New England state near (and, hopefully, for reunification with) his mother who lives in that state. In each of those cases it took several months of careful review before the transfer of each child to willing and generally qualified relatives was accomplished. Recently, on an emergency basis, DCF sought to initiate the process of placing a child with a relative in a southern state. DCF seemed to ignore the Connecticut grandmother's statements that her daughter, the child's aunt, with whom DCF was seeking to effect placement, recently had been released from a six-year incarceration in that state. DCF also seemed to ignore the child's mental health issues that required immediate treatment, and the possibility of reunification with the Connecticut grandmother, with whom the child previously resided. The court denied DCF's motion for an ICPC study. If the grandmother's statements are correct (and DCF did not dispute them), it is difficult to understand why the aunt was attractive to DCF as a possible placement resource and as a solution to the child's placement issues and mental health problems. It is difficult to accept that the aunt would have been considered by DCF as a placement resource had she lived in Connecticut. Eventually, in fact, the child was reunified with the grandmother in Connecticut.
Despite the foregoing examples and the matters set forth in this memorandum of decision, the court reiterates that its general experience is that the great majority of DCF supervisors and workers appearing before it are professional, dedicated and caring, and they do make a positive difference in the lives of many children and families.
Because, in the fall of 2004, Nathan needed trauma treatment, DCF identified a new, untried facility instead of the specific trauma treatment best suited to Nathan given his life history filled with abuse, loss, and, from his perspective, very painful failure and rejection. Unfortunately, as described above, DCF did not insure that Nathan was actually seen by the treatment providers at this unified trauma facility, so there is no way to know if Nathan would have benefitted from its services.
Even if DCF were correct in its 2004 discharge plan for Nathan, which, as set forth above, was disputed by all those other than DCF involved in this matter, it is not enough for DCF to use appropriate words, e.g., "therapeutic foster placement," "professional foster placement" or "trauma treatment facility," if there is only a little, or not enough, relevant substance to them from the perspective and actuality of the child's needs and circumstances.
The DCF paradigm is that no substantive or material decisions are made solely by a single individual. Most, if not all, such decisions are made after a hierarchal administrative review and/or group participation and discussion. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the intransigent and closed-minded behavior and attitudes demonstrated in this case are institutionally rather than individually based. The remedy, therefore, should be directed at DCF generally rather than against specific DCF employees.
As stated on December 8, 2004, the court will continue to keep watch on this matter to see if DCF is more successful in the future than it has been in the past in discharging its duties as statutory parent of Nathan. Because of DCF's unwillingness or inability to accept and obey this court's November 17, 2004 order, and its insistence on proceeding ahead as it alone had determined, despite overwhelming contrary recommendations and advice, DCF failed Nathan.
If this attitude and approach toward court orders and children, including but not limited to the excuse, justification or rationalization of how strongly DCF believes that it alone can identify appropriate solutions for children's needs, is not corrected, other children will be at an increased and unnecessary risk of failure and harm. As set forth in In re Lindsey P., supra, 49 Conn.Sup. at 152, ". . . under its inherent supervisory authority, the court can [attempt to] deter similar conduct by DCF in the future."
DCF is thus ordered to show cause why it should not present to the court for consideration and implementation (1) a program for all of its current and future employees that emphasizes to each such employee (a) that there are circumstances where DCF is not the final arbiter, and where DCF employees in good faith thus have to accept and implement decisions that are different from the decisions DCF would have made; (b) if a court enters an order requiring DCF to act differently from the course of action it has or would have selected, DCF employees have a good faith duty to focus on the importance of and need for understanding and accepting the reasons for each such order, and for obeying and implementing each court direction and order, unless and until such order is vacated; and (c) that DCF expects and requires each such employee to do so ("the Program"); and (2) a timetable for and the details of the Program's dissemination and implementation to each current and future DCF employee. DCF is further ordered to show cause why, if DCF fails or refuses to act immediately to establish the Program, the court should not enter an order setting up the Program without any further DCF input. Additionally, DCF is ordered to show cause why DCF and the attorney general each should not identify to each superior court for juvenile matters a person who shall have the duty and responsibility to review and approve before filing each DCF motion or other request to vacate or rehear any prior contested court order directed to DCF.
Stuart David Bear, J.