FINAL ORDER

The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Atencio (ALJ), which awarded temporary total disability benefits. The respondents contend the ALJ misapplied PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995), by awarding temporary disability benefits after the claimant was separated from employment. We affirm.

The claimant sustained a compensable back injury on March 5, 1997. As a result, the claimant's treating physician imposed restrictions which precluded the claimant from performing his regular duties. However, on April 2, 1997, the respondent-employer offered the claimant modified duty within his restrictions. The claimant accepted the offer and returned to modified work.

After the return to work, the employer learned the claimant may have provided a false social security number at the time he was hired. The employer then retained an investigative service to determine whether the claimant's social security number was valid. The investigative service reported that the social security number given by the claimant belonged to another person.

On April 8, 1997, the respondent-employer's general manager approached the claimant concerning the incorrect social security number and asked him to furnish documentation establishing his legal status in order to continue working. The general manager also gave the claimant his paycheck, even though payday was not until April 9, 1997. The ALJ found that the claimant "believed that he was effectively terminated on that date."

The ALJ also found that respondent-employer did not actually terminate the claimant until later. The general manager testified that the reason for the termination was the claimant's abandonment of the job as evidenced by his failure to return to work after April 8.

At the hearing, the claimant stipulated he was an "undocumented" worker at the time of the separation. (Tr. p. 12). Nevertheless, the ALJ held that the claimant's "undocumented legal status" did not disqualify him from receiving temporary total disability benefits. In support, the ALJ found the restrictions imposed by the treating physician impaired the claimant's ability to perform his regular duties. The ALJ also stated that "the circumstances surrounding the claimant's termination would not have arisen but for the claimant's injury." Concluding that the claimant's "resulting wage loss is to some degree the result of the industrial injury," the ALJ ordered the respondents to pay temporary total disability benefits from April 9 through May 27, 1997, when the claimant reached maximum medical improvement.

I.

On review, the respondents first contend that, although the ALJ correctly recognized the case is governed by PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, supra, she erred in her application of PDM Molding. Specifically, the respondents assert the claimant was "at fault" for the separation from employment because he either abandoned the job or lacked work authorization. Under these circumstances, the respondents argue that the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to prove his post-separation wage loss was to some degree the result of the injury. The respondents argue that the ALJ failed to make this determination, and instead applied an incorrect "but for" test. We find no error.

In PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, the Supreme Court held that a temporarily disabled claimant "who is subsequently terminated for fault from the employment out of which the injury arose prior to reaching maximum medical improvement is not automatically barred from receiving temporary total disability benefits." 898 P.2d at 547. Instead, if the temporarily disabled claimant was at fault for the termination, he may reestablish the right to temporary disability benefits if he proves that the post-separation wage loss was to some degree the result of the injury. 898 P.2d at 548. Thus, temporary benefits may be denied "only when the work-related injury plays no part in the subsequent wage loss." Horton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 942 P.2d 1209 (Colo.App. 1996).

Assuming, arguendo, that the respondents are correct in stating the claimant was at fault for the separation from employment, we find no error in the ALJ's application of PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg. As we understand the ALJ's first and third Conclusions of Law, she has determined that the claimant's wage loss, subsequent to the separation, was to some degree the result of the restrictions imposed by the treating physician. Because these restrictions impaired the claimant's access to his pre-injury job, the claimant presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his burden of proof. Cf. Champion Auto Body v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 950 P.2d 851 (Colo.App. 1997). These conclusions, which are supported by the evidence, justify an award of temporary total disability benefits under PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg.

We recognize that the ALJ's third Conclusion of Law introduces an element of ambiguity by stating that the circumstances surrounding the claimant's termination "would not have arisen but for the claimant's injury." However, in light of the first Conclusion of Law, we are unwilling to infer, as the respondents would have us do, that this statement constitutes the basis of the award of benefits. See Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489 (Colo.App. 1992) (ALJ not held to a "crystalline standard" in articulating the administrative order).

II.

The respondents next contend that, regardless of PDM Molding, the claimant was not entitled to revive his right to temporary total disability benefits because his benefits were properly terminated when he accepted the modified employment. In support of this contention, the respondents cite Laurel Manor Care Center v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. 97CA1543, April 16, 1998). We are not persuaded.

In Laurel Manor, the temporarily disabled claimant returned to work on September 13, 1995, but left because she believed the employer was requiring her to perform duties beyond her restrictions. On September 14, 1995, the claimant returned to the job site and was presented with a written offer of employment listing duties within her medical restrictions. However, the claimant did not return to work after being presented with the offer.

Under these circumstances, the Laurel Manor court held that the claimant's right to temporary total disability benefits was terminated under § 8-42-105(3)(d)(I), C.R.S. 1997, because she refused a written offer of modified employment within her restrictions. Moreover, the court concluded that the holding in PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg did not entitle the claimant to temporary total disability benefits even though her post-refusal wage loss was to some degree caused by the industrial injury. In support, the Laurel Manor court stated the following:

"If a claimant who is terminated for failure to begin modified employment is nevertheless allowed to recover upon showing a causal connection between the industrial injury and the post termination wage loss without any showing that the offer of modified employment is somehow unreasonable, an employer could never rely on § 8-42-105(3)(d) to terminate TTD benefits. Because such a result is contrary to the mandate of that particular section, we hold that the ALJ and the panel erroneously awarded TTD benefits under the circumstances present here." (Emphasis added).

Here, unlike the situation in Laurel Manor, the respondents' right to terminate temporary total disability benefits was predicated on the fact that the claimant returned to modified employment within his restrictions. See § 8-42-105(3)(b), C.R.S. 1997. Thus, § 8-42-105(3)(d) is not pertinent. Moreover, extending the logic of Laurel Manor to benefit terminations under § 8-42-105(3)(b) would be contrary to existing case law.

In Padilla v. Digital Equipment Corp., 902 P.2d 414 (Colo.App. 1994) ( Padilla I), the claimant sustained an occupational injury, but was allowed to continue working in a limited duty capacity. However, the claimant was later discharged for falsifying a time card. Applying the law as it existed prior to PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, supra, the Court of Appeals held the claimant was properly denied post-separation temporary total disability benefits because the claimant acted volitionally in causing his discharge.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Padilla I and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ordered the case to be remanded for reconsideration in light of the holding in PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, supra. The Court of Appeals then remanded the matter to us for further findings because no determination had been made "as to whether claimant's work-related injury contributed in part to his post-termination wage loss." Padilla v. Digital Equipment Corp., 908 P.2d 1185 (Colo.App. 1995) ( Padilla II).

We infer from the holding in Padilla II that PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, applies in cases where respondents are entitled to terminate temporary total disability benefits under § 8-42-105(3)(b). Thus, claimants whose benefits are terminated under subsection (3)(b) may reestablish the right to benefits if the post-separation wage loss is to some degree caused by the industrial injury. Conversely, we understand the holding in Laurel Manor to be restricted to those situations where a claimant refuses a written offer of modified work. Laurel Manor suggests nothing more, and we decline to extend its holding as requested by the respondents.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated November 14, 1997, is affirmed.

INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL

______________________________ David Cain

______________________________ Bill Whitacre

NOTICE

This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C. R. S. 1997.

Copies of this decision were mailed July 15, 1998 to the following parties:

Roberto Gonzales, 11242 Lafayette, Northglenn, CO 80233

Vaughn Excavating Construction, Inc. d/b/a Vaughn Concrete Products, 12650 Tucson St., Henderson, CO 80640

Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Curt Kriksciun, Esq. (Interagency Mail)

Robert P. Koehler, Esq., 681 Grant St., Denver, CO 80203 (For the Claimant)

Jennifer Bisset, Esq., 3464 S. Willow St., Denver, CO 80231 (For the Respondents)

By: _______________________