In re Melody L.

Full title: In re Melody L., In re Melinda L., In re Jenira R., In re Jaime R., In re…

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Feb 23, 2007

2007 Ct. Sup. 3342 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)

Opinion

Nos. FA 04 4000907 S, H12-CP02-008535-A, H12-CP02-008536-A, H12-CP02-008537-A, H12-CP02-008921-A

February 23, 2007

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BEAR, STUART DAVID, JUDGE.

These are termination of parental rights ("TPR") cases. The grounds alleged by the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"), the petitioner herein, in the May 30, 2006, TPR petitions it filed against each respondent parent are

(1) Ground A, abandonment, against the biological fathers of (a) Melody L. ("Melody") and Melinda L. ("Melinda"), and (b) Jenira R. ("Jenira"), Jaime R. ("Jaime") and Neri R. ("Neri");

(2) Ground B (i), failure to rehabilitate, and Ground C, acts of commission or omission, against the biological mother with respect to all of such children;

(3) Ground C, acts of commission or omission, against the mother with respect to all of the children, and against the father of Jaime with respect to such child; and

(4) Ground D, no parent-child relationship, (a) against the father of Melody and Melinda, and (b) against the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri.

Commencing on November 28, 2006, the TPR trial took place. Neither of the two biological fathers, each of whom had been defaulted, appeared for trial. The mother appeared and attended each day of the trial.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The court makes the following factual findings:

1. In 1997, the mother, her two oldest children (not named in this case, respectively referred to as "the oldest child" and "the teenage older brother"), Melody and Melinda were living in Florida. (Exhibit 2, 9.)

2. Beginning at least in 1997, the Florida department of children and families ("Florida DCF") became involved with the family. Id.

3. In 1998, Florida DCF issued a protective order in favor of such children. Id.

4. In order to avoid such court order, and in violation of such court order, the mother fled with such children from Florida to Connecticut. Id.

5. The mother then went to New York with such children. Id.

6. While in New York, from 1998 through 2001, the mother and the children had an open case with the New York office of children and family services ("NY CFS") "for excessive corporal punishment and sexual abuse." Id. The sexual abuse was committed by the mother's boyfriend, who is the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri.

7. In January 2002, after NY CFS issued a protective order for the removal of Melody, Melinda, Jenira and Jaime, and for no contact with them by such boyfriend, in order to avoid such order and to maintain her relationship with such boyfriend, who had been for a substantial prior period and who was continuing to sexually abuse her children, the mother fled to Connecticut with such children. Id.

8. From January to May 2002, the family was transient, and for a time they lived with such boyfriend's/sexual abuser's relatives. During such five-month period in Connecticut, the mother did not register the children in school. The mother did not obtain medical insurance for the children, and they had no medical treatment during such period.

9. The mother's excuse for fleeing from New York was that she did not want NY CFS to take her children. The mother's excuse for failing to register her children in school from January 2002, through May 29, 2002, when they were removed by DCF, was that she did not want DCF to take away her children.

10. By the time DCF, on May 28, 2002, became aware of the family, the mother had a multi-year history of failure properly to care for, parent and supervise her children. She eventually admitted that during the period between 1998 and May 28, 2002, she left the parenting of the children to her sexually abusive boyfriend.

11. On May 28, 2002, DCF received a referral from an anonymous caller that the mother, her boyfriend, Melody, Melinda, Jenira, Jaime and Melody and Melinda's two older brothers were living in Connecticut in a one-bedroom apartment. The caller alleged that the children were being exposed to sexual activities and abuse by the mother's boyfriend, and to physical abuse by such boyfriend and the mother.

12. A DCF worker, who testified in the trial, was assigned to investigate. She testified that she telephoned the local police department and she conducted a home visit. Such worker contacted other agencies and learned that NY CFS had an active case concerning the family. Such worker also testified that she learned that the mother had a history of substance abuse and the mother had relapsed. Melody had disclosed to NY CFS that she had been sexually abused by the mother's boyfriend. In late 2001 the mother was ordered by a New York court not to allow her boyfriend to have contact with the children. The mother violated this order, and in January 2002, the New York court ordered the mother to turn over Melody, Melinda, Jenira and Jaime to NY CFS. Instead of complying with such order, in January 2002, the mother fled with such boyfriend and the children to Connecticut. Thus, in January 2002, the mother chose continued companionship with the sexually abusive boyfriend over the safety of her children, and she enabled him to sexually abuse such children in Connecticut for several additional months before DCF became involved with the family, and removed the children.

13. Such worker testified that she consulted with her supervisors, and on May 29, 2002, pursuant to what are now Connecticut General Statutes ("C.G.S.") § 17a-101g(e) and (f),¹ DCF invoked a "ninety-six hour hold" on Melody, Melinda, Jenira, and Jaime.

1 ". . . (e) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or the commissioner's designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from the child's surroundings and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall authorize any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child's parent or guardian. The commissioner shall record in writing the reasons for such removal and include such record with the report of the investigation conducted under subsection (b) of this section.
"(f) The removal of a child pursuant to subsection (e) of this section shall not exceed ninety-six hours. During the period of such removal, the commissioner, or the commissioner's designee, shall provide the child with all necessary care, including medical care, which may include an examination by a physician or mental health professional with or without the consent of the child's parents, guardian or other person responsible for the child's care, provided reasonable attempts have been made to obtain consent of the child's parents or guardian or other person responsible for the care of such child. During the course of a medical examination, a physician may perform diagnostic tests and procedures necessary for the detection of child abuse or neglect. If the child is not returned home within such ninety-six-hour period, with or without protective services, the department shall proceed in accordance with section 46b-129."

14. The evidence presented to the court through the worker's testimony and other sources established that prior to and on that day, such children, the two older brothers, the mother and her boyfriend were sleeping together in one room; the boyfriend and the mother had multiple instances of sexual relations, including oral sexual contact, in the midst of such children; the boyfriend molested and abused Melody and others while the mother was present in such bedroom, and, while the mother was not present in the room, but present elsewhere in the home, such boyfriend sexually abused Melody and other children in the bathroom and in other locations; such boyfriend and the mother physically abused such children; the mother admitted to one incident of domestic violence; and in an effort to excuse her failure to protect her children from such boyfriend's predations and her own behavior, the mother eventually claimed that she was frequently unable to function or to exercise good judgment because of her continuing abuse of heroin, and because she was "emotionally disabled."

15. Additionally, there were multiple instances of intra-sibling and half-sibling sexual contact that the mother failed to prevent.

16. The worker testified that the mother initially denied to DCF that her boyfriend, who was using an alias, was in fact such boyfriend. However, after the second oldest child ("the teenage older brother") disclosed and confirmed such boyfriend's identity, the mother admitted that he was the boyfriend ordered by the New York court not to have contact with the children. Such child also confirmed that the family was sleeping in one room, the mother and the boyfriend had sexual relations in their midst, Melody masturbated in the bathroom with an object and the children had not been enrolled in school.

17. On May 31, 2002, (i) upon its finding that each of the children was in immediate physical danger² and that continuation in the mother's home was contrary to their welfare, the court (Turner, J.) issued ex parte orders of temporary custody ("OTC") that placed DCF in custody of each of such four children, (ii) DCF filed petitions seeking an adjudication that each of such four children was neglected, and (iii) the court ordered specific steps for each parent. The oldest child and the teenage older brother remained in the home with the mother and the mother's boyfriend.

2 C.G.S. § 46b-129(b) provides in part that "[I]f it appears . . . that there is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child . . . is in immediate physical danger from the child's . . . surroundings, and (2) that as a result of said conditions, the child's . . . safety is endangered and immediate removal of such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's . . . safety, the court shall . . . (B) issue an order ex parte vesting in some suitable agency . . . or person the child's . . . temporary care or custody . . ."
Sections 17a-101g and 46b-129 contain different language establishing a basis for a ninety-six-hour hold and the issuance of ex parte order of temporary custody. The Supreme Court has determined that the differing language reflects "a distinction without a difference." Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 749 n. 9, 865 A.2d 428 (2005):
"The reasonable cause determination in § 46b-129(b) requires a finding that the child is `suffering from serious physical illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical danger,' whereas the probable cause determination in § 17a-101g(c) requires a finding that the child is `in imminent risk of physical harm.' The word `imminent' is defined as `[n]ear at hand,' `impending' and `on the point of happening . . . Something which is threatening to happen at once, something close at hand, something to happen upon the instant . . .' Black's Law Dictionary, supra. The word `immediate' is defined as `[p]resent; at once; without delay . . . [T]he word . . . denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time.' Id. In our view, this is a distinction without a difference . . ."
"Furthermore, if the legislature had intended to distinguish between § 46b-129(b) and § 17a-101g(c) on the basis of the urgency of the threat to the child, it presumably would have used different language in each of those statutes to describe the necessity for removal. Instead, both statutes use identical language in providing that, as part of the probable cause determination, it must be found that `immediate removal . . . is necessary to ensure the child's safety . . .' General Statutes §§ 17a-101g(c) and 46b-129 (b)."

18. On June 4, 2002, the worker interviewed Melody and Melinda. Melinda blamed Melody for the previous New York out-of home placement because Melody had disclosed the sexual abuse. Melody told such worker that the mother "loved her boyfriend too much." Melinda disclosed to such worker that there were ongoing arguments between the mother and her boyfriend and that such boyfriend hit all of the children except Jaime.

19. On June 5, 2002, in a meeting with such worker, the mother admitted that she had not applied in Connecticut for medical insurance for the children, and the children had not been seen by any physicians after they moved to Connecticut.

20. Physical neglect of each of the children was substantiated by such worker.

21. On June 7, 2002, each OTC was sustained.

22. In July 2002, the mother took a hair drug screening test and tested positive for heroin and marijuana. (In the March 25, 2003, initial psychological evaluation, she claimed to the evaluator that marijuana "has always been her drug of choice . . . At one time, she said, she smoked the drug every other day — often several doses. She tried heroin on one occasion, she said, `and it came out in my hair test.' She denied intravenous use of this or any other drug." (Exhibit 7, 2.)³ She denied excessive use of alcohol. Id. She said that she had tried cocaine once but did not like "the effect." Id. "She denied use of any other illicit drugs." Id. (Emphasis supplied.))

3 These statements contradict the mother's eventual "incapacitated by heroin abuse" excuse for not protecting her children from the horrific sexual and physical abuse inflicted on them by her boyfriend. See page 18, paragraph 66, and pages 35-36, fn.7, infra.
As set forth in Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia: "Hair follicle testing is quite accurate and can go back 6 months or longer, showing any controlled substances used in a sort of timeline. As hair grows out any drugs used are encased in the hair shaft, so the longer the hair, the longer back in the individual's drug history the lab can detect. Most legitimate testing facilities, however, only use hair within about 3-5 cm of the scalp, and discard the rest. This limits the detection history to about 90 days, depending upon the rate of growth of the individual's hair. Some people attempt to circumvent this through shaving their heads. In the absence of the required amount of hair on the scalp, body hair can be used as an acceptable substitute."

23. On August 7, 2002, (i) service on the father of Melody and Melinda was confirmed and he was defaulted for failure to appear, (ii) each of such children was adjudicated neglected and each was committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF, and (iii) final specific steps were ordered for the biological mother, and for the biological father of Jenira and Jaime.

24. On December 11, 2002, DCF received a hotline call that Jenira had been sexually abused by her father, the mother's boyfriend, after a supervised visit with the mother. Results from a subsequent medical examination were normal.

25. The mother admitted that in December 2002, she cohabited with such boyfriend. Her excuse was that she was pregnant and needed him to help her. (Exhibit 7, 4.) She also admitted she and the boyfriend had sexual relations through November 2002. Id. ⁴

4 In June 2002, such father was incarcerated. In August 2002, he was released. After his release, he was transient and lived with different relatives. On December 30, 2002, and in February 2003, he missed appointments for hair tests. In February 2003, when the first treatment worker transferred the case, the mother still was in contact with such father.

26. In late January 2003, the mother's boyfriend drove her to the hospital for the birth of Neri. The mother initially insisted to the court-ordered evaluator (although this was disputed by DCF) that her last contact with her boyfriend was on the day of Neri's birth. Id., 3. Despite her initial statement of her last contact being on the day of Neri's birth, she subsequently admitted to the evaluator that she did have contact with him after Neri's birth. She admitted that in February 2003, he drove her and Neri in a vehicle because he did not want her to ride in a bus. Id. (In the March 25, 2003, evaluation, the mother told such evaluator that she did not see a future with the boyfriend. Id., 3.)

27. On February 10, 2003, DCF received a hotline referral concerning Melinda. Melinda had reported that the mother's boyfriend had sexually abused her, Melody and Jenira.

28. On February 14, 2003, the investigative worker interviewed Melinda who reported physical discipline by the mother's boyfriend, being hit and being afraid of being hit, inappropriate sexual touching by such boyfriend with toys and fingers, and touching by such boyfriend on her private parts. Melinda said that she reported these incidents to the mother who told her boyfriend to stop touching her.

29. Also on February 14, 2003, such worker sought out the mother. The mother was evasive and did not arrive as scheduled. Such worker found her at the home of her boyfriend's relatives. The worker stated that the mother denied knowledge of sexual abuse by her boyfriend and denied that there had been unsupervised contact between such boyfriend and Neri, their daughter, who was then a newborn infant.

30. DCF believed that the mother and her boyfriend continued in contact in 2002 and through February 2003, at her Section 8 apartment, at visitation with the children and at the birth of Neri. DCF also believed that they also remained in telephone contact.

31. On February 14, 2003, DCF placed a ninety-six-hour hold on Neri.

32. The case worker for the family during February 2003, testified that the mother still did not believe that her boyfriend had sexually abused the children, or that he had caused intra-sibling sexual abuse to occur. Although the teenage older brother had also reported the abuse to her, the mother's excuse for not acting was that she believed that Melody was lying (see, e. g., children's February 13, 2007, post-trial brief, page 31, fn 8) and if she were sexually abused, it was not by her boyfriend. The mother did admit past drug use including use of heroin and marijuana. The worker noted that the mother did not report any inappropriate physical discipline of the children by her boyfriend. The mother allowed him to be a caretaker for the children.

33. On February 18, 2003, (i) based on a "reasonable cause" finding that Neri R. ("Neri") would be in immediate physical danger from her surroundings and that continuation in the mother's home was contrary to her welfare, the court (Wollenberg, J.) ordered that temporary custody of Neri be placed in DCF and (ii) the court ordered specific steps for the mother and her boyfriend, Neri's biological father (who, as noted above, is also the biological father of Jenira and Jaime).

34. On February 20, 2003, Melody stated to the investigative worker that the mother and her boyfriend engaged in substance abuse in front of the children while the family lived in New York. They smoked "weed" and a "drug in a ball," and they allowed the oldest child to smoke "weed" in the home. She also described to such worker how she was sexually assaulted by the mother's boyfriend. She stated that when she told the mother about the abuse, the mother said that she was too little for the mother's boyfriend to do that to her, e.g., the mother told Melody directly that she did not believe her. Melody stated that she had to keep "a close eye" on her siblings and half-siblings to protect them from the mother's boyfriend.

35. According to such case worker, prior to February 2003, the mother did not admit or concede that the children had been sexually abused. Because of her resistance to and denial of such reality, and because of her drug and substance abuse, the boyfriend was able to sexually abuse the children while the mother was in the home. If the mother had admitted or conceded the occurrence of such sexual abuse, as determined by the New York authorities at the end of 2001, and had she immediately acted to protect her children, the boyfriend's access to the children would have ended approximately fourteen months before February 2003. Because of the mother's refusal to believe her children's statements (including those to her by the older brother) concerning their sexual abuse, and because she did not admit to and accept her responsibility to protect them from such continuing sexual abuse, through February 2003, and thereafter, the mother was not a viable candidate for reunification with such children during such period.

36. On February 25, 2003, Melody was interviewed at the St. Francis Hospital Aetna Children's Center, and the worker attended such interview. Melody disclosed multiple incidents by such boyfriend of penetration and oral sex, the mother and such father having sexual relations in her presence, and of such father having her older teenage brother "hump her" in such father's presence. DCF substantiated sexual abuse by such father of Melody, Melinda and such brother.

37. On March 7, 2003, the court's order of temporary custody concerning Neri was sustained.

38. On March 14, 2003, such older teenage brother stated to such worker that when the mother and her boyfriend were having sexual relations, he felt the bed shake and he heard his mother moan. Such boyfriend talked to him about "humping": when such older brother "grew up," he would "hump women." Such older brother also stated that when they lived in New York, the boyfriend would sit on the toilet, make him get into the bathtub with Melody and direct him to put his penis on her vagina. The oldest child told the older teenage brother that the mother and the boyfriend were using heroin, but at the time such older brother did not know what that was.

39. After the series of disclosures by Melody, Melinda and their older brother, the worker testified that DCF substantiated sexual abuse by the mother's boyfriend. DCF also substantiated that the children were neglected.

40. On March 20, 2003, the court (Wollenberg, J.) found, by clear and convincing evidence, that further efforts to reunify the respondent biological father of Melody and Melinda with them were no longer appropriate.

41. On March 25, 2003, the first court-ordered evaluation occurred. The psychological examiner reported that when Melody was interviewed by the sexual abuse professionals she "made detailed and specific allegations of sexual abuse by [the mother's boyfriend] including multiple incidents of fondling, frottage, digital anal and vaginal penetration, anal and vaginal intercourse and fellatio. She also reported witnessing the mother and stepfather engaging in coitus and fellatio." (Exhibit 7, 1.) The mother failed to protect Melody from such horrific, egregious sexual abuse. (Exhibit 5, 4.) The mother also failed to protect Melody's older brother from repeated physical abuse and from being forced into sexual activities by the mother's boyfriend. (Exhibit 6.)

42. During such evaluation, the mother claimed that Melody had never told her about the boyfriend's sexual abuse of Melody (e.g., Melody was a liar) and that she first learned about it from the DCF worker. (Exhibit 7, 4-5.) She claimed that she could not figure out Melody's vaginal bleeding. Id., 4. Despite the statements of several of her children that the mother and the boyfriend had sexual relations in the midst of them in the same bedroom, the mother asserted "No, the rooms were separate." Id.

43. Regarding reports by the older brother concerning the boyfriend's sexual abuse, the mother stated: "I didn't go into details." Id., 5. Regarding reports of her boyfriend molesting Melinda in the shower, her response was ". . . that doesn't make sense — they're too small to take showers."

44. The evaluator observed regarding the mother's reporting: "She volunteered little, but seemed sincere in most of what she did report. Her denials regarding the children's report of sexual abuse, and her reports of her relation with [her boyfriend], were qualitatively different, however, and suggested a lack of candor, if not intentional distortion." Id.

45. Such evaluator also observed: "No gross defects in present judgment were apparent, but insight regarding the children's molestation, its effects and her role in facilitating it appeared poor." Id., 6. The mother's position was: "Maybe I'm partly to blame for not seeing it, but I didn't do anything directly to my children, and I've suffered." Id., 5. (Emphasis added.)

46. The evaluator observed that the mother's "openness to allowing some level of relation in the past [with her boyfriend], particularly after repeated allegations of sexual abuse of the children, would seem to imply a risk of resuming that relation should circumstances allow. Her voiced refusal to reconcile with [the boyfriend] was not viewed as credible." Id., 10.

47. The mother was unwilling to admit to herself and to such evaluator that her children had been sexually abused by her boyfriend and that she was responsible for enabling such abuse to occur. As noted above, see fn 3 and text, by the time of the first evaluation, the mother was not admitting to use of heroin and she did not claim that it had incapacitated her to the point that she could not protect her children from her sexually and physically abusive boyfriend. Her denials precluded any serious effort on her part for reunification.

48. On September 8, 2003, the second evaluation took place. In this evaluation the mother stated that she had learned from the non-offender program about sexual abuse that she should not blame any of the children for what happened and that she should let the children know that the adult is responsible and the children have no control over what happened. (Exhibit 8, 3.) She told the older brother that she believed "what was going on and that [the boyfriend] is responsible and he needs to pay for what has happened." Id. (Emphasis supplied.)

49. In such evaluation, the mother admitted that she and the children had a transient lifestyle before DCF became involved at the end of May 2002. Id., 4.

50. The older teenage brother told the evaluator that on one occasion the mother's boyfriend "beat him severely with his fists and feet. He disciplined the children by hitting them with a belt. This often left marks . . . and he sometimes bled. Mostly, he said, this was for `not listening.'" Id., 7.

51. Melody told the evaluator that the mother's boyfriend had hit her with a belt "`on purpose, because he had been drinking beer . . .' Other punishment included slamming her into things and hitting her with glass . . ." Id., 11. She confirmed the mother's boyfriend's sexual abuse of her. Id.

52. Melinda also disclosed the boyfriend hit her with a belt or his hand.

53. Given the family's living circumstances in close quarters, the mother had to know that such abuse was occurring. Melody said that she had told the mother of her boyfriend's actions "on many occasions, and that, in response, the mother had yelled at him." Id., 11.

54. The mother also applied physical discipline to the older brother and to Melinda. Id., 11, 14.

55. The evaluator concluded, as of September 8, 2003, approximately fifteen months after the children were removed, that "the mother was an angry and unhappy person preoccupied with what she sees as the injustice of her circumstances. Her focus on her own concerns may often prevent her from addressing her children's needs and her passivity, generally, keeps her from taking what actions are in their best interests . . . [Her] report at the present interview did little to allay the examiner's concerns about her relation with [her boyfriend]. Even if her protestations are sincere, there seems a real risk for future, continued contact, and this might ultimately include contact with the children." Id., 18. The evaluator opined about the boyfriend: "Filing charges against him and obtaining a protective order are necessary, and failure to do so should be taken to reflect the mother's inability to alter her previously destructive pattern. Equally, it is important that there be no further contact between [the boyfriend and the mother]." Id., 20. The court did not receive any evidence that the mother obtained a protective or restraining order against the boyfriend.

56. The evaluator also opined: "Given [the mother's] apparently limited progress in the past six months, it seems counter to Melody's best interests to maintain the child in an ambiguous status. Return is not practical, and a termination of parental rights is strongly advocated . . . [T]he history of sexual contact between [the older brother] and Melody precludes their placement together at this time . . . As noted elsewhere, the mother's previous failures to denounce [her boyfriend], allegations of continued contact with him, and her failure to acknowledge the children's reports of sexual abuse are pathognomonic⁵ and bode poorly for substantive change in the future . . . [I]t is clear that she has progressed remarkably little in the past six months in her understanding of the children's trauma and its effects on them. Her ignorance is tantamount to denial, and this substantially increases the risk of further abuse (by other parties) if they are placed in her care. Placement with the mother now or in the near future is clearly contraindicated . . ." Id., 18-19.

5 "Pathognomonic: A sign or symptom that is so characteristic of a disease that it makes the diagnosis. For example, Koplik's spots (on the buccal mucosa opposite the 1st and 2nd upper molars) are pathognomonic of measles. The word `pathognomonic' (pronounced patho-no-monic) comes from the Greek `pathognomonikos' meaning `skilled in judging diseases.'" (MedicineNet.com)

57. The evaluator correctly identified a primary issue in this case as the mother's failure to protect the children, and whether she would be able to do so in the future if one or more of the children were returned to her. Id., 21. The evaluator wrote: "She presently shows little progress or growth in this dimension, and her potential for real and meaningful change in the future is modest." Id.

58. Also on September 8, 2003, Neri was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care, custody and guardianship of DCF.

59. Additionally on September 8, 2003, the respondent biological mother signed and the court ordered final specific steps including steps for reunification with Neri. (Exhibit 14.)

60. On September 29, 2003, the court-ordered psychological evaluator filed an addendum to the September 8, 2003, evaluation. (Exhibit 9.) Such evaluator had contacted the mother's therapist (who testified at trial as the mother's witness). While such therapist declined to offer a diagnosis of the mother, such therapist stated that "minimization is a life-long pattern . . ." for the mother. Id., 2.

61. Such therapist noted that the mother "ha[d] steadfastly maintained in therapy that Melody never made any disclosure to her prior to [Melody's] removal . . .," and that "the work with [the mother] ha[d] been difficult . . ." Id. (See fn 5, above, and text.)

62. On or about August 24, 2003, the mother had been assaulted by the boyfriend who then took and crashed the mother's van. The therapist noted that when the mother told the therapist about the incident, "she minimized a lot . . ." Id. When the mother was asked by the therapist about her ongoing relation with such boyfriend, the therapist noted that "the mother `was very adamant about their not being any contact — she has excuses . . .'" Id. (Emphasis supplied.)

63. In November 2003, the teenage older brother began family therapy with the mother.

64. On January 20, 2004, the court (Dannehy, J.) found, by clear and convincing evidence, that further DCF efforts to reunify the mother's boyfriend, who is the respondent biological father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri, with them were no longer appropriate.

65. On June 15, 2004, approximately twenty-four one-half months after the children had been removed, the court-ordered psychological evaluator conducted a third evaluation. During such evaluation the mother described herself as a "softie" and admitted that her boyfriend "`did the discipline in the house.' She conceded that she had allowed him to physically abuse the children, as he was able to control . . ." (Exhibit 10, 3.)

66. "Sexual abuse, she conceded had been the primary issue in removal." Id. The mother believed "that reunification had been delayed because Melody had allegedly told her of the abuse, yet she failed to act. She continued to deny that this had occurred. She offered, however, that she had been `so high that anything could have happened in front of me and I wouldn't have known it.' `The drug abuse played a big part in my not being able to protect my kids' . . . Pressed regarding Melody's report to her, she pleaded, `In her way, she might have been trying to tell me stuff and it didn't dawn on me . . . I just didn't catch it.'" Id. (Emphasis supplied.)

67. The mother's statements demonstrate that she had previously minimized to the evaluator her use of heroin, and, although in excess of two years had elapsed since the removal of the children, she still was unwilling to accept responsibility for her role in the sexual and physical abuse of her children. See fn 7, infra. Without such acceptance, she was unable to make the commitment to and progress that was necessary for viable reunification efforts with Melody, Melinda and the younger children to occur. The mother had lost two years of opportunity for reunification, and the children had two years away from her to develop new relationships and supports.

68. On November 26, 2004, the psychological evaluator conducted an interactional evaluation of Melinda, Jenira and Neri and their foster family. The evaluator observed: "The behavior of all parties was considered modal for a family of this configuration, and was indistinguishable from that of a biological family." (Exhibit 11, 2.)

69. On such date, the psychological evaluator also conducted an evaluation of Melody and her foster mother. Id., 2-3. The interaction was positive.

70. The evaluator concluded: "It does appear that all of the [above] children are happy in their relations with their respective foster parents." Id., 4.

71. The mother's therapist testified that between May 2004, and May 2005, the mother went through a process of acknowledging the level of her substance abuse prior to the removal of her children. Such therapist said that the mother "accepted responsibility." (Compare, however, paragraphs 66-67 above, and fn 7, infra.)

72. At various times during 2005, the teenage older brother, Melinda, Jenira and Jaime were involved in family therapy with the mother.

73. In April 2005, the teenage older brother of Melody and Melinda was reunified with the mother. In an effort to maximize the success of the reunification, the Intensive Family Preservation ("IFP") program was instituted in the mother's home for ten hours per week. The function of the program was to assist the mother with parenting by helping to establish rules, limits and discipline and to model positive parenting approaches.

74. In July 2005, Jaime was reunified with the mother, and he began to reside with the mother, the teenage older brother and an adult older brother ("the mother's oldest child") at the mother's home. In an effort to maximize the success of the reunification, the IFP program again was instituted in the mother's home.

75. During such reunification period, DCF believed that the mother was struggling to parent both such children, and that she became overwhelmed by the responsibilities of their care. However, the mother minimized the issues and problems, and asserted that "everything [was] fine." Her therapist also testified that the mother was "very overwhelmed" with an active toddler and with the teenage older brother who had "a lot of difficulties." The therapist tried to help her with her stress.

76. The therapist testified that the mother told her about "smacking" the older teenage brother "out of frustration." The therapist said that the mother was "completely overwhelmed" and that she felt that corporal punishment would "settle him down." The therapist reported that the teenage older brother had run away, the mother "chased him down" and "out of her fear and feeling overwhelmed smacked him." The therapist stated that given the mother's fear, her reaction was "not abnormal."

77. Such therapist stated that the mother blamed the teenage older brother for the rest of the children not being returned to her. The therapist noted that such teenage older brother has "significant behavior problems." Such therapist stated that he has PTSD, is oppositional, wants to be in control, feels he can parent himself, and is not willing to have the mother act as his parent. But for such behavioral problems, the therapist would have recommended starting the reunification process with Melinda, Jenira and Neri.

78. The therapist opined that if the children were to be returned to the mother, it should happen not "altogether at once" but sequentially.

79. The mother did not disclose to such therapist the teenage older brother's September 2006, disclosure that when he was six years old, he was inappropriately touched by the oldest child (his older brother). The mother did disclose to such therapist the teenage older brother's disclosures about her boyfriend being sexually inappropriate with him and forcing him to be sexually inappropriate with his sister Melody. Despite these disclosures, the teenage older brother has not received therapy, because he was not ready to do so, for his sexual abuse issues.

80. Such therapist also testified that although the oldest child was living in the home with the mother and would be living in the home with any and all children who were returned to the mother, he did not want to be part of and was not a part of any of the family therapy.

81. The DCF worker assigned to the family in 2005 testified, and there is other evidence that during such period, that while the teenage older brother and Jaime were in her care, the mother

(a) allowed the older teenage brother's health insurance to lapse;

(b) did not assure that he attended his therapy;

(c) did not insure that he was seen as scheduled by his neurologist and by other doctors;

(d) although it was available at the pharmacy, did not pick up his very important anti-seizure medication from such pharmacy, where it was waiting and stayed for approximately six weeks (in the children's post-trial brief, page 27, a proffered excuse for the mother's failure is that the "medication lapse was caused by insurance problems and confusion . . .")

(e) did not insure that he took his medications;

(f) at least twice physically struck such teenage older brother, once with her hand and once with a belt, causing bruises;

CT Page 3356

(g) did not supervise all of such older teenage brother's contact with Jaime, Melinda, Jenira and Neri;

(h) on at least one occasion was asleep in the house while Jaime was outside;

(i) although she knew or should have known that the teenage older brother was physically aggressive and bullying toward the younger children, and although she was warned not to do so, she left Jaime to be supervised by the teenage older brother and additionally during an unsupervised visitation, she left the younger children to be supervised by the teenage older brother and she did not prevent such teenage older brother from frightening the younger children by, inter alia, tormenting the family cat in front of them;

(j) she did not attend scheduled family therapy with Melody that began in September 2005;

(k) the mother missed at least some of her scheduled appointments; and

(l) she was suspected by DCF of relapsing into use of substances and substance abuse.⁶ See, e.g., exhibit 12, 14-16.

6 The mother was described as "savvy," and she did not comply with DCF requests for a hair test from December 2005, through October 23, 2006, a period of approximately ten months. See paragraph 107, infra; mother's February 12, 2007, brief in opposition to TPR, page 15; and page 7, fn 3, supra.

82. Because of the mother's failure to obtain his medicine, on November 26, 2005, the teenage older brother had an epileptic seizure.

83. During such reunification period, the mother was seeing the therapist who testified at trial. The therapist reported to the psychological evaluator that she believed Melinda's report that she had been hit by the teenage older brother when she was visiting at the mother's home. (Exhibit 12, 11.) The mother did not take responsibility for this or other incidents involving the teenage older brother. Id., 10-11.

84. On or about December 2, 2005, the teenage older brother and Jaime were removed from the mother's custody. DCF substantiated the mother for physical neglect of Melinda and Jenira when the mother left them unsupervised by her and in such teenage older brother's care. CT Page 3357 Id., 16. Currently, such teenage older brother is living with the mother and the oldest child under an order of protective supervision that expires on May 23, 2007. (Exhibit 4, 2.)

85. In December 2005, and January 2006, the mother refused DCF requests that she take a hair test to determine if she had relapsed and was again using illegal substances. See fn 6, supra.

86. In December 2005, although two of her children had recently been removed from her, the mother stopped consulting with her psychiatrist. (Exhibit 12, 4.) The mother also discontinued use of prescribed medication. Id.

87. On January 20, 2006, DCF filed termination of parental rights petitions concerning Melody, Melinda, Jenira, Jaime and Neri, in which it alleged, inter alia, that: (A) it had made reasonable efforts

(i) to locate each biological father,

(ii) to reunify each such child with his or her biological parent(s),

(iii) that reasonable efforts to reunify with each biological father were no longer required because the court had determined that they were no longer appropriate, and

(iv) that the mother and each biological father were unable or unwilling to benefit from such reunification efforts; and

(B)

(i) that the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri had abandoned each of his children ("Ground A").

(ii) that each child had been found in a prior proceeding to be neglected and that the mother had failed to rehabilitate ("Ground B (i)"),

(iii) that each child had "been denied [by the mother], by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission . . . the care, guidance or control necessary for his/her physical, educational or emotional well being . . . ("Ground C"),

(iv) that Jaime had "been denied [by his father], by reason of an act or acts of commission or omission . . . the care, guidance or control necessary for his/her physical, educational or emotional well being . . . ("Ground C"), and

(v) that each father had no parent-child relationship with any of his biological children ("Ground D").

88. In its summary of adjudicatory facts for termination of parental rights, DCF alleged, inter alia, that:

(A) since May 2002, DCF had been involved with the family;

(B) DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate each biological father;

(C) on March 2, 2003, January 20, 2004, November 30, 2004 and August 9, 2005, the court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify all of the children with the mother;

(D) on March 20, 2003, the court found that further efforts by DCF to reunify the father of Melody and Melinda with them were no longer required;

(E) on January 20, 2004, the court found that further efforts by DCF to reunify the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri with them were no longer required;

(F) the "presenting problems with this family were sexual abuse of the children by [the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri], substance abuse by [such father and the mother], and the children were not enrolled in school by [such father or the mother] . . .";

(G) the following services were offered to the mother:

(i) non-offending parent program;

(ii) substance abuse treatment;

(iii) individual therapy;

(iv) random urine screens;

(v) parenting program;

(vi) court ordered evaluations; and

(vii) family therapy;

(H) the following programs were offered to the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri:

(i) substance abuse treatment;

(ii) parenting classes;

(iii) sexual offender evaluation; and

(iv) individual therapy;

(I) no services were offered to the father of Melody and Melinda because his whereabouts have been unknown since May 2002;

(J) each such parent was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification services because:

(i) the mother "demonstrate[d] poor judgment and insight into the abuse of her children, poor parenting and discipline skills . . ."

(ii) the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri "has refused services for his predatory behavior and has not maintained involvement in the li[ves] of his children . . .," and

CT Page 3360

(iii) the father of Melody and Melinda "has not maintained involvement in the li[ves] of his children . . .";

(K) "1. In November 2001, mother and [the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri] resided with Melody . . ., Melinda . . . Jenira and Jaime in . . . NY . . . [T]he state of New York issued [such father] a no contact order with the children, who were in the care of mother. The order was issued as [such father] was suspected of sexually abusing Melody.

"2. Mother failed to comply with the order and fled from New York with the children in January 2002 for fear they would be removed [from her]. The mother, [such father], Melody, Jenira and Jaime were located in Hartford, CT in May 2002 . . . [C]ontributing factors in the abuse of the children were mother's inability to protect the children from sexual abuse, her substance abuse, her lack of parenting skills, and her inability to provide a stable home . . .

"From the first department involvement of 5-29-02, through the present [January 12, 2006], mother has been informed by the court and [DCF] that she should have no contact with [such father], [that she should] enhance her parenting skills, participate in individual and family therapy, maintain stable housing, and participate in appropriate drug treatment.

"7. On 8-27-02 and subsequently on 9-8-03, the court ordered of mother that she not have contact with [such father], inter alia, and she has failed to comply in that she has been observed with [such father] in April 2003 and August 2003 . . .

(L) the mother has "limited insight into the behaviors of her children and poor ability to parent or discipline them . . .";

(M) "In November 2005, [the mother] left Jaime . . . in the care of known drug dealers, indicating her continued lack of judgment and protection for her children. In August 2005, [the mother] left Melinda . . . and Jenira . . . in the care of [an older] son . . . who has many behavior problems, [after] she was informed that [such son] should not be left alone with the children . . .";

(N) "In October 2005, [DCF] substantiated [the mother] for hitting [such son] with a belt and leaving marks on him. In October and November of 2005, [the mother] failed to administer [such son's] seizure medication, causing him to have a[n] epileptic seizure. Since July 2005, [the mother] has failed to consistently follow through with [such son's] therapy or psychiatric appointments . . .

(O) "Although mother has maintained sobriety for 2 years, stable housing and [although she has] participated in visitation and therapy, she has failed to address the trauma of her children [caused] by [such father] or [to] address her poor parenting and discipline skills . . .

"Given the age of the children and their need to be raised in a home free of sexual abuse, with a parent capable of protecting them and responding to their emotional trauma as well as providing structure and discipline, mother cannot, within a reasonable period of time assume a responsible position in her children's lives . . .";

(P) with respect to Ground C as to the mother, the mother failed to protect the children from sexual abuse by such father and she maintained her relationship with such father "even after she learned from the Department of Social Services in New York that at least one of her children was sexually abused . . ." On at least three occasions she was told by Melody that such father "was sexually assaulting her . . ." The mother "ignored" Melody's reports. In November 2001, a New York court "issued [the mother] a no contact order with [such father] . . .";

(Q) Melody and Melinda have no "present memories of the[ir] father since the children have not seen their father since 1998 . . ."; and

(R) such father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri "has not seen the children since 3-14-03 . . ."

The worker testified that DCF's decision to proceed with the TPR petitions was based on the number of years the cases had been active, the failure of the reunification efforts, the continuing presence of several of the case issues, the mother's failure to improve her parenting skills and abilities, her poor judgment and lack of insight, and her poor ability to manage the behavior of the children. At the end of 2005, the mother's therapist perceived the mother as disorganized and chaotic.

89. Such case worker testified that the mother had failed to rehabilitate to the point where she reasonably could care for her children. Such worker stated that the mother was rehabilitating from a relationship with a male where she had been battered, her dependence on men in relationships, substance abuse, and parenting issues, including inability and failure to set boundaries and to manage the behaviors of her children.

90. On March 17, 2006, through July 25, 2006, the teenage older brother was a patient at Riverview Hospital. (Exhibit 3, 4.)

91. On April 20, 2006, April 27, 2006 and May 5, 2006, the last (fourth) psychological evaluation was conducted. The mother told the psychological evaluator that the DCF TPR petitions were "retaliation" because she "filed to fight for [her] kids" at the beginning of 2006. (Exhibit 12, 4.) The mother believed that she had "been persecuted with no just cause." Id., 9.

92. The evaluator reported that instead of improving in her responses to, candor and cooperation with the evaluation, the mother's responses to a portion of the testing "reflected a consistent and intentional effort to avoid self-disclosure. She was unwilling to discuss matters of a personal nature, be they problematic or not. While not an uncommon response bias in forensic settings, it is seldom seen to this degree. For example, she responded "False" to more MMPI items than do 99.9% of the general population . . ." Id., 9. Additionally, other data did not "support improvement in coping and stress tolerance. In fact, the opposite was suggested." Id.

93. Further, the evaluator reported that despite "her work in psychotherapy, data [did] not support improvement in insight." Id. The evaluator noted: "Persons with her pattern of testing are closed-minded, and disinclined to material change in their views and ways." Id.

94. Although, the teenage older brother had been reunified with the mother for approximately seven months before he was again removed from her care, and the mother was seeing him regularly at Riverview Hospital with the goal of reunification into the mother's home, the mother's therapist recommended that any new reunification efforts start with Jaime, then Melinda, Jenira and Neri, "and Melody and [the teenage older brother], last." Id., 12.

95. In the interaction portion of the evaluation the evaluator observed that with her children, "[a]part from her provision of food, the mother's nurturing and blatant affection were limited. They did, however, notably increase upon [the teenage older brother's] arrival, and she continued to interact in a more physical and affectionate manner until the end of the observation." Id., 23.

96. After the evaluation process, the psychologist concluded that the mother was "feeling quite defensive, and is wont to rail at the perceived injustices of her circumstances. More than simply an expression of her feelings in the matter, this is likely an attempt to shift attention and blame away from her and unto others, and circumstances . . . She may lack confidence in herself, but she has little interest in changing her perspectives or behavior, and substantive change appears highly unlikely." Id., 26.

97. The evaluator opined: "[The mother's] limited stress tolerance and modest coping skills, combined with essentially ongoing dysphoria, make her prone to responding to the demands of a parental role in notably impulsive and ill-advised ways. This occurs in spite of her ability to articulate the appropriate course and response. Her emotionality also detracts from her stability and the stability of her relationships — including those with her children. Emotional liability and a propensity for dependent relationships place her at greater than normal risk for abusive relationships and attendant domestic disharmony — potentially providing inappropriate models for children in her care. Her consistent failure to perform at a level approaching her potential makes it difficult for her to consistently provide practical support to her children. Her limited motivation for change and limited persistence often mean that she fails to sustain important services for them. This includes sustaining modifications in her parenting practice. Perceiving most guidance to be intrusive, if not threatening, she is disinclined to make changes in her lifestyle, relationships and parenting practice." Id., 27-28.

98. The psychological evaluator also opined: "While [the mother] demonstrates the intellect and understanding necessary to effect productive changes, it is evident that she continues to demonstrate inadequate or inappropriate parenting when given the opportunity to have the children in her care. Such failures are evident despite more than adequate services and an appropriate level of participation in such services . . . [T]here is little to suggest that the mother will productively improve to the degree that she would consistently parent any of her children in a safe and psychologically healthy manner consistent with their best interests . . . [The mother] continues to accept little responsibility for the children's mistreatment — at her hands and at the hands of her former partner . . ." Id., 29. (Emphasis supplied.)

99. Thus, the mother did not demonstrate to the psychological evaluator either acceptance of responsibility for the actions against her children, or her rehabilitation in a manner sufficient adequately to parent them. Such psychological evaluator observed: "The long period outside her care has effectively precluded an ongoing parent/child relation for Melody, Melinda and Jenira." Id.

100. After such evaluation process, such court-ordered psychological evaluator concluded: "Continued placement outside the family of origin appears in the best interests of all of the children except [the teenage older brother]. Lacking an evaluation of the boy, the examiner is unable to recommend a specific placement." Id., 28.

101. In his reports and testimony, the psychological evaluator referred to or described the close relationship between such teenage older brother of Melody and Melinda and the mother, his determination to protect his favored place in the mother's home and to win any competition for the mother's attention, his behavioral issues, his failure to take, and the mother's failure to insure that he took, his anti-seizure and other medication, the mother's physical discipline of him, his bullying of the younger children, his in-patient treatment at Riverview Hospital during 2006, and family therapy involving him and the mother. See, e.g., exhibit 10, pages 1, 3, 5-6, 8-11; exhibit C-4; exhibit 12, pages 2-3 ("[Such teenage older brother] was noted to have attacked one or more siblings in Spring 2005. In July 2005, [the mother] allegedly struck [such teenage older brother] in annoyance. In October, she reportedly struck him with a belt, leaving marks. In the interim, concerns were raised about [such teenage older brother] bullying Jaime. The mother was characterized as `slow to respond or intervene.' Also in 10/05, the mother reportedly left [such teenage older brother] alone with several younger siblings, during an unsupervised visit. Melinda reported that [such older teenage brother] hit them, and was torturing an animal. In 11/05, [the mother] reportedly left Jaime with `known drug dealers.' On 12/2/05, [such older teenage brother] had a seizure. It was discovered that the child's blood levels of anticonvulsive medication were low, and it was subsequently reported that he had not taken his medication for a month. [The mother] reportedly failed to deliver him to his prior neurologist appointment, and she allegedly allowed his medical coverage to lapse. As well, it was reported that she failed to deliver him to several psychiatrist appointments. Pursuant to these concerns, [such teenage older brother and Jaime] were returned to DCF care on 12/2/05"). Id., 3.

102. On the April and May 2006, dates of the fourth evaluation, such teenage older brother, who prior to the December 2006, commencement of the trial had been returned to and was living with the mother, was a patient at Riverview Hospital. After his December 2, 2005 removal from the mother's home, he "fared poorly, acting out in various placements and moving through a series of treatment programs and foster homes. Runaway behavior, assault on other children and generalized verbal and physical abuse were noted." Id.

103. From July 25, 2006, through August 23, 2006, based on a court order sought by his attorney, the teenage older brother was placed at Connecticut Children's Place to prepare him to return to the care and custody of the mother.

104. On August 25, 2006, the teenage older brother returned to the home of his mother to reside with the mother and the mother's oldest child. Since that time, because of her commitments and obligations the mother has had "some difficulty" in keeping up with such teenage older brother's medication needs and in getting him to his psychiatrist. (Exhibit 3, 4.) Such teenage older brother complained that the mother was not spending enough time with him. The mother switched from her intensive college nursing program to be more available for him. Such child requires a very large amount of the mother's attention and effort to keep him on track, and to deal with his school and social issues.

105. Both of the mother's parents are deceased. (Exhibit 2, 3.) Despite the mother's claims "that she grew up in a loving home, she has not had contact with her siblings in years and she left home at the age of 16 . . .," the year her father died. Id., 3-4. The mother "is opposed to the Department's contact with her family and requested that the Department not reach them." Id., 8. "Currently [as of January 2006,], [the mother] is refusing . . . [to] allow the Department to contact her relatives for possible placement resources." Id., 10. The mother thus does not have available to her any family support.

106. Since 1998, the mother has not had contact with the father of Melody and Melinda. Id., 5. Such biological father has never seen Melinda. Id. On March 20, 2003, this court found that further efforts to reunify such father with such children were no longer appropriate. Id., 10.

107. Since he allegedly took her vehicle without permission in 2003, the mother claims not to have had contact with the biological father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri. The parental rights of the biological father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri have previously been terminated to five of his other children. Id., 5. On January 20, 2004, this court found that further efforts to reunify such father with such children were no longer appropriate. Id., 10. Such father's last scheduled visit with such children was in March 2003. Id., 11.

108. As of May 22, 2006, the mother continued to refuse to take a hair drug screening test. (Exhibit 3, 27.) On October 23, 2006, the mother attended an appointment for a hair test and the results were negative for all substances. (Exhibit 4, 2.) (See fn 6, infra.)

109. Although it was reported by the GAL and others that the mother has admitted her failure to protect the five oldest children during the lengthy period of their sexual abuse by her boyfriend, she has continuously excused or sought to excuse her failure to act to protect such children from the horrific sexually abusive actions of such boyfriend.⁷ After she eventually acknowledged that the children were sexually abused, and that she had failed or was unwilling to hear their reports of such continuing sexual abuse, she began to make excuses for her failure to do so based on the allegedly incapacitating effects of her excessive substance abuse that she claimed had occurred during the period of the children's exposure to such sexual abuse.

7 In her March 25, 2003, initial evaluation by the forensic psychologist, the mother was in denial about her role in and responsibility for the sexual abuse of her children, and her failure or unwillingness to protect such children: "`Maybe I'm partly to blame for not seeing it, but I didn't do anything directly to my children, and I've suffered.'"(Exhibit 7, 5.)
In the August 26-27, 2003, second evaluation, the mother stated that she had come to believe that the children were sexually abused, but she was not responsible: "I told [the teenage older brother] that [her boyfriend/sexual abuser] is responsible and he needs to pay for what has happened." (Exhibit 8, 3.)
In a September 29, 2003, addendum to the second psychological evaluation, the psychological evaluator wrote that the mother's therapist reported to him that the mother "has steadfastly maintained in therapy that Melody never made any disclosure to her prior to removal . . ." (Exhibit 9, 2.)
In the June 15, 2004, third evaluation, the mother admitted to the evaluator, ". . . counter to her previous assertions, [that] she had been using marijuana and heroin prior to the children's removal." (Exhibit 10, 2.) The mother conceded that "[s]exual abuse . . . had been the primary issue in removal. She allowed that reunification had been delayed because Melody had allegedly told her of the abuse, yet she failed to act. She continued to deny that this had occurred. She offered, however, that she had been `so high that anything could have happened in front of me and I wouldn't have known it.' `The drug abuse played a big part in my not being able to protect my kids,' she suggested. Pressed regarding Melody's report to her, she pleaded, `In her way, she might have been trying to tell me stuff and it didn't dawn on me . . . I just didn't catch it.'" (Exhibit 10, 4.) As the guardian ad litem testified, the mother has continued to use the excuse of "I was blinded by my excessive substance abuse" through the present to excuse her from having or taking responsibility for the sexual abuse of her children, her failure or unwillingness to protect them, and the consequences thereof.
In the mother's February 12, 2007, brief in opposition to TPR, page 11, ". . . her claim [is] that her drug use prevented her from recognizing that the abuse was occurring . . ."
Such a type of excuse as a way to acknowledge the wrongfulness of one's actions but to avoid personal responsibility for them is well known, inter alia, in the criminal law:
"In contrast to justification defenses, excuse defenses `concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the actor'; G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) p. 759; based `on the presence within the actor of a condition or status that exculpates him or her from culpability . . .' Taylor v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 54, 63, 521 S.E.2d 293 (1999), aff'd, 260 Va. 683, 537 S.E.2d 592 (2000). `A justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act.' G. Fletcher, supra, p. 759. Examples of excuse defenses include insanity, duress and involuntary intoxication.
G. Fletcher, `The Right and the Reasonable,' 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 954-55 (1985)." State v. Montanez, 277 Conn. 735, 752 n. 17, 894 A.2d 928 (2006). The Appellate Court recently has examined "involuntary intoxication" in State v. Borrelli, 94 Conn.App. 849, 895 A.2d 257 (2006). In this case, however, the mother's asserted excessive heroin abuse was "voluntary."
An earlier version of such type of excuse is described in Jacob D. Zeldes, Connecticut's Most Memorable "Good For Nothing Rascal," 80 Conn. Bar Journal 367, 397 n. 130 (2006). In 1815 or 1816, before his execution, Peter Lung, who was convicted of the murder of his wife, "wrote to his mother-in-law (protesting his innocence and confessing he `was often to be disguised with liquor and when this was the case, [he] was in a violent rage') . . ."
As the execution of Peter Lung and other cases demonstrate, an excuse need not be accepted. In the recent case of Krukiel v. Krukiel, No. (MMX)FA950074621S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex, Regional Family Trial Docket at Waterbury (Bozzuto, J., January 18, 2007), 2007 CT.Sup. 1101, 1004 (Loislaw) the court did ". . . not accept the Plaintiff's excuse that the situation [was] just `boys being boys.'" In David M. Somers Assoc. v. Busch, No. CV 03 0822125S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford (Sheldon, J., April 10, 2006) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 332], 2006 Ct.Sup. 6796, 6815 (Loislaw), the lawyer's disbarment was not a "valid legal excuse" for the lawyer's nonperformance of his contract with his client: "Impossibility, to reiterate, is not an excuse for non-performance when the occurrence or condition that gave rise to it is one for which the party . . . is itself at fault." In a previous case, this court declined to accept DCF excuses for its failure to protect and to act in the best interests of a child. In re Nathan Z., Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham, Juvenile Matters at Willimantic (Bear, J., Sept. 18, 2005), 2005 Ct.Sup. 13060, 13068 (Loislaw).
In a recent case involving Representative Mark Foley, it was reported that when he resigned from the U. S. House of Representatives, "he said he was entering treatment for `alcoholism and related behavioral problems,' the latter including his online flirtation with teenage boys. His lawyer said the Florida Republican was under the influence when he wrote the sexually charged messages that got him in trouble." Jacob Sullum, Demon Rum Defense, Washington Times, October 14, 2006 (available online). The reporter wrote that "[a]lcoholic impairment may be the world's oldest excuse. It was the reason . . . that (some say) Aaron's sons, Nadav and Avihu, brought `strange fire' into the Tabernacle." Id. The reporter further wrote that "[t]he defense does not always work; Nadav and Avihu, for instance, were immediately consumed by divine fire. But it must work enough for people to keep trotting it out after all these years . . ." Id. The reporter noted the consequences of the defense: "Mr. Foley seems eager to be known as a drunk as well as a pervert . . . If he's an alcoholic . . . he is not fully responsible for his behavior. In those online exchanges with pages, it was his disease talking not him . . ." Id.

110. The GAL and others who have accepted the statements of the mother that seem to be an acceptance of responsibility have failed to note that such statements contain excuses to avoid such personal responsibility and have failed to discern and to understand that, while the mother may have articulated her upset about the continuing sexual and physical abuse of her five oldest children, she did not actually acknowledge and accept her personal responsibility to prevent such horrific sexual acts committed by her boyfriend against such children, she did not acknowledge and accept her failure or unwillingness to prevent them, and she did not accept her responsibility for her and such boyfriend's physical abuse of such children. For example, in the mother's February 12, 2007, brief in opposition to TPR, page 11, ". . . her claim [is] that her drug use prevented her from recognizing that the abuse was occurring . . ."

111. Because the mother has not been able to acknowledge and accept that she was personally responsible for what happened to and that she failed to protect such children, the mother has been unable to take the steps necessary for her rehabilitation to the point where she could be viewed as a viable resource for the protection and safety of her children, and thus as a viable parenting resource with whom the children could again reside permanently.⁸

8 In the May 18, 2006, report, the psychological evaluator concluded as follows:
"While [the mother] demonstrates the intellect and understanding necessary to effect productive changes, it is evident that she continues to demonstrate inadequate or inappropriate parenting when given the opportunity to have the children in her care. Such failures are evident despite more than adequate services and an appropriate level of participation in such services . . . [T]here is little to suggest that the mother will productively improve to the degree that she would consistently parent any of her children in a safe and psychologically healthy manner consistent with their best interests . . .
"Owing to the mother's slow progress in rehabilitation, the children have remained outside the home for an unreasonable period. While she gives the appearance of adequate education in parenting skills, has the intellect to make reasonable decisions regarding their welfare, and has sufficient understanding for self-management, [the mother] continues to accept little responsibility for the children's maltreatment — at her hands and at the hands of her former partner.
Whatever insight she has gained through education and treatment has not translated to consistency in responsible parenting, and the children are in need of permanency now." (Exhibit 12, 28.)
The mother's excuses and lack of acceptance of responsibility were and are not limited to her former boyfriend's sexual abuse of the children. See exhibit 12, 4-6. Also, the mother did not claim that she was continuously incapacitated by her heroin use at all times after she, the perpetrator and the children fled from NY CFS and moved to Connecticut, so the mother has not used that excuse to explain away her failure to register the children in school for five months in 2002. She did claim, however, as an excuse for not registering them, that she was afraid they would be removed from her. Once she, her boyfriend and the children did come to the attention of DCF, all children except the oldest child were in fact removed.

112. Paradoxically, the mother's admissions — to the GAL, the psychological evaluator and others — of her failure to believe her children's statements and to protect them from the continuing sexual and physical abuse by, and continued exposure to, her boyfriend, and of her unwillingness to send her children to school for approximately five months, establish the basis for the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother denied Melody, Melinda, Jenira and Jaime, by reason of acts of parental commission and omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for their physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being.

113. In the fall of 2006, such teenage older brother "reportedly had some behavioral issues and ha[d] been suspended, the first of which [suspensions] happened on the 3d day of school." Id. Because of his disruptive and aggressive behavior, he was asked not to attend the weekly family visitations. Because of his continued presence in and access to the mother's home, and because of his continuing behavioral issues and his need for full-time monitoring and supervision, his siblings and half-siblings would be in constant danger if they were returned to the mother and lived in her home. See, e. g., exhibit 12, 13; exhibit 3, 28-29.

114. DCF substantiated the mother for physical neglect of Melinda and Jenira when the mother left them unsupervised by her and in such teenage older brother's care. Id., 16. Currently, such teenage older brother is placed with the mother under an order of protective supervision that expires on May 23, 2007. (Exhibit 4, 2.)

115. In February 2007, at the conclusion of the trial, the teenage older brother and the mother's oldest child were residing with the mother in her home.

116. See also the factual findings set forth in pages 69-79, infra.

APPLICABLE LAW:

C.G.S. section 17a-93 provides: "As used in sections 17a-90 to 17a-124, inclusive, and 17a-152: . . . (e) `Termination of parental rights' means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent or parents so that the child is free for adoption except it shall not affect the right of inheritance of such child or the religious affiliation of such child . . ."

C.G.S. section 45a-707(8) also defines the termination of parental rights as above:

"`Termination of parental rights' means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents so that the child is free for adoption except it shall not affect the right of inheritance of the child or the religious affiliation of the child . . ."

1. Prerequisite to any TPR determination, and the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner DCF:

The prerequisite to a determination that any TPR petition should be granted is that the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of section 17a-110 or section 17a-111b that such efforts are not appropriate, [and]

(2) that termination is in the best interest of the child . . ." (C.G.S. 17a-112(j)(3).)

The third requirement is that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF has proved at least one of seven statutory grounds for termination.⁹ The grounds that are alleged in this case are:

9 "The respondent also claims that the court improperly found that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between the respondent and the child pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). We decline to review that claim. `Because the statutory grounds necessary to grant a petition for termination of parental rights are expressed in the disjunctive, the court need find only one ground to grant the petition. Thus, we may affirm the court's decision if we find that it properly concluded that any one of the statutory circumstances existed.' In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003). Having concluded that the court properly found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to rehabilitate herself pursuant § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii), we need not address the respondent's remaining claim." In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 214, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).
"After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under General Statutes § 17a-112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest." In re Davonta K., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43(2006), cert. granted, 280 Conn. 947 (2006).

"(A) The child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;

(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to be neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;

(C) the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. Nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights;

(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . ." Id.

Despite the order in section 17a-112(j) in which the statutory prerequisites to be proved are set forth, prior to any termination of parental rights, "[i]f the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

2. Explanation of Ground A, abandonment: CT Page 3370

"Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment . . . General Statutes [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . .

"[Section 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern. The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 37 (2000). In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 839-40, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).

3. Explanation of Ground B, failure to rehabilitate: A. General standards:

In In re Halle T., 96 Conn.App. 815, 835, 902 A.2d 670 (2006), the Appellate Court has explained the failure to rehabilitate requirements as follows:

"Failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation is one of the seven statutory grounds on which parental rights may be terminated under § 17a-112(j)(3). We have stated that [p]ersonal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . Rehabilitate means to restore [a . . . delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through social rehabilitation . . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life. Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life . . ." (Emphasis in original.)

The Appellate Court also elucidated the foregoing finding requirement as follows:

"[T]he adjudicatory determination to be made by the trial court is whether the parent of a child who has been found by the [S]uperior [C]ourt to have been neglected [or] uncared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child . . .

`Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue . . . Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children.' (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259-60, 881 A.2d 450 (2005); see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 383-84, 784 A.2d 457 (2001); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 740 A.2d 496 (1999)." In re Halle T., supra, 96 Conn.App. at 835-36.

The Appellate Court also referred to Supreme Court statements of the applicable standards:

"Our Supreme Court has instructed that the applicable standard in these types of cases requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [a parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); see also In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 399, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 17; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984). A finding of when the respondent would be able to resume caring for the child was required neither by statute nor by case law. Instead, the court properly examined whether, `within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, [the] parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re John G., supra, 17." In re Halle T., supra, 96 Conn.App. at 837.

The Appellate Court then focused on the importance of the factual context of the child's circumstances in each case:

"We recently emphasized the importance of conducting this inquiry by considering the factual context of the particular child's situation. 'The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child . . . What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.' (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 260; see also In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706; In re Christina V., 38 Conn.App. 214, 220-21, 660 A.2d 863 (1995); see also In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 173-74, 743 A.2d 165 (1999) (respondent's failure to achieve rehabilitation illustrated by lack of understanding of child's medical, psychiatric condition)." In re Halle T., supra, 96 Conn.App. at 837-38.

Finally, the Appellate Court noted that in a number of cases the parent was unable to meet the standard of rehabilitation sufficiently to have the child returned and to avoid a termination of parental rights:

"The court acknowledged the evidence that the respondent had made some progress in personal rehabilitation. Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the child's significant needs, such progress, made over approximately two years, was insufficient when considered in relation to the child's special needs and her need for permanency. Our case law contains numerous examples of a parent, who, despite an admirable attempt, was unable to achieve rehabilitation sufficiently and, as a result, lost his or her parental rights. See, e.g., In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 22-25; In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 479-82 (respondent's efforts at rehabilitation too little, too late and court's finding that she failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation despite some level of stability not clearly erroneous); In re Shyliesh H., supra, 56 Conn.App. 172-75 (although respondent testified that he loved child, trial court's finding that he lacked insight, responsibility to cope with her significant psychiatric disorder supported determination of failure to achieve rehabilitation)." In re Halle T., supra, 96 Conn.App. at 838-39. (Footnote omitted.)

In an earlier decision, the Appellate Court noted that the trial court must consider the complete history of the respondent's parenting abilities:

"The court, however, makes an inquiry into the full history of the respondent's parenting abilities. In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999)." In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 499, 816 A.2d 697 (2003), cert. den. 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003). In a dissolution of marriage context this requirement has been expressed as follows:

"Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has also held that "the court must . . . take account of the parents' past behavior, since it must evaluate their present and future parenting ability and the consistency of their parenting for the purpose of determining which parent will better foster the [child's] growth, development and well-being.' Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 283, 440 A.2d 899 (1981)." Gil v. Gil, 94 Conn.App. 306, 322, 892 A.2d 318 (2006).

B. Ground B exception to the usual rule that in the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events occurring prior to the filing of the TPR petition, as amended:

Connecticut Practice Book section 35a-7 provides that

"(a) in the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.

"(b) In the discretion of the judicial authority, evidence on adjudication and disposition may be heard in a non-bifurcated hearing, provided disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded."

In In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002), the Appellate Court explained the language of Conn. Practice Book section 33-3(a), the predecessor of section 35a-7, as follows: "`A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998). `In the adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings, the court determines the validity of the grounds alleged in the petition, and therefore is limited to events preceding the filing date of the petition. In the disposition phase, the court is concerned with what action should be taken in the best interests of the child, and in that phase the court is entitled to consider facts occurring until the end of the trial.' In re Romance M., 30 Conn.App. 839, 859, 622 A.2d 1047 (1993), appeal dismissed, 229 Conn. 345, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

"Despite Practice Book [section] 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under [section] 17a-112(c)(3)(B), the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). In In re Stanley D., we addressed a claim that the trial court improperly found that the respondent had not achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation within the meaning of [section] 17a-112(c)(3)(B). Id., 225, 763 A.2d 83. In our explanation of the requirements of [section] 17a-112(c)(3)(B) and the hearing process for petitions to terminate parental rights based on that section, we stated that "`[p]ersonal rehabilitation' refers to the reasonable foreseeability of the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent, not merely the ability to manage his or her own life . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) The respondent, therefore, cannot prevail on his claim that the court could not consider whether he had achieved personal rehabilitation during the eighteen months subsequent to the filing of the petitions." Id., 748-49.

In Ground (B)(i) cases, a court may consider events subsequent to the filing date of the petitions, but it does not have to do so: "This court has expanded that rule [set forth in section 35a-7(a)] to allow courts to consider events subsequent to the filing date of the petitions in the adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings. `Practice Book [section] 33-3(a) [now section 35a-7] limits the time period reviewable by the court in the adjudicatory phase to the events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.' (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. At 230, 763 A.2d 83; see In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. at 776, 785, 746 A.2d 222 (2000).

"The respondent's appeal challenges the evidence that a court must consider during the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings. The respondent argues that because this court has stated that trial courts may, in their discretion, consider such evidence, fundamental fairness requires the trial court to consider those events that take place up until the hearing. We do not agree with the respondent." In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. at 494-95.

C. The relationship between a respondent's compliance with the "specific steps" and whether there is "sufficient rehabilitation":

Pursuant to C.G.S. section 46b-129(d):

". . . The court, after a hearing pursuant to this subsection, shall order specific steps the commissioner and the parent or guardian shall take for the parent or guardian to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth . . ." The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of compliance by each respondent with the specific steps:

"The specific steps that a respondent and DCF must follow in order to provide an opportunity for reunification. Although the present appeal does not concern a termination proceeding, we note that specific steps are considered to be `fair warning' to a parent of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings. In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding . . ." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584 (2003). For an explanation and application of DCF's obligations pursuant to the specific steps, see In re Leah S., 96 Conn.App. 1 (2006), cert. granted, 280 Conn. 911 (2006).

The Appellate Court has explained that successful completion of the specific steps, e.g., "petitioner's expressly articulated expectations," is, by itself, "not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. At 670, 783 A.2d 534." In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. at 500. In Vincent D., the Appellate Court explained: "In determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department . . . Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a department claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation . . ." (Citations omitted.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).

With appropriate notice, the court may order specific compliance with the specific steps, and the court may enforce its order with its contempt power. In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).

4. Explanation of Ground C, acts of parental commission or omission:

In In re Rachel J., 97 Conn.App. 748, 754-55 (2006), the Appellate Court discussed Ground C in the context of co-terminus neglect and TPR petitions:

"The court issued a thorough and well-reasoned memorandum of decision on June 3, 2005, in which it found that there was ample evidence that R and N were neglected in that they were denied proper care and attention and permitted to live under conditions or associations injurious to their well-being. The court found that `the extreme injury inflicted on [R], and [the respondent's] subsequent failure to obtain medical treatment for many days amounted to a denial of proper care and attention of both children . . . [R] has been abused and received a serious physical injury that was inflicted by other than accidental means.' In addition, the court found that the respondent exposed R to sexual abuse. It stated: `Whether the abuse was perpetrated by [the respondent] or by [F] as [the department] originally believed, in either instance, both children were permitted to live in a home where sexual abuse occurred. [R's] significant behavioral problems demonstrate the serious effect the abuse has had on [R].' As to N, the court specifically found that `the domestic violence and physical and emotional abuse of [R] created an environment in the home such that [N] was denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally and was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being.' The court further found that `the fact that [the respondent] severely injured [R] after entering into [two service] agreements is further evidence that the children were neglected.'

"Finding that both children were neglected, the court turned its attention to the termination petitions. As to R, the only ground alleged in the termination petition was that the respondent, as a result of sexual molestation and severe physical abuse on her part, denied R the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being under § 17a-112(j)(3)(C). The court found by clear and convincing evidence that R's injuries at the hands of the respondent constituted nonaccidental serious physical injuries to a child. It found further that the respondent's `failure to obtain medical treatment for [R] for days after the injury constituted an act of parental omission that . . . denied her the care, guidance and control necessary for her well-being. Moreover, [the respondent] only took [R] for treatment after learning that [the department worker] and [the] father were planning to see [R] the following day.' The court found that, in addition to serious physical injury, R suffered serious emotional injury and sexual abuse while living with the respondent. Accordingly, the court concluded that the respondent denied R, by reason of acts of parental commission and omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being."

In another recent decision, In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn.App. 624, 626-27, 905 A.2d 706 (2006), the Appellate Court also affirmed a Ground C basis for the termination of parental rights upon the following summary of facts:

"The court found that [children] N and Y had seen the respondent and the father abuse [another child] E [who eventually died], and that the respondent had ordered N and Y to hit E with a sandal. There was no evidence, however, that the respondent and the father physically had abused N and Y. The court nonetheless found that the respondent and the father had failed to provide N and Y with "a safe home environment free of violence" and accordingly granted the petitions for neglect and termination of parental rights . . ."

The Appellate Court discussed the portion of Ground C that refers to a parent's failure to provide for the emotional well-being of a child:

"The respondent next claims that the court improperly found that she had failed to provide for the emotional well-being of N and Y pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(C). In support of her claim, the respondent points out that she did not physically abuse N and Y and that she was not the biological mother or legal guardian of E. Section 17a-112(j), however, provides in relevant part that the court `may grant a petition [for termination of parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . (3) that . . . (C) the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to . . . the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being . . .' That statute does not require that the children who are the subjects of the termination petition be abused physically. See In re Sean H., 24 Conn.App. 135, 144, 586 A.2d 1171, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 904, 588 A.2d 1078 (1991). Furthermore, the respondent's relationship with E is not relevant to her claim. See id., 143-46. We conclude that the court properly found that the respondent had failed to provide for the emotional well-being of N and Y by abusing E in their presence and ordering them to participate in the abuse." In re Nelmarie O., supra, 97 Conn.App. at 628-29 (fn omitted).

5. Explanation of Ground D, no parent-child relationship:

Judge Wollenberg recently has explained the requirements of Ground D, no parent-child relationship, to require a finding by this court that "no positive aspects of the relationship survive," e.g., that the child has no positive feelings toward the parent:

"This ground alleged by DCF requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means `the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.' This statutory definition, as it has been interpreted in case law, requires a finding that `no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.' In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991). It is inherently ambiguous when applied to non-custodial parents who must maintain their relationship with their children through visitation. Id., 459; In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 531, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). Although the ultimate question is usually whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent, the existence of a loving relationship or a `psychological parent' relationship with one other than the natural parent does not, of itself, establish the no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination. In re Jessica M., supra, 473-75.

"Unlike the other nonconsensual grounds to terminate parental rights, the absence of a parent-child relationship is considered a `no fault' ground for termination. To establish this ground requires the trial court to make a two-pronged determination. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists; and second, the court must look to the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop. The absence of a parent-child relationship can be demonstrated in situations where a child has never known his or her parents so that no relationship ever developed between them, or where the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence, it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). Judicial interpretation has imposed a requirement that a child have `present memories or feelings' for the parent, and `at least some aspects of these memories and feelings are positive' to overcome this ground. In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 475; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1984). The existence of positive feelings usually depends on the viewpoint of the child. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 35, 534 A.2d 897 (1987). As the Appellate Court recently noted, `the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.' In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602 (1999). `Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.' Id." In re Jannessa C., Docket No. H12-CP04-009929-A, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford (Wollenberg, J., Aug. 2, 2006). In In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 268-70 (2006), decided after Jannessa C., the Appellate Court, citing Jessica M., set forth the "two-pronged analysis": "First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).

"In In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 586 A.2d 597 (1991), our Supreme Court defined an ongoing parent-child relationship as it applies to noncustodial parents. The court stated that termination of a noncustodial parent's rights requires a finding that `the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 468. When the child does have present memories or feelings, there must be a finding that `no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.' Id., 470. We recognize that `the evidence regarding the quality of [a parent's] relationship with [a] child must be reviewed in the light of the [parent's] limited access to visitation at the time of the petition.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 425, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003)."

6. The best interest of the child requirements:

"After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under General Statutes § 17a-112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest. That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged. Although a judge is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is intensely human. It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript." In re Davonta V., supra, 98 Conn.App. at 42, 43.

"A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under § 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).

"In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, `the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.' In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). During this dispositional phase, `the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in § 17a-112[k].' In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361-62, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). We note that those `seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered . . . There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.' (Citation omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261, 829 A.2d 855 (2003)." In re Davonta V., supra, 98 Conn.App. at 46-47. (Footnote omitted.) Although the focus in the dispositional phase "appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child . . ." In re Romance M., supra, the sixth required finding in § 17a-112(k) is to consider ". . . the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child . . .";

Also, although "the best interest of the child" is referred to as a dispositional focus, the concept also appears in one of the adjudicatory grounds, Ground D, no parent-child relationship:

"(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . ." (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3).)

Also, C.G.S. § 17a-112(q) provides that the "provisions of this section shall be liberally construed in the best interest of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed." The seven adjudicatory grounds are part of "the provisions of this section," e.g., § 17a-112.

Effective October 1, 2005, in C.G.S. § 46b-56, the General Assembly established a set of factors that the court may consider in determining the best interest of a child when entering a custody order, some of which factors may be applicable in a TPR case. C.G.S. § 46b-56(c) is as follows:

"(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:

(1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;

(2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;

(3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;

(4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;

(5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;

(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;

(7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;

(8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;

(9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;

(10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;

(11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;

(12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;

(13) the child's cultural background;

(14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;

(15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and

(16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers."

This court's responsibility does not include where or with whom a child should live after a termination of parental rights, and thus this court should not enter orders concerning such matters as part of any TPR case disposition:

"In the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding, the court properly considers only whether the parent's parental rights should be terminated, not where or with whom a child should reside following termination." In re Sheena I., 63 Conn.App. 713, 726, 778 A.2d 997 (2001). However, after termination of parental rights the court generally appoints DCF as each child's statutory parent, see C.G.S. CT Page 3384 17a-146: ". . . the Commissioner of Children and Families shall exercise and have all authority, rights, duties and functions granted to or imposed upon the Commissioner of Social Services in the general statutes in the area of adoption of children, including, but not limited to, authority . . . to act as a statutory parent as defined in section 45a-707."

C.G.S. section 17a-93 provides: "As used in sections 17a-90 to 17a-124, inclusive, and 17a-152: . . . (f) `Statutory parent' means the Commissioner of Children and Families or that child-placing agency appointed by the court for the purpose of giving a minor child or minor children in adoption . . ." C.G.S. section 45a-707(7) also provides:" `Statutory parent' means the Commissioner of Children and Families or the child-placing agency appointed by the court for the purpose of the adoption of a minor child or minor children . . ." C.G.S. section 17a-112(m) provides: . . . The Superior Court may appoint a statutory parent at any time after it has terminated parental rights if the petitioner so requests."

C.G.S. section 17a-112(o) provides: "In the case where termination of parental rights is granted, the guardian of the person or statutory parent shall report to the court within thirty days of the date judgment is entered on a case plan, as defined by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, for the child which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules. At least every three months thereafter, such guardian or statutory parent shall make a report to the court on the progress made on implementation of the plan . . . If the court determines that the department has not made reasonable efforts to place a child in an adoptive placement or that reasonable efforts have not resulted in the placement of the child, the court may order the Department of Children and Families, within available appropriations, to contract with a child-placing agency to arrange for the adoption of the child. The department, as statutory parent, shall continue to provide care and services for the child while a child-placing agency is arranging for the adoption of the child."

In determining the best interest of a child, the court considers and applies, inter alia, the concepts of stability, closure and permanency:

"It is abundantly clear that the court gave careful consideration to the concepts of closure and permanency and did not simply use those terms as empty incantations." In re Davonta V., supra, 98 Conn.App. at 53. "In its decision, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children's best interests would be served by granting the petitions to terminate the respondent's parental rights. In support of that finding, the court noted that much of the children's short lives had been spent in the custody of the commissioner, and that the children needed stability and permanency in their lives. On the basis of those facts, we conclude that the court's determination that the respondent's parental rights should be terminated was not clearly erroneous." In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. at 262.

7. The standard of clear and convincing evidence:

In In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App. 151, 158-59, 756 A.2d 303 (2000), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940 (2000) the Appellate Court explained the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence:

"While it is true that evidence of the respondent's acts of omission was largely circumstantial, that evidence was sufficient. The law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative force is concerned. State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211, 478 A.2d 1005 (1984). The standard of clear and convincing proof used in this case denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the issuable fact in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n., 170 Conn. 520, 536-37, 368 A.2d 125 (1976). In a criminal case, the jury may draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven as long as they do not resort to speculation and conjecture. State v. Festo, 181 Conn. 254, 259, 435 A.2d 38 (1980). In a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence, the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts, and not any one fact, may establish guilt. State v. Bember, 183 Conn. 394, 397, 439 A.2d 387 (1981). Insofar as circumstantial evidence can be and is routinely used to meet the higher standard of proof in a criminal prosecution, so can it be used in a case such as this where the applicable standard is that of clear and convincing proof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), supra, 3 Conn.App. 192-93.

In Miller v. Commissioner of Corrections, 242 Conn. 745, 794-95 (1997), Justice Borden explained such standard:

"The clear and convincing standard of proof is substantially greater than the usual civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, but less than the highest legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It `is sustained if the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.' (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonello, CT Page 3386 210 Conn. 51, 66, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082, 109 S.Ct. 2103, 104 L.Ed.2d 664 (1989).

"Although we have characterized this standard of proof as a `middle tier standard'; J. Frederick Scholes Agency v. Mitchell, 191 Conn. 353, 358, 464 A.2d 795 (1983); and as `an intermediate standard'; State v. Davis, supra, 229 Conn. 293; between the ordinary civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, or more probably than not and the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this characterization does not mean that the clear and convincing standard is necessarily to be understood as lying equidistant between the two. Its emphasis on the high probability and the substantial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such . . . We have stated that the clear and convincing evidence standard `should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 539, 441 A.2d 151 (1981) . . ." (Footnotes omitted.)

8. The construction of C.G.S. section 17a-112:

As set forth above, C.G.S. Section 17a-112(a) provides that the "provisions of this section shall be liberally construed in the best interest of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

However, "[f]amily reunification is an important social objective. As our Supreme Court recently has reminded us: `[A]n important goal of the child protection statutes, in addition to protecting children from abuse and neglect, is to preserve family integrity by . . . teaching parents the skills they need to nurture and care for their children.' Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 754, 865 A.2d 428 (2005)." In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 570-71, 877 A.2d 941 (2005), affirmed, 280 Conn. 474 (2006).

9. The balancing of the legitimate interests of the parents, children and the state of Connecticut:

"The desire and right of a parent to maintain a familial relationship with a child cannot be separated from the desire and best interest of a child either to maintain or to abandon that relationship, or the interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children. The legitimate interests of parent, child and state require a balancing of the factors involved in those interests . . . In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle . . ." (Citations omitted.) In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 592, 598-99, 767 A.2d 155 (2001).

Former Chief Justice Peters has noted: "Cases involving the termination of parental rights are always difficult . . . Accordingly, the court sought the proper balance between the parents' constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody and control of their children, and the interest of the state, acting as parens patriae, to protect the children's health and safety." In re Christina M., supra, 90 Conn.App. at 566-67.

C.C.S. SECTION 17A-112(k) FINDINGS: 1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and each child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of each child with the parent.

(A) The mother timely was offered the following services, inter alia:

(i) non-offending partner parenting program and understanding sexual abuse issues;

(ii) substance abuse evaluation and treatment;

(iii) individual and group therapy;

(iv) random urine screens;

(v) child parenting program;

(vi) court-ordered evaluations;

(vii) family therapy;

(viii) supervised and unsupervised visitation;

(ix) transportation for herself and her children;

CT Page 3388

(x) assistance in obtaining appropriate housing;

(xi) assistance in obtaining furniture;

(xii) intensive family reunification services;

(xiii) in-home services;

(xiv) assistance in obtaining resources for employment;

(xv) infant outreach program;

(xvi) parent aide services; and

(xvii) administrative and case management services.

(B) The following programs, inter alia, timely were offered to the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri:

(i) substance abuse treatment;

(ii) parenting classes;

(iii) sexual offender evaluation; and

(iv) individual therapy.

(C ) No services were offered to the father of Melody and Melinda because his whereabouts have been unknown since May 2002.

(D) The oldest child, who has resided with the mother since DCF became involved with the family on May 28, 2002, refused DCF offers of services, and despite his role in the family and his presence in the home, the mother was unable to persuade him to change his mind about services for himself and about regular participation in services such as visitation and family therapy.

CT Page 3389

(E) The older brother timely has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including hospitalization at Riverview Hospital; Institute of Living services; other psychiatric, psychological and counseling services; family therapy; medical and dental services; school and day programs; sexual abuse victim evaluation, diagnosis and treatment; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; in-home services; and administrative and case management services.

(F) Melody has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including psychiatric, psychological and counseling services; medical and dental services including a multidisciplinary examination ("MDE"); sexual abuse victim evaluation, diagnosis and treatment; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; and administrative and case management services.

(G) Melinda has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including psychological and counseling services; medical and dental services including an MDE; sexual abuse victim evaluation; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; and administrative and case management services.

(H) Jenira has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including birth to three services; Head Start program; medical and dental services including an MDE; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; and administrative and case management services.

(I) Jaime has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including birth to three services; Head Start program; medical and dental services including a MDE; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; in-home services; and administrative and case management services.

(J) Neri has been offered and has received numerous services from or facilitated by DCF, including medical and dental services plus a MDE; reunification services; supervised and unsupervised visitation; transportation; foster care services; and administrative and case management services.

All services offered to the children have been reasonably timely under the circumstances.

2. Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 as amended.

DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. See 1. above, and discussions of reasonable efforts throughout this memorandum of decision.

3. The terms of an applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s).

On August 7, 2002, the court issued specific steps for the mother and the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri, and on September 8, 2003, the court issued specific steps for the mother, including:

* Keep all appointments set by or with DCF . . .

Because of the mother's boyfriend's potential substantial criminal exposure, he did not make himself available to DCF nor did he comply with any specific steps. (The mother was required, and she agreed, to sever all relations with such father. Whether, and when, she actually severed her relationship with her boyfriend was disputed by DCF.)

The mother generally kept all appointments set by or with DCF.

* Keep your whereabouts and those of the children known to DCF . . .

The mother complied with this expectation.

* Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

The mother has consistently participated in individual therapy. However, in December 2005, the mother's therapist reported to DCF that the mother "continued to use poor judgment and her disorganization was troubling." (Exhibit 3, 24.) The mother's therapist also reported to DCF that "the mother would not be able to keep the children safe with their sibling, [the teenage older brother,] in the home. [Such teenage older brother] is aggressive with his younger siblings, often bullying, hitting and antagonizing them." Id.

* Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

The mother cooperated with in-home services. Id.

* Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations regarding treatment, including in-patient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.

The mother did not comply. Because of a suspicion that the mother had relapsed, DCF twice, in December 2005 and January 2006, asked the mother to take a hair test. The mother declined and waited until October 23, 2006, approximately ten months after such first DCF request, when she was sure she would test negative, before taking such test. See page 7, fn 3.

* Submit to random drug testing; time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

There is no evidence that DCF asked the mother for any tests other than hair tests.

* Submit to substance abuse assessment . . .

The mother did participate in substance abuse assessment and treatment services. In 2003 and 2005-06, however, she delayed taking requested hair tests.

CT Page 3392

* Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations and testing.

The mother attended and participated in several court-ordered evaluations, but she did not fully cooperate with the evaluator through the testing process. See, e. g., exhibit 12.

* Obtain and cooperate with restraining/protective orders and safety plans to avoid domestic violence.

The mother evidently was not asked to seek any such orders, although it would have been reasonable, based on her description of the events of August 24, 2003, and her physical condition thereafter, for her to do so. See exhibit 8.

* Sign releases.

The mother generally complied with this expectation.

* Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

DCF successfully referred the mother for a section 8 housing certificate and she successfully obtained housing that she has maintained throughout the case. (Exhibit 3, 25.)

Although the mother has obtained part-time employment through the community college in which she is enrolled, she was unsuccessful in obtaining full-time employment or in completing such college program through the conclusion of the trial. Id.

The mother has exhausted her sixty months of eligibility for DSS benefits. Id. She receives a utility stipend in connection with her Section 8 housing, food stamps and DCF has provided bus passes. Id. The mother has received food donations and additional money for utilities. Id.

There was no evidence presented as to how the mother would be able to support herself and the children if they were returned to her.

* No substance abuse.

The mother has not complied with this expectation.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.

The mother has had no known involvement with the Connecticut criminal justice system. Id.

* Infom DCF of household changes.

The mother has complied. To DCF's knowledge, there have been no changes in the mother's household other than those that occurred in connection with this case.

* Cooperate with children's therapy.

With respect to the children who are the subjects of the petitions, the mother has generally cooperated. Although it was requested by the mother, the therapists for Melody and Melinda did not recommend that they participate in family therapy with the mother. Id., 26. However, in the fall of 2005 when the mother was given the opportunity to have family therapy with Melody, the mother missed many of the scheduled sessions.

* Visit the children as often as DCF permits.

The mother generally complied with this expectation.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of each child with respect to their parents, any guardian of the person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Because of the horrific, egregious, continuing sexual abuse she was subjected to while in the mother's care, the physical abuse she suffered, and the sexual behavior of the mother and the perpetrator/stepfather she witnessed, and the other events that she witnessed, Melody is fearful of being returned to the mother's care and custody. Melody's post-traumatic stress syndrome issues and associated mental health issues continue negatively to affect her behavior. She continues to engage in inappropriate sexualized behavior. As of the second court-ordered evaluation on September 8, 2003, the psychological examiner reported that Melody still was focused on what had happened to her. She wanted to make sure that before she was returned to her mother "that her mother has housing, a job and beds. As well, she admonished, `Make sure you watch your kids — they don't get hurt or touched by another guy.' In particular, she said, `Stand by the oldest girl [herself] and make sure they don't get hurt; and no guy touches her like they did last time.'"(Exhibit 8, 11.)

The examiner concurred with Melody's therapist that, as of September 8, 2003, "Melody [was] in much greater need of stability than are most children, and that her present level of distress will require 18 months at the least before reunification could even be entertained." Id., 18. Also as of September 8, 2003, the examiner had concluded: "Given [the mother's] apparently limited progress in the past six months, it seems counter to Melody's best interests to maintain the child in an ambiguous status. Return is not practical, and a termination of parental rights (and placement in a pre-adoptive home) with regard to this child is strongly advocated." Id.

Although the children have not seen the mother's sexually abusive boyfriend for in excess of three years, Melody currently is afraid that if she returns to her mother, she might be subject to sexual abuse and her mother will not believe her if she reports it to her. Melody currently is fearful that such boyfriend will return. On one occasion she thought that she saw him and, according to her foster mother, she started to scream and to cry. Additionally, because of the sexual contact by the teenage older brother with Melody, her return to a mother's home is contraindicated.

Because of the horrific, egregious, continuing sexual abuse she was subjected to while in the mother's care, the physical abuse she suffered, and the sexual behavior of the mother and the perpetrator/stepfather she witnessed, and other events that she witnessed, Melinda is fearful of being returned to the mother's care and custody. She is aware of Jaime being removed for a second time from the mother's home, and she does not want to have a similar experience. She is bonded to her foster family and to Jenira and Neri who live with her in such foster family. She has lived with them for in excess of four years.

Since she was removed from the mother in the first month of her life, Neri has lived with the foster family, her sister Jenira and her half-sister Melinda for the rest of her four-year life.

The foster parents are the psychological parents of Melinda, Jenira and Neri. (Exhibit 12, 26.)

Jaime has a bond with the mother. While he lived with the mother, she was unable to protect him from the negative behaviors of the teenage older brother and to insure his safety.

5. The age of each of the children. CT Page 3395

Melody will be twelve years old in March 2007.

Melinda is nine years, six months old. Jenira is seven years, five months old. Jaime is five years, eight months old. Neri is four years old.

6. The efforts each parent has made to adjust his or her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return home in the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, as set forth throughout this memorandum of decision, the mother has not been able to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Melody, Melinda, Jenira, Jaime or Neri to return to her in the foreseeable future.

In her March 25, 2003, initial evaluation by the forensic psychologist, the mother was focused on herself and she was in denial about her role in and responsibility for the sexual abuse of her children: "Maybe I'm partly to blame for not seeing it, but I didn't do anything directly to my children, and I've suffered." (Exhibit 7, 5.) In that evaluation the evaluator also wrote:

"She concedes that sexual abuse of Melody took place, but her ability to perceive attendant risk to the other children, or, indeed, to acknowledge abuse of the other children remains limited. She persistently denied that she knew of Melody's molestation prior to the child's removal. She also denied reports from the other children, and expressed skepticism regarding abuse of Melinda and Jenira." Id., 12.

In the May 18, 2006, evaluation, the evaluator concluded: "[The mother] continues to accept little responsibility for the children's mistreatment — at her hands and at the hands of her former partner. Whatever insight she has gained through education and treatment has not translated to consistency in responsible parenting, and the children are in need of permanency now." The evaluator also concluded: "While [the mother] demonstrates the intellect and understanding necessary to effect productive changes, it is evident that she continues to demonstrate inadequate or inappropriate parenting when given the opportunity to have the children in her care. Such failures are evident despite more than adequate services and an appropriate level of participation in such services . . . There is little to suggest that the mother will productively improve to the degree that she would consistently parent any of her children in a safe and psychologically healthy manner consistent with their best interests." Id., 28.

Neither father has participated in the case or made any effort to be a resource for any of the children.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the children, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

There was no evidence presented that the mother has been prevented from maintaining a relationship with Melody, Melinda, Jenira, Jaime, and Neri for any reasons other than the predictable consequences of her actions, behavior, omissions and choices.

The mother did not provide specific information concerning her current or past economic circumstances.

Because of his own actions and behavior the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri was unable to participate in services and he should not have contact with any children.

Such father did not provide specific information concerning his current or past economic circumstances.

The whereabouts of the father of Melody and Melinda were not known, so such father was unable to participate in services or to be a resource for his children.

Such father did not provide specific information concerning his current or past economic circumstances.

(1) WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF MELODY AND MELINDA, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND A ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITIONS;

(2) WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF JENIRA, JAIME AND NERI, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND A ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITIONS;

(3) WITH RESPECT TO THE MOTHER, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND B(i) ALLEGATIONS OF EACH SUCH PETITION CONCERNING EACH OF SUCH CHILDREN;

(4) WITH RESPECT TO THE MOTHER, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND C ALLEGATIONS OF EACH SUCH PETITION CONCERNING EACH OF SUCH CHILDREN EXCEPT NERI;

(5) WITH RESPECT TO JAIME'S FATHER, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND C ALLEGATIONS OF EACH SUCH PETITION CONCERNING SUCH CHILD;

(6) WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF MELODY AND MELINDA, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND D ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITIONS;

(7) WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER OF JENIRA, JAIME AND NERI, DCF HAS PROVED, BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUND D ALLEGATIONS OF ITS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITIONS;

The court finds that DCF has alleged and proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that

(1) this court has jurisdiction over the matter and the parties;

(2) each of the children was previously adjudicated neglected;

(3) prior to filing its termination petitions, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify each of the children with the mother and the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri through offers of and provision of services; because the whereabouts of the father of Melody and Melinda were and are unknown, DCF was unable to offer and provide services to him;

(4) the mother and the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neil were unable or unwilling to benefit from the offers of and provision of services to the point where either of them could be considered to be a parental resource for reunification; because the whereabouts of the father of Melody and Melinda were and are unknown, he was unable to benefit from the offers of and provision of services to the point where he could be considered to be a parental resource for reunification;

(5) prior to the filing of the neglect petitions and thereafter, and prior to the filing of the TPR petitions and thereafter, because of his absence from their lives, the father of Melody and Melinda was unable or unwilling to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of each of such children;

(6) prior to the filing of the neglect petitions and thereafter, and prior to the filing of the TPR petitions and thereafter, because of his behavior, issues and circumstances set forth in this memorandum of decision, the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri was unable or unwilling to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of each of such children;

(7) because of her circumstances and issues set forth in this decision, after each child was removed, and after each such neglect adjudication, and prior to the filing of the TPR petitions and thereafter, the mother failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation

(a) that encouraged the belief that prior to the filing of the TPR petitions,

(b) that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time after the filing of such petitions, or

(c) that would encourage the belief, within a reasonable time in the future, considering the ages and needs of each child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of each child;

(8) each of the children except Neri, who was not born at the time of the events, has been denied by the mother, by reason of acts of parental commission and omission including, but not limited to, a pattern of sexual abuse and severe physical abuse involving multiple acts, and failure to act to prevent such abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for each of their physical and emotional well-being;

(9) Jaime has been denied by the father, by reason of acts of parental commission and omission including, but not limited to, a pattern of sexual abuse and severe physical abuse involving multiple acts, and failure to act to prevent such abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical and emotional well-being;

(10) while Melody may recognize her father as her biological parent, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with him of the kind that ordinarily develops as a result of such parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional and moral needs of such child, and after in excess of four years in the care of foster parents, to allow further for the establishment or re-establishment of a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Melody;

(11) Melinda does not recognize her father as her biological parent, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with him of the kind that ordinarily develops as a result of such parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional and moral needs of such child, and after in excess of four years in the care of foster parents, to allow further for the establishment or re-establishment of a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Melinda;

(12) while Jenira may recognize her father as her biological parent, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with him of the kind that ordinarily develops as a result of such parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional and moral needs of such child, and after in excess of four years in the care of foster parents, to allow further for the establishment or re-establishment of a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Jenira;

(13) while Jaime may recognize his father as his biological parent, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with him of the kind that ordinarily develops as a result of such parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional and moral needs of such child, and after in excess of four years in the care of foster parents, to allow further for the establishment or re-establishment of a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Jaime; and

(14) Neri does not recognize her father as her biological parent, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with him of the kind that ordinarily develops as a result of such parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional and moral needs of such child, and after in excess of four years in the care of foster parents, to allow further for the establishment or re-establishment of a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Neri.

THE BEST INTEREST OF MELODY: CT Page 3400

The court has considered the best interest of Melody. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Melody to be returned to the mother, including whether the mother reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court also has considered whether it is in the best interest of Melody to be returned to the father, whose whereabouts were and are unknown, including whether the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning Melody's unhealthy, dangerous, abusive situation and circumstances at the time of and prior to the filing of the neglect petitions; the trauma inflicted upon her, from which she suffers at present although more than four years have elapsed since her removal from the mother; her current situation, needs and circumstances; the length of time she has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; and the reports of her needs, behavior and continuing issues after being removed from the mother's care, custody and control.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Melody, and that it is necessary for her growth, development safety, security, stability, and permanency, that the rights of the mother and the father be terminated.

THE BEST INTEREST OF MELINDA:

The court has considered the best interest of Melinda. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Melinda to be returned to the mother, including whether the mother reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court also has considered whether it is in the best interest of Melinda to be returned to the father, whose whereabouts were and are unknown, including whether the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning Melinda's unhealthy, dangerous, abusive situation and circumstances at the time of and prior to the filing of the neglect petitions; her current situation, needs and circumstances; the length of time she has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; and the reports of her positive growth, development and progress after being removed from the mother's care, custody and control.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Melinda, and that it is necessary for her growth, development, safety, security, stability, and permanency, that the rights of the mother and the father be terminated.

THE BEST INTEREST OF JENIRA:

The court has considered the best interest of Jenira. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Jenira to be returned to the mother, including whether the mother reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court also has considered whether it is in the best interest of Jenira to be returned to the father, whose whereabouts have been for approximately three years and are currently unknown, including whether the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning Jenira's unhealthy, dangerous, abusive situation and circumstances at the time of and prior to the filing of the neglect petitions, her current situation; needs and circumstances; the length of time she has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; and the reports of her positive growth, development and progress after being removed from the mother's care, custody and control.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Jenira, and that it is necessary for her growth, development, safety, security, stability, and permanency, that the rights of the mother and the father be terminated.

THE BEST INTEREST OF JAIME:

The court has considered the best interest of Jaime. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Jaime to be returned to the mother, including whether the mother reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court also has considered whether it is in the best interest of Jaime to be returned to the father, whose whereabouts have been for approximately three years and currently are unknown, including whether the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning Jaime's unhealthy, dangerous situation and circumstances at the time of and prior to the filing of the neglect petitions; his current situation, needs and circumstances; the length of time he has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; the mother's inability to care for him and to protect him during his reunification with her; and the reports of his behavior, needs and issues after each time he was removed from the mother's care, custody and control.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Jaime, and that it is necessary for his growth, development, safety, security, stability, and permanency, that the rights of the mother and the father be terminated.

THE BEST INTEREST OF NERI:

The court has considered the best interest of Neri. The court has considered whether it is in the best interest of Neri to be returned to the mother, including whether the mother reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court also has considered whether it is in the best interest of Neri to be returned to the father, whose whereabouts have been for approximately and currently are unknown, including whether the father reasonably could be expected and relied upon to provide the safe, secure, nurturing, stable, violence-free, and permanent environment idealized in the statutes and case law. The court has considered, inter alia, the evidence presented concerning the reasons for Neri's removal from the mother shortly after her birth, and her situation and circumstances at the time of and prior to the filing of the neglect petition with respect to her; her current situation, needs and circumstances; the length of time she has been out of the mother's care, custody and control and in foster care; and the reports of her positive growth, development and progress after being removed from the mother's care, custody and control.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Neri, and that it is necessary for her growth, development, safety, security, stability, and permanency, that the rights of the mother and the father be terminated.

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS:

Having considered the evidence and the statutory, Practice Book and case law requirements, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, as to the mother that DCF has proved Grounds B(i), failure to rehabilitate, and C, acts of commission or omission (except with respect to Neri, who was not born at the time of the Ground C incidents). With respect to the father of Melody and Melinda, DCF also has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, Grounds A, abandonment, and D, no parent-child relationship. With respect to the father of Jenira, Jaime and Neri, DCF also has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, Grounds A, D and, as to Jaime, C.

Having considered Melody, her age, experiences, needs, developmental requirements, sense of time, her current relationship with the mother, her lack of a relationship with the father, her relationship with her current foster mother, her need for safety, security, stability and permanency, the mother's continuing needs, issues and current circumstances, the presence of the oldest child and the teenage older brother in the mother's home, and the general totality of circumstances, the court finds that it is in the best interest of Melody to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.

Having considered Melinda, her age, experiences, needs, developmental requirements, sense of time, her current relationship with the mother, her lack of a relationship with the father, her positive relationship with her foster parents and their family, her need for safety, security, stability and permanency, the mother's continuing needs, issues and current circumstances, the presence of the oldest child and the teenage older brother in the mother's home, and the general totality of circumstances, the court finds that it is in the best interest of Melinda to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.

Having considered Jenira, her age, experiences, needs, developmental requirements, sense of time, her current relationship with the mother, her lack of a relationship with the father, her positive relationship with her foster parents and their family, her need for safety, security, stability and permanency, the mother's continuing needs, issues and current circumstances, the presence of the oldest child and the teenage older brother in the mother's home, and the general totality of circumstances, the court finds that it is in the best interest of Jenira to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.

Having considered Neri, her age, experiences, needs, developmental requirements, sense of time, her current relationship with the mother, her lack of a relationship with the father, her positive relationship with her foster parents and their family, her need for safety, security, stability and permanency, the mother's continuing needs, issues and current circumstances, the presence of the oldest child and the teenage older brother in the mother's home, and the general totality of circumstances, the court finds that it is in the best interest of Neri to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.

Having considered Jaime, his age, experiences, needs, developmental requirements, sense of time, his current relationship with the mother, his lack of a relationship with the father, his relationship with his current foster mother, his need for safety, security, stability and permanency, the mother's continuing needs, issues and current circumstances, the presence of the oldest child and the teenage older brother in the mother's home, his experiences in the mother's home during the previous period of reunification, and the general totality of circumstances, the court finds that it is in the best interest of Jaime to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of the mother and the father to Melody and Melinda are hereby terminated. Further, it is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of the mother and the father to Jenira, Jaime and Neri are hereby terminated. The commissioner of the department of children and families is appointed as each of such children's statutory parent. The initial status report concerning each of such children shall be submitted, as required, within thirty days hereof. Quarterly reports and annual permanency plans shall be submitted as required in accordance with statutory requirements.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.