Opinion
Nos. UO6-CP04-004754-A, U06-CP04-004755-A
January 23, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes ("CGS") Section 46b-120(9)(B) and (C), on December 1, 2005, after a three-day trial, this court adjudicated Justin F. ("Justin") and Hailee L. ("Hailee") as neglected. Additionally, pursuant to CGS Section 46b-120(10), this court adjudicated Hailee as uncared for. Pursuant to CGS Section 46b-129(j) this court, after finding that it was in their best interest, committed the care, custody and guardianship of Justin and Hailee to the commissioner of the department of children and families ("DCF").
The mother of Justin and Hailee and the father of Hailee, who is also the stepfather of Justin (hereinafter "the father") (collectively, "the parents") have generally appeared pro se in this case. The children have been represented by counsel, and a guardian ad litem was appointed. With respect to such counsel, on August 1, 2005, the parents, inter alia, were ordered by the court as follows:
(1) the parents "will not communicate with counsel except by mail addressed to their business address only . . . [and] "will not attempt to communicate with counsel on any phone except their business phone . . .";
(2) the parents shall "stay at least 1/2 mile away from the private homes of counsel . . . [and shall] make no efforts to follow counsel . . ."
After this order entered, the parents continued to represent themselves pro se, including but not limited to at the neglect trial, where the parents were present only for the first day, and by the filing of many written motions, objections and other papers.
THE PARENTS' POST-ADJUDICATION AND POST-DISPOSITION PLEADINGS
The parents' first post-adjudication and post-disposition pleadings:
On December 8, 2005, the parents filed a "motion for stay of proceedings," a "motion for disqualification for bias and prejudice," a "motion to object concluded kangaroo mistrial," and a "motion to object the petitioner's permanency plan" (the quotation marks are in the original motions).
The parents' allegations in the "motion to object concluded kangaroo mistrial" were that
(1) the court failed to hear all of the facts and failed to accept evidence;
(2) the parents had a right to confront witnesses and accusers in the context of a speedy trial, not 15 months after the children were placed under an order of temporary custody;
(3) the court refused to issue subpoenas (at state expense) for the witnesses sought by the parents;
(4) although the parents were not present, DCF was allowed to proceed with its case;
(5) the attorney representing DCF and the attorney for the children advocated for an adjudication of neglect, and commitment to DCF of one or both children;
(6) "The Two State of CT accomplice doctors . . . evaluated the joint-respondents over a year ago maliciously trying to cover up the sexual abuse of a child . . ., committed by the one pedophile [name omitted] . . . with the `Aid of Others' . . .";
(7) "the joint-respondents successfully completed all . . . services . . . with no difficulties parenting our children, no clinical problems, no substance abuse or mental health issues . . . The joint-respondents have no past history of mental health issues or substance abuse problems and do not have any present mental health issues or substance abuse problems . . .";
(8) the court is "Hindering the Prosecution" of a sexual predator with the "Aid of Others";
(9) the court is "Obstructing Justice" by impeding a criminal investigation;
(10) the court's memorandum of decision contains an incorrect conclusion that DCF proved neglect by a fair preponderance of the evidence;
(11) the court did not accept "crucial evidence" from the parents, including evidence from people who were not "called into court to testify: pediatricians, counselors, other service providers, other police officers, other CT DCF workers, school staff, other hospital staff, and our accusers (two anonymous callers). Accomplice witness [name omitted] is a false name and perjury . . ."; and
(13) certain statements in the memorandum of decision "are religiously discriminating . . ." (footnote omitted).
On December 12, 2005, the motions were heard by the court. Although given the opportunity to do so, the parents did not offer any evidence in support of any of their motions. The motion to stay the already concluded neglect trial was denied as moot. The motion for disqualification for bias and prejudice was denied. Treating the "motion to object concluded kangaroo mistrial" as a motion to open the court's judgment or for a new trial, it was denied.
The objection to the DCF permanency plan was referred to the local court.
In the motion for a stay of proceedings, the parents alleged that they were appealing from the court's December 1, 2005, decision. Evidently, despite the parents' representation concerning an appeal, they have not filed an appeal. On January 17, 2006, the parents told the court that they had not filed an appeal because neither this court nor the appellate court would grant them a waiver of fees.
Previously in August 2005, the parents filed motions "for disqualification for bias and prejudice" against two other judges who were involved in earlier matters in this case. On September 7, 2005, these motions were denied.
The parents' second post-adjudication and post-disposition pleadings:
On December 28, 2005, the parents filed a "motion for a new, fair and impartial trial." The motion in part contained the following:
"The joint-respondents . . . are insisting that the trial court grant us a `New, Fair, and Impartial' Trial with the facts being presented (not perjury, fraud and false statements by the State of CT with their accomplice witnesses) including only sufficient evidence introduced in our family case . . .
". . . The specified prejudicial errors are violating the Federal HIPAA Law by allowing medical information (Protected Health Information) to be disclosed without authorization from us . . . allowing the State of CT/CT DCF to proceed maliciously with the `Kangaroo Mistrial' without our presence due to emergency circumstances in violation of our US Constitutional Rights/Civil Rights, allowing the State's accomplice witnesses to testify falsely including perjury, fraud and false statements, and without the CT DCF ever presenting any solid evidence of neglect against us . . . because there is none. The evidence is against the pedophile [name omitted] . . . and the State of CT/CT DCF allowed this to happen for a second time while failing to prosecute and hindering the prosecution of the child molester . . . with the Aid of Others . . .
"We have a right under the 14th Amendment to a fair and impartial trial . . .
". . . Failure of justice is also easily applied to the `Miscarriage of Justice,' which occurs when the result of a trial is so intentionally wrong as to shock the moral sense . . .
". . . The Court is abusing its power by the use of one who possesses it in a manner contrary to law . . .
". . . The Court is permitting the State of CT/CT DCF including the Attorneys to use an unlawful legal process called `Malicious Use of Process' against us . . . In addition, there is another term used called `Malicious Abuse of Legal Process,' which is being committed against our family . . . It is willfully misapplying court process to obtain object not intended by law. These `Sham' proceedings are malicious acts (wrongful acts intentionally done without legal justification or excuse; an unlawful act done willfully or purposely to injure another) being committed by the State of CT, CT DCF, Attorneys, AAGs, Courts, and Medical Professionals against our family . . .
". . . The joint-respondents insist that a reversal be instituted immediately with the return of our two children back with their `real parents' . . . We are insisting that a dismissal of our family case be initiated promptly without any further damage, suffering, and affliction. In addition, we are insisting that the State of CT/CT DCF produce some factual and solid evidence of neglect against us in order to pursue this action in court against us, which the CT DCF has not produced. We are claiming our inherent rights . . ." (footnotes omitted).
In an addendum or attachment to their motion, the parents set forth the following:
"Fighting for our children is the just, moral, and upright thing to do because the State of CT/CT DCF being aided and abetted by the trial courts, attorneys, assistant attorney generals, police departments, and medical professionals are all failing to report and criminally investigate the second incident of sexual abuse of a child . . . committed by pedophile . . . with the `Aid of Others' inside and outside of the courtroom that are Obstructing Justice, impeding a Criminal Investigation, Hindering Prosecution, and concealing a Molester . . ." (emphasis in original).
The parents also filed a "motion to object memorandum of hearings — November 28, 29, 30, 2005," a "motion for bench warrant," and a "motion for contempt — P.B. 34A-22" (these quotation marks are in the pleadings). The motion for contempt related to the parents' visitation, and that motion was referred to the local court. The "motion for bench warrant" was heard by Judge Taylor.
The "motion to object memorandum of hearings — November 28, 29, 30, 2005" contained, inter alia, the following allegations and assertions:
(1) the trial judge should disqualify himself;
(2) the parents' constitutional and civil rights have been violated;
(3) the courts and DCF are holding the two children against the parents' free will in violation of their rights;
(4) the memorandum of decision contains fraud and false statements and needs to be corrected; and
(5) the court is hindering the prosecution of an alleged pedophile with "Aid of Others."
The parents annexed to the motion a "`summary of events' — facts" including, but not limited to, at least one egregious misrepresentation concerning when they arrived at court on the first day of trial. The parents were aware that the trial was scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. At approximately 9:20 a.m. the parents called the clerk's office and stated that they had just left their residence. The parents' residence is approximately twenty-nine miles from the court. Although one of the doctors scheduled to testify first was inconvenienced, could not complete his testimony, and was required to return on November 30, 2005, to do so, the court delayed the beginning of the trial until approximately 10:30 a.m. so the parents could be present for the beginning of the trial. During the first day of the trial, the parents were warned that the continued trial would begin promptly at 9:30 a.m. on each of the following days. The schedules for the time of witness testimony were prepared by DCF in accordance with the court's statement.
Another misstatement by the parents in such summary is that "the first day of the Kangaroo Mistrial" was for the exhibit list (any objections) and the witness list only. There [were] not supposed to be any witnesses called the very first day . . .
In such summary, the parents expressed their belief that "the whole entire neglect proceedings are a way to try and cover-up I conceal I bide the sexual abuse of a child . . . committed by pedophile [name omitted] with the `Aid of Others.'
"In general, such summary seems to set forth the parents' alleged bases for appeal.
At the January 17, 2006, hearing on the parents' second set of motions, the parents did not offer any evidence in support of such motions. Citing and relying upon their Fifth Amendment rights, the parents declined to testify in support of their motions. The parents, however, candidly admitted that they had filed the second set of motions in an effort to create an additional period of time in which to appeal the court's December 1, 2005, decision.
Pursuant to Practice Book Section 63-1(c), inter alia, which sets forth how a new appeal period is created, DCF objected to the motions. Based on such section, and based on the court's rulings on the parents' first set of motions, DCF argued that the second set of motions were ineffectual to extend and preserve the parents' appeal rights. The court agrees, but recognizes that it is the province of the appellate court finally to decide that issue.
A motion for reargument of a prior motion that extends the Practice Book Section 63-1(a) twenty-day appeal period does not itself extend the time for filing an appeal. Waldman v. Jayaraj, 89 Conn.App. 709, 712, 874 A.2d 860 (2005): "`Motions that do not give rise to a new appeal period include those that seek . . . reargument of a motion listed in the previous paragraph [of Practice Book Section 63-1(c)(1)] . . .' Id. In CT Page 685 Opuku v. Grant, 63 Conn.App. 686, 694, 778 A.2d 981 (2001), we noted that Practice Book [Section] 63-1(c)(1) `makes absolutely clear [that] a motion to open a judgment does give rise to a new appeal period, but a motion to reargue a motion to open does not.' (Emphasis in original.)" (Footnote omitted.) In child protection matters, including neglect proceedings, Practice Book Section 35a-21 provides a twenty-day period for appeal "in the manner provided by the rules of appellate procedure."
Treating the second set of motions as an attempt to reargue the first set of motions previously denied by the court, and having given the parents the opportunity to submit their testimony and other evidence in support of such motions, which the parents declined to do, such motions are denied.
Even if the parents' second set of motions could be viewed as something other than an attempt to reargue the court's denial of the first set of motions, there is no basis on which to grant them.
THE SUI GENERIS NATURE OF A NEGLECT PETITION
The parents continue to misperceive the nature of a neglect proceeding, the meaning and effect of an adjudication, and the meaning and effect of the disposition arising therefrom.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court discussed the sui generis nature of a neglect proceeding: "A neglect petition and concomitant request for an order of commitment are not a typical civil action. `A neglect petition is sui generis and, unlike a complaint and answer in the usual civil case, does not lead to a judgment for or against the parties named.' In re David L., 54 Conn.App. 185, 191, 733 A.2d 897 (1999). In such proceedings, the petitioner acts not to vindicate her personal rights but, acting for the state as parens patriae to ensure, first and foremost, the child's safety and, second, a permanent placement of the child as expeditiously as possible. In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 196-97 n. 15, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002); In re Jason C., 255 Conn. 565, 576-77, 767 A.2d 710 (2001); In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231-32, 764 A.2d 739 (2001). The petitioner does not seek the monetary or equitable relief of a typical civil action, but, rather, actions by the court that will further the dual goals of safety and permanency. Accordingly, `relief' in this context takes on a somewhat different meaning, and the petitioner's interests in seeking an adjudication and disposition upon filing a neglect petition do not fit neatly within the aggrievement rubric. See In re David L., supra, 191-93 (distinguishing between significance of adjudication and disposition of neglect petition).
"Further evidence of this imprecise fit is that the disposition of a petition resulting in an order committing a child to the department's custody does not terminate the court's jurisdiction over the matter . . . Rather, there are further proceedings at which the adjudication, independent of the disposition, can have significance." In re Allison G., 276 Conn. 146, 158-59, 883 A.2d 1226 (2005). Under some circumstances, the result of such further proceedings may moot any appeal filed by the parents. In re Claudia F., (January 24, 2006).
After an adjudication that a child is neglected or uncared for, and commitment of the child takes place, the parents continue to have the opportunity for reunification with such child, id., 160-61; CGS 46b-129(j), in the same manner as they had before the adjudication and commitment took place. Prior to the trial, the court explained this concept to the pro se parents. After the trial, on January 17, 2006, the court spoke to the parents about the importance of them acting as soon as possible to do all that is necessary and possible to put themselves in a position to demonstrate that reunification is a reasonable option for them and the minor children. The court informed the parents that their failure to take the actions necessary and possible to demonstrate that reunification is a reasonable option will most likely result in the filing by DCF of a petition for the termination of their parental rights.
THE PARENTS DID NOT SATISFY THE STANDARDS FOR A NEW TRIAL
CGS Section 52-270 sets forth causes for which new trials may be granted: "(a) The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or in part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action." (Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the last sentence of CGS Section 52-270(a), the judges of the superior court have not provided by rule for a new trial of neglect cases. Practice Book Section 35a-1 et seq. (But see Practice Book Section 35a-18 concerning the opening of a default in a child protection proceeding. In the instant case, on November 29, 2005, defaults were entered against the parents because of their failure timely to appear for the second day of trial.) Compare Practice Book Section 31a-11 relating to delinquency, family with service needs and youth in crisis matters:
"(a) Upon motion of the child or youth, the judicial authority may grant a new trial if it is required in the interest of justice in accordance with Section 42-53 of the rules of criminal procedure.
"(b) Unless otherwise permitted by the judicial authority in the interests of justice, a motion for a new trial shall be made within five days after an adjudication or finding of guilty or within any further time the judicial authority allows during the five-day period.
"(c) A request for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall require a petition for a new trial and shall be brought in accordance with General Statutes [Section] 52-270. The judicial authority may grant the petition even though an appeal is pending."
Although Practice Book Section 17-4A provides for a new trial in cases tried to the court, that section is not incorporated into the rules for child protection matters. See Practice Book Sections 1-1(a), 1-1(b), 34a-1(a) and 34a-1(b).
As set forth above, in order to preserve their Fifth Amendment rights, the parents have declined to testify in support of any of their motions. Although the parents have read the clerk's memorandum of the November 29, 2005, proceedings contained in the court file, the parents have not moved to open the defaults entered against them. Presumably to establish good cause to do so, the parents would have to testify.
The parents voluntarily chose not to testify in support of their motions. Even if the Fifth Amendment is asserted as the basis on which the parents declined to testify, it does not prohibit the court from denying their motions solely on the basis of such failure to testify. Pavlinko v. Yale-Haven Hospital, 192 Conn. 138, 146-48, 470 A.2d 246 (1984). Also, if the parents, to preserve their Fifth Amendment rights, decided not to testify at trial, after prior notice the court could have drawn an adverse inference from such decisions not to testify. In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 635, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).
Because the parents did not establish any of the bases set forth in CGS Section 52-270 for a new trial, they did not establish any basis on which the court could grant such a motion.
BACKGROUND OF THE NEGLECT AND UNCARED FOR PETITIONS, ADJUDICATIONS OF NEGLECT AND UNCARED FOR, AND THE DISPOSITIONS
On August 12, 2004, DCF filed petitions alleging that Justin and Hailee were neglected, and that Hailee was uncared for.
On September 23, 2004, at approximately 3 a.m., the parents and children arrived at the Bristol Hospital Emergency Department ("Bristol Hospital"). Because of the parents' bizarre statements, demands, behavior and threats to violate Justin to preserve "evidence," Bristol Hospital eventually placed a ninety-six hour hold on Justin and Hailee. As a mandated reporter, Bristol Hospital then made a DCF hotline report. While the children remained at Bristol Hospital, DCF investigated, and later on September 23, 2004, pursuant to CGS Section 17a-101g(c), DCF also invoked a ninety-six hour hold on both children.
On September 27, 2004, the court granted DCF's application for ex parte orders of temporary custody. On September 30, 2004, the orders of temporary custody were sustained and confirmed by the court upon the agreement of the mother and the father.
On October 21, November 1, November 23, and December 3, 2004, a psychologist, who is a Diplomate, American Board of Psychological Services, and Fellow, American College of Forensic Examiners, conducted court-ordered psychological and interactional evaluations of Justin, the mother and the father. On December 12, 2004, the psychologist prepared four written reports. On December 31, 2004, the psychologist prepared an addendum, in which he responded specifically to the questions submitted on behalf of the court. Trial exhibits (hereinafter "exhibit" or "exhibits") 11-15.
On November 22 and November 29, 2004, a board certified child, adolescent, and adult psychiatrist conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Justin, the mother and the father. On January 3, 2005, the psychiatrist prepared his written evaluation and report. Exhibit 10.
For each of the evaluations the mother and the father were told and understood, or should have understood, that there was no doctor-patient privilege and what they said, how they behaved and the evaluators' observations and conclusions would be shared with the court.
On November 28, 29 and 30, 2005, the neglect and uncared for trial took place. The parents arrived approximately one hour late for the first day of trial (the start of the trial was delayed because of their late arrival). The parents were told that the second and third days of trial would start promptly at 9:30 a.m. The parents did not attend the second day of trial.
DCF made arrangements for timely transportation of the parents to the third day of trial. The parents refused the DCF offer, and did not attend the third day of trial. They reportedly arrived at court after the third day of trial had concluded.
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 12, 2004, DCF filed a petition alleging that Justin was neglected because (1) pursuant to CGS Section 46b-120(9)(B), he was denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally ("denied proper care"); and (2) pursuant to CGS Section 46b-120(9)(C) he was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to well being ("conditions injurious").
Also on August 12, 2004, DCF filed a petition alleging that Hailee was neglected because (1) she was denied proper care; and (2) she was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her. In addition, pursuant to CGS Section 46b-120(10), DCF alleged that she was uncared for because her home could not provide the specialized care which her physical, emotional or mental condition required ("specialized needs").
DCF also alleged that: (1) the children had been moved from motel to motel since January 2003, e.g., the family was transient; (2) the mother had not secured sexual abuse counseling for Justin; (3) the mother withdrew Justin from school in January 2003, and had failed to register him in another academic program; (4) the mother and the father failed to allow Justin to attend school, or to receive home instruction; and (5) the mother and the father failed to take the appropriate steps to ensure Justin's regular school attendance.
On November 4, 2004, DCF filed an amended summary of facts; including but not limited to the following:
(1) the mother and the father have a history of domestic violence;
(2) ". . . 10. Hailee has specialized needs in that she is an infant who is completely dependent on a competent caretaker to provide for her every need, such as feeding, comfort and hygiene . . ."
(3) Hailee was diagnosed by her pediatrician with failure to thrive syndrome;
(4) the mother did not cooperate with the pediatrician's request that she keep a "food diary" for Hailee;
(5) the mother subsequently terminated that pediatrician and went to another pediatrician;
(6) Hailee was determined to be in need of birth to three services, but the mother would not sign a necessary release so those services could begin;
(7) neither the mother nor the father demonstrated insight into Hailee's developmental delays;
(8) since Justin had been placed in DCF care, he made statements concerning "devil worshipers," "Satan" and broken crosses that could not be fixed until he returned home;
(9) while at Bristol Hospital, the staff witnessed Justin mirroring statements made by both parents, including but not limited to calling the staff "devil worshipers."
By a fair preponderance of the evidence, the court found that DCF had proved these allegations.
THE NEGLECT AND UNCARED FOR TRIAL
DCF presented eight witnesses and thirty-two exhibits (excluding one that was objected to and not admitted as a full exhibit).
The respondents submitted several photographs and a September 21, 2004, letter that were admitted as full exhibits.
By a fair preponderance of the evidence DCF also established the following as a basis for the adjudications that Justin and Hailee were neglected and that Hailee also was uncared for:
The Bristol Hospital Incidents
At approximately 3 a.m. on September 23, 2004, the parents and the children arrived at the Bristol Hospital Emergency Department. The parents were concerned about the alleged sexual abuse of Justin. According to the affidavit of the emergency department physician who was on duty, "[s]pecifically, the couple was concerned that a DCF worker and the GAL had been conspiring with members of the mother's family to expose Justin to a person who had sexually assaulted Justin in the past and that they had together been showing him explicit movies and dancing naked with him. Justin's mother said that the last time this may have occurred was one month ago . . . During the course of the interview, the parents appeared agitated and confused and displayed poor impulse control." Exhibit 3.
The emergency department physician consulted with a child abuse expert who suggested that Justin ". . . be placed on a 96 hour hold because of the bizarre nature of the story and concern that the parents might attempt invasive examination of the child's rectum." Id.
An experienced Staff Registered Emergency Nurse who was on duty was also consulted and became involved with the family. He was concerned about the one-month delay from the date of the alleged sexual abuse before the family sought help. Exhibit 5. The mother would not accept the emergency department physician's assurance that he saw no abnormalities or injuries on his examination of or from her photographs of the child's anal area. Id. She requested an anoscope examination. Id. This is an invasive, penetrating examination. Id. In his affidavit, the emergency nurse also stated: "I was convinced that mom would continue to examine Justin herself, and seek other venues for this til her fears were validated. I was worried that this would lead to eventual repetitive injury or accidental trauma to Justin . . . My concern . . . was that Justin was being `shopped around' to uncoordinated caregivers in an exploitive way to document mom's concerns and reach mom's desired outcomes . . . That when it became clear that we were going to seek more detailed and formal evaluation of Justin from a sexual assault focus by referring him to the regional pediatric sexual assault center . . . the tone of our interactions changed dramatically from a traditional caregiver/care seeker one to an adversarial one in which all parties except the infant child, including Justin[,] now began to pace the room, make cell phone calls, pray repeatedly, and recite scripture and religious references, as well as references to US constitutional law as they perceived it . . ." Id.
The family also was seen by an on-duty crisis worker. She noted that Justin hid under his jacket when the mother spoke, and that the mother's and father's "irrationality pose[d] risk to [Justin and] sibling[.]" Exhibit 5. She also noted that Justin was alert, and mirrored his parents' behaviors and statements as the parents escalated their behavior. Justin made "excessive religious statements, and he called the emergency department staff "devil worshipers." Id.
Her diagnostic impression was that Justin was emotionally abused, and at risk for further abuse. Id. In a conversation with the mother, the mother told her that an alleged perpetrator "had abused Justin sexually again during visits arranged by her family [with] DCF collusion." Id. The crisis worker reported that the mother "could not tolerate any questions." The mother stated that the crisis worker "was trying reverse psychology!" Id.
On September 23, 2004, the crisis worker concluded that there was "sufficient level of suspicion of risk to both children to warrant a report to DCF. Mother presents as very unreasonable [and] unable to put the needs/welfare of her children above her own emotional agenda . . ." Id.
When DCF determined to invoke a ninety-six hour hold, it requested the assistance of the Bristol police department. Exhibit 16. Officers were dispatched to the hospital. Id. One officer stated in his incident report: "When [the DCF social worker] attempted to serve the order [for a ninety-six hour hold] on [the mother and the father] they became uncooperative and told . . . Justin to resist so they could claim police abuse and [the mother] told Justin to resist by kicking the officers." Id. Also, "[a]t the time of removal father told Justin not to speak and that he is the Lord." Exhibit 7, page 9.
None of the persons at the Bristol Hospital Emergency Department previously had met, known or had any contact with the mother, the father or the children before they arrived at the hospital at approximately 3 a.m. on September 23, 2004.
Approximately six weeks earlier, the parents had taken Justin to another emergency room, and they had made conspiracy allegations against relatives of the mother. Exhibit 9.
The parents have not been able to see and accept that their actions, omissions and behavior prior to and at Bristol Hospital denied the children proper care and placed the children in conditions and circumstances that were injurious to them. However, as explained to the parents, by its finding of and adjudication that the children were neglected and that in addition Hailee was uncared for, the court has not entered any adjudication against the parents. At the neglect and uncared for stage, the focus is on the status and condition of the children.
The psychiatrist's testimony and report
In his January 3, 2005, report, the psychiatrist commented: ". . . on multiple occasions during the interview, both the mother and father appeared to have abnormal thought content which crossed from reality into delusion . . . During multiple occasions in the interview, both alone and in the presence of her husband, [the mother] insisted that an elaborate conspiracy existed to further abuse her child [Justin] and to discredit her and her husband. She felt that the New Haven police department not pursuing the case . . . and Justin's GAL [appointed in the criminal case] making a report about educational neglect to DCF were proof of these malevolent conspiratorial practices. During her various narratives, the mother felt that there were multiple parties involved in the conspiracy to include the police department, court system, her own sisters and cousin, as well as various attorneys and other officials. She implied that [the alleged perpetrator] wielded some unknown political influence through the police and court systems and that various medical personnel who had been involved at different times in evaluating her son had bowed to DCF pressure in making reports or failing to make reports. She also described [alleged] malevolent behavior by the foster family in [allegedly] giving sedatives to Hailee as the most likely explanation for Hailee's change in behavior following the removal. Even during repeated confrontation by the examiner, [the mother] clung rigidly to this belief system about an elaborate conspiracy . . . The father, when interviewed independently, confirmed a similar set of conspiratorial allegations even going so far as to allege an elaborate and secret child sex abuse ring involving attorneys, DCF workers, police, and other state officials." Exhibit 10, page 19.
The psychiatrist determined that the mother had a delusional disorder, persecutory type, and that the father shared that delusional disorder. Id., 20. He determined that Justin had post-traumatic stress disorder, rule out psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, reading disorder, disorder of written expression, and developmental coordination disorder (fine motor). Id.
He found that "[Justin] presents with noticeable levels of anxiety and developmental delay. He endorses a history of bizarre perpetual phenomenon, of almost hallucinatory intensity, which seems to have abated somewhat . . ." Id., 21.
He also found that "[t]he parents present as traumatized and delusional. What might have started as a normal reaction to learning of their child's sexual trauma has developed into an elaborate, shared, delusional belief system involving a host of government agencies and independent attorneys. This clearly goes beyond simple mistrust of DCF and the police department for mishandling (possibly) the original sexual abuse investigation from a criminal perspective; rather, it represents a rigid belief system of incredible proportions. In fact, the allegations of a pedophilic sex ring are completely unbelievable, as members of such a ring would not perform sexual acts in each other's presence and would ordinarily take considerable measures to maintain anonymity and privacy. The idea that family members, lawyers, police, emergency room doctors, office-based pediatricians, hotel managers, DCF workers, criminal investigators, and other state officials could all be part of this conspiracy is preposterous. This leaves no alternative but to conclude that both parents are suffering from a delusional belief system . . ." Id.
He reported that their "delusional thought patterns have interfered with their judgment and behavior in dealing with outside agencies for their children." Id., 22. He concluded: "Because both parents are actively delusional and admit no need for treatment or support services, neither parent can be considered as a placement resource at this time. Because neither of the parents could identify an alternative intrafamilial placement, there is no choice but to leave the children in the care of DCF." Id. He also concluded that the "psychiatric condition of both parents is much too acute to predict a potential timeframe for reunification." Id., 23. He continued: "The parents should each be receiving individual counseling to address their major psychiatric issues. The complexity of their delusional belief systems will require a doctoral level therapist . . . Delusional disorders are notoriously difficult to treat with psychotherapy . . . The rehabilitation potential of both parents will depend in large part on the degree to which their current shared delusional belief system is `post-traumatic' in nature . . ." Id.
The psychiatrist found that the mother was Justin's psychological parent, and that Justin had a strong attachment to his mother and stepfather. Id., 22.
The psychologist's testimony and reports
The psychologist stated that the mother had a well organized belief about a system wide threat to the integrity of her children. The father and the mother have shared beliefs. Neither parent believed that they or the children needed services. All problems were caused by "the system." The parents have very set views of what happened, and who is at fault. They do not accept any responsibility. There is no "ownership" of their roles leading to the removal of the children from them. They believe that the problems have been caused solely by others.
The parents believe that there was a conspiracy to allow Justin to be sexually abused. They also believe that Hailee was drugged in foster care.
The psychologist stated that the parents have egosyntonic views. This limits their motivation to change. It is unlikely that the parents would take advantage of any therapeutic intervention. Because in their minds they are not the source of any of the problems, there is little likelihood they will change their beliefs, attitudes and behavior. The psychologist did not doubt that the parents loved the children. However, this love is not enough to cause or motivate the parents to change their beliefs, attitude and behavior. The parents do not see each of the children's needs. The psychologist saw evidence of delusional and paranoid behavior by the parents.
After this report, on or about March 1, 2005, the father went to be evaluated for counseling in a domestic violence treatment program. Exhibit 29. The evaluating counselor reported: "When asked to view the violent, abuse and controlling behaviors checklist and to check any behaviors he may have done in any adult intimate relationship, he failed to check any. This is unusual. Most of our clients we interview may check at least one or two behaviors on the list. This leads me to believe that [the father] is not being honest . . . In our session he . . . consistently denied any problem or even the possibility of having a problem. This will make it unlikely he will respond to treatment for the issues he may have . . ." Id.
The psychologist believed that the children were neglected. As an example, each child was behind the average level of development for his or her age. The parents' failure to recognize and address each children's needs was neglectful.
The psychologist's recommendation was that the children not be returned to the parents' care. He opined that it would neither be safe nor appropriate to return the children to either parent. The parents' shared belief in a conspiracy put the children at risk.
Prior to their interviews, both the psychiatrist and psychologist told the parents that they would report to the court their evaluations and the information in support thereof.
The parents did not testify at the trial
The parents did not testify. The parents, acting pro se, did try to prove through cross examination of the psychiatrist and psychologist that a conspiracy, or conspiracies, existed, and, therefore, they were not delusional.
ADJUDICATION
Justin and Hailee were adjudicated as neglected pursuant to the denied proper care and conditions injurious allegations of the petitions. Hailee was also adjudicated as uncared for pursuant to the specialized needs allegation of the petition relating to her.
DISPOSITION
The court could not find that it was in either child's best interest to be reunited with the parents either under an order of protective supervision, or without protective supervision. The court found that it was in the best interest of the children to be committed to the care, custody and guardianship of the commissioner of the department of children and families. Such commitments were ordered until further order of the court. The orders of temporary custody were vacated.
DENIAL OF THE SECOND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the children were neglected and that Hailee was uncared for, that the parents are and were actively delusional as set forth above, and that prior to and after the filing of the petitions they were not in a position to provide a safe, stable and permanent environment for the children, there is no reasonable basis to find that a new trial, with or without the parents' testimony, would produce any different result. Thus, the parents' second motion for a new trial is hereby denied. As set forth above, because such second motion for a new trial was in the nature of a reargument of the first motion, DCF argued that the second motion for a new trial did not preserve or extend the parents' time to appeal. The court agrees, and nothing set forth herein should be interpreted inconsistently with such position.