Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Linda Leeser, Leeser Howell Law Firm PLLC, 9800 Lorene Ln., San Antonio, TX 78216, Timothy A. Hootman, Attorney at Law, 2402 Pease Street, Houston, TX 77003, for Appellant.

Jessica Manojlovich, Assistant Attorney General, Cara Blossom Hanna, Assistant Attorney General, Sharon Newman Pruitt, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, TX 78711, for Appellee.

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice, Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

This is an accelerated appeal under Section 56.01(h-1) of the Texas Family Code. Appellant J.C.W.G. appeals the juvenile court's order denying his plea to the jurisdiction and granting the State's petition to transfer his case to criminal court. We affirm the trial court's order.

BACKGROUND

J.C.W.G. is charged with sexually assaulting Jenny (a pseudonym) when she was thirteen and he was fourteen. Jenny did not report the sexual assault until two years later. The offense was alleged to have occurred on or about January 29, 2016, and Jenny told her mother who reported the offense to the police in July 2018.

At the time of the offense, Jenny was attending a stock show with her family and friends. J.C.W.G. was a new acquaintance of Jenny's friend, and he followed Jenny and her friends around the stock show throughout the first day of the event. Jenny said J.C.W.G. made her feel uncomfortable, and she asked her friend not to leave her alone with J.C.W.G.

On the evening of the second day, Jenny walked to the playground next to the show barn with her friends, and J.C.W.G. was there. Jenny's friends left her alone with J.C.W.G. to get soft drinks, which made Jenny uncomfortable, but she reasoned that her friends would return quickly. During her friends' absence, Jenny tried to keep space between J.C.W.G. and her, but she tripped on the play equipment, and J.C.W.G. got on top of her, pushing her down. Jenny said that she was big, but not strong and could not lift J.C.W.G. off. She tried to scream, but he covered her mouth, pushing down her pants and underwear. Jenny said that she tried to bite J.C.W.G.'s hand, and he then moved his hand to her throat and choked her until she passed out.

When Jenny revived, J.C.W.G. was removing his penis from her anus and telling her to clean herself up before the girls returned. Jenny could hear her friends talking and laughing in the distance as they walked back to the park. Jenny said she felt unsure of what to do and acted as though nothing had happened.

At home, Jenny felt disgusted with herself and showered for a long time. She cried, could not sleep, and lost her appetite. Following the assault, Jenny lost about seventy pounds. Jenny's mother also recalled that Jenny started staying in bed more and going outside less and that she lost weight, but she attributed the change to Jenny's age. Jenny's mother recalled that around that time, Jenny had feces under her fingernails. Jenny said that she was afraid to go to the bathroom and tried to dig out the feces instead. A physical exam later revealed that Jenny suffered internal and external hemorrhoids and an anal fissure.

Jenny tried to tell her friend what happened, but the friend did not report the outcry and instead dated J.C.W.G. Jenny's friend later reported that J.C.W.G. was aggressive and abusive during their relationship.

J.C.W.G. attempted to contact Jenny over Snapchat, but Jenny blocked the communication. Jenny told her boyfriend about the assault. Around that time, J.C.W.G. also reached out to Jenny's boyfriend to find out whether Jenny had told him and to brag about the assault, claiming that he planned to do it again, and that he planned to choke Jenny to death. Jenny's boyfriend disclosed this message to his mother, who then shared the information with Jenny's mother. This disclosure led to Jenny's outcry.

When the case was presented to the Medina County Attorney's Office, the Medina County Attorney recused herself, and the Attorney General accepted the case. The State filed and mailed its original petition charging J.C.W.G. with aggravated sexual assault as well as its petition to transfer J.C.W.G. to adult criminal court under Section 54.02(a) on September 21, 2018. The Medina County Court at Law judge sitting as the juvenile court, Judge Vivian Torres, scheduled the first hearing for October 3, 2018. The parties attended two hearings prior to December 6, 2018, when Judge Torres notified the parties that she was going to retire, and the newly elected judge would be taking over the case. The trial court then filed the grand jury's certification of the State's charging petition and set the next hearing for February 12, 2019.

On January 31, 2019, before the next scheduled hearing, Judge Mark Cashion of the Medina County Court at Law transferred the case to the District Court of Medina County and canceled the February 12 hearing without notifying the parties.

Between February and May of 2019, Medina County District Court Judge Camile DuBose signed warrants for the State, but she did not preside over the case, and instead recused herself because she had personal knowledge of both J.C.W.G. and Jenny.

On May 1, 2019, the Medina County District Court Administrator informed the State that a visiting judge, who was scheduled to arrive in August, would be assigned to J.C.W.G.'s case. Accordingly, the State called the court administrator in July to set an August status hearing for J.C.W.G.'s case. Soon after the State's request for a status hearing, the parties agreed to set the case for trial on the October 16, 2019 docket.

At the status hearing on August 26, 2019 , J.C.W.G.'s counsel advised that they planned to change lead counsel, but that J.C.W.G. would be ready for trial on October 16, 2019. On October 7, 2019, J.C.W.G. moved to continue the trial for fifty days. The State did not object. The trial was reset to December 18, 2019.

On October 24, 2019, the State asked the district court to set a certification hearing for its petition to transfer the case to criminal court for November 14, 2019.

On November 6, 2019, the trial court completed its social evaluation of J.C.W.G. through the juvenile probation department, as required by Section 54.02(a), based on the pending petition to transfer J.C.W.G.'s case to criminal court.

J.C.W.G. turned eighteen on November 8, 2019.

On November 13, the court reset the transfer certification hearing to November 25, 2019.

On November 20, 2019, J.C.W.G. moved to dismiss his case, claiming that the State did not exercise due diligence to adjudicate him before his eighteenth birthday.

At the hearing on November 25, 2019, the court heard J.C.W.G.'s plea to the jurisdiction and denied it, finding that the State had exercised due diligence and that it was not practicable to adjudicate J.C.W.G.'s case prior to his eighteenth birthday. The court deferred the transfer certification hearing until December 9, 2019.

On December 9, 2019, the trial court heard the State's certification to transfer J.C.W.G. from juvenile court to criminal court and granted the transfer.

J.C.W.G. appeals the trial court's order denying his plea to the jurisdiction and granting the State's motion to transfer the case to criminal court. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

J.C.W.G. presents five issues: (1) the State did not exercise due diligence to complete proceedings before J.C.W.G. turned eighteen; (2) the State improperly proceeded under Texas Family Code Section 54.02(j) at the transfer hearing after filing its original petition under Section 54.02(a) ; (3) it was not out of the State's control to go forward with proceedings in juvenile court as required by Section 54.02(j)(4) ; (4) there was no proper notice of the transfer hearing as required by Section 54.02(k) ; and (5) the trial court's transfer order fails to state necessary reasons for transfer under Section 54.02(h). We will address each issue separately.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

In his first issue, J.C.W.G. contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the juvenile court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on a finding that the "prosecuting attorney exercised due diligence in an attempt to complete the proceeding before" Appellant turned eighteen as required by Section 51.0412(3). The State responds that "the delay in Appellant's proceedings [was] not attributable to the State, but instead due to circumstances affecting the juvenile court and due to Appellant's actions," i.e., J.C.W.G.'s motion to continue the transfer hearing to a date after his eighteenth birthday.

A. Standard of Review

At issue in this case is whether the State was diligent in moving forward with its prosecution of J.C.W.G.'s case and able to reasonably explain delays. See In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d 163, 166–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). "Diligence is usually a question of fact" for the trial court to decide. See id. at 168. We review the trial court's findings for an abuse of discretion and "defer to the trial court's findings unless the record contains no evidence to support them." Id. (citing Marcus v. Smith , 313 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). "Even if we would have decided the matter differently, we may not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable." Id.

B. Applicable Law

A juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over all proceedings involving a person who has engaged in delinquent conduct as a result of acts committed before age seventeen. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.02, 51.04 (West 2011). A juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction when a juvenile turns eighteen, but its jurisdiction becomes limited. The juvenile court retains limited jurisdiction to either transfer the case to an appropriate court or dismiss the case.

Id. at 166–67 (citing In re N.J.A. , 997 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. 1999) ; In re T.A.W. , 234 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) ). But if certain proceedings are pending when the juvenile turns eighteen, including transfer to criminal court under Section 54.02(a), then the juvenile court can retain jurisdiction if (1) the petition was filed before the juvenile turned eighteen, (2) the proceeding was incomplete when the juvenile turned eighteen, and (3) the court finds that the State exercised due diligence to complete proceedings before the juvenile turned eighteen. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 ; In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d at 166–67.

"Due diligence requires the State to ‘move ahead’ or ‘reasonably explain delays.’ Due diligence does not require the State to ‘do everything perceivable and conceivable to avoid delay.’ " In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d at 168 (citations omitted) (quoting In re N.M.P. , 969 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.) ).

The State is not responsible for court delays, which can be described as exceptional circumstances. See Lloyd v. State , 665 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1984) (citing Ostoja v. State , 631 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) ; Ordunez v. Bean , 579 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ). When referring to the State, we do not mean the court, but rather "the prosecutor, other lawyers and employees in his office, along with members of law enforcement connected to the investigation and prosecution of the case." In re A.M.H. , No. 12-19-00284-CV, 2020 WL 2078412, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 30, 2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Moore v. State , 532 S.W.3d 400, 404–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ).

Furthermore, the State has no duty to prevent a defendant from causing delay. See Kirkwood v. State , 647 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ) (citing R.E.M. v. State , 569 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. App.—Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Appellant should not be permitted to complain about a delay for which he was responsible.")).

C. Analysis

We defer to the trial court's findings, which are supported by the record, that the State moved J.C.W.G.'s case forward and exercised due diligence in its handling of the case. In its order denying J.C.W.G.'s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court cited several intervening obstacles that impeded the case's progress and the State's ability to move the case forward, including (1) the Medina County Court at Law's juvenile judge retired, (2) the Medina County Court at Law transferred J.C.W.G.'s case without notifying the parties and canceled the next hearing, (3) the Medina County District Court assigned J.C.W.G.'s case to a visiting judge, (4) the State then requested a follow-up hearing, (5) J.C.W.G. changed his lead counsel, and (6) J.C.W.G. requested a fifty-day continuance. After J.C.W.G.'s motion to continue was granted, the State filed a notice of setting for its petition to transfer J.C.W.G.'s case to criminal court, the administrative judge signed an order for the visiting judge to hear it, and trial was reset for the following month.

This record shows that the State both moved ahead in its case where possible and was able to reasonably explain delays.

At the hearing on J.C.W.G.'s plea to the jurisdiction, the court's clerk testified on cross-examination that the district court could have accommodated the State if the prosecutor had insisted on scheduling the next hearing at an earlier time, but the record does not show that the clerk expressed this possibility to the State. Rather, the record shows that the local judges recused, that the administrative judge planned to assign a visiting judge to sit in the fall, and that it did so.

Furthermore, the timeline imposed by the Medina County District Court and even the change in J.C.W.G.'s lead counsel could have culminated in a disposition prior to J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday were it not for J.C.W.G.'s request to continue his trial date. J.C.W.G. argues now that part of the State's duty to exercise due diligence included objecting to his request, but we disagree. J.C.W.G. was in a position to assert his interest, yet he requested a continuance to a date past his eighteenth birthday. The trial court noted this contradiction when it orally denied J.C.W.G.'s plea to the jurisdiction at the hearing. Similarly, we will not hold a delay initiated by J.C.W.G. against the State.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State exercised due diligence or in denying J.C.W.G.'s plea to the jurisdiction. J.C.W.G.'s first issue is overruled.

PETITION TO TRANSFER

In his remaining issues, J.C.W.G. contends the State incorrectly argued its case for transfer and the trial court improperly transferred J.C.W.G.'s case to a criminal court under Texas Family Code Section 54.02.

A. Texas Family Code Section 54.02

J.C.W.G. argues in his second issue that the State improperly proceeded under Section 54.02(j), which applies to juvenile court defendants who have turned eighteen, after filing its petition to transfer under Section 54.02(a), which applies to juvenile court defendants under eighteen. The State contends that it was required to proceed under Section 54.02(j) at the certification hearing after J.C.W.G. turned eighteen, as a matter of law, and that the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the previously filed petition under Section 51.0412 of the Texas Family Code.

1. Standard of Review

"We review a trial court's interpretation of the law de novo." In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d at 166 (citing State v. Shumake , 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) ).

2. Applicable Law

Section 54.02(a) provides for transfer of a juvenile to criminal court if the defendant is under eighteen years old and certain requirements are met. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) ; In re A.M. , 577 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. filed) (citing In re D.L.C. , No. 06-16-00058-CV, 2017 WL 1055680, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) ). Likewise, Section 54.02(j) provides for transfer of a case from juvenile court to criminal court if certain requirements are met and the defendant is at least eighteen years old. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j) ; In re A.M. , 577 S.W.3d at 658 ; see also In re M.A.V. , 954 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, pet. denied). If the juvenile turns eighteen while his case is pending, Section 51.0412 provides for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction of an incomplete proceeding if it finds that the State exercised due diligence in prosecuting the case. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 ; In re B.R.H. , 426 S.W.3d at 167 ; In re V.A. , 140 S.W.3d 858, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Section 51.0412 does not require the State to amend its filings, but the court is required to consider age-appropriate factors under Section 54.02. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 ; In re B.R.H , 426 S.W.3d at 167 ; In re V.A. , 140 S.W.3d at 859.

3. Analysis

The State filed its petition to transfer J.C.W.G.'s case to criminal court under Section 54.02(a) and served summons on J.C.W.G. and his parents before J.C.W.G. turned eighteen. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) ; In re A.M. , 577 S.W.3d at 658. The proceeding against J.C.W.G. was pending when he turned eighteen, and the State completed its certification in support of the petition to transfer under Section 54.02(j) when J.C.W.G. was eighteen, as dictated by J.C.W.G.'s age and relevant law. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j) ; In re A.M. , 577 S.W.3d at 658 ; In re M.A.V. , 954 S.W.2d at 119. The trial court found that the State exercised due diligence under Section 51.0412 regarding incomplete proceedings and, therefore, maintained jurisdiction to complete the discretionary transfer proceeding. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 ; In re B.R.H , 426 S.W.3d at 167 ; In re V.A. , 140 S.W.3d at 859. We conclude that the trial court did not err in its application of the law under Sections 54.02 and 51.0412.

We overrule J.C.W.G.'s second issue and turn now to his third issue.

B. Practicability to Proceed Before J.C.W.G. Turned Eighteen

J.C.W.G. argues in his third issue that evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the State could not reasonably have proceeded before J.C.W.G. turned eighteen. The State contends that the record amply supports the trial court's finding that, for reasons beyond the State's control, it was not practicable to proceed before J.C.W.G. turned eighteen.

1. Standard of Review

In reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile court transfer case, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's findings and determine whether there is any evidence to support such findings." Faisst v. State , 105 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) ; see also In re J.G. , 495 S.W.3d 354, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing Moon v. State , 410 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff'd , 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ). "If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no evidence challenge fails." Faisst , 105 S.W.3d at 12 ; see also In re J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 370.

2. Applicable Law

Section 54.02(j)(4)(A) states that, in order for a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction and transfer the proceeding to criminal court after the defendant has turned eighteen, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not practicable for the State to proceed prior to the defendant turning eighteen, for reasons beyond its control. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j)(4)(A) ; Moore v. State , 532 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Some reasons for delay, such as the State's heavy caseload or investigatory delays, have been considered not beyond the State's control and insufficient to satisfy Section 54.02(j)(4)(A). Moore , 532 S.W.3d at 405 ; In re A.M. , 577 S.W.3d at 670. But other reasons, such as delayed outcry and investigatory obstruction by the defendant's family were sufficient to satisfy Section 54.02(j)(4)(A). Collins v. State , 516 S.W.3d 504, 525 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. denied) ; In re E.M.F. , No. 11-19-00278-CV, 2020 WL 868065, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

3. Analysis

The trial court cited several reasons that were beyond the State's control and made it impracticable to complete proceedings before J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday: the sitting judge retired, the juvenile court transferred the case, a visiting judge was assigned, and J.C.W.G. changed lead counsel and then requested a continuance. On this record, and acknowledging the trial court's broad discretion, we conclude that the reasons cited by the trial court made it impracticable to finish proceedings before J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday, were beyond the State's control, and amount to more than a scintilla of evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. See Collins , 516 S.W.3d at 525 (citing Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 47 ).

We overrule J.C.W.G.'s third issue.

C. Summons and Notice

In his fourth issue, J.C.W.G. argues that the notice of hearing on the petition to transfer did not comply with Section 54.02(k). The State argues that the notice of hearing was not required to comply with Section 54.02(k) in this case since the proceeding began under Section 54.02(a). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02.

1. Standard of Review

We review the juvenile court's determination of law de novo. In re S.J. , 977 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2. Applicable Law

Once the State files its original petition against a juvenile, summons must be served on the juvenile as a matter of jurisdiction. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.06 ; In re M.D.R. , 113 S.W.3d 552, 553 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). For a discretionary transfer petition under Section 54.02(a), the summons must state the purpose of the hearing, also as a matter of jurisdiction. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(b) ; Ex parte Rodriguez , 466 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If the juvenile then turns eighteen, jurisdiction to finish the proceeding is maintained under Section 51.0412. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.0412 ; In re J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 363. No new summons is required. Ex parte Rodriguez , 466 S.W.3d at 850 (citing In re R.M. , 648 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ) ).

3. Analysis

The State originally stated its intention to transfer J.C.W.G.'s case in a petition filed on September 21, 2018, and later in a summons served on J.C.W.G. and his parents on October 18, 2018. The parties worked with the court to resolve the case through December 2019. By that time, J.C.W.G. had turned eighteen, and the State relied on Section 51.0412 to complete the transfer proceeding under Section 54.02(a). Because J.C.W.G. had turned eighteen, the State was required to satisfy the elements of Section 54.02(j), but the purpose of the hearing still aligned with Section 54.02(a), which is evident from the trial court's review of J.C.W.G.'s diagnostic study and social evaluation under Subsection (a). Cf. In re J.G. , 495 S.W.3d at 368 (concluding that there was no due process violation where the trial court "essentially considered all of the relevant statutory factors for waiver of jurisdiction that the Legislature has specifically enumerated in Section 54.02, despite the age-based distinction between Subsections (a) and (f) and Subsection (j)"). Since jurisdiction in J.C.W.G.'s case had been established by petition and summons in 2018, and because Section 51.0412 preserved jurisdiction in J.C.W.G.'s case after he turned eighteen, the State was not required to reestablish jurisdiction with a new filing and summons after November 8, 2019.

We overrule J.C.W.G.'s fourth issue.

D. Waiver and Transfer Requirements Under Section 54.02(h)

In his fifth issue, J.C.W.G. argues that the trial court did not state its reasons for waiver and transfer as required by Section 54.02(h), thereby abusing its discretion. The State contends that Section 54.02(h) either does not apply or that the record satisfies the requirement, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's waiver decision for an abuse of discretion, In re A.J.F. , 588 S.W.3d 322, 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 47 ), and its application of the law de novo. See Turrubiate v. State , 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Gonzales v. State , 467 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref'd).

2. Applicable Law

Section 54.02(h) requires a trial court to state its reasons for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court in its order granting discretionary transfer. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h) ; In re J.W.W. , 507 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing Moon , 451 S.W.3d at 49 ). It states in relevant part, "If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver...." Id.

3. Analysis

We assume without deciding that Section 54.02(h) applies in J.C.W.G.'s case. In the trial court's oral pronouncement for transfer, it made extensive findings. The trial court found that J.C.W.G. was at least fourteen years old at the time of the offense, that probable cause exists to support the State's allegations, and that the offense was serious, involving both injury and violence. The court further found that transferring the case to a criminal court was appropriate for the community's welfare, because the juvenile probation department lacked experience in supervising a child sexual assault case such as the one alleged. The court also noted that the reports showed aggressive acts in the circumstances surrounding the charge. The court found that the case had not yet been adjudicated and that the failure to complete proceedings before J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday was for reasons beyond the State's control.

At the end of the hearing, the court asked whether J.C.W.G. required further findings for the order, and he stated there was not. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

In the written order of the court, the court noted that it had considered that the offense was against a person, and that it had taken J.C.W.G.'s maturity into account as well as his history. The court considered the protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitating J.C.W.G. through the juvenile court given the limited services and facilities available to J.C.W.G. in this case. The court noted the existence of probable cause to support the allegations against J.C.W.G. and the fact that it was not practicable to proceed with the case before J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday.

We disagree that the trial court's order was required by statute to do anything other than state the court's reasons for transfer, and we conclude that the order states those reasons.

Accordingly, we overrule J.C.W.G.'s fifth issue.

CONCLUSION

Because J.C.W.G. was eighteen when the hearing occurred, the State was required to establish transfer elements of Texas Family Code Section 54.02(j). Because the trial court found that the State exercised due diligence in completing its transfer proceeding before J.C.W.G.'s eighteenth birthday, the trial court maintained jurisdiction over J.C.W.G.'s transfer proceeding under Section 51.0412. Finally, the trial court's transfer order met the requirements of Section 54.02(h). For these reasons, the trial court's order is affirmed.